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ABSTRACT 
The subject of this thesis is the development of all branches of 
the glass manufacturing industry on the rivers Tyne and Wear, including 
the glass works at Hartley on the Northumberland coast and Seaham Harbour on 
the Durham coast, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
account of this development is primarily descriptive and is based on 
separate, chronological accounts of each of the three branches of the 
glass industry: flat glass, bottles, and flint glass or table-ware. The 
fortunes of the individual north-east firms are treated in some detail and 
the thesis also establishes a broad chronology of the growth and decline 
of the industry within the region. 
There are two major areas of analysis: firstly, the influence of 
the region's economic structure on the development of its glass industry; 
and secondly, the effect of excise taxation, between 1745 and 1845, on 
the British glass industry as a whole (abrief history of the glass excise 
with particular reference to the role played by north-east glass 
manufacturers in shaping its legislation, is included). 
The main conclusion of the study is that the regional context was 
a fundamental influence on the growth and decline of the north-east glass 
industry during this period. During the eighteenth century the glass 
industry was encouraged by the regionts natural resources, its established 
Predominance in the London glass trade, and the presence in the region of 
complementary industrial and commercial activities. As changes in the 
nature of glass manufacturing rendered these favourable regional 
conditions less significant so the north-east industry declinedý and 
its decline can in large part be explained by north-east manufacturers' 
- VIII - 
continued but misplaced confidence in the regionts traditional strengths, 
and their consequent failure to adapt to the changing circumstances 
of the industry. 
- ix - 
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PART 1 1700 - 1850. 
-I- 
CHAPTER ONE: THE NORTH-EAST AS A LOCATION FOR THE GLASS INDUSTRY 
In 1835 the Commissioners of Inquiry into the glass excise described 
the north-east, and Newcastle in particular, as the "principal seat" of 
the glass industry in Great Britain. The excise statistics provided in 
the Commissioners* report leave little doubt that the description was a 
fair one at that time: in 1832 the Northumberland and Durham collections 
amounted to Z310,179 or 41.776 of the total of Z748,097 collected on glass 
in Great Britain; of the 126 glass houses licensed by the Board of Excise 
in 1832,41 were in the north-east. 
I 
Although the north-ýeast was not 
to retain this predominant position, it seems fair to say that it had 
been broadly true of the preceding half century; that from the 1780s to 
the 1830s the north-east was the leading area of glass production in 
Britain. Although the lack of excise statistics for the north-east 
collections alone means that this claim cannot be backed up by compre- 
hensive evidence. 
2 
what evidence that is available, and which will be 
examined in detail in the following chapters, consistently supports it. 
Even when the industry is broken down into its three separate branches 
the north-east's predominance in at least two of these branches is well 
supported by evidence. The most important branch of the industry was the 
manufacture of flat glass (or plate glass, crown glass and broad glass 
which were all types of flat, or window, glass of varying degrees of 
quality) and here the predominance of the north-east even in the earlier 
half of the eighteenth century is in little doubt. As we shall see this 
predominance was a well established one, being, in large partv a heritage 
of Sir Robert Mansellts monopoly which had bestowed many advantages on 
the flat glass industry at Newcastle during the seventeenth century. 
In 1832 north-east glass houses paid 43.876 of the crown glass duty 
collected in England, 35.876 of the broad glass duty, and 25.276 of the 
- 
plate glass-duty. The second branch of the industry, the manufacture of 
glass bottles, had been established in the north-east much later than 
flat glass and had enjoyed nothing Of the advantages inherited from 
Mansell. Nevertheless the industry had flourished, had experienced an 
impressively rapid growth and by 1832 the north-east contributed 63.976 of 
the English bottle duty. The remaining branch of the industryl the 
manufacture of flint glass ortable-ware, was the branch in which the 
north-east's claim to national importance is least justified. In 1832 
north-east flint glass houses contributed only 17.376 of the English flint 
glass duty and this represented a comparatively recent spurt of growth 
in the industry; for the greater part of the eighteenth century only a 
minimal amount offlint glass was produced in Newcastle and was destineds 
almost entirely, for a local market. 
The various developments of the three branches of the glass industry 
will be examined separately in the following chapters for in many respects 
they were quite different types of industrial undertakings, serving 
different markets, demanding different quantities of capital, and subject 
to different pressures. The separate branches did, however, have much in 
common, not least their situation in the north-east and so it is worthwhile 
to begin by looking at the north-east glass industry as a whole and 
exploring the broad question of why this particular industry flourished 
so luxuriously in this particular part of the country throughout the 
eighteenth century-and well into the nineteenth century. What factors 
in the region were so favourable to the glass industry and to what degree 
did the particular local environment encourage'and influence its growth? 
Any answers to these questions must begin by, considering the natural 
resources of the. region and the raw material requirements of the glass 
- 
industry. There can be little doubt that in respect of natural resources 
the north-east was a particularly suitable situation for the glass 
industry. On a direct level the region was able to supply many of the 
industryls raw material needs. On' the indirect level the regionts 
resources gave rise to a particular type of local economy into which 
glass fitted with ease being complementary to a number ofather commercial 
and industrial activities within the region and this in itself was a 
source of considerable benefit to the glass industry. The most important 
natural resource of the region was of course coaloand coal illustrates 
well both the direct and more complex indirect way in which the north- 
eastglass industry profited from its situation. 
Coal was a raw material that the north-east could supply to its 
glass industry in abundance, but the advantage to the glass industry lay 
not merely in the availability of coal but in its cheapness. Glass 
manufacturers within easy reach of collieries enjoyed the considerable 
advantage of using the poor quality small coal which, if not used for 
manufacturing purposes, was merely burnt at the pit head. The advan- 
tage of using small coal wassimply that it was cheap; although the price 
of small coal varied according to individual circumstancesv a reflection 
of the fact that 
A possessed no 
"market price",, it was considerably 
lower than the market price for the better qualityv and saleablej round 
coals. At Sir John Delaval's Hartley bottle works on the Northumberland 
coast, for instance, small coal was supplied to the bottle works at 
5 shillings per chaldron throughout the last half of the eighteenth 
century during which period the price of round coal (at the pit head) 
rose from 12 shillings to 19'shillings: from July to December 1772 the 
if 
bottle works consumed 1., 719 chaldrons of small coal at 5 shillings per 
chaldron and 49 chaldrons of round coal at 15 shillings; from June 1792 
-4- 
to June 1798 the works consumed 5,411 chaldrons of small coal at 
5 shillings and 64 chaldrons of round coal at 18 shillings. 
3 The low 
price of 5 shillings reflected the fact that both the colliery and 
bottle works at Hartley were under the same proprietor. When, in 1813, 
the bottle works was let to an independent firm the price of small 
coals rose to 9 shillings, although not without some argument as to what 
was a fair "market price". Eventually the problem was presented to the 
experienced colliery viewer John Buddle for his opinion: 
Messrs. Harrison who have purchased the bottle houses at Hartley are 
furnished with small coals at 8 shillings per chaldron by Messers 
qobling and Co. who have lately demanded 9 shillings per chaldron 
which Messers H. think is more than they are worth considering the 
quality of the coals .... The proprietors of the bottle houses 
are to be supplied with coal at "a market price". The-question - 
is therefore what is the market price of such coals if a market 
could be obtained for them? 
One interesting possibility about the previous low price of 5 shillings 
per chaldron is that it may have been'fixed according to what the 
bottle works could afford rather than with any reference to the colliery's 
costs. This was certainly the case with the small coal supplied to the 
salt pans at Hartley; in 1781 Delaval was. told by his agent that "the 
present price of salt does not leave more than 3s 6d per chaldron for 
the coals they consume". 
5 
These small coals were identical to those 
supplied to the bottle houses for when small coals were scarce the pans 
were left to go idle and only restarted once there was surplus to the 
bottle workst requirements. 
Evidence from other glass houses confirms that prices for small 
coals,, although always remaining considerably lower than the market 
price for good coal, varied according to circumstance. The colliery 
owner Walter Featherstonhaugh was said (in 1807) to supply his bottle 
houses at Sunderland with coal at 5 shillings per chaldron. 
6 
Stock 
ve 5- 
accounts for the Ouseburn bottle houses in 1780 valued their small coal 
at 9 shillin+r chaldron. 
7 As late as the 1840s the Cooksons' crown 
and plate houses at South Shields were being supplied with coal at 13s 
8 
per chaldron. 
Cheap coal was perhaps the single most importait advantage the 
north-east glass manufactuerers possessed over their rivals in London 
who had to make use of the better quality but considerably more-expensive 
round coal bought at London prices, Although the decline of the glass 
industry in London during the eighteenth century has not been the subject 
of any detailed study it seems certain that high fuel costs were a 
crucial factor in this obvious decline: in the late seventeenth century 
London contained 26 glass houses producing all types of glass, by the 
time of the 1835 commission, only three remained all producing high 
quality flint glass table ware, Theevidence of builders$ price books 
(see fig. 4) shows that throughout the eighteenth century north-east 
flat glass was consistently undercutting the price of London flat glass 
and a similar price difference was true of bottles. Even in the flint 
glass trade where the London houses were, in some degree, able to 
retain the market for quality goods, the market for goods where low 
price was a more significant consumer attraction was lost to those 
areasenjoying low manufacturing costs. An estimate of the cost differ- 
ence was made during the 1830s by the London flint glass manufacturer 
Apsiey Pellatt: 9 
Mr. Pellatt a celebrated metropolitan glass manufacturer informs 
usthat about twelve pounds weight of Newcastle coal is required 
to manufacture one pound of. flint glass; and that when coals sold 
in London at about 38 shillings the chaldron and the glass at 
fourteen pence a pound, the advantage of a manufacturer at the 
Pit mouth might be about three farthings a pound over those of 
the London manufacturer. 
- 
The local glass industry clearly benefited from the availability 
of cheap coalobut the nature of the relationship was complementary in that 
coal also benefited from the consumption of small coals by the glass houses. 
Again Delavalts colliery and bottle works at Hartley provide a good illus- 
tration of this and Delaval himself summed up the relationship when 
he spoke of the "mutual and inseparable profit" betweý-n his colliery and 
his bottle works. 
10 He explained this more clearly in a letter to his 
London coal factor: 
11 
Were it not for my glass works, salt works, copperas works-etc, 
in which I consume annually several thousand chaldrons of my 
small coals, I could not work the seam I furnish the London 
market from and send such large coals as I do without a loss that 
would be insupportable, 
An echo of this is found in a letter written by John Cooksonga bottle 
and flat glass manufacturer, in 1755 intended to give advice to a 
prospective colliery owner: 
12 
If you can have a sufficient quantity of brass lumps no trade 
will yield you so much profit as making copperas. If you cannot 
sell your coals otherwise a bottle house may consume them, 
Small' coal Pas, an ineviFable bý-prc4L4cý of a. coil ierý, eveA ole Qorko'nj 
seams'of better coa4 and it was clearly in the colliery owners$ interest 
to get at least some return, however small, on it. As a memorandum to 
the Commissioners of Excise from the Supervisor of Glass at Bristol in 
1769 notes, small coal was unsaleable for anything other than manufac. - 
turing purposes: 
13 
he roprietors of the coal works aquaint. me that if itoyason t or 
Ue 
glass, copperas and tin manufactories that kind c2 
could not be vended for any other use. 
Glass benefited from this complementary relationship in that many 
colliery owners found it in their interests to invest in glass works. 
Among the many examples of men with interests in both coal and glass 
are Richard Pemberton and Walker Featherstonhaugh of Sunderland, 
-. 7-. 
Matthew White and Richard Ridley who both owned glass works at Newcastle, 
Joseph Liddell, the founder of the South Shore bottle house who owned 
colleries on Gateshead Fell, and Joseph Airey. Many of these men had 
shares in bottle houses rather than any other type of glass houses and 
it does appear that bottles was the most attractive branch of the glass 
industry to the colliery owner. Wýy was this? It is hard to find a clear 
answer but there are three possibilities. Firstly that as bottle glass 
was a dark Coloured, poor quality glass it was not devalued by contam- 
ination from the sulphurous fumes that were present in small coals. 
Secondly, furnaces in bottle houses were kept at higher temperatures 
than in other glass houses and therefore bottle houses may actually have 
consumed greater quantities of small coal than white glass houses. 
Thirdly bottle manufacturing demanded less capital than the manufacture 
of better quality glass and therefore was the most suitable form of 
subsidiary undertaking for a collierycwner, 
A further link between coal and glass existed in matters of trade 
and transports and here again it is clear that both industries benefited 
from the presence of the other; Glass benefited from the extensive 
opportunities for shipping provided by the coal trade, Although during 
the seventeenth century glass had been shipped to London in the holds 
of the collier4 (see Appendix 2) by the eighteenth century glass was 
more frequently shipped to London on its own as a commodity in its own 
right; however the coal trade still provided valuable opportunities for 
shipping small amounts of glassIoLother parts of'the country where 
demand was not so constant. Coal ships benefited in return by being 
able to carry raw materials needed for the glass industry on their 
return journeys to Newcastle; notably white sand from Lynn in Norfolkv 
"8- 
or soapers* ashes from London and Yarmouth. Indeed in times of financial 
pressure these transport arrangements could develop into a convenient 
barter as, for instance, in 1793 when coal sent from Hartley to Yarmouth 
was paid for in part exchang6 by ashes, an arrangement that was initiated 
by Delaval's agents at Hartley: 
14 
We wish to have brown ashes in exchange, an article essential for the glass works, We have fixed-the price at 14 shillings a 
chaldron and ready. -settlement if they send ashes. 
As we shall see the main suppliers of soapers* ashes to the north-east 
glass works were coal merchants. 
What of the other raw material needs of the glass industry? Glass 
at its most simple is silica fused. into crystals by high temperature, 
In practice a flux is added-to ease the fusion and strengthen the glass 
and this usually takes the form of some alkaline ingredient, During 
the eighteenth century. both alkaline and silicaeous ingredients varied 
enormously according to the quality of glass that was required. Both 
affected the final colour and quality of the glass and this was well 
understood at the time. The properties of the most commonly used 
ingredients were set out in a memorandum to the Treasury in 1757 on 
the subject of the differences in the ingredients used at Stourbridge 
and Newcastle for flat glass and bottles: 
15 
NEWCASTLE 
Bottles 
Broad: 
kelp 
brown soapers$ waste 
fresh ashes 
Newcastle river sand 
kelp 
white soapersO waste 
fresh ashes 
Yarmouth sea sand 
STOURBRIDGE 
kelp 
brown soaperst waste 
common sand 
lime 
kelp 
brown soaPers* waste 
common sand 
common sand 
Crown: kelps Lynn sand 
- 
All these materials yield a salt except sand. Some afford not 
only a greater quantity but a whiter and stronger salt than otherst 
consequently when those materials are used or when a greater 
proportion of such materials are used in the mixture the whiter 
will the glass be. Kelp yields the strongest salt considerably 
next the fresh ashes and lastly the white soapers' waste which is 
much preferable to the brown as they (sic) are produced from Barilla 
and pot ash and the brown from ashes which are the produce of our 
own country such as wood ashes. Sand is what gives a body to glass. 
the smaller and whiter it is, the whiter will the glass be. Small white 
sand is used for white glass and any coarse hard sand for bottles and common green glass - such is the sand in the Newcastle river and that which is dug, out, oforocks and banks at Sjourbridge, but Yarmouth sea sand, w ch sfa much better quality was never used for bottles or any other coarse green glass. 
The best quality glass was plate glass which, particularly when 
used forýýthe manufacture of mirrors, had to be as colourless and near 
perfect as possible. The alkaline ingredient most commonly used in plate 
glass was Spanish barilla which yielded a purer and stronger alkali than 
kelp; the ingredients of plate glass listed in a book of 1757 were barillap 
salt petre, Lynn sand and cullet (or broken glass which, when added to 
the batch, eased the fusion of the other materials. ) 
16 
Crown glassv 
although it was occasionally manufactured with barilla, was more commonly 
manufactured with Scottish kelp: in 1815 Samuel Parkes listed the ingre- 
dients of crown glass as Lynn sand, Irish kelp and slaked lime. 
17 
This was a more or less identical list to that contained in the Excise 
memorandum of 1757 as was Parkes' recipe for the poorer quality broad 
glass, namely soapersO waste and coarse sand. Bottles were also manu- 
factured from a poor quality metal (or the fused and molten ingredients) 
made from coarse sand and soapers9 waste., although in 1815 Parkes noted 
that at Newcastle bottles were said to be manufactured with a mixture 
of sea sand and lime wet thoroughly with sea water. Parkes confessed 
that he could not speak decisively on this as he had doubts whether 
lime and sand by themselves would be able to decompose salt and produce 
a suitable fluxv but it is clear from several other contemporary 
references that this method was used by north-east bottle manufacturers. 
18 
. 10 . 
Flint glass was A slightly more complex 
form of glass than the others in 
Ihat the metal included oxide of lead or litharge which imparted lustre 
and refractiveness to the glass, Again a fine quality white sand such 
as Lynn sand was used but the flux was usually American or Russian 
pearl ash plus lead in some form. Small quantities of minerals such 
as manganese or zaffre were also added in order to improve the colour 
of the glass (see P. 294 for an early nineteenth cen . tury recipe fbi 
flint glass). Although 'the ingredients for the various types of glass 
varied, common to all was the basic method of manufacture whereby the 
ingredients were calcined (or fritted) and then fused at a high 
temperature in large clay pots in coal fired furnaces. Broadly speaking 
then, the necessary raw materials for the manufacture of glass during 
the eighteenth century were coal, sand, an alkaline ingredient or flux$ 
lead and other minerals, fireclay for pots and furnace, stone. 
Perhaps the most interesting material to consider, and certainly 
the one which like coal demonstrates to good effect the interconnections 
between the various sections of the north-east economy, is the alkaline 
ingredient or flux. The reciplesgiven above all make use of vegetable 
alkalis such as kelp, barilla or pearl ash but the rising price of all 
three, and in particular kelp, created a considerable incentive for 
glass manufacturers to experiment with alternative forms of alkali 
synthesised from cheaper substances. North-east glass manufacturers 
were clearly encouraged in these experiments by the presence in the 
region of related manufactures which were able to supply cheap raw 
materials to experiment on; manufactures such as salt, alums soap and 
eventually the synthetic alkali industry itself. The relationship 
between these four industries and the glass industryv centering round 
their common interest in alkali, are complex but two clear points 
- 11 - 
specifically concerning glass do emerge. Firstly that the particular 
character of the north-eastts economy encouraged north-east glass 
manufacturers A explore the possibilities of using a synthetic alkali as 
a substitute for kelp. Secondly, that their initial explorations were 
important and perhaps necessary procedents to the early emergence of 
a separate synthetic alkali industry in the region; it has already 
been suggested that the location of the alkali industry in the early 
nineteenth century depended oxVIthe jutaposition of one or more of the- 
soap, glass and textile industries within a region which was largely 
19 
treating kelp as opposed to barilla for its supply of natural soda" 
and the evidence provided here tends to support and amplify this. 
The emergence of a commercial synthetic alkali. industry in the 
region was, of course, the establishment of Losh and Dundonaldts alkali 
works at Bell? t Close in 1791. Although this certainly was a new 
departure in the commercial sense, as the first works devoted to the 
production of alkali for sale to other industries, its novelty in 
the chemical sense must be qualified in view of the practical activities 
of glass manufacturers in the same field for at least thirty years 
previously; Losh and Dundonald's works is arguably better seen not as a new 
departure but as a natural progression in an existing chain of developments. 
Indeed this is to some degree implied by what we know of the Bell's Close 
works; according to R. C. Clapham 
20 
the works was not. based solely on 
Dundonald*s own patent for synthesising alkali from Glauber's salt but 
employed at least six different processes to decompose salt. The fact 
that six different processes were available and were used "according 
to the. price of the materials at the time" suggests that a body of 
knowledge already existed on Tyneside and that there had already been 
some degree of experiment into suitable processes for decomposing salt. 
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For three of the processes listed by R. C. Claphamv decomposing salt 
by alum, copperas and by potashp there is no doubt that previous 
practical experiments had been carried out by glass manufacturers. 
The emergence, of the synthetic alkali industry is a subject of consid- 
erable interest and for this reason it is perhaps worth looking in 
some-detall. at the activities of north-east glass manufacturers in their 
search for a substitute for kelp, for the significance of glass in 
relation to the emerging alkali industry, although certainly acknowledgedl 
has not, perhaps, been fully appreciated. 
The, early activities of north-east glass manufacturers in this 
field produced three patents: in 1764 Evan Deer, a bottle manufacturer 
of South Shields patented amethod of manufacturing glass using alum 
slam; 
21 
in 1766 Thomas Delavall-the founder of the bottle works at Hartley 
patented a "flux for glass"; 
22 in 1780 James King, a partner in the 
Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company patented his "British barilla". 
23 
These three patents, it cannot be emphasised too strongly, do not 
represent disinterested enquiries into the problem of producing synthetic 
alkali in itself but attempts to produce something more specifict namely 
a cheap flux for glass. Despite the common ground between the three 
glass manufacturers and other experimenters into the mineral alkali 
field - men of science such as Alexander Fordyce, James Watt and 
James Keir . and despite the fact that Delaval at least could fairly 
claim to have produced a true mineral alkali, the glass manufacturers 
were not concerned with mineral alkali as such but only with a mineral 
alkali sufficiently pure for making glass. Furthermore the glass manu- 
facturers, whatever their degree of scientific knowledget were entirely 
motivated by commercial considerations and this is underlined by the 
fact that all-three Patents were taken out in periods following a 
disruption of the Scottish kelp trade. 
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Evan Deer9s patent, for instance, was taken out following a sudden 
and dramatic rise in the price of kelp in the early 1760s, a rise that 
is confirmed by letters written by J ohn Cooksonv Deer9s partner in 
bDttle manufacturing and a crown and plate glass manufacturer in his own 
right. In June 1763 Cookson wrote to his agent in London asking him 
if he knew of any correspondants in Carthegena who could supply barilla 
or salsa since the shortage of ýome produced kelp was critical: "I 
never knew kelp so scarce or dear in my life. People are riding along the 
coast and buying up everything theyseell. 
24 His situation was somewhat 
eased when one of his London bottle merchants found him a supplier of 
(probably Irish) kelp. Cookson told him to offer f. 4 a ton for large kelp 
and Z3 10s a ton for small kelp'adding that., in his opinion "the great demand 
for it in making alum has raised it to that pitch". 
25 According to his 
letter book, in 1761 the price of round and small kelp per ton had been 
50 shillings and 40 shillings respectively. 
A similar rise in price was said to have been behind Kingfs patent 
of 1780. According to the agent of Sir John Delaval; 
26 
n account of some Association raising the price 9f kelp coming 
rom the Orkneys several glass owners met to consider some sub- 
stitute for kelp. They at last resolved to make the same flux 
you now make but before much was done in it James King sent to 
London and has got a patent for it. 
The interest of other Tyneside glass makers in a substitute for the 
increasingly expensive kelp is confirmed by a petition sent to Parliament 
in 1780 by Isaac Cookson (John Cookson*s son) and Edward Wilson, glass 
manufacturers of South Shields, against special priviliges being extended 
to Alexander Fordyce allowing him to manufacture mineral alkali using 
salt duty free, According to Cookson and Wilson they too deserved this 
privilege: 
27 
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... many years ago (the petitioners) prepared a mineral alkali 
from sea salt as a substitute for keip and barilla, sufficiently 
pure for making glass .... but on account of the then low price 
of kelp and barilla and His Majesties' high duty on salt, was 
laid aside as impractical; and that on the late great advance 
in price and scarcity of kelp and barilla, the petitioners have 
again made expensive experiments in preparing an alkali from 
common salt, theZ beg for the same exemption and drawback.,. this will 
enable the manufacturers to extend their commerce to foreign 
countries which they cannot at present serve on account of the 
scarcity and exorbitant price of kelp and barilla. ' 
It is perhaps worth noting in passing a slight hostility on the part of the 
two glass manufacturers to the - as they no doubt considered Fordyce to 
be - dilletante in their insistence that glass makers themselves were 
the best people to prepare their own fluxes as they had the best under- 
standing. of what was required(since Fordyce had set up his works in 
South Shields, virtually next door to their own. -their hostility, faced 
as they were with the prospect of him alone being allowed duty free saltj 
. 
is understandable). A similar hostility was expressed but with even 
more force-by James King. the following year in*a letter to Sir John 
Delaval: 28 
I suppose this is a scheme of Fordycets to obtain thereby an 
exclusive privilege to himself, taking it for granted that none 
but he has discovered the secret of decomposing the marine acid 
and rendering it into an alkali. How far he has or has not made 
this discovery I know not but this I know to be a matter of fact, 
_that a material 
has been invented upon this river to flux crown glass, 
-broad glass and bottles and making of alum (sic), for which a patent 
has been granted, and by which good glass and alumIus actually 
been made and at this very instant is making in glass works that 
I am concerned in as a proprietor. 
The commercial impulse behind all three patents is clear. It 
follows from this that the major question to ask about all three is 
whether they were commercially effective and*did they succeed in providing 
a cheap alternative to kelp? The patent about which we have the most 
information is Thomas Delaval's and it is by far the most interesting 
of the, three not least because there is clear evidence that the patent 
had practical issue and the "patent flux" was made use of at Hartley 
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bottle works for over 60 years; a licence to manufacture mineral 
alkali was taken out in 1782 by the then owner of the works, 
Sir John Delaval, andit continued to be manufactured paying the mineral 
alkali duty of 20 shillings per ton until the repeal of the salt duties. 
Unfortunately there is scanf detailed evidence in the Delaval papers 
I on 
the subject of the flux, and in particular exactly what process was 
used to produce it. Delaval's patent spetification was brief and merely 
mentioned boiling and evaporating ashes, copperas, soot, arsenic, animal 
dung and salt water,, "the proportion of each according to the strength". 
until the mixture came to a suitable consistency. Basically it appears 
to have relied on the decomposition of salt by copperas and the flux 
was patented in conjunction with a separate process by which copperas 
was used. for gunpowder; copperas was manufactured at Hartley and was 
therefore a comparatively cheap and easily available raw material. 
29 
What evidence there is does suggest that the original method was not 
rigidly adhered to and the ingredients both of the flux and of the 
bottle metal (or molten glass) varied according to circumstance; in 
1778 during a shortage of ashes, lime was introduced to the metal in 
place of ashes and eventually it was decided to reintroduce a small 
amount of kelp instead of the flux and lessen the amount of lime used 
in order to be "less harmful to the, pots 11 , 
30 The corrosive action of 
the metal containing the flux on the pots was a constant problem at 
the bottle works and in 1790 kelp was once again introduced with 
evident success: 
31 
Since the introduction of kelp in part with the alkali in the making of 
bottles the Pots are found to stand much better and a considerable 
increase in-goods each journey (sic) which affords sufficient encour- 
agement to continue it in use. 
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That the flux ivas indeed commercially effective and emancipated the 
bottle works from the market price of kelp is self-evident from the fact 
that it continued to be made use of. John Delaval had no doubts on this 
point and claimed c. 1780: 
32 
They cannot make their bottles at Shields and Newcastle so cheap 
as at Hartley by 3076 which is in great measure owing to having 
substituted the Patent Flux for kelp, and lime prepared with sea 
water (which Ivas never tried till last year) for ashes. 
The cost effectiveness of the flux did however depend on the price of kelp 
and a calculation made in 1775 revealed that once the extra cost of the pots 
lud been taken into account1he difference between using kelp and using the 
flux was not at that time so great: 
33 
Account of costs, October 14 - November 11,1775 
lst House: To kelp @ 60s per ton 
burnt ashes @ 22s-' 11 
cullet @ 35s ti 
sand @ 3d it 
clay cullet @ 4s It f, s d 
lime @ 7s 58 15 91ý 
Duties on 979 cwt. 3qr. l9lbs. 114 6 
3 54 
-4 pots set @ 50s per pot 10 0 0 
183 2 34ý4 
2nd House: To flux @ 22s per ton 
ashes @ 22s ti 
cullet @ 35s It 
sand @ 3d tt 
clay cullet @ 4s is 48 18 3 
Duties on 941 cwt. 3qrs. 8lbs 109 17 7 
6 pots set @ 50s per pot 15 0 0 
173 15 10 
The rising price of kelp underlined this difference however and by 
1798 the financial advantages of using the flux were sufficiently 
significant to continue its production despite the inconveniences occasioned 
by the new salt act (largely because the new Act prohibited the manufacture 
of mineral alkali and white salt in the same place and up to that date 
the alkali had'been manufactured at Hartley salt pans); Delaval's agent 
was adamant that the manufacture of mineral alkali must continuet 
34 
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We must for the use of the glass houses continue to make the 
alkali at any rate without whichp or kelp, the metal cannot 
be fluxed, and kelp is this year, I believe, from Z5 to Va ton. 
The basis of Evan Deer9s patent of 1764 was alum slam or the 
sediment of silica and iron oxide left in the alum tank after the alum 
solution had been drawn off. In the same way that Delaval used a 
material that was cheap and easily available to him so Deer had easy 
access to a supply of alum slam through his bottle manufacturing partner 
John Cookson who manufactured alum at South Shields at a subsidiary of 
the larger Whitby alum works. Both Deer9s patent and the connection 
between the alum works at Shields and Whitby, were noted by Gabriel Jars on 
his visit to Whitby in 1765: 
35 
The deposit in the tank into which the solution runs from the 
chaldrons and the sediments in the latter are washed with fresh 
water and sold to a glass maker who has discovered the secret of 
making bottles from this material. He has the patent of doing 
this for fourteen years .eo. The alum factory at Shields, 
eight miles from Newcastle, is-a dependant of Whitby. The reason 
for transporting the liquor tD Shields was the rising cost of 
fuel and coal is more available there. 
Both Cookson and Deer also owned salt pans at Shields. Deer's patent is 
not so interesting as-Delaval's in that it did not produce a distinct 
alkaline substance but merely. -as the specification describesl concerned 
the use of alum slam within the manufacture of glass. According to the 
patent specification the slam was pounded in a stone troughl mixed with 
soapers* waste, wet ashes and sea sand then calcined and melted as any 
other bottle metal would be. According to the Attorney General to whom 
Cookson submitted the proposed patent in January 1764 this was scarcely 
a new "invention" and could only be described as "adding a new button to 
36 
an old coat". nevertheless Cookson and Deer thought the method 
worthwhile enoughtD be patented in both England and Scotland. Unfortunately 
evidence on the practical application of Deer. 9s patent has not emerged 
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however there seems little reason to doubt that it was made practical 
use of., John Cookson's letter book contains much evidence of the 
interconnections between his glass and alum interests with alum slam being 
sold to the glass houses and sandiver (or the scum from the glass) sold to 
the alum works in return; kelp was also frequently sold from one works 
to the other. 
Finally, James King9s patent which, like Delaval9s, produced a 
distinct substance which King named "British barilla". Like Delaval's 
process, King9s involved the evaporation of sea water but the catalysts 
in his case were pot ashes, bracken, soapers'-waste and quicklime; the 
whole mixture was evaporated and calcined in a'reverberatorl furnace for 
two nights. King established his "British barilla works" not near the 
crown glass works at Newcastle in which he was a partner, but at Blyth 
-on the Northumberland coast where his partner and mentor Sir Matthew 
White Ridley owned salt pans. Blyth was quite near Hartley which gave 
Delaval's agents an opportunity to observe him and conclude that his 
preparation (and Alexander Fordycets) wassimilar to their own patent 
flux: 37 
King and Ridley had a large pan in a cart went. past here to Blyth. 
Ridley and him is concurred M there. Fordycep the late banker 
has taken a place called the ten pan room at South Shields where 
all told he is making something nearly like it for he has ordered 
pans at Skinnerburn foundry nearly like them used at your works. 
We have Kinggs own word that his British barilla was actually used to 
manufacture flat glass and bottles but unfortunately, there are no further 
details about it or its practical use. In 1781 King and Ridley discussed 
the possibility of moving the works from Blyth to Howdon Panns on the 
river Tyne (to land owned by Edward Anderson who also-owned the salt 
pans at Howdon) but this does. not appcELr to have hLppened. 
38 
Lack of 
any further evidence about, the barilla works makes it highly probable 
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that it did not survive King*s spectacular bankruptcy in 1786 
(see pp. 69-70) and by the early nineteenth century the Newcastle Broad 
and Crown Glass Company were certainly conti nuing to use kelp as their 
major soucce of alkali. It is unfortunate that no further details about 
King9s patent have emerged for at least saperficially it appears to be 
similar to the method patented in 1795 by Dundonald which decomposed 
Glauberts salt by means of pot ashes, and indeed in that patent 
Dundonald described the method whereby common salt was decomposed by 
pearl ashes as "well known". 
39 
Despite the differences in their methods and raw materialso the 
three patents had one raw material in common, - soaperst ashes or the 
earthy ratter rich in salts left as sediment after the lye had been 
drawn off. The availability of soapers* ashes on the Tyne was of crucial 
importance and here., as mentioned previously, the fact that returning 
coal ships had need of a bulk cargo as ballast was immensely useful. 
The soapers' ashes used at the Hartley bottle works came from two 
sources; from Yarmouth through the agency of the boat builders and ship 
ownerso Messers Hurry; and from London from where asheswere sent down 
either in the returning bottle sloops by Benjamin Harrison, Delaval's bottle 
agent, or by coal merchants such as Joseph and Sarah Shakespeare who sent 
ashes in the returning colliers. Of these two sources Yarmouth was the 
most important in that by the late 1770s the Hurrys had contracted to 
supply Delaval with ashes on a yearly basis. The price of ashes varied 
according to availability and the expense of collecting them but 
throughout the 1770s the price remained around 7s 6d per ton. Inevitably$ 
as the practical use of the ashes became more well known so demand affected 
both supply and price and in March 1778 the Hartley works wats faced with 
a'shortage--and an increase in price as Delaval's agent informed him: 
40 
- 20 - 
Mess. Hurry acquaint me that they have by my desire gone all over 
the countr+here soap is made to endeavour to purchase their 
ashes and that they had succeeded at one place thirty miles from 
Yarmouth .... but they have been obliged to remove them when 
made which makes about 15 pence a ton advanced price more than 
they buy them for in Yarmouth for your works and for which they 
are in contract; and have wrote to them this day that we will 
give the additional 15 pence for bringing them to the port ... 
Mrs. Shakespeare writes me that besides the great demand from 
Scotland there is a saltpetre works at Chelsea that are (enhancing? ) 
them for that work which has occasioned a rise in price. With the 
manufacturers of soap she promises to get all she can at the 
7 shillings per ton and when she can buy them cheaper she will 
charge accordingly. 
In May 1779 the shortage was still critical and Delavalvas informed 
of another rise in price: 
41 
Mess. Hurry write me that the Newcastle glass proprietors are 
again offering the soapers their own prices to let them have 
their ashes but that they will prefer the Hurrys for another 
year on an advance of I shilling per ton which I think we must 
comply with for the quality of their ashes. 
By July the following year however, the shortage was over: 
42 
We now have a very great stock of soaperst ashes upon hand. 
Mrs. Shakespeare sent us several cargoes the best brown (wood) 
ashes that the workmen ever saw. I have wrote to her and Lynn 
to stop sending more at present. We have 1,400ýons on hand and 
a few coming by the bottle sloops, also from Yarmouth as we 
contract for them by the year with the Hurrys. We have more brown 
ashes than blue which is a great advantage. 
From the evidence of his letter book John Cookson was also supplied 
with ashes from London and East Anglia and an interesting confirmation 
that the value of soaperst ashes consisted of their high salt content 
can be found in a letter of March 1768 to a supplier of ashes, 
Caleb Webster (perhaps of Norwich), in which Cookson complained that 
the ashes in the most recent consignment did not appear to contain 
as much salt as those formerly sent. 
43 
It has often been pointed out that the particular vlue of 
soapers9ashes lay in the fact that they provided duty free salt. 
Although this is certainly a reasonable conclusion for the period 
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until 1782, it must be qualified-for the period following the salt 
act of 1782, at least for glass manufacturers, to whom the act 
allowed the privilege of using salt duty free for the purposes of 
j 
manufacturing a mineral alkali or a flux for glass. That the effect 
of the salt duties on glass manufacturers was indeed minimal from 1782 
onwards is clearly-illustrated by the Delaval papers. Certainly after 
1782 Delaval found himself able to use salt for his flux duty free on 
payment of a mineral alkali duty of 20 shillings per ton and although 
there is no clear evidence on this point it seems possible that previous 
to 1782 Delaval had been avoiding the salt duty altogether by reason of 
using sea water rather than manufactured salt; this possibility is to 
some degree supported by the value of 22 shillings per ton put on the 
flux in 1775 (see p. 16), and also by the fact that the passing of the 
1782 act apparently caused an increase rather than a decrease in the 
salt officers' authority over the production of the flux, 
44 
On Monday last the collector of the salt duties informed us there 
was a duty of 10d a bushel on salt and that there wCtS also a duty 
of U e. ton on all fluxes or any kind of chemical preparations Made 
from sea water, salt wells or rock salt used as kelp or barilla 
substitutes in the making of glass. He also said the place where the 
aame is made and also the place where laid or deposited must be 
entered to enable the officers to survey and inspect the same in 
such a manner as they do the salt pans; that the penalties are 
Z500 and licenses are to be taken out by the proprietors at the 
Commissioners* Office for the salt duties, We have at present and 
until we have your directions for the same shut up the flux house 
as there is a good stock on hand. 
The salt act of 1786 which is often misinterpreted as removing the mineral 
alkali duty altogether in fact made an exception for glass makers provided 
they confined themselves to manufacturing a flux for their own use at 
their own works. 
45 
Indeed oneof Delavalts agents considered that the 
act,, if anything, benefited him by prohibiting the use of foul salt for 
any other purposes. 46 
I am much inclined to think that the abuses complained of in the 
said act will rather forward than hinder-your Lordships obtaining 
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leave to use the said foul salt, as tI he reason assigned for the 
said act was that foul saltt which was sent a great way into the 
country under pretence of manuring land was refined and used as 
good salt. Now as your Lordship can have all the use of that 
foul salt when applied as flux for glass (done in the presence of 
the salt officers) the danger to Government of it being substituted 
for good salt is totally (removed? ) and further, as the benefit 
to the Governmentý of having so much duty added to the revenue by 
your LordshL p. being the first founder of this flux for glass, I 
think your Lordship is entitled to the above and every other indul- 
gence of the kind. 
The 1798 salt act restated the unique privilages. granted to glass 
makers with two additional encouragements: firstly that the Z5 mineral 
alkali licence was no longer necessary, and secondly that glass makers 
were permitted to take salt directly from the warehouses in order to 
make their fluxes. This act could be said to have marked the firm 
beginning of a separate alkali industry by extending identical provisions 
to the newly established works at Walker owned by Losh and Dundonaldt 
but it is not often appreciated that the privileges granted to Losh and 
Dundonald in 1798 had been enjoyed by all glassFmanufacturers since 
1782 and exclusively since 1786. How many glass manufacturers availed 
themselves 'of the opportunity to use duty free salt for the production 
of mineral alkali is not certain but judging from Samuel Parkes* comments 
47 in 1815 many did not, valuable though the concession was: 
Before we proceed further on our subject I wish to inform my 
readers that for the production of the soda the glass manufacturer 
is allowed common salt free of duty; which is a circumstance of 
considerable importance, especially as I have reason to believe 
that there are several glass makers in the Kingdom who are not 
aware of their privilege in this respect. Every manufacturer of 
glass is entitled to this allowance whatever the species of glass 
may be which he is in the practice of manufacturing .... It 
appears to me that every glass maker should prepare his own alkali 
because he has the exclusive advantage of a draw back of the whole 
of the duty on the salt employed, amounting to 930 per ton and he 
will then have a more suitable alkali for his business; and con- 
sidering the soda will saturate more silex than potash the saving 
will be at least 30 or 4076 on the alkali consumed (the maker of 
mineral alkali for glass will have a duty of 20 shillings per ton 
to pay on the whole of the soda produced but as he has the liberty 
of finishing his process before the duty becomes chargeable he may 
continue to pay only upon the pure alkali, which will amount to a 
very trifling impost). 
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Parkes included in this section a detailed description of the method 
of decomposing salt solution with potashes in order to produce carbonate 
of soda. This must have been reasonabl y well known amongst glass 
manufactureres since in-1813 an Act of Parliament was passed permitting 
glass manufacturers to dispose of the muriate of potash disengaged by 
this process to alum manufacturers, on payment of 20 shillings a ton 
duty. 
48 
It was also described by R. C. Clapham as the "chief process" 
used by Losh and Dundonald at Walker and it was also the process used 
at the plate glass house at South Shields until 1832 when "carbonate of 
soda of commerce at half the price was substituted". 
49 
Can one distinguish any precise effects that the early activities 
of glass makers in, their search for a substitute for kelp had on the 
emergence of an alkali industry in the region? Or is it only possible 
to draw the broad conclusion that their activities created a fertile 
climate of experiment out of which the alkali industry naturally 
developed? Unfortunately precise evidence is lacking: there is no 
evidence of any exchange of knowledge between, sayo Delaval and 
Dundonald, nor does there appear to be any detailed chemical evidence 
from which to draw conclusions about the similarities, if any, between 
the various. patented methods. Nevertheless the broad conclusion is 
perhaps sufficient for this argument namely that the glass industry 
enjoyed a complementary relationship with other industrial and commercial 
activities in the region. 
For the period after 1798 howevers more precise conclusions can be drawn 
about the mutually beneficial relationship between glass and the alkali 
industry. The emerging alkali industry clearly benefited from the 
presence of the glass industry in the area, firstly as a customer for 
its products and secondly-as a source of capital and enterprise. 
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Although in theory the fact that glass makers were able to manufacture 
their own alkali reduced the potential market for commercial alkalip 
there is evidence that Dundonald's alkali was made use of by local glass 
makers; the Northumberland Glass Company and R. T. Shortridge & Co. 
(both flint glass manufacturers) advertised in the local papers in 1797 
that they had found Dundonald's pearl ash to answer as well as foreign 
pearl ash for flint glass 
50 
; the plate glass works at South Shields was 
also said to have used Dundonald9s soda in place of barilla. 
51 Perhaps 
a more important benefit to the alkali industry however was the fact 
that some glass manufacturers chose to extend their industrial activities 
by establishing separate alkali works. The best example of a move from 
glass to alkali is Isaac Cookson jr. a partner in the plate and crown 
glass firm of Isaac Cookson & Co. Cooksons certainly made use of the 
privilege of manufacturing sod4at their glass works in South Shields and 
during the late eighteenth century were said'to have used copperas to 
decompose salt. 
52 The firm later used a process passed on to them by 
Losh9s partner, Thomas Doubleday. In 1822 Isaac Cookson jr. and 
William Cuthbert jr. established a completely separate soda works at 
Templetown in South Shields. Although this was established using the 
Le Blanc process the works was not successful until certain improvements 
were introduced by Robert Rough (the manager of Cookson's plate warehoue 
in London), following his visit to a number of French chemical factories. 
In 1828 the works were moved to a larger site and became the Jarrow 
Alkali Company. Both Cookson and Cuthbert remained partners in the 
South Shields glass works which ceased manufacturing its own alkali 
in 1832. 
Another example is Charles Attwood a London glass dealer who 
purchased a crown glass works at Gateshead in 1831. It seems more 
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than likely that Attwood availed himself of the privijýge of manufacturing 
soda at his glass works since in 1817 he patented a method of manufacturing 
crown glass using carbonate of soda instead Of kelp and followed this up with 
a patent in 1819 for a mode of manufacturing mineral and vegetable alkali. 
Attwood9s first patent, as we shall see in more detail in the chapter on 
flat glasswas a considerable advance in the glass chemistry of the 
time since crown glass, unlike the pure soda plate glassp was not nat- 
urally suited to the use of puresoda. Although Attwood's method retained a 
certain part of the kelp, the earthyinsoluble residue, he laid the found- 
ations for further developments which finally succeeded in doing away 
with kelp altogether. According to R. W. Swinburne Cooksons played a 
major part in these later developments: 
53 
The analytical examination of this -insoluble portion of kelp was 
undertaken in 1829 by the employes (sic) of a large crown glass 
manufacturer of South Shields, ' with the assistance of the late 
eminent Dr. Turner of the London University, and after a long 
series of experiments, most seriously impeded by the excise duty 
and regulations, it was discovered thatlelp in any form might 
be safely abandoned, and that better results with a great saving 
could be obtained by the use of limeznd carbonate of soda than 
by kelp or any of its expensive preparations. 
Attwood, like Cookson2 eventually established his own separate alkali 
works at Friar*s Goose near Gatesheadý and took out a further patent 
concerning the manufacture of soda in 1833.. 
Partly as a consequence of Attwood*s patent, other crown glass 
manufacturers were not able to follow his lead until c. 1830 when 
the use of carbonate of sodaand later sulphate of soda in the manufac- 
ture of glass of all types became widespread. Many larger glass 
manufacturers established their own alkali works, for instance 
R. L. Chance & Co. of Birmingham did so in 1834, but it is quite inter- 
esting to note that for a small period around 1830 Isaac Cookson and 
William Cuthbert, as the Jarrow Alkali Company, were supplying soda 
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to many of their glass making rivals. 
54 
A particularly large customer 
was R. L. Chance who first purchased a parcel of soda in April 1828 and 
by the end of the year had purchased sodaworth U. 215. He continued to be 
one of the Jarrow Alkali Company9s best customers purchasing Z1,850 
worth in 1829, U. 528 in 1830, and U. 548 in 1831. Other crown glass 
manufacturers to purchase soda from the Jarrow Alkali Company were 
William Richardson & Co, in 1827, the South Tyne Glass Company and 
the Edinburgh and Leith Glass Co. in 1828, Lucas Coathupe & Co. of 
Bristol and the Sunderland Glass Company in 1831. None of these 
firms made large or regular purchases but the benefit to the local 
glass works of having a convenient source of alkali inthe region must 
have increased as the use of soda in glass became more common place. 
What of the other raw materials needs of the glass industry, 
namely pot clay, furnace stone and mineral, ý? The north-east was fort- 
unate in possessing extensive deposits of a wet sandstone suitable for 
lining furances with; furnaces usually had to be rebuilt every eight 
months. The north-east furnace stone appears to have been particularly 
well suited bo its purpose. In 1663 Christopher Merrett, in his 
annotated translation of Veri*s "Art of Glass" had noted that the best 
furnace stone in England was to be obtained in Durham, 
55 
and according 
to Andrew Ure writing in 1839: 
56 
The best stone for building furnaces is fire stone from Cox Green 
in the neighbourhood of Newcastle. Its quality is a close grit 
and it contains a greater quantity- of talc than the common fire 
stone which seems to be the chief reason of it's resisting the 
fire better. 
During the 1840s the Cox Green quarry was owned by Walker Featherstonhaugh, 
the ownercf, the Deptford bottle works at Sunderland and some confirmation 
of the quality of the Cox Green Stone is found in the fact that he 
supplied firestone to glass manufacturers in Lancashire. 
57 
By the 
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1870s the Cox Green quarry plus a quarry of similarly good stone at 
Penshaw were owned by Horn & Scott of the Ayres Quay Bottle Company. 
During the eighteenth century most of the furnace stones for Delaval's 
Hartley Bottle Works came from the neighbouring Burradoa quarry but 
in 1790 his agents were fortunate enough to find a suitable seam at 
Hartley itself: 58 
We have great hopes of meeting with a fire stone in the New 
Harbour Close for glass house furnaces. Many stones have been 
used for the teaze holes and stand very well; a working hole 
has been put in the last furnace a few days ago of this stone 
and looks very well indeed. More stones shall be put in the 
next furnace as a further trial (if this answers) before a whole 
furnace is built with it but there is little doubt of its 
answering I believe, and if so there will be a considerable saving 
in expense for the bearing of the stone is trifling and all 
working stones will be used about the place for one thing or 
other .... I expect the Quarrymen will win a furnace cheaper 
here than was done at Burroden on account of the situation. 
The Burradon quarry was owned by the Cookson family during the early 
nineteenth century. 
The north-east was also able to provide deposits of pot clay but 
although some us e was made of Northumberland clay most north-east glass 
manufacturers chose to make use of Stourbridge clay, despite the extra 
expense of shipping it to the north-east. Stourbridge fire clay was 
exceptionally fine grained and well able to withstand the heat of the 
furnace. This was a crucial factor in the success of the whole manu- 
facturing operation; as John Cookson put it "no neglect is so fatal as 
a neglect in the pots". 
59 
A seam of clay at Thirston in Northumberland 
was worked for a while during the eighteenth century but fell into 
disuse in theI770s on account of the competition from the Stourbridge 
clay which was said to be "brought by sea for a trifle as ballast for 
ships". 
60 
Clay from Rivergreen near Morpeth was also made trial of 
at the St. Lawrence Bottle works in 1778 and 1781 but was only found to 
answer if mixed with equal quantities of Stourbridge clay. 
61 
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Despite the claim that Stourbridge clay was brought to the north-east 
for a trifle, evidence suggests that the cost was quiteligh. During 
the 1760s for instance the price of Stourbridge clay at Bristol was 
35 shilings a ton and the freight from Bristol could be as high as 
16 shillings depending on the quantity shipped. 
62 Evidence also suggests 
that although it was frequently transported as ballast in the holds of 
timber ships returning to the north-east, it was a co mmodity of sufficient 
value to merit being shipped in its own right. John Cookson combined his 
need for clay with his trade in window glass to Dublin from where the 
ships would return to the north-east via Bristol picking up a cargo of 
clay; on one occasion he wrote to his correspondent in Dublin that he would 
be "obliged" to send another consignment of glass soon as he was quite 
out of Stourbridge clay. 
63 The Bristol sea route was also used by 
Delaval. until the opening of the Worcester and Staffordshire canal in 
vir4 fýe 7ýe^ý as%d Mersel CwNa( 
1773 made an alternative route availableý. In 1773 Delaval was approached 
by two Gainsborough merchantso Joseph and Aaron Smith, offering to deliver 
clay at Gainsborough for 44 shillings a ton; even allowing for the 
freight from Gainsborough this compared favourably with the cost from 
Bristol. In 1776 the Smiths, in an effort "to encourage the conveyance 
of clay this way". offered an even more favourable price of 44 shillings a 
ton delivered at Hartley. By 1800 the value of Stourbridge clay had 
risen to 86 shillings a ton but the north-east manufacturers continued 
to be supplied from Stourbridge and in particular by the firm of Hill 
and Waldren (who were also glass manufacturers besides clay merchants 
at Stourbridge). Mr. Waldron made a yearly journey to the north-east 
in order to collect the sums owed to him. 
Minerals were also easily obtainable in the north-east) in partic- 
ular lead for flint glass and it is not surprising-to find some lead merchants 
becoming concerned in flint glass companies: Thomas Aireys for instance, 
was a lead merchant and a partner in the flint'glass company Airey 
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Cookson & Co. John Cookson was also a partner in the company and had 
shares in the company working Fallowfield lead mines near Hexham. 
Fallowfield was also the source of particularly pure crystals of 
witherite, which was used as a flux in plate glass and like 
lead imparted a brilliance to the metal. 
In matters of raw materials, then, the north-east glass industry 
was well served by its situation. Many of the industryts raw materials 
were easily available within the region and the remainder was able to 
be supplied with ease with the help of the regionts other industrial 
and commercial activities. In respect of raw materials the north-east 
was a highly favourable environment for the eighteenth century glass 
industry. There, is one further advantage of the north-east that remains 
to be discussed and that is the region's comparative nearness to the 
lucrative markets for glass along the P-ast,, coast and in particular 
London. The short and cheap sea carriage from the north-east to 
London was a vital factor in the growth of the industry throughout 
the eighteenth century. On theone handothe minimal effect of transport costs 
on total costs protected the north-east manufacturerst price advantage 
over London manufacturers. On the other hand, the comparatively long 
sea journey from other low cost glass manufacturing areas such as 
Stourbridge and Liverpool protected the north-east from further compet- 
ition in the London market. The practical problems faced by the north- 
east manufacturers in the London market - for example the relationship 
between them and London glass merchants, or the competition from other 
provincial areas-will be considered in more detail under the'separate 
branches of the industry. However it is worth emphasising here that 
the north-east manufacturers' predominance in the London market was of 
vital importance in stimulating growth in the north-east industry. 
6 
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As we shall see there can be little doubt that the connections between 
the north-east glass industry and the London glass trade were except- 
ionally close. Many north-east manufacturers considered themselves to 
be manufacturing specifically for the London market much in the 
tradition of Mansell. All of the larger firms enjoyed firm connections 
in the-London glass trade and many owned their own warehouses in the capital 
for retail sale. In return there are several examplesý during the early 
nineteenth century, of London glass dealers purchasing shares in 
north-east glass houses. 
_ 
This chapter has attempted to look in the very broadest of terms 
at the reasons why the north-east proved such a favourable location 
for the glass industrythroughoutthe, eighteenth century and until the 
period 1830 - 1850. The reasons can perhaps be summed up in three 
points. Firstly, the north-east was an area of low manufacturing costs 
thanks largely to the availability of cheap coal and other raw materials. 
Secondly, the growth of the glass industry within the region was en- 
couraged by the particular character of the 'region's economy; glass 
was complementary to other industrial and commercial activities and 
this not only benefited it in matters of raw materials but-made it an 
attractive investment for local capitalists. Thirdly, thanks to the 
easy sea carriage to London, the growth of the industry was greatly 
stimulated by the rising demand for glass in the London market, a demand 
that the north-east was able to exploit to the full. The combination 
of these three points provided the north-east glass industry with 
natural advantages that few other areas, if any, could match. With 
entrepreneurs in the north-east able to exploit these natural 
advantages it is hardly surprising that the local industry should have 
expirienced a steady growth (see Figure 2) and should have reached 
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national predominance by the 1830s. This position was not to be 
maintained and after 1850 the north-east industry experienced a decline 
that, by reason of its speed, was more spectacular than its growth. 
If the growth to 1830 can in part be explained by the regionts 
natural advantages it diould perhaps also be said here that its decline 
can in part be explained by the undermining of these advantages by 
changes in. the glass industry and the glass trade. The development of 
gas fired tank furnaces, for instance, cancelled out the simple 
connection between low manufacturing costs and cheap coal. The improve- 
ment of-inland transport nullified the north-east's advantages of cheap 
sea carriage. to London. The increasingly large capital demands made 
by the glass industry in the last half of the nineteenth century provedp 
in many cases, more than the local private capital market could supply. 
These changes were not only to remove the advantages enjoyed by the 
north-east for so long but were to place, those north-east manufacturers 
unwilling to adapt to them in an increasingly disadvantageous position. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MANUFACICURE OF FLAT GLASS 
I 
It is arguable that during most of this period flat glass manu- 
facture in the north east was a national industry that happened to be 
located in the north-east rather than a purely local industry and there- 
fore that it is more suitably analysed on a national scale. To treat 
the north-east*s flat glass industry narrowly, purely within its local 
context, would certainly be foolish in view of the industryts obvious 
national importance; an importance that is easily seen by even a 
casual look at writings on building and architecture from the seventeenth 
century onwards. An early commentator on building materials was 
Sir Roger. Pratt, Charles 110s commissioner supervising the rebuilding 
of London after the Great Fire, and he wrote in 1660 "the best glass 
that we have here of our own is that of Newcastle". 
1 Nearly two centuries 
later the architect Peter Nicholson wrote "The colour is one of the 
most important considerations in estimating the quality of the glass; 
and on thisaccount chiefly the glass manufactured in the vicinity of 
Newcastle is most esteemed in the market". 
2 
Although the case for approaching the north-east industry from a 
national view point is a sound one, nevertheless there are both- 
difficulties and dangers in such a comprehensive approach. Firstly 
the task demands a knowledge of the development of other glass making 
areas in England, plus a knowledge of ýhe London glass tradev equal 
in detail to that of the development in the north-east. Secondlys by 
analysing. the north-east manufacturers ona, national scale there is a 
risk of treating them as one homogeneous group; of emphasising their 
similarities at the expense of their differences. From the broad 
national view point all north-east manufacturers, could be said to have 
been working under identical conditions with equal advantages of cheap 
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fuel and water transport. Yet this view would not do justice to the 
considerable internal differences between the individual firms. 
*n 
A less ambitious but equally valid approach2 adopts a much closer 
view point and sees the development of the glass industry in the north- 
east as primarily the development of the individual firms that made 
up the industry. The advantage of this approach is that it recognises 
the internal differences between the various firms and the crucial 
influence these differences exerted on the firmst varying rates of 
growth. The growth of the firm is the major theme of this approach and 
in this particular study is a particularly rewarding one since it helps 
to answer many of the questions that emerge from the evidence: whyý for 
instance, did the Cooksonsts firm outstrip its rivals in terms of size? 
Why did only three firms survive the turbulent decade of the 1840s? 
These and similar questions can only be answered by examining the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of each firm such as the size of its 
capital and the abilities of its owners and workmen. - 
An ideal study of the north-east flat glass industry would succeed 
in treating the national and local contexts of the industry in equal 
detail. However this ideal is a somewhat unrealistic one for the present 
study and it must be said at the beginning that this study approaches 
the subject from the more local view point and treats the subject 
primarily as a study of the individual firms2 their internal organis- 
ation and growth. The national glass trade is not of course ignored 
but the sections concerned with national factors inevitably rely on s 
secondary sources and isolated examples rather than a comprehensive and 
detailed body of evidence. In short, this study does not attempt to 
analyse the development of the flat glass ýndustry in Great Britain 
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10 
even though during most of this period the flat glass industry in 
the north-east constituted the major part of the national industry. 
The natural starting point of this chapter is the foundation of the 
two companies that made up the whole of the eighteenth century industry 
in the north-east and provided the model for others to follow: The 
Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Companyo which wasfounded by a deed of trust 
in 1729, and the company associated with the Cookson family, which was 
founded in 1738 as Cookson & Jeffries. Before turning to these 
companies however it is necessary to say something about the national 
glass trade in the period leading up to. their foundations, in partic- 
i 
ular theperiod following the surrender of Mansell*s patent of monopoly 
in 1642. Certainly in the case of the Newcastle company, its foundation 
was more of a reaction to events of the recent past than an ambitious 
enterprise with an eye to future profits. 
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1. Mansell and the post-monopoly period 
The period of Mansell Os monopoly has been chronicled and analysed 
in admirable detail by Eleanor Godfrey, 
3 
but some of her points need 
to be repeated here in order to bring out the particular situation of 
the north-east houses. Broadly speaking. the monopoly - at least in its 
initial thirty years - was an invaluable encouragement to glass manufact- 
uring in England for it significantly accelerated the transformation of 
a medieval craft into a modern industry. The three most important 
achievements of the monopoly in this respect were; firstly, that it 
led to the separation of capital and labour ingLass manufacturing; 
secondly, it made possible the transition from woodburning furnaces to 
furnaces fired with coal; and thirdly, by increasing production it 
encouraged a wider market for glass than it had hitherto enjoyed. 
These were all importait stimulants to glass manufacturing but there 
was another aspect to the monopoly and one that was-far less of an 
encouragement to the infant industry. Although creating the potential 
for further growthrthe monopoly, by its very nature, proved a severe 
restriction on that growth by minimising competition and discouraging 
the entry of new capital into the industry. This double effect, the 
I 
establishment of an infant industry and the restriction of its further 
growth, can be seen quite distinctly in the flat glass branch of the 
industry where the period saw the establishment of the industry at 
Newcastle and the failure of any other area in England to developfLat 
glass manufacturing on a comparable scale. There was no competition 
and growth was limited to one area alone. 
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The kernel of Manselltsflat glass industry was the three large 
furnaces he erected at Newcastlev all of which were said to be fully 
operational by 1617. These Newcastle furnaces were in effect the old 
Londonfurnaces relocated to an area of low costs, low fuel-costs in 
particular, which enabled them to function economically. They were 
intended specifically to supply the London market which, as might be 
expected, constituted the largest single source of demand for window 
glass. Mansell did not directly prohibit the establishment of furnaces 
in other parts of the country, in fact to a certin degree he encouraged 
it and leased out the privilege of working his patent to glass makers 
in the midlands and north-west of the country-with the intention that 
they should supply window glass to those areas of the country that 
did not enjoy convenient water transport from Newcastle. The rent 
he charged was a remarkably low ; 960 per annum. However whilst not 
directly prohibiting the development of flat glass manufacturing in 
other areas Mansell effectively restricted its growth by dictating the 
market conditions in favour of his Newcastle houses. The semi-independent 
houses were not permitted to sell glass in the lucrative markets of 
London and the east coast towns, nor were they allowed to sell at a 
competitive price for they were to sell their flai glass at 22s 6d per 
case at the furnace door which was the same price that Mansell charged 
in London for Newcastle glass after transport from Newcastle. Thus 
Mansell ensured that the most profitable markets were reserved exclusively 
for his own houses. 
The situation that resulted from'these conditions was a flat 
glass industry heavily centred in Newcastle. In 1624, according to 
Mansell, the total number of flat glass houses in England was nine, 
of which his three at Newcastle were certainly the largest and most 
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capitalised. Mansell claimed to have spent over f. 2,000 at Newcastle 
erecting not just the glass furnaces but store rooms, warehouses2 
dwellings for the workmen and two of the six quays on the Tyne. 
Besides this initial capital expense there was the cost of the 11fourty sayle 
of ship" employed in transporting the glass to the capital and1he cost 
of its distribution there. There is no evidence at all that any of 
the semi-independent houses approached this scale of investment. Nor 
is there any. evidence that the total number of semi-independent furnaces 
had increased by the end of the monopoly. in 1642 which, considering their 
unsatisfactory position of having to supply their own capital, take all 
risks upon themselves and yet operate under Mansellts dictates, is 
hardly surprising. 
Another aspect of the monopoly period should be mentioned here - 
the glass trade in London. Like the pattern of production that was 
established during this period, the pattern of trade that was established 
in London was to influence the subsequent development of the industry. 
The London glass trade centred on the members of the London Glaziers, 
Company whose power to control the practice of. their trade,. Uke that 
of many other trade guilds, had waned during the seventeenth century 
as glazing increasingly came to be practised by other tradesmen such as 
plumbers and house carpenters. By collaborating with Mansell however 
they regained some of their lost authority, not so much by controlling 
the practice of their trade but by controlling the supply of its raw 
material. - the glass itself. The practice established in Mansell's 
day was for the glass to be shipped to London in uncut slabs, distributed 
to some of the wealthier members of the Glaziers'Company who would then 
cut the glass up into usable squares and act as glass merchants for the 
. small glaziers in the city and the surrounding countryside. This 
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practice tended to produce an alteration in their roles; instead of 
being working glaziers, the leading members of the Glazier&9 Company 
became glass merchants or "glass cutters" which is how they were 
most usually described. The importance of the London cutters in 
the London glass trade was to last until the nineteenth century. A 
good description of their function is to be found in Richard Nevets 
The City and Country Purchaser of 1724 in which he clearly describes I 
how the country glazier sends up to the London cutter an exact draft 
of the amount and dimensions of the glass he requires and the cutter 
cuts it out accordingly "so that it shall fit each window though he 
be forty miles remote from it as well as if he were by it". 
4 In some 
respects the cutting of the slabs of glass into squares economically 
was a more skilled job than the actual fixing of the glass into the 
window frames and it was into this one highly skilled aspect of their 
work that the London Glaziers* Company retreated. 
It is still fair to say that the monopoly period was one which 
saw a great encouragement to glass manufacturing in England but from 
the national point of view1his must be qualified by the fact that the 
infant industry that was established was a highly unnatural one with 
the production of glass controlled by a monopoly and its distribution in 
the major market controlled by a guild company. Altogether., the industry 
possessed the potential for further growth and yet this growth was inhibited 
by restUctive market conditions and the discouragements to new capital 
entering the industry. From the point of view of the north-eastg the 
achievements of the period need no such qualifications. Locally it was 
an extremely fruitful period which saw the establishment of the industry 
on an extensive and profitable scale offering employment for'hundreds 
and substantially increasing the trade of Newcastle. - 
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The consequences of the surrender of the patent in 1642 on the 
industry nationally were to a certain extent predictable; the greater 
freedom that followed did indeed encourage new entrants into the I 
industry and accelerate the pace of growth. The effects on the glass 
houses in Newcastle were less predictable for the greater freedom had 
to be balanced against the loss of Mansell*s capital on which the 
local industry had relied completely plus the loss of the north-eastts 
guaranteed predominance in the London market. 
The development of the glass industry in the period that immediately 
followed Mansell's monopoly has not, unfortunatelys been analysed in 
any comparable detail. This is a pity as the period between the ending 
of the monopoly in 1642 and the beginning of excise taxation in 1746 
appears to be a most interesting one and certainly the period which the 
industry, free, on the one hand, from the restrictions of the monopoly 
and on the other from the distortions of the excise, saw its most 
"natural" growth. Certain broad developments are however clearly 
apparent from the available evidence. Firstly, and most importantly, 
the Restoration period saw a rapid increase in the number ofgLass furnaces 
working in England, This increase is best seen by comparing the nine 
furnaces of Mansell*s day with John Houghton's figures of working flat 
glass houses in 1696 
5 
:- 
Crown & 
Plate Glass 
Window Glass 
Window glass 
& bottles 
London district 4 
Woolwhich I 
Chellwood, Somerset 
Bristol district 
Oakengate, Shropshire 
Stourbridge 
Warrington 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
7 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
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From Houghton's table it is clear where the main growth had 
occurred; in the common green window glass (or "broad glass") houses 
of Stourbridge and in the crown glass houses of London. There had 
been some growth at Newcastle but not sufficient to maintain the 
predominance that the area had enjoyed under Mansell. Looking at these 
figures with the Newcastle houses in mind, the question that immediately 
follows is to what degree the growth in the industry in these other 
areas posed a threat to Newcastle; were the newer houses gaining trade 
at the expense of the older ones? In so far as this can be answered 
from the available evidencev it seems likely that the challenge from 
the new areas was not, at this time, a serious nor a damaging one to 
Newcastle. The Restoration period was one of rising standards of living 
and an increased amount of building; in London of course the rebuilding 
of the city following the Great Fire ensured a constant demand for all 
building materials including glass. Given this increasing demand it 
seems fair to assume that no glass house experienced hardship as aresult 
of competition from other areas and certainly there is no record of any 
Newcastle glass house being laid up in this period of increasing 
production. However if competition was not yet sufficiently serious 
to cause alarm, there is no doubt that an element of competitiveness was 
entering the glass trade. A clear suggestion of competition is found 
in a petition to Parliament from the broad glass makers of Newcastle in 
1696 against the war tax on glass and river borne coals in which they 
specifically complain that "several other glass works using no water 
t; 6 borne coals, they will undersell the petitioners This was almost 
certainly a reference to the broad glass makers of Stourbridge who 
posed the greatest potential challenge to Newcastle in the production of 
this particular type of glass. 
i 
- 42 - 
It was almost inevitable that the lapse of Mansell's monopoly 
should herald the resurgence of glass making in Stourbridge. 
7 The 
area possessed natural advantages equal to if not greater than those 
of Newcastle and in particular the presence of exceptionally fine clay 
suitable for manufacturing glass house pots from. So well suited was 
the area to glass making that the original foreign broad glass makers, 
the families of Henzell and Tyzack who had been brought to England in 
the late sixteenth century, settled in the area of their own accord. 
The monopoly had effectively restricted the activities of these 
foreign glass makers except for those who had. been induced by Mansell 
to move from Stourbridge to Newcastle to staff his own glass houses. 
Many Henzells and Tyzacks had remained in Stourbridge and in many cases 
did well in business with the result that when the trade was thrown 
open they were well placed to provide capital for new ventures. One 
broad glass house, belonging to Paul Tyzack, had remained-in production 
throughout the monopoly and thus glass making skills were also still in 
the area. The agreement of 1703 between the broad glass makers of 
Stourbridge and a Bristol merchant house is evidence that at this date the 
broad glass houses were largely owned by Henzells, Tyzacks, and other 
foreign glass making families. In the 1696 petition the Newcastle 
glassmakers, (Peregrine Tyzack, Peregrine Henzell, John Henzell and 
Jacob Henzell) had claimed they were the descendants of those glass makers 
who had first brought the manufacture of broad glass to Englandl but the 
same descent, and possibly a more direct one, could also have been 
claimed by the Stourbridge broad glass makers. 
Despite this common family descent there is no indication of any 
co-operation or indeed sympathy between glassmakers of Newcastle and 
Stourbridge. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Stourbridge 
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glassmakers, in the early years of the eighteenth centurys were making 
a determined effort to sell in the London market, traditionally the 
preserve of their Newcastle cousins. They faced the considerable 
difficulty of the inconvenience and expense of water transport to 
London andpevidently not being able to finance this operation on their 
ownsappear to have followed a policy of offering their glass at the 
furnace door at a price sufficiently low to induce London merchants 
to undertake the transport themselves. To this purpose they advertised 
in the London Gazette on 10th January 1712, saying that the price of 
broad glass in London had long been 26s per case. but that it was now 
available at 22s per case from Stourbridge. Further reductions were 
advertised with glass being offered at 16s a case in 1717. Further 
evidence of an attempt to displace Newcastle's traditional hold on 
the London market is found in an advertisement placed in The Postman 
in October 1709 stating that as the agreement between the Newcastle glass 
makers and the London glass cutters had expired, tenders for the supply 
of broad glass to London were invited; to which the Newcastle glass 
makers replied: 
8 
Trgas an advertis ment taiwput ifletUassm 
er anAn8lass ters tPa ecause the contract e een t 
PostKansins' tingcut 
a 
was expired, the Glaziers could not be furnished with Newcastle 
glass as heretofore, which insinuation is altogether groundless for that the said glassmakers are as capable as ever to serve the Glaziers either from Newcastle or from their warehouses at London$ 
with as good a commodity and at as reasonable rates: the design 
of the said advertisement thereof is only the project of some 
men to make confusion in the trade and to draw in (by specious 
pretence) men not knowing the true circumstances of the Glass 
Trade. 
These isolated newspaper advertisements certainly do not add up to 
overwhelming. evidence of a serious attack on Newcastle9s traditional 
hold on the broad glass market in London. They do perhaps serve to 
illustrate that by the early decades. of the eighteenth century Newcastle 
broad glass was not the onlytype of common window glass available and its 
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position in the market less well assured; although there is no doubt 
that because of the convenience of sea transport from Newcastle to 
London,, the. Newcastle men were still able, as the advertisement claimed, 
to provide a good commodity at a reasonable price. 
An invaluable account of tie different types of glass available to 
the London house builder in this period is contained in The City and 
Country Purchaser' by Richard Neve. 
9 
The second edition of 1726 in 
particular-contains an extremely detailed account of the various types 
of glass and a comparison between their various qualities and prices. 
The choice available to the builder was a surprivingly large one: 
Crown glass (of two sorts, Lambeth or Ratcliff), French or Normandy 
glass, German glass (of two sorts, white or green), Dutch glasso Newcastle 
glassp Staffordshire glass, Bristol glass, Looking glass, Jealous glass 
and Woolwich glass. Of these ten types the German, Dutch, Newcastle) 
Staffordshire and Bristol glass were similar "common green" or "broad" 
glasses. There were variations in quality with Newcastle appearing to 
be the worst in respect of blemishes but the price of all was generally 
similar; "of about the same price as Newcastle glass".. From Neveos 
comments on-the English common glass it is particularly clear that 
Newcastle was the type mostccommonly available in London. He has 
little to say on Staffordshire (or Stourbridge) glass: 
'This sort of glass which is made in Staffordshire I could never 
yet learn any certain account of; for Itis a sort of glass but 
but seldom used in these parts of the Kingdom. 
His entry on Bristol glass is equally brief: 
, This is made at the City of Bristol; but by reason they have not 
the conveniancy to send it by sea (as they have from Newcastle by 
coal ships) it is very rare to have any of it in London thot it 
be as cheap and better than Newcastle glass . 
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Presumably the same transport difficulties prevented the Staffordshire 
glass from reaching London. By contrast, Nevets entry on Newcastle 
glass is long and detailed (see appendix 2) and there is no reason to 
doubt his statement that Newcastle glass "is the glass that is most in 
use here in England 11. 
The best quality of glass available was looking glass, or looking 
glass plates which were ground and polished before being sold. This, 
according to Neve, was by far the best quality of glass available with 
the clearest colour but " ttis a dear sort of glass" costing as. much as 
4s per foot. Jealous glass was a type, of plate glass that was moulded 
into patterned squares and used in the lower'lights of sash windows 
"to prevent people9s seeing what is done in the room as they pass by". 
Like looking glass it was relatively expensive, the reason being "the 
looking glass plate makers do not care to make these sort of squares 
but only when their pots are almost out and they are a little at their 
leisure; for they say it wastes glass too much for their profit". In 
between common glass and plate glass both in price and quality were 
French and crown glass. French glass was not particularly to Neve's 
liking; although it was thinner and more transparent than Newcastle glass 
it was also more expensive, "it used to be of a middle price betwixt crown 
and Newcastle glass but some say Otis now. (we have a war with France) 
near as dear as cr own glass". Neve reserved his highest praise for 
English crown glass, particularly that made at Ratcliff which "much 
exceeds French glass in all its qualifications". Both Ratcliff glass, 
which was a light sky blue colour, and Lambeth crownt which was slightly 
darker and greener, were more expensive than Newcastle glass yet Neve 
at least was in no doubt that the colour of crown glass and its 
freedom from blemishes made it the most attractive glass in the market. 
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The establishment of crown glass houses in London appears to have 
posed a far greater threat to the Newcastle broad glass makers than any 
attempt at competition from the broad glass makers of Stourbridge. 
Crown glass was a distinctly different type of glass to broad, manu- 
factured in a different way and using different ingredients which 
produced a distinctly improved-colour and quality, Exactly when crown 
glass was first manufactured in England is not entirely certain but 
Neve dates its firm establishment to June 1691 in which month he testified 
to the qualities of English crown in an advertisement in The London 
Gazette. According to him the first crown glass was made at the Bear 
Garden glass house in Bankside and was introduced by an-English glass- 
maker who had travelled to France to learnihe French method of manufacturing. 
On returning to England "he set up making of ccown glass and therein much 
outdid his teachers as Englishmen usually do". Whatever the details of 
its originý, l introduction aregit is clear that the technique was known 
in the 1690s and rapidly spread'to other glass houses in the London area. 
By the time Neve was writing it was well established in the market, 
particularly the products of Lambeth and Ratcliff (the Baýkside house 
I 
had by this time gone completely over to plate glass). Woolwich was 
another London crown glass. house butt according to Nevev "by reason 
they met with some discouragement in their proceedings-there they have 
laid it down for some time and do not now make it there". ' 
The establishment of crown glass in the market seems to have gone 
hand in hand with the establishment o-k a new andgin architectural termss 
revolutionary type of window - the sash window. Both sash windows and 
crown glass date from the last quarter of the seventeenth century; both 
were taken from continental models and both spread rapidly from the 
II 
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fashionable south-east to become accepted architectural features 
by the 1720s (the events most usually mentioned as the significant 
ones in the introduction of the sash window are its use at Chatsworth 
c. 1676-80 and at Whitehall Palace in 16ý5: glass for sash windows was 
being advertised for sale in the London Gazette in 1686). Before the 
sash window the typical English window had been the casement window 
consisting of small diamonds,, or "quarries", of glass set in lead in the 
frame.. Inevitably such a window washeavy and. thus this method of 
glazing was not-suited to the sash window which demanded lightness. 
To glaze a, sash. window glass was, cut up into larger squares, and fixed 
into the wooden frame with putty rather. than lead. A good account of the 
difference is foundin the description of the glazierts work in Robert 
Campbell2s The London Tradesman of 1747. This also. incidentally suggests 
that the, transformation of the London Glaziers from working glaziers to 
glass merchants was accelerated by the advent. of-the sash window, the 
glazing of. which was evidently a far more straightforward job able to be 
undertaken by someone with, no speciAl glazing skills. 
10 
This branch was more employed, before, the invention Of-sashes than 
now; if our house is sashed he. 'has-only to put in the panes: he cuts 
the glass with a small diamond fixýd in the end of a, pencil and fixes them with putty made ofwhiting-and linseed oil. But'as to 
the garrett windows we must have-iron frames made by thesmith into 
which thýe. glazier puts the glass with. lead; lead is drawn for their use 
through an engine which prepares it , 
for*, them ready to cut into 
lengths and sodered (sic) together. He-buys the-glass from the glass 
house in chests and his profits arise from the difference between 
the buying and. selling prices. This branch of mechanics requires 
neither great strength'nor much irienuity andis in fact but a poor business. 
Besides producing a lighter window, the use. ot-larger. squares of glass 
produced a faý more aesthetically., pleasing appearance to the building 
when seen-from the, outside, and a less: interruPted,, view of the outside 
from within. The attractions of the sash window were manifold and it 
was rapidly-adopted by ýnglish builders. with the result that the sash 
window of twelve panes or"Ilights" became, the-standard eighteenth century 
English window. 
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Newcastle'glass was not suitable for this--new type of window and it 
was usually crown glass that was cut, up into the larger sash squares 
and Newcastle glass that was cut into the smaller "quarries". This was 
not an absolute distinction and Neve clearly describes Newcastle glass 
being used in large squares; 'however it is not hard to imagine that the 
warps in Newcastle glass would not have fitted it well for sashes. The 
evidence seems to indicate that on the whole the spread of sash windows 
throughout the country was inseparable from. the spread of crown glass 
and it is perhaps worth picking out one illustration of this from the 
north-east itself. 
11 
In 1718 Robert Cotesworth, erected a new house 
for himself near Gateshead. It was fitted out with fashionable sash 
windows and, although locally made. glass was good enough, for the kitchen 
and rear windows, the main facade was glazed with glass sent from London. 
It is worth drawing attention to this-one example as evidence of the 
size of. the challenge posed to Newcastle broad glass by London crown 
It must surely have been seen at the time as distinctly alarming that 
for thelirst time in living memory window glass-was being manufactured 
in London and sent down to Newcastle instead of vice versa. 
The obvious counter to this ne -w and serious challengtwas for the 
Newcastle. broad glass makers to establish the manufacture of crown 
glass in Newcastle. This is just what-they did-do-and we can, date, the 
firm establishment of crown glass manufacturing on'ýthe river to 1729 
when a company was*formedo consisting of all*the broad glass owners on 
the river, specifically for the purpose of1manufacturing, crown glass. 
Befo re looking at the 1729 company it is perhaps worth trying to establish 
exactly when crown glass was. first manufactured on, the, Tyne-for the 1729 
companyýwas merely the legal recognition of events that had, already 
taken place'and it is clear that crown glass had been manufactured on 
the Tyne for some years previously. 
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The first apparent-mention of. locally manufactured crown glass 
is found in 1715, in the order book. of the. Newcastle Company of 
Pl=bers and kaziers when it was, ordered that "no brother of this 
Company shall cut at any time either by, hir6self or by agents any 
crown or broad glass or other glass for the glassmakers of the glass 
12 house in Newcastle". This order was prompted by complaints that the 
glass makers had been employing-their own cutters, who were not members 
of the company. and had been cutting glass for home sale. -The established 
practice was that the glass makers. were permitted to cut glass into 
I 
squares or quarries for export but not for'the home market, which was 
the job of the glaziers. ' These complaints figure frequently in the 
glaziers9 minute books and an especial offender was one William Linton 
who was a member of the company but employed directly by the glassmakers. 
and, for instance, in 1717 was fined "for cutting crown glass for the 
makers of the Western glass houseyery, much to the prejudice of the 
several brothers-of this company". Linton was-fined so frequently that 
he was eventually forced to petition the Common Council complaining of. 
unfair treatment from the glaziers. In 1720 the Council attempted 
to reconcile the. two sides by writing a clear definition of each group's 
sphere of activity into the lease of one of the 'glas .s houses: 
13 
The free. glaziers shall have what glass they have occasion for at 
31s'per case '' or ls'6d more than the like glass is sold for-at London 
and when the free glaziers want any. glass to send for Scotland they 
shall have the'same for Is. less than the'p'r ices above, applying to 
some of the, principal glassmakers and, assuring. them that the glass is 
to be sent to Scotland. And that the glassmakers shall cut no glass 
for land sale. And that these covenants-shall be void if the free 
glaziers zýnd any glass'south of'Tynemouth harbour without consent. 
Despite this, the quarrel continued"unt'il at least 1728 when the Glaziers 
ordered that "no glazier shall work for the glassmakers till such times 
that the difference between-them be made up and signed by all parties"; 
this ordez was with" rawn in 1736. 
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The main importance of, this quarrel'in this context is that'it 
provides evidence that crown glass was being manufactured on the 
Tyne from at. least 1715. This crown glass was almost certainly 
largely experimental and was manufactured in one of. the broad glass 
houses, probably the Western broad. glass house. A more serious start 
to the manufacture can be dated to 1724in which year a new crown 
house was erected. The lease to the land on which-the Western broad 
house was built was held by Jane Tyzack, Nicholas Fenwick and Matthew 
White who in June 1724 petitioned the Common Council for its renewal 
with the plea that a low toll should be charged on "the crown house 
14 intended to be erected thereon". This was the glass house that was 
to be used by the. 1729 company and the deed of trust by which the 
company was established transferred the lease of the crown house from 
the three original lessees to the whole company. 
To date the firm establishment of crown glass manufacture on the 
Tyne to 1724-9 fits in opportunely with the date of 1726 which. we can 
give as the date of the adoption of the sash window in the area. In 
Dedember 1726 the Newcastle Company of House Carpenters petitioned the 
Common Council complaining of obstruction from another body of tradesmen 
15. the Joiners. The point at issue was-who was to 
the eventual judgement was that all windows where 
with lead *i. e. *the old fashioned casement window,, 
the, house-carpente. rs but sash windows of wood whe 
with putty were to be constructed by the joiners. 
fit-sash windows and 
the. glass-was fixed 
were to be made by 
r, e. the glass was fixed 
It seems reasonable 
to assume that the greater availability of-cýpwn-glass, in the area would 
have encouraged house builders to construct-houses-w4h modern sash 
windows. It is-also worth mentioning that,. the Stourbridge glass makers 
appear to have adopted crown glass at about the same time. The earliest 
I 
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mention of crown glass being manufactured.,. at Stourbridge is when it 
was advertised-for sale from Batchelorts glass house in 1728. 
Broadly speaking, the period. following-"Mansellts monopoly seems 
to have been a period of vigorous growth inthe glass-industry and a period 
which saw a significant shift in the flat-glass, market towards a new 
and better q'uality glass. Both these develoments poseda challenge to 
the Newcastle broad glass makers whose houses had been establishedv and 
had flourished, under very different circumstances. The events of the 
post monopoly period created conditions which demanded-a new impetus 
from the Newcastle broad glass makers, This new impetus was expressed 
in the formation, in 1729,. of a company specifically intended to 
organise the manufacture_of crown glass. 
I 
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2.1700 - 1790 
(i) The Newcastle Company of Broad and Crown-Glass Owners 
The 1729'deed establishing a company to manufacture crown glass 
at the newly erected crown glass house was'signed by the thirteen owners 
of the five existing broad glass houses on the Tyne: the-western,. eastern 
and middle broad glass houses, the St. Lawrence house and,, further down 
the river at Wallsend., the Howdon Panns house. 1 The partners and their 
16 
shares in the new crown glass company-were: 
shares 
, Matthew White 
Jane Tyzack 
Jonathan Hall 
Ralph Davison 
Peregrine Henzel 
James Proctor 
Jonathan Tyzack 
Edward Henzell 
Joseph Henzell 
Jane Roddam 
Elizabeth Tyzack 
Rachel Colt 
Peregrine Henzell jr. 
of Newcastle, merchant. 24 
of Newcastle, widow 8' 
of Durham, doctor of divinity 12 
of London, gentleman 15 
of the glass houses, gentleman 8 
of Morpeth,,, gentleman 8 
of the Low glasshouses, gentleman 10 
of Howdon Panns, glassmaker 4 
of Bill House, glassmaker 4 
of Newcastle, widow 11 
of Norwich, widow 10 
of Ouseburn, widow 2 
of the glass. houses, glassmaker 4 - - 1 14 
Two points of interest stem from this deed which, although described 
as a "deed of trust". must be seen as serving the purpose of a deed of 
partnership by reason of the fact that it divided up shares among the 
partners. Firstly it provides a good illustration of the fact that the 
form business organisation took during the eighteenth century was dictated 
more, by local and individual circumstances than by any one ideal type of 
partnership arrangement; the 1729 differed from what might be called more 
typical partnership arrangements and this reflected-the peculiar local' 
circumstances surrounding the enterprise. Secondly, the deed was to 
be crucial to the future development of the company which was profoundly 
influenced by the size of the partnership and the diversity of the 
partners. 
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The 1729. deed differed from more typical eighteenth century 
partnerships in its perhaps surprising lack Of attention. to formal 
detail. No total joint capital was specified, 'no responsibilities 
or liabilities defined and no legally , b[nding commitment to the 
partnership was mentioned for the whole deed had been drawn up after a 
more informal agreement had been reached; "the undersigned are now in 
partnership for the making of crown glass and have for that purpose 
latterly .... made crown glass at their joint costs and charges". 
Legally, the deed bound the signatories to only two things. Firstlyp 
to a joint tenancy of the crown glass house,, ý which although built beside 
the western broad glass house on land. leased from the Corporation by 
Matthew White and Jane Tyzack, had been built at the joint cost of 
the partners. The partners agreed to pay part of the yearly rent to 
the Corporation and thus become tenants in common for the remaining 
years of the lease. The second legal function of the deed was to divide 
up the shares of ownership and "issue and profits" which, as has already 
been mentioned, seems to make the deed into a deed of partnership. No 
evidence of any other deed of partnership between the signatories has 
been found. 
The unusual features of the 1729 deed could be explained as necessary 
precautions to avoid offending against the Bubble Act which limited the 
number of partners in a speculative venture to six. There issDme truth 
in this as the company was not incorporated by Act of Parliament as 
technically such a large partnership should have been. A more immediate 
explanation, however, lies in the local circumstaices of the partners 
and the enterprise in which they were investing. Most importantly 
all the partners were already owners of broad, glass houses and the new 
crown glass company was certainly seen as an extension of'the broad 
glass trade rather than a completely new venture. This perhaps explains 
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the lack of formal detail in the deed since the partners' existing 
interests must have guaranteed their committment to the glass trade; 
and the capital to be advanced may well have consisted of materials, 
equipment, facilities and workmen rather than a_defined sum of money. 
The size of the partnership should not perhaps be taken as an indication 
that the initial capital requirements of the venture were, in cash terms, 
large, rather the opposite, that by including all the owners of the 
existing broad glass houses, the actual capital requirements were sub- 
stantially reduced. Not only could the existing broad glass houses 
provide equipment or facilities, the owners were already-well within 
the network of credit and trust through which the glass trade operafed. 
This closeness between the crown and broad. glass houses on the 
Tyne must be underlined for although the 1729 company was formed 
exclusively for the manufacture of crown glass, and the five broad glass 
houses remained in the hands of smaller partnerships until the nineteenth 
century, I in practice the crown and broad glass owners were identified ass 
and traded under the title of, "The Newcastle Company of Broad and 
Crown Glass Owners". The legal separation of the five broad glass houses 
into five distinct partnerships appears to have meant nothing in practical 
terms for-the owners manufactured and marketed broad glass in common 
and received remittances as one company of broad glass owners. Even 
the profits appear to have been divided out on a common-basis with, for 
instance, Matthew White Ridley receiving ; 9192 for his'-, 16/24'share in 
the western'broad house and F. 96 for his 8/24 share-'in the middle broad 
house in 1779.17 Why the broad glass owners did, not formalise this 
situation into a single company is not known but it may well have been 
a matter of minimising personal risk in matters of repair or rebuilding. 
The intimacy of the connection between the. broad houses and, the crown 
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glass company is made quite clear by the fact that, shares. -in the 
crown company. appear to-correspond to each partnerts share in a 
broad glass house. Thus Matthew White, who owned 16/24 of the western 
broad house and 8/24 of the middle house, received 24 shares of the 
crown company: Jane Tyzack*s eight shares represented her 8/24 of the 
western broad house. 
The second point that arises from the 1729 deed is the size of 
the partnership and the diversity of the individual partnerso both of 
which were to have a profound influence on the companyts future develop- 
ment. The company was a large unincorporated partnership containing an 
extraordinarily diverse cross-section of people of varying degrees of 
wealth and social standing: from a Prebend of Durham Cathedral to the 
widow of a glassworkman at the Ouseburn; from ex- and future. mayors 
of Newcastle to those who were denied even the, freedom of the city by 
reason of their religious persuasion. These people appear to have 
been united less by their common purpose as, by their common good fortune 
in finding themselves part owners of a broad. glass house. Some of the 
partners had deliberately bought their way into, the glass trade but 
others-appear to have become owners more by chance and circumstance. 
This lack of common purpose makes it difficult to place the crown glass 
company into any clearly definable type of busiaess-organisation. It 
was not wholly an undertaking done in the capitalist spirit of "the 
rationalistic pursuit of unlimited profit" yet. neither was it wholly 
a self protective company in the sense of an old guild Company - the 
banding together of people with a common interest in one trade in order 
to protect their livelihoods and to provide security'for them and their 
families. Perhaps the most satisfactory analysis of the crown glass 
company was that it served in both these roles; it was both an organisation 
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for profit. and, a means of prot ection for the glassmakers and their, 
families. These two roles were not mutually exclusive and it seems 
reasonable to asume that at its foundation the partners wished the 
company would both make a profit and provide family security for its 
members. However as the company developed it became less easy to 
accommodate both these aspects of the company*s nature. Before describing 
the way in which the company did or did not develop in the eighteenth 
cEntury it is-worth exploring the nature of each partnerts interest in 
glass to bring out the differences between the aspirations and ambitions 
of the partners. 
Broadly speaking we can divide the 1729 partners into three 
categories: wealthy capitalist mer. chants who had no traditional family 
interest in glass; members of the traditional glass making families 
of Henzell and Tysack who took an active part in the business; and 
sleeping partners including widows and daughters who played no active 
role, or if anything a very limited one. Of these three the most 
significant were the wealthy merchants., Matthew White and Ralph Davison, 
who represented an important injection of outside capital into the 
industry. The departure of Mansell in la2 caused a serious withdrawal 
of capital from the glass houses and it was not. really until the late 
seventeenth century when an alternative capital source was found in 
these wealthy Newcastle merchants that the industry fully recovered. 
Immediately after Mansellts death several attempts had been made to 
finance and organise the industry but none with any great success. In 
1645 the lease to the old glass houses was taken over by a Mr. Edward Harris 
from London in par*tnership with Richard Haynes from Newcastle but their 
18 lease was revoked in 1653 on their failureto pay arrears of rent. 
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They were followed by John Hatterhill, William Pollicot and Robert 
Tainton representing "a company of. citizens and glaziers of London" 
(Tainton and Pollicot were Masters of the London Glaziers* Company 
19 - at the time). Neither were the glaziers successful and in 1662 their lease 
AOUSes 
to the old eastern and middle A was revoked and granted to 
two glassmakers2 
Isaac and Peregrine Henzell. This was followed in 1679 by a lease of 
the western glass house to Henry and William Tyzack and-Daniel Tittory. 
20 
There seems little doubt that the leasing of the glass houses to the 
glass makers rather than London merchants or glaziers marks an attempt 
by Newcastle Corporation to gain some measure of control over the 
production of a useful and valuable commodity; into the 1679 lease was 
written a clause obliging the glass house owners to supply glass to the 
free burgesses and free glaziers of the, town at a certain rate. Jhese 
leases could be said to have marked the beginfling of the interest taken 
in the glass houses by those in power at Newcastle. 
The first appearance of substantial local capital in the industry 
can be dated to 1684 when the lease to the eastern and middle glass 
21 houses were renewed. In addition to two Henzells (the descendents of Isaac 
and Peregrine Henzell) four other lessess were named: Timothy Davison 
of Newcastle, gentleman; John Airey of Gateshead, soap boiler; Peregrine 
Tysack and John Tysack of Newcastle, both gentlemen. From later docu- 
ments it appears that they each took 1/6th of-the property but a few 
days later Davison sold 3/8ths of his share to Jonathan Roddam who, like 
Davison himself, was an affluent Newcastle merchant. The most significant 
of these newcomers was Davison who, as, a goyerner of the Merchant 
Adventurers Company, and a former Mayors was a powerful and wealthy figure 
in Newcastle. Davison soon extended his interest in the'glass industry 
by helping to erect a completely new glass house, the St. 'Lawrence broad 
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glass house. In December 1687 a lease was granted by the Corporation 
to Joseph Tyzacks Peregrine and John Henzell of a parcel of land at 
St. Lawrence shore with liberty to erect a new glas s house. 
22 Davison 
almost certainly had a hand in this for five days later the1hree 
transferred 1/6th of the property to him. The glass house was erected 
but,. according to. a petition to renew the lease, in 1720,, "a misunderstandirg 
happening among the leseesthe glass house fell down some years ago". 
23 
The petitioners of 1720 were Ralph Davison (Timothy's son), Joseph 
and John Henzell and Jonathan Tyzack who wished to renew the lease as 
"the petitioners intend to build a new glass house which will cost them 
above Z300,11 which they accordinglydid. By 1729 Ralph Davision owned 
at least l/6tIz of the middle and eastern glass. houses and 1/4 of the 
St. Lawrence house. 
Three other local merchants were to follow TimothyDavison's example 
and become involved in the glass industry: Jonathan Roddam, who left 
substantial*shares in the middle and eastern glass housestD his widow 
Jane, Matthew White and Nicholas Fenwick who both became shareholders 
in the western glass houýe c. 1700. The most important of these three 
was Matthew White who like Davison was a powerful figure- twice 
Mayor of Newcastle and a governer of the Hogtman's-Company which organ, 
ised the a)al trade on the river. His son, also Matthew White, added 
to the glass house shares inherited from. his father when in 1727 he 
bought Nicholas. Fenwicklsdiare in the western glass house plus "all his 
part share and proportion in the glass house now erected and built and 
24- 
employed at Suddick 11, Suddick, or Southwick, was on the Wear at 
Sunderland and a broad glass house'had certainly been erected there 
25 during the 1690s. It-is interesting to discover this connection 
between Suddick and the owners of the glass houses on The Tyne for 
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it possibly explains why the Suddick glass house, apparently fell into 
disuse in that it is possible that the house was deliberately closed 
down by the Newcastle menin order to concentrate the production of broad 
I 
glass on the Tyne. By 1729 Matthew White owned 16/24ths of the western 
broad house and 8/24ths of the eastern and middle broad house. 
The involvement of men like Davison and White in the glass house 
held out many advantagesfzr the older owners. In order to maintain the 
predominance of Newcastle glass in the London market whoever owned the 
glass houses needed a strong source of working capital to fiAnnce the 
transport of glass to London andihis was best provided by men who were 
already involved in a similar venture, the transport of coal to London. 
Davison and White could also supply raw materials on advantageous terms 
(Matthew Whitess ledger shows that he frequently shipped clay for the 
use of the glass houses) and in addition an association %ith men of power 
and influence proved an advantage in negotiating favourable rents and 
tolls from the Corporation. The rent of the western glass house charged 
to. theý London-glaziers in 1658 had been f, 70 per annum. Foz the Henzells 
it was reduced to 960 but in 1710 when Nicholas Fenwick and Matthew White 
petitioned for its renewal they pleaded that the ; 960 was "burdonsome" 
and it was further reduced to f. 50.. When this lease was renewed in 1724 
they also pleaded for further concessions on thet3lls in order "to enable 
them to manufacture glass at as easy rates as any that have or may attempt 
to set-up any such manufacture without the liberty of the town" which 
were granted. them. ' The Corporation also granted-theman exceptionally 
long lease of thirty one. years but noted that "this shall-not be taken 
as a precedent in granting any lease in the future". 
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What of the other members of the 1729 company, in particular 
the Henzells and Tyzacks? It would not be entirely true to class 
all male members of the families as representing the skilled labour 
the company required since, although those who are described in the 
deed as "glass makers" were certainly actual workers in the glass houses, 
those Henzells and Tyzacks who are described as "gentlemen" almost 
certainly played a less menial role as managing partners and, like 
White and Davison, suppliers of capital. Although his family fortune 
stemmed from glass, by the 1720s Peregrine Henzell. was-an established 
merchant and shýp owner (a one time master of Trinity House) besides being 
"the principal person then remaining of his family and one of the chief 
owners'of the glass. houses". 
26 
His social standing is reflec'ted in the 
fact that his son Thomas, who was to inherit his shares in the glass 
houses, did not go into trade but became an attorney. Less is known 
of Jonathan Tyzack but he also appears to have been a man of some 
wealth whose active role in the glass business was a managerial one. 
By contrast the female Henzell and Tyzacks played no significantly 
active role and all could be said to have represented-the strong family 
bonds that existed in both families. Rachel Colt-(nee Henzell) had 
inherited her shares from her father Peregrine Henzell of St. Lawrence. 
Jane Tyzack was the widow of the Peregrine Tyzack who had held 8/24ths 
of the western glass house. Elizabeth Tyzack'was'the'*widow of another 
Peregrine Tyzack who had held a large share in the-middle and eastern 
glass houses. Bequeathing shares to widows or daughters with no 
other means of support was to become, as we. shall see, a characteristic 
of the company which always contained a substantial proportion of 
sleeping female partners, In this care for the female members of their 
family the behaviour of the Henzells and Tyzacks was not unlike that 
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of the Protestant Dissenfers and it is probably not surprising that 
one branch of the Tyzacks should have become Quakers for there are 
recognisable similarities in the values that both groups were 
encouraged to hold in order to survive. Like the non-conformists the 
foreign glass makers formed a close knit and resiliant group, conscious 
of a degree of separateness from the rest of $ociety. Indeed they may 
to some extent have encouraged this separateness in order to preserve 
the art and mystery of their craft; even as late as 1785 according to 
John Brand,, "they (Henzell and Tyzack glass makers) will admit none 
of any other name to wqr. k: with them". 
27 This was not strictly true 
in 1785 yet marriage bonds show that although marriages were made 
outsidethe two families by far the greatest proportion was between 
Henzell and Tyzack. In addition the Henzells and Tyzacks evidently 
sensed a deep connection between their work and their self-esteem; glass 
making was a matter of family pride and for that reason industry was 
always to be encouraged. 
The Quaker Tyzacks were represented in the 1729 deed by Elizabeth 
Tyzack of Norwich, the widow of Peregrine Ty?: ack who had been one of the 
six lessees of the middle and eastern glass houses in 1684. In addition 
to him two of the other lessees, John Tyzack and John Airey, were also 
Quakers. 
28 
During the 1790s both-John and Peregrine Tyzack left 
Newcastle; John moved to London where he appears to have taken an 
active role in promoting the glass housest interests: 
29 
Newcastle cut glass, good and sizeable, may be had by all 
merchants and others at 13 shillings per hundred foot. Apply 
yourselves to John Tyzacke at the Glass Warehouse near Old Swan 
Stairs. 
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Peregrine Tyzack moved to Norwich where he was unsuccessful in 
business and died in 1717. All the Quaker shares in the glass houses 
at Newcastle appear to have been vested in another prominent Quaker, 
Joshua Middleton, whose name often appears as an owner of the glass 
houses during the early eighteenth century. On Middletonts death the 
shares passed to his sister Elizabeth who had married'Peregrine Tyzack 
of Norwich and who thus became a shareholder in the 1729 company. 
Elizabeth Tyzack, if not playing a significantly active role in the 
company, at least promoted its interest in Norwich: 
30 
At Mrs. Blizabeth Tyzack's at the sign of the six bottles in 
St. Margaret*s Upper St. is a large parcel of glass bottles now 
to be sold, and she intends to carry on the said business and 
will sell them as reasonably-as anyone in Norwich being one 
of the owners of the glass houses in Newcastle. 
Her son Peregrine Tyzack was sent back to Newcastle to be apprenticed 
and eventually act as managing partner in the glass houses. He remained 
a committed Quaker throughout his life and by the time of. his death in 
1777 had become a respected merchant with considerable interests besides 
glass. 
31 
The connections of the two remaining partners Jonathan Hall 
and James Procter are less easily established. Hall, however, is the 
best example amongst the partners of a person who had come to be 
interested in glass by circumstance rather than design. His share in 
the crown glass company represented the major share in the broad glass 
house at Howdon Panns that had been established, probably during the 
1660s, by Timothie Tyzack of Gateshead, a Merchant Adventurer who 
appears to have come into a greater fortune than other members of the 
Tyzack family. On his death in 1684 his estate passed to his widow 
Elizabeth who made a second marriage in 1698 to Anthony Hall of Durham 
- 63 - 
from whom the glasshouse shares passed to his brother Jonathan. The 
Halls were a distinguished Durham family who had provided the city with 
a number of. mayors and aldermen. 
32 
Jonathan had studied at and been 
made a fellow of St. Johnts College Cambridge after which he had become 
chaplin to the Governer of Berwick. In 1723 he returned to Durham to 
be made a Prebend of the cathedral where he remained until his death 
in 1743. By his will his "right title and interest in and to the glass 
house at Howdon Panns in Northumberland and the-other glass-houses 
at Newcastle" 
33 
were left to his nephew Anthony Hall of Wombwell in 
Yorkshire. 
It seems probabl4ý that, like Hall, James Proctorts shares in 
the crown company represented a share in the Howdon Panns glass house 
since his name never appears on any of the Corporation-leases to the 
Newcastle glass houses. Nothing is known about Proctor, he does 
not appear to have taken any active part in the glass trade and appears 
to have sold his shares by the 1760s. The glass house at Howdonv 
although founded by a Tyzacke and worked by the family of Edward Henzellp 
remained more independent than the Newcastle glass houses in that 
it was outside the jurisdiction of the Corporation. Newcastle 
Corporation did make occasional efforts to control the other glass 
houses on the river for instance in 1732 the council ordered tolls to 
be collected from all the glass houses that did not at present pay. 
This order provides a useful list of all the glass houses working on 
the Tyne at that date apart from those at the Ouseburn: 
34 
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Broad glass Howdon Panns ; 915 toil 
South Shields U5 11 
Bottle glass Closegate elo 
Western bottle house flo 
St. Lawrence f, 10 
Bill Quay elo 
South Shields 910 
Flint glass Closegate f, 5 
The order was not successful and was repealed in 1742. Another 
constant complaint about Howdon was that "several quantities of glass 
and materials are unloaded and loaded directly in and out of ships 
and not bought to the New Quay of this town to the detriment of the 
1135 tolls and dues of this corporation . 
Howdon remained a working broad glass house until 1772 when it 
was converted into a short lived plate glass house by Matthew Ridley 
a wealthy merchant connected to the Whites (see Appendix 3a). It is 
not known how Ridley came to have an interest in the glass house but 
it is possible that he had purchased Proctor's shares. The newly 
converted house was advertised as being complete in 1772 and in 
February 1773 Matthew Ridley was able to tell the Parliamentary Commission 
on plate glass tlu t "a manufactory he was concerned in had just begun to 
blow plate glass and had made one plate 6511 x 32". 
36 The whole enter- 
prise came to an abrupt end in June 1773 when some old wood piled against 
the side of the building caught fire and three quarters, of the works 
37 
was destroyed. Although the building was insured with the Royal 
Exchange, -the glass house never appears to have been rebuilt and the 
fire effectively put an end to glass making at Howdon. 
The Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company wasv therefore, a 
business organisation with quite unique characteristics. Particular 
circumstances had produced an unusually large unincorporated partnership 
consisting of a wide variety of partners holding an equally wide variety 
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of aspirations; some . presumably-,, wishing 
for nothing more than a 
comfortable annuity from the company, others being motivated by a more 
ambitious spirit. Did this sprawling company provide an effective means 
of organising and financing the manufacture of flat glass on the Tyne 
during the eighteenth century, or did it prove an unwieldy organisation 
and an obstacle_to progress? Broadly speaking the. answer must be that 
the company was effective in that it was successful in most major 
respects. It was successful in its initial aim of establishing the 
manufacture of crown glass on the river. It was successful in that it 
survived well into the nineteenth century and it also appears to have 
been successful from the point of view of its shareholders most of whom 
appear to have led lives of reasonable comfort and prosperity. 
One major qualification must, however, be made to this broad picture 
of success. The company does not appear to have developed or built on 
its resources to any significant degree during the eighteenth century. The 
size of the company*s productive capacity, for instance, saw no increase 
at all and by 1800 the company's main site at the Ouseburn remained 
virtually unchanged with four broad glass houses and one crown glass 
house. The company's continuing concentration on broad rather than crown 
glass was perhaps the most significant aspect of its lack of development 
for if the trend towards the better quality crown glass was evident 
in 1729 it was'doubly so by the end of the century. It is difficult to 
imagine that a more iýnterprising company would have remained for so 
long in the production of what was, by eighteenth century standards, 
aslightly old fashioned type of glass. 
How is this lack of development to be accounted for? In many 
respects it is surprising as the company possessed many natural 
advantages: the presence of influential and wealthy men, well established 
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glass making skills and existing trade connections. Two reasons 
can perhaps be advanced. Firstlys the size and nature of the partnership 
made the company an ineffective instrument of growth. Secondlyv the company 
was encouraged to keep its interests in broad glass because it enjoyed a 
near monopoly in the London market,, unlike crown glas. s which 
e. pcountered a_greaterdegkpe of'competion-from, London and other north- 
east glass houses. 
The first reason is perhaps the more important. It is easy to 
see that a large. partnerships including a high proportion of sleeping 
partners, discouraged the accumulation of profits for further expansion. 
The partnership saw no tendency to decrease in size; when the 1729 
partnership was renewed in 1767 it consisted of seventeen partners; in 
1780 there. were still seventeen partners, eleven of whom took no active 
part in the glass company. 
38 On the next renewal of the partnership 
in 1812 the number of partners had decreased to thirteen but the 
4 
proportion of shares taken by the sleeping partners had increased with 
the result that the active partners took legal advice on the possiblility 
of excluding those who contributed nothing to the firm's progress: 
39 
The present proprietors are desirous to enter a 
to the exclusion of some others who have become 
representatives of-deceased partners whom the m; 
of and who, residing at great distance from the 
conveniently be consulted or give assistance to 
business. 
new partnership 
such as personal 
ajority know little 
manufactory, cannot 
the-co-partnership 
As we shall see the problem of sleeping partners was to dominate the 
company's development, and indeed prove a considerable obstacle to the 
company's development, during the first quarter of the-nineteenth century. 
Less is known about the effects during the eighteenth century but it 
seems reasonable to assume that they were similar, namely that the 
dispersal of a substantial proportion of the firm's profits to sleeping 
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partners did not encourage the growth of the firm. A high proportion 
of sleeping partners alsos almost certainlyq encouraged an unadventurous 
attitude within the company as a whole; many partners were not in the 
position to risk their incomes from the company by reinvesting in 
further risk bearing ventures. 
Most shares in the company passed from generation to generation by 
inheritance and this process, in these particular familiest seems to 
have resulted. in a consistently high proportion-of female partners: 
shares tended to be left to widows or daughters without any other means 
of support. This tendency was perhaps encouraged by the very size of 
the partnership for whilst there were sufficient male partners at Newcastle 
able to take care of the business, there was no need to leave shares to 
sons who would take a more active role; shares in the glass company appear 
to have been seen as a safe annuity. Female sleeping partners could 
however be the means through which more active partners entered the company; 
thus John-Head., who managed the crown house during the first quarter of 
the nineteenth centuryentered the partnership by his marriage in 1791 to 
Sarah Tyzack who had inherited her four shares. from her father Jonathan and 
her brother John. Indeed the size of the company-could have been said 
to have been an advantage in some respects, for it provided a number of 
opportunities for men with new talents and skills to enter; throughout 
its life the company appears to have been well served from within 
for managers, lawyers, ship owners, insurersaid partners able to advance 
short term credit. 
Three important outsiders, in addition to John Head, entered the 
glass company during the eighteenth century. The first was George Lake 
whose'entrance was one of the few instances'when shares were not left 
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to next of kin but were directed, by the terms of Jane Tyzackls willy 
to be sold by the glass owners at their discretion. 
40 Lake was sold 
her eight shares in 1750 and he entered the partnership on the certain 
understanding that he was to play an active role'in the business as the 
major managing partner. The second outsider was James Kingg a Quaker 
from a glass making familypwho bought his way into the company by 
purchasing shares in the crown glass company and St. Lawrence broad 
glass house from Nicholas Tyzack during the 1760s 
41 Like Lake King played 
an active role until 1785 as. chief clerk and cashier to the company. The 
third outsider-was Alexander Adams., a wealthy India merchant,, who entered 
the company in 1786 by purchasing the eight crown glass shares of, the 
bankrupt James King. He too actively promoted the glass business until 
his death in 1817 although the major managerial role during this period 
was taken by John Head and Henry French. 
Although Lake, King and Adams were all active within the glass 
companygnone succeeded in makingaiy significant changes to the company's 
character; for most of the eighteenth century the company appears to 
have run on its own momentum rather than through any injection of entre- 
preneurial fuel. This is interesting for all three m. en, and King in 
particularg possessed evident entrepreneurial qualities-and might have 
been expected to express their ambition, initiative and drive through 
the company. In theory the company*s lack of development during the 
eighteenth century could be explained by the lack of able entrepreneurs 
within its ranks but the presence of men like King suggests that there 
was some fundamental conservatism within the company itself, and in 
particular in its structure. The point is underlined in King's case by 
the fact that he did embark on new ventures in glass but not through 
the larger companyusing instead quite separate smaller companies. In 
many cases the partners he recruited to these new ventures were, like 
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him, also partners in the larger company, in*particular Sir Matthew 
White Ridley, Matthew Whitel's heir and King's mentors and Joshua Henzell 
the manager of the crown glass house during the 1770s. 
Most of King's venture into new glass works occurred during the 
early 1780s and were almost certainly a consequence of his British Barilla 
patent of 1780 (see Chapter One). There is evidence of his involvement 
in a plate glass company in December 1780 which, although never 
apparently established, was to include King, Henzell, Elizabeth Lake 
(George Lake9s widow), Mary Tyzack and the bank of Surtees and Burdon. 
42 
In 1785 King erected a new flint glass house on the South Shore near 
Gateshead in. partnership with Joshua Henzell and othersý King and 
Ridley also established their British Barilla works at Blyth in 1780. 
As a consequence of these and other ventures (Including'a pottery at the 
Ouseburn, aftint mill at Newburn, a copperas works at St Anthonysq a. 
brewery, and. six cinder ovens on Brandling Quay) King went spectacularly 
bankrupt in 1786 and, although in theory King's smaller glass companies 
were separate from the broad and crown glass company, the baiýkruptcy 
revealed that King had in fact been financing them with creditgIven by 
the local bank of-Surtees and Burdon on the larger company's account. 
The whole bankruptcy episode highlighted amongst other things the ambiguous 
position of an unincorporated partnership and the partnerst liability for 
company debts. 
From 1768 the glass company had regularly borrowed short term 
credit from Surtees and Burdon which facility was allowed them, it was 
later saidg because of the great wealth of some of the individual 
ý3,: ýz partners Initially the agreement was a,, satisfactory one with the 
company being granted a credit amount of Z1,000 on a bond of f. 2,000. 
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James King was the chief clerk and. cashier at the time and it was 
agreed that he should make the necessary withdrawals in the company's 
name. At the end of each year a credit was struck by which time the 
company had usually exceeded by a slight amount the Z1,000. At the 
time of King*s bankruptcy the credit to the bank stood at U. 515. 
which, naturally, thetank assumed would'be discharged by the company 
as usual. However the company refused maintaining that the debt was 
Kingts private one. The reason was that in 1782 King had approached the 
bank asking for a further credit of Z1,000 and claiming the company's 
authority for doing so. Further credit was granted but, as it now 
appeared, the company had not authorised King to ask for extra credit 
and the money he had withdrawn had been used not'on company business 
but to finance his other ventures. The bank was forced to take the 
case to law. Aubone Surtees, who wrote to John Delaval about the matter 
in August 1786, felt that they had been treated very badly by the 
glass company: 
44 
We have at present a Chancery suit depending in consequence 
of our having allowed a man,, both agent and partner, to exceed 
by Z500 the credit lodged by the other partners, men of great 
fortune and consequence, on account of that concern, Itho the 
partners-knew that in exceeding the credit we meant a particular 
liability to them, and 9tho one of the partners had frequently 
seen without disapprobation the limited sum exceeded. 
Kingts bankruptcy appears to have had substantial local repercussions. 
In 1788 all five local banks met to consider. the affair 
45 
which dragged 
on until the early nineteenth century; the commission of bankruptcy 
was renewed in 1802. It is perhaps possibleto speculate that it 
contributed something to the glass company's lack of development both 
by destroying the company's credit worthiness. in the eyes of the local 
banks and by. providing a cautionary tale for other entrepreneurs in 
glass. Sir Matthew White Ridley certainly lost. from the affair, 
according to a comment made in 1786 which noted 
16 
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the great loss that Sir Matthew. White Ridley has suffered 
by James King together with the purchase of Bedlington colliery ... 
makes it believed he is of late made poor by the above failure 
and purchase. 
Although Ridley too was a man who might concievably have made an effort 
to develop and improve the company3, 'he'embarked on no further glass 
ventures and it was not until his son inherited his shares in 1811 that 
the Ridley family resumed a fairly active role in the company's develop- 
ment. The bankruptcy certainly led Surtees and Burdon to be more 
prudent in the future and by 1797 the only industrial concern they 
indulged with credit facilities was Sir-John Delavalts colliery and 
glass works at Hartley (see P. 208 ). 
The second reason for the companyts lack of development during the 
eighteenth century,, and in particular its failure to shift its resources 
from broad to crown glass, was the company9s apparent monopoly on the 
London broad glass trade. Despite its poor quality there 'is no doubt 
that there continued to be a market for broad glass throughout the 
eighteenth century, and that the glassts main attraction was its 
cheapness. Because it was made of poorer quality materials, broad glass 
was naturally cheaper than crown glass but thýdifference was underlined 
with the imposifion of the excise in 1745 which taxed broad glassp 
sheltering under the description of a I'necýssityll rather than a I'luxury"I 
at a lower rate than crown glass. The excise thus encouraged the 
survival of what was really an obsolete type of flat glass well into the 
n; neteenth century. Because of its cheapness (which is well illustrated 
by glaziers price lists, see fig. 4). broad glass was a suitable 
choice for glazing buildings where aesthetic appearance was not 
important: such as gaols, out housess workmen's cottages and warehouses. 
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Traditionally$ broad glass had been supplied to the London 
market by the Newcastle glass makers through the London glaziers and 
glass cutters and this arrangement appears to have continued throughout 
the eilhteenth century with the Newcastle men supplying only the members 
of the glazierscompany in return for the glaziers' commitmenb to deal 
only in Newcastle glass. 
47 This relationship was a relic of the Mansell era 
yet there were evidently advantages for both sides in, its continued 
existence. It was in the interests of both the Newcastle broad glass 
makers and the London glass cutters to maintain the established channel 
of trade and minimise competition from new interests. As--we shall see a 
far greater degree of competition existed in the crown glass market 
despite the efforts of the London glaziers. 
That the Newcastle glass makers still found it profitable to 
supply broad glass to the London market is easily measured by their 
aggresive iesponse when new competition did appear. The traditional 
competition in broad glass had come from the Stourbridge glass makers 
but transport costs appear to have continued to provide the Newcastle 
men with an effective protection against Stourbridge for the greater 
part of the eighteenth century. - A more serious challenge came from 
other glass houses in the north-east. Three other north-east glass 
houses appear to have manufactured broad glass during the eighteenth 
century: the broad glass house established by the Dagnias at South 
Shields in 1710; Thomas Delaval*s bottle houses at Hartley, established 
in 1762 which originally manufactured broad glass in addition to bottles; 
and the broad glass house at Ayres Quay near Sunderland which had been 
established in the late seventeenth century. Whilst: these houses 
manufactured broad glass on a small scale for a local or an export 
market they did not constitute a threat to the Newcastle men but when 
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they ventured into more ambitious areas they provoked some measure 
of retaliation. For instance in 1776 the Ayres Quay house came into 
the possession of William Russell, an able and ambitious man who was 
eventually to realise a large fortune from Wallsend Collieryt whose 
activities forced the Newcastle broad glassmakers to take action against 
48 him. In 1780 Joshua Henzell wrote to Sir Matthew White Ridley: 
Our company*s plan to fall the price of common-glass has succeeded. 
Mr. Russell of Sunderland came and desired the company to raise the 
glass to its former selling price, he also offered to sell the 
Gompany all the glass he made or to let them his glass works but 
all were refused. 
Similar action had been taken nearly twenty -years previously against 
Thomas Delaval mcording to the scant evidence provided in some of 
John Cookson's letters. In 1763 Cookson's London partner, James Dixon, 
wrote to him in alarm about"the Newcastle Company's breach of their 
agreement tt49 which appears to have consisted of underc 
. 
utting the trade 
price. Cookson, who as we shall see only manufactured broad glass in a 
casual way9 was not unduly alarmed but did seek a meeting with the 
Newcastle men and in March 1764 was able to send Dixon "the proposals 
of the Broad Glass Company, it relates entirely to the London trade so 
you will be the best judge ... as to the fitness or unfitness of it". 
Whatever these proposals were (they wgre not copied into the letter 
book but were almost certainly a price agreement) it is clear that 
Delaval had been forced out of the broad glass trade. As a bottle 
manufacturer. he and his brother John also came into competition with 
the Newcastle men but were more successful in withstanding efforts to 
dislodge them. In 1780 Joshua Henzell wrote to Ridley regretting the 
fact that they had not been equally forceful-in the bottle trade: 50'. 
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Had the bottle glass owners on the river followed the Broad 
Glass Company's plans, Sir John Delaval's bottle trade would 
this day be in a similar situation with his late broad glass. 
The one manufacturer who was tolerated by the Newcastle broad glass 
makers was John Cookson who took over the Dagnias' broad glass house in 
1756. This was partly because John Cookson was already well established 
in the London market as a crown glass manufacturer; it was also because 
John Cookson does not appear to have manufactured common broad glass 
regularly or in large quantities. In 1762 his London partner Dixon 
specifically asked for some broad glass to be sent and Cookson replied 
that he had not made a bit of broad glass that year but would try to 
supply some. 
51 
In 1767 Dixon ordered some more and Cookson told him 
that he would be supplied on the same footing-as the London cutters were 
supplied from Newcastle which was at 40 shillings per case. 
52 From his 
letters Cookson also appears to have supplied other merchants in other 
parts of the country and Ireland with broad glass but only when it 
was ordered. 
From the evidence that is available it appears that1he Newcastle 
broad glass makers did succeed in maintaining their traditional predom- 
inanc e in the London broad glass market and this almost certainly was 
one reason why the company as a whole did not develop into a crown glass 
company at an earlier date. As we shall see it was not until the 
second-decade of the nineteenth century that the-companyls broad glass 
houses were given over wholly to crown. glass. Although it seems fair to 
see this as a failure to develop the companyts potential it should not 
be forgotten that this failure was merely one qualification to a picture 
of broad success. The Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass, Company was 
successful in preserving the, status quo,, which favoured the north-easto 
in the London, glass market. 
, 
By linking together the various broad 
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glass houses on the Tyne it created a stronger force in the trade, 
further fortified by the addition of the manufacture of crown glass. 
On the wholethe company was a successful way of. organising and financing 
the manufactureof flat glass on the Tyne during the eighteenth century 
but with the advent of more volatile market conditionsin the early 
nineteenth century, its disadvantages became more apparent and, as 
we shall see, the company then found itself severly handicapped by 
its peculiarly large and, in many respects, outdated partnership 
stzucture. 
(ii) Cookson and Jeffries 
The crown glass company associated with the Cookson family was a 
more recognisable type of eighteenth century business organisation, 
namely a family firm whose partners and capital were drawn from a close 
circle of relatives and business associates. Control remained firmly 
in the hands of the Cookson family and the company was consolidated and 
extended by successive generations of the family with marked success. 
In terms of industrial growth the success of the Cookson firm was an 
almost unqualified one: not only did the original company experience 
a steady growth but the Cooksons extended their interests in glass to 
other partnership ventures manufacturing several different types of 
glass. Such a successful and impressive record provides an interesting 
contrast to the Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company, and one which 
suggests that the-smaller family firm was a far more manageable unit 
and better suited to growth than the larger partnership. Cookson and 
Jeffries carried no sleeping-partners and although the number of partners 
occasionally rose as high as six the largest proportion of. shares, and 
hence the largest share of the profitss always remained in the hands 
of the Cooksons. There seems little doubt thaithe company's development 
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was financed in large part by the company's- profitsIthough by the 
1760s the Cookson family interests includedt besides glassq lead mines, 
coal mines,, salt,, alum, iron and banking. 
The original deed of partnership, dated 17 April 1738, was 
made between John Cookson, a merchant of Newcastle and Thomas Jeffries, 
53 
a merchant of Snow Hill in London. Each was bound to a thirty one 
year partnership to manufacture crown and plate glass-at the glass 
house "shortly to be built" on the ballast quay at South Shields that 
the two had recently leased from John Cookson's father Isaac Cookson. 
Isaac Cookson had also advanced f, 2tOOO of the capital for the new 
company and it seems probable that the whoie enterprise was in part 
his attempt to start his eldest son in business. Isaac Cookson (1680- 
1743) originally came from Cumberland but had settled in Newcastle 
54 
c. 1700 to make a successful career primarily in trade. . 
By 1738 he 
had already established some manufacturing interests with shares in an 
iron furnace at Whitehills. and glass bottle house at Bill Quay. On 
his death in 1743 he was described as "one, of the most oDnsiderable 
glass manufacturers of these parts" and it was certainly he. who laid 
the foundations of the Cookson family interest in glass, although he 
perhaps does not merit the description"entrepreneur" as fully as his 
son John. 
The 1738 deed was a business like document setting out in detail 
each partner9s precise responsibilities and the strict-manner in which 
the company's finances were to be arranged. The total capital to be 
invested in the enterprise was Z69000 divided into 32 shares, twenty of 
which (f. 3,750) were to be advanced by John Cookson, aid twelve (; E2,250) 
by Thomas Jeffries. John Cookson was to manage the glass, house at 
Shields. and control the companyOs-finances. Jeffries was to manage 
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the London warehouse and "travel the principal towns between South 
Shields and the Sands" to promote trade. All remittances and monthly 
accounts were to be sent to John Cookson and a yearly meeting was to 
be held for an account and reckoning. Besides receiving a proportionate 
share of the profits, each partner was to. pay-a proportionate share of 
the losses. Dealings were to be conducted in joint. names, no private 
debts were to be taken from the jdint. stock and neither partner was to 
"disclose the secrets of their manufacture or advise, aid or assist 
any similar manufacture". 
The deed also made. provision for the entry of additional partners. 
It was stated that Thomas Jeffries should be permitted to assign four 
shares to his brother Richardl two to James Dixons another merchant 
of Snow Hill, and two to Francis Hawkes, a glass maker of Vauxhall. 
All three of these assignments were made the following year beginning 
with the assignment of two shares to James Dixon in March 1738 for the 
original price of 9375. Dixon*s specified-role was "to promote the 
trade.,. attend the warehouse in London without any fee save costs 11. 
Dixon-was a. merchant who had already established connections in the 
north-east. He was to cx)nsolidate his place in the-partnership by 
his marriage in October 1738 to Isaac Cookson's daughter, Hannah. The 
Jeffriest connection. was likewise to be consolidated by the marriage 
of Isaac Cookson's third son, Isaac, to Thomas Jeffriest daughter 
Mary (see Appendix 3b). 
In April 1738 two further shares were assigned by Jeffries to 
Francis Hawkes. Hawkest part in the concern was not explicitly stated 
in the deed but it was certainly a practical one of-managing the 
actual manufacture and-in particular the "founding" or mixing of the 
metal; the deed was most explicit in stating that Hawkes "shall not 
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nor will at any time hereafter discover or 'make known to any person 
or persons any of the secret or secrets'relating to the merting of 
the metal for the making of the said crown or plate glass ". Unlike 
I 
the other deeds, Hawkes* contained no clause denying him a salary which 
may have b6en as high as U00 a year for the deed stated that in the 
event of his death and if his executors refused to continue the 
management, of the glasshouse they should pay U00 per annum out of the 
profits for putting the existing partners to the trouble of management. 
Hawkes' Vauxhall address makes it more than likely that he had recently 
been employed in the plate glass works at Vauxhall which had been 
established on an extravagant scale by the Duke of Buckingham in 1658. 
Plate glass, like crown glass, was a beneficiary of the trend 
towards greater elegance both in the outside appearance of buildings 
and their inner furnishings, Like crown its manufacture had been 
introduced into England during the seventeenth c6ntury; previously plate 
glass had been imported into England from Italy and France. Like crown 
it was c: onsidered a luxury but to a far greater degree since it had 
noticeable advantages over ccown in. respect of colour and brilliancy. 
This finer quality was due firstly to the better ingredients that were 
used in plate glass, in particular barilla, and secondly to the fact 
that the plates were ground down and polished,. after, manufacture to 
produce a uniformg brilliant and undistorted surface. This extra 
treatment raised the price of plate, glass Lpfficiently high to make it 
ill suited for ordinary glazing purposes (in 1726 Neve had described it 
as "a dear sort of glass" costing 4s per sq. ft. 9 or nearly three times 
as much as crown). 
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Instead, the major use of plate glass was in the manufacture of 
mirrors, for which the glass had to be silvered with lead. The f ashion 
for pier glasses and large decorative mirrors gathered strength through- 
out the eighteenth century, supporting a number of trades: looking 
glass makers who specialised in large glasses' cabinet makers and up- 
holsterers who manufactured less expensive glasses, and the glass 
grinder who was-usually employed as a journey man by either the glass 
house or the upholsterer but who occasionally managed to set up in 
business on his own account. A 1763 London Directory lists twelve 
glass grinders and two are listed in Newcastle in 1778. R. Campbellts 
The London Tradesman of 1747 contains a good description of the glass 
grinder*t work: 
55 
The glass grinder buys (the plates) from the glass house rough 
and it is his business to grind them even and then polish them 
which is done with sand and water. The plate pf glass is fixed 
horizontally in a weighty frame and is rubbed backwards and 
forwards upon another plane on which sand and water is constantly 
running ..... after the glass lus been ground to a true plane it 
is then polished with emery and putty. 
Campbell's entry on the glass grinder is interesting for the 
suggestion that glass plates manufactured in England at that time were 
being cast rather than blown, although he admitted that the manner of 
casting "is pretended to be a secret nor could I find any person who 
pretends to know it that they could give a rational account of the matter". 
However the evidence given to the Parliamentary commission on plate 
glass in 1773 makes it clear that eighteenth century English plate 
glass houses were blowing rather than casting plate glass though casting 
had been experimented with. James Dixon, giving evidence on behalf of 
the Cookson company, said that the largest plates they had produced were 
84" x 5211"which he believes were cast" but it is almost certain that 
Cookson and JeffriesO glass was entirely blown. Had casting been 
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extensively practised at South Shields then more would surely have 
been said about it to the commission. 
The publicity given to the formation of the British Plate Glass 
Company in 1773 has tended to obscure the fact that before that date 
there were a number of firms in England, among them Cookson and Jeffriess 
producing blown plate glass. Blown plate was produced by blowing the 
glass into a large cylinder which was then opened with shears and 
flattened. It differed from broad glass in that broad glass was blown 
in an elliptical or conical shape and opened by holding the glass 
near the furnace which caused it to burst at its weakest point. 
56 
Plate glass also differed from broad glass and crown in the finer 
quality of ingredients used; barilla imported from Alicante or Teneriffe 
and fine quality white sand.. Blowing was not a particularly efficient 
or economical way of producing plate glass. Because of the heavy weight 
of the cylinder workmen could not produce much more than one large 
cylinder an hour and not work longer than six hours in one journey. 
Blowing also limited the size to under 45" - 5011 long. If plates of 
larger dimension were produced they were frequently too thin to be 
polished. This uneconomical method of production was probably as much 
responsible for the high price of plate glass as the more expensive 
ingredients or the great risk of breakage. 
The main demand for both crown and plate glass was in London and 
it is not surprising that Cookson and Jeffries should have soon est- 
ablished a London warehouse. This was first situated at the Old Swan, 
the quay at which the Newcastle ships usually bertheds but moved in 
July 1740 to Blackfriars, and in 1756 to Fleet Street where it remained. 
The London warehouse was important not merely for distnibution but as an 
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office through which raw materials, such as barilla, could be purchased 
and as a source of information about the market and the products of 
their 
OF , 
rival plate glass houses in London. A good example4the many uses of a 
London agent can be found in a letter written from Cookson to Dixon 
in 
1763 in connection with the glass house's need for a new spreading stone: 
57 
I have been-enquiring about the spreading kiln and it is undoubtedly 
in our interest to have the stone as large as we can 9tho it were 
to cost Z8 or UO more. But that you may give a better guessp there 
was (sic) two plates lately made at Vauxhall, the largest they could 
make for which they had of the East India Company Z2,00 each. The 
grinder is to have U00, his name is Bell and lives at the Bankside. 
You had best see the size which may be some guide to you, they go 
as a present to the Nabob in the East-Indies. I find Green who I 
suppose is Mr. Peacock's partner has wrote to Mr. Deer for some 
green glass, he does not seem to be a glazier but by his writing 
more like a merchant9s clerk .... but you must tell him we 
have 
none to spare. Our stock of barilla is not large and we need an 
additional 25 cernes (? ) more. 
By 1746 the number of partners in Cookson ýLnd Jeffries had risen to 
six with the addition of Sir John Delange., another Loncbn rnerchant who 
had brought one share from Thomas Jeffriesp and Joseph Cookson who had 
been assigned two shares by his brother and had taken over the management 
of the glass house, A new partnership agreement was drawn up in 1746 
in order to confirm all these assignments and to reinforcelhe strict 
accountability of all the partners. Each had to account for all 
money he received to John Cookson., on penalty of forfeiting his dividend. 
John Cookson was to account for all money to the other partners in 
the yearly dividend. This second partnership agreement-confirms thats 
although London merchants were involved in the venture, control rested 
entirely with the Cooksons at South Shields. 
The wording of the deeds with their attention to detail confirms 
the general impression that the partners in Cookson and'ieffries 
possessed a sound commercial attitude towards the enterprise in which 
they were investing money. Th9had clearly recognised their market, 
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sought out a skilled glass maker who was able to produce glass of the 
right standard for that market, and provided for the supply and 
distribution of glass where demand was likely to be strongest. They 
had committed themselves to work without salaries and to be strictly 
accountable for all the-company9s money. This. was certainly a rational 
attitude and it appears to have proved an effective one-since, according 
to the evidence provided in a number of legal cases, the partnership 
of Cookson and Jeffries was a profitable one which saw its shares 
steadily increase in value until itsdissolution in 1770. 
The first of these legal cases occurred in 1751 when Thomas Jeffries 
brought a Chancery suit against the other partners with the aim of 
forcing his re-entry into the partnership. 
58 In 1748 financial troubles 
had persuaded Jeffries to sell his five remaining shares "on trust" to 
John Cookson for Z2,051 on the understanding that should he subsequently 
raise the money he should be readmitted to the partnership. In 1751 
Richard Jeffries, on behalf of his brothers offered to discharge the 
debt in return for the shares, but unfortunatelyv in the meantime'two 
of the shares had been sold to Isaac Cooksono, Joseph Cookson's brother 
and a sea faring man who "at about that time had proposed to reside 
on the land and employ his money in some advantageous way". Thomas 
Jeffries was forced to bring a legal suit to recover the shares and 
four were eventually resold to him for Z2,535 4s (or f. 637 16s each which 
represented a substantial increase from their original value of U87 10s). 
Although no complete account of the company's dividends or profits are 
available, legal cases do provide isolated figures: for instance, in 
1749 the total dividend on capital was U. 200 or ; E37 10s on each share. 
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Isaac Cookson eventually did become a share holder when he was 
left Iwo shares by his younger brother Joseph Cookson who died in 1750. 
These two shares became the subject of another legal case when, following 
Isaac9s death in 1761, his creditors attempted to force the sale of his 
estate against the wishes of his widow and executor John Cookson. 
59 
John Cookson had assumed control of his brother's glass house shares 
(2/32 of Cookson and Jeffries and 3/16 of the bottle house at Bill Quay) 
immediately after his death but was forced to put them up forauction 
and purchase them himself for Z2,600. Even allowing for "theinclusion of 
the Bill Quay shares the price is further evidence of the rising value 
of the shares in Cookson and Jeffries. Isolated dividend figures are 
again provided by this legal case: in 1762 I3a4c Cookson, vs-ýtwo shares of 
Cookson and Jeffries received a dividend of Z108 or 04 each. 
The partnership of Cookson and Jeffries came to an end in 1770 
when John Cookson bought the ten shares of the late Richýrd Jeffries, 
whose executors had no wishtD carry on the business. The price of the 
ten shares 'was Z8,000 (Z800 each) which was a considerable increase from 
their original value in 1737 of U87 10s each. Cookson's purchase of 
these ten shares probably gave him sole ownership of the company although 
it is possible that James Dixon still owned two shares at this time. 
By the time of John Cookson9s death in 1783 he was certainly the sole 
owner and the company passed in its entirety to his eldest-son Isaac; 
his two younger sons, Joseph and John were entrusted with the shares in 
the bottle houses at Bill Quay and South Shields. 
John Cookson's career in glass manufacturing was a most impressive 
one. Not only was a second flat glass house erected at South Shields, 
probably c. 1770,60 but he extended his interests in glass through new 
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partnerships manufacturing different types of glass. The major 
extension of his glass interests was his purchase. in 1756. of 'the 
two glass houses at South Shields and the flint glass house in Newcastle 
belonging to the Dagnia f amily. The Dagnias will be considered in more 
detail in the bottle chapter for, alth6ugh one of their houses at 
South Shields was ostensibly a broad glass house, their main significance 
was as bottle manufacturers. Under John Cookson it seems probable that 
both. houses were, turned over to the production of bottles with broad 
glass being manufactured only occasionally,, as' we have seen. By 
1770 John Cookson, was also working the DagniasO two-flint and bottle 
houses at Newcastle and these eventually came into the possession of 
his son Isaac Cookson. 
The diversification of John Cookson9s glass interests was in some 
respects a more suitable development for him than the extension of the 
crown and plate works. He remained primarily a merchant, dealing in 
a range of commodities such as coal, salt, ironv lead, glass and butter 
and many of his letters to other merchants emphasise that he is able to 
supply a variety of commodities. John Cookson's'career as. a merchant 
and manufacturer was undoubtedly a successful, and, even perhaps a 
spectacularly successful one. By the time of his death in 1783 he owned 
lucrative shares in, amongst other things, coal mines, 
lead mines, bottle and flat glassw'orksgand, the, first Newcastle bank. 
In addition he had purchased a country house and estate at Whitehill 
near Chester-le-Street and was unquestionably-a respected figure in 
Newcastle*s commercial life. The final measure of the success of his 
career is the considerable fortune he left, on his death. By the terms of 
his will his estate passed to his wife during her, lifetime and then to 
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his eldest son Isaac but out of the estate two legacies worth ; 910,000 
each were to be given to his two surviving sons and a legacy of 0,000 
to his only unmarried daughter. These legacies consisted of invested 
capital in land or other securities and, in the case of his two sons 
Joseph and John, his bottle manufacturing shares: namely 8/16ths of the 
Bill Quay bottle house and 11/16ths of the South. Shields bottle hots e. 
This arrangement'gave rise to an interesting legal case which illustrates 
well the crucial importance of-inheritance to the eighteenth century 
firm: the manufacturing interests that John Cookson had built up were 
threatened by the unfortunate fact that his, son Joseph proved more 
interested in the army than business. 
Soon after his father's death Joseph Cookson brought a Chancery suit 
against his mother and elder brother Isaac in an attempt to force them 
to realise his U0,000 legacy which he wanted in cash to advance himself 
in the army. 
61 
In reply Isaac and Elizabeth Cookson argued that the terms 
of the will, whereby the legacy was managed by a trustee (Isaac Cookson)v 
were specifically intended "to prevent its being spent" and that 
Joseph Cookson was only entitled to U0,000 invested in land or, securities 
in the name of a trustee and that"the tomplainant is not nor was ever 
meant or intended to be entitled to, have any power vested-in such 
trustees to raise any sum for the complainant's advancement in the army"* 
They argued, further that John Cookson"s intention at the time the will 
was made was that Joseph Cookson should be brought up for some trade 
or business and had been sent to the Shields glassworks and then the 
blast furnace in order to learn book. keeping. But when Joseph Cookson 
had expressed a desire to go into the army his. father had "reluctantly 
acquiesed" and purchased an ensignts and then a, lieutenant's commission 
for him. These sums, they argued should be seen as having taken the 
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place of the legacy which was written into the will at a time when 
Joseph Cookson had been intended for a business. career. Their arguments 
appear to have prevailed. Fortunately the same problem did not arise 
with- the third son John Cookson whop being intended for the law and 
given in addition to his legacy a S250 annuity, was happy to leave his 
shares -in the hands of his elder brother Isaac. Joseph and John Cookson 
died in 1800 and 1802 respectively leaving John Cookson9s entire 
business interests in the sole hands of Isaac Cookson. Fortunately for - 
the Cookson family Isaac proved a worthy successor to his father and 
under his ownership and management the, crown and -plate works and the 
bottle works were to see an equally impressive growth. 
(iii) The flat glass trade 
There seems little doubt that for both the north-eAsi flat glass 
manufacturers London remained their principal market and the one on 
which their profitability depended. There also seems little doubt that 
the demand for. glass in the London market steadily increased throughout 
the eighteenth century; even without statistical evidence for the whole 
century the increase in building in and around London is self-evident. 
An increasing demand for glass is also suggested by evidence that a more 
sophisticated structure of trade was emerging, namely the establishment 
of specialised window glass merchants in placelof the glaziers. In a 
Directory of 1763 Cookson and Jeffries9 warehouse is one of only five 
62 glass warehouses (including three bottle warehouses) in London, but by 
1790 this number had risen to thirteen. Some of the window glass - 
merchants were the wealthier members of the Glaziers Company. Others 
like James Dixon were associated with one manufac'turer'in particular 
and were general merchants by origin who because of their connections had 
been led to specialise in window glass. 
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The importance of the London market -to the north east, manufacturers 
isuell illustrated by an analysis made by Preston Pilbin of the ship- 
ments in a day book of Cookson and Jeffries covering the period 1744-48. 
(see Fig. 3) 63 There are twoslight qualifications to-this illustration. 
Firstly, as Pilbin himself points out, the map is based simply on the 
number of shipments to each destination _ 
and not on the quantity of 
glass contained in the shipments. Because of* the larger size of the 
shipments sent to the London warehouse Pilbin estimated that the total 
proportion sent to London was about 6076 of the whole. The second 
qualification is that the shipments included bottles and very occasionally 
flint glass (from the Bill Quay bottle house or the. Dagnias* flint glass 
house in Newcastle) although flat glass from Cookson and Jeffries 
constitutes the largest proportion of the cargoes. With these two 
qualifications in mind the map still gives a useful illustration of the 
geographical range of Cookson*s tradeand the predominance of London. 
Cookson and-Jeffries and the Newcastle company appear to have 
adop . ted different methods of distributing their glass in London. The 
Newcastle company, as we have seens maintained a close relationship with 
the London GlaziersO Company supplying uncut glass. only. to their members. 
Cookson, by contrast, made use of his own warehouse and supplied glass 
either cut or uncut. This was in some respects a departure from tradition 
in that it operated independently of the glaziers and indeed in direct 
competition with them in their developing roles as glass cutters and 
merchants. -It is not surprising to find evidence of some hostility 
towards Cookson in the Glaziers* Company court book which in 1751 recorded a 
complaint that Cookson and Jeffries at Blackfriars was employing cutters 
who were not members of the Company. 
64 
The Glaziers' Company later 
considere4'commencing a prosecutionagainst Cookson and Jeffries on the 
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grounds that the firm contained no freemen of London amongst its 
partners but this does not appear to have taken place and the firm does 
not appear to have been affected by the hostility of the glaziers. 
The crown glass trade in London appears to have been more compet- 
itive than the broad glass trade. Thi's was probably a reflection of the 
larger number of crown glass houses in London itself. As a flat glass 
which relied on quality for its sale slightly more than broad glasss 
which relied entirely on cheapnesss crown glass was able to be manu- 
factured in London despite the higher manufacturing costs. ' London 
crown glass was, on the whole, of better quality than Newcastle glass 
because it was manufactured with barilla rather than kelp. Cookson also 
used barilla in his plate glass and also. occasionally manufactured "barilla 
crown" (which he told a Dublin merchant, was "as good as any manufactured 
in London") but it was considerably more expensive, at 45 shillings the 
half case, than ordinary crown at 26 shillingsýhe half case. 
65 
According 
to Samuel-Parkes barilla, crown glass manufactured at London was "ever 
preferred" 
66 
to other crown glass but the slightly better quality-does 
not have appeared to have been of sufficient commercial weight to 
compensate for its higher price. By 1800 not a singlecrown glass house 
was left in London and by the 1820s the manufacture of plate glass had 
also disappeared. 
There seems little doubt that it was low manufacturing costs and 
low selling price that enabled the north-east crown glass to gain 
full possession-of the London market by the end of the eighteenth 
century. From the evidence of builders9 price books'(Fig. 4) Newcastle 
crown glass was consistently cheaper than London glass throughout the 
century: for example a builders* price book of 1774' quotes: 
67 
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New green glass per ft. superficial 6d 
Newcastle crown glass per ft, superficial 9d 
Blackfriars crown glass in- squares Is 2d 
Radcliff crown glass measured neat Is 3d 
Second crown glass in squares -Ild- ls 
Moulded plate squares 3s Od 
Best crown bent circular for shop windows 3s 6d 
The success of north-east crown at the expense of London crown is 
reflected in the fact that when the Glazierst Company issued its first 
printed price list in 1803 (Fig. 5) 
68 
only "Newcastlecrown" is quoted. 
The Glzaizierst Companyts lists continue to quote "Newcastle crown" until 
1818 when it becomes just "crown" which in itself probably reflects 
the increasing amount. of crown glass coming from other areas such 
as the Midlands and Lancashire. 
Figure 4: Prices of flat glass charged by glaziers, 1726-1794 
Ai 
B. 
C.. 
D. 
B. 
G. 
H. 
Key: 
London crown 
iasashes 
Newcastle crown Broad glass 
in sashes in lead 
Jealous 
glass 
Plate 
glass 
(All prices, per. foot) 
1726 8d - 9d 5d - 6d 18d 4s Od 
1738 lld . 12d 7d 8d 5d 2s 6d. 5s Od 
1746 18d 15d 
1757 Ild 5d' 
1774 14d 15d 9d .. 6d 3s Od 
1777 14d 16d 
1793 19d 13s Od 
1794 202d 14s 6d 
A. R. Neve, The City and Country Purchaser (1726), pp. 145-9. 
B. W. Salmon, Palladio Londinensis, -(1738), p. 57. 
C. Norwich Mercury, 5 April 1746, notice by twenty Norwich glaziers 
of a rise in prices owing to, the glass duty. Quoted Buckley(1926). 
D. Newcastle Journal, 12 March 1746jadvertisement by a Newcastle 
glazier. 
E. The Builder*s Price Book (1774), pp. 93-4. 
F. W. Pain The Practical Builder or Workman's General Assistant 
(1777). 
G. Glaziers prices quoted in J.. Mordaunt Crook and Portq The 
-H. 
1 
History of the King*s Works, vol VI (1973)9 pp. 90-1. 
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Figure 5: Flat glass prices listed by the London Glazierst Company, 
1800 - 1845 
1 1803 
In new sashes 
best crown 
2nd crown 
3rd crown 
ground crown 
green glass 
1s 7d/2s 4d 
ls 4d/2s Od 
ls 2d/Is 3d 
3s/Od 
10d 
1805 
2s Od/2s 9d 
Is 8d/2s 4d 
Is 5d/Is 8d 
3s 6d/4s Od 
ls 4d 
1812 
3s 2d/3s 10d 
2s. 6d/3s 3d 
2s Od/2s 9d 
4s 6d/5s 6d 
ls 6d 
3s Od/4s Od 
2s 6d/3s 6d 
2s Od/3s Od 
4s 6d/5s 6d 
Is 6d 
Is 3d/ls 8d 
Is 2d/Is 6d 
Is Od/Is 5d 
8d per ft. 
add 
II. *Lead lights, 'crown or green glass 
squares or q arries und 81, 
Is 2d/Is 6d_ I Is 3d/Is 7d Is 6d/2s Od Is 8d/2s Od Is 2d/Is 4d 
NOTE: Four prices for each type of glass are listed but only the highest 
and lowest are given here. The four-prices are based on the size of 
-2 
foot),, In 1812 the squares (2 foot, 0-2 foot,, 3 foot and 3ý- 
largest size of square is discontinued and only-three prices are 
given thereafter. 
Builders9 price books never distinguish-between London plate glass 
and Cookson9s plate glass, however, according to a trade book of 17579 
the price of plate glass from Black friars was lower than plate glass 
69 from Vauxhall. Interestingly'this did not appear to reflect any 
difference in manufacturing costs, for both charged the same nominal 
amount*for their glass, but differences in the way the bill*was drawn up 
and in particular-the amount-the customer was supposed to pay in advance 
tIon account of the duty". As theq)ecimen bills indicate the Blackfriars 
glass was cheaper because only 4076 was charged for the,. duty, and this 
was calculated before the deduction of the ready money discount: 
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Siie Vauxhall Blackfriars 
14 x9 2s Od 2s Od 
13ýg x Wg 2s 8d 2s 8d 
25 x 12! g 6s Od 6s Od 
2711 x 16 8s 10d 8s 10d 
28 x 26 25s Od 25s Od 
U 4s 6d 92 4s 6d 
Discount (2%) 4s 5d As 5d 
Z2 Os ld Z2 Os Id 
Discount for 2s Od 407o., ad- 16s Od 
ready money vance - 
for duty 
El 18s ld S2 16s ld 
5076 advance discount for 
for duty ready money 2s 9d 
U 17s V32d F. 2 13s 4d 
The first discount varied according to the quality of the glass. All 
qualities were charged the same nominal price according to their size 
but best quality glass received a 276 discount, seconds (marked IV) 
received 4%. thirds (marked Ibl) received 6%. and fourths (marked OBI) 
8%. Although the price difference between Blackfriars and Vauxhall 
apparently reflected only different commercial procedurest it seems 
probable that at root it reflected lower manufacturing costs. 
What of the. markets outside London?. As Pilbin's map showsp 
although London was the major market Cookson also supplied glass to most 
centres of population on the east and south coasts. From his letter book 
it is clear that the firm did not maintain warehouses in any of these 
towns or cities but relied entirely on local merchants-for their sales. 
Glass was usuallybought by the merchant and kept as his own stock, 
Cookson never sent glass anywhere except when it had been ordered. The 
one exception was Glasgow where Cookson appears to have maintained a 
stock of unsold glass in the warehouse of one David Nesbit. This 
connection was a useful one from Cookson's point of view for an account 
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was kept between the two merchants and used by Cookson to pay other 
Scottish debts, notably those to the highland kelp suppliers. Despite 
this the arrangement was not ultimately a satisfactory- one; Cookson 
wrote to Nesbit in 1763: 
70 
As to the glass trade I believe Mr. Buchannan intends to decline 
selling crown glass for me at Glasgow and indeed it is hardly 
worthwhile anybodies while on either side to engage in it for 
returns are so slow and your payments so bad. If it could be 
made 
* 
to turn out better I would have no objection to engage in it 
but as it is will not answer the purpose .... I, have no warehouse 
at Leith nor do I send any-glass there but what is ordered. If 
it could be in any way struck out that we could carry on a corres- 
pondence to mutual benefit it would give me great pleasure. 
Another important market for Cookson was Dublin. By the 1760s he 
was supplying a -number of merchants there but a letter written in 1751 
suggests that at that time he had an agreement with only onev John Orpin. 
Orpin had complained of the quality of glass sent, to which Cookson 
71 
replied: 
I cannot but observe that all these complaifits have arrived since 
you had all the glass. If you have a mind only to have one cargo 
yearly you may; or leave the trade open, I to sell to everybody 
as before. I cannot chalk out any method to promote the trade in 
Dublin. I shall ship you as good a commodity as I have at the 
price you want them at. I have no intention of overstocking the 
market nor have I it in my power not having any glass at all by 
me to spare. If I had had any I would have sent Pollock (The ships 
captain) but could not altho' glass was extremely wanted at Glasgow. 
By the 1760s Cookson was supplying at least fx)ur other merchants besides 
Orpin. There does not appear to have been any binding agreement between 
them and Cookson but Cookson obviously felt some-obligation not to 
supply glass to othersand thus harm their trade; except in. exceptional 
circumstances as., for instance, in 1761 when-Cookson wrote to one of his 
merchants: 
72 
I was surprised to receive a letter from an unknown-'person in 
Dublin enclosing two Bank of England notes for Z60 and desiring 
me to send him glass for it. The affai'r, is so uncommon that I 
cannot refuse him .... if you should desire it I can decline him-for the. future. -,, 
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The glass trade, in common with most other eighteenth century trades, 
relied almost entirely on credit thus prepayment was indeed uncommon. 
As was mentioned in chapter onethe Dublin trade was useful for Cookson 
in that his ships returned via Bristol collecting pot clay from 
Stourbridge. 
Outside the London market it is clear from Cookson's letter book 
that he relied heavily on other merchants and the same was true of export. 
He himself was not an exporting merchant and when his glass was sent 
to-overseas markets it was done through the services of other merchants: 
for instance during the 1740s the Newcastle merchant Ralph Carr (a 
partner with Cookson in the first Newcastle bank) exported -some of 
Cookson9s glass to the Americas. Another merchant who undertook the 
export of Cookson9s glass was Alexander Baxter of Edinburgh who had 
extensive connections in the Baltic and Russia; during the 1760s he 
sent a cargo of Cookson9s crown glass to St. Petersburg where it was said 
to have "answered well". On the whole it was not until the late eighteenth 
century, encouraged by Pitt's generous bounty on the drawback, that 
crown glass manufacturers began to undertake the export of their own 
gla ss. 
The general picture of the eighteenth century flat glass trade that 
emerges from the evidence is of a well ordered and stable trade relying 
on well established merchants and manufacturers. Like most trades it 
was one in whiqh personal trust, reputation and credit figured prominently 
and this must, to a certain degree, have favoured manufacturers in the 
traditional and well established region of pr6duction, the north-east. 
Between them the two north-east flat glass. companies supplied London 
and the east 'coast with all varieties of flat glass - broadt crown 
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and plate - at what was certainly a competitive price and thus they 
appear to have maintained the importance of the north-east that had 
first been established under the unnatural conditions of Mansell's. 
monopoly. 
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3.1790 - 1830 
This was a period of unprecedented activity in, the glass industry 
both locally and nationally. Locally, the major feature of this 
period was the establishment of new firms alongside, and in competition 
with, the two older establishments. Within forty years the productive 
capacity of the north-east flat glass industry more than quadrupled and 
the number of firms engaged in it increased from two to eight. The 
first of these new firms was -the Northumberland Glass Company which 
was established in 1791. This was followed in 1796 by the rather shaky 
beginning of another new company - the 'Tyne Glass Company*, arguably 
the most interesting of the new firms. Around 1807 these two were 
joined by a second crown glass. firm at South Shields - the South Tyne 
Glass Company, or Shortridge Russell and Barrass; and two new firms 
at. Sunderland - the South., wick Glass Company. of Burn and Brumell and the 
Sunderland Glass Company of Addison Fenwick. Finally in 1825 a new 
company erected--a crown glass house at St. Peterts Quay in Newcastle 
and entered into trade as the North Tyne Glass Company. In addition to 
all these new firms the period saw significant developments for the 
two older firms and the impressive rate of progress inihi. s period is 
underlined by the fact that set against all these successful ventures 
there is no instance of a failure inthe glass trade; neither is there 
any evidence that profits were anything but extremely satisfactory. 
What were the conditions that-produced and fostered this impressive 
growth? Was it a direct response to national market demands or was it 
an expression of increased wealth in the locality ? Both local and 
national conditions were certainly important. On the national level 
it is certainly right to see the expansion in production of this period 
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as a direct response to the demand created by domestic- and industrial 
building. The index of brick production during this period cleat-ly 
shows the major building peaks being followed by a peak in the production 
of crown glass (Fig. 6) 
1 On the local level two aspects of the economic 
environment were exceptionally favourable to productive investment. 
Firstly the period saw a greater accumulation of wealth. in the area 
than in any other period. This wealth, from a variety of commercial 
and industrial ventures., was important not just for creating a pool 
of capital from which other ventures could be financed but in encouraging 
local men to put their money into risk taking ventures rather than safer 
forms'of investment. The4 importance of existing local weath and existing 
entrepreneurs is seen in the f act Ahat with one exception all of the 
new glass firms were founded by local men who had already built up a 
comfortable capital from other ventures ranging from other ventures in 
glass to ship building. The second favourable aspect'of local conditions 
was the recent emergence of more sophisticated financial institutions 
able to sustain firms by meeting their short - term credit. needs - namely 
banks. By 1790 there were five banks in Newcastle and four of these had 
strong industrial and commercial connections. By 1793 the total note 
circulation of the Tyne Banks was ; Z230,000 and given that there was 
a not unsympathetic attitude towards commerce it seems inevitable that 
I 
such a large mobilisation of capital should-have heralded an upsurge in 
productive investment in industry. A third favourable local condition 
that perhaps should be mentioned in respect of investment in glass as 
opposed to any other form of industry was the obvious success and 
profitability of the two older firms. Their example was almost 
certainly crucial in providing real evidence that there were large profits 
to be made from the . -manufýacture of flat glass. They may also have 
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been an encouragement in that their existence provided a ready made - 
pool of skilled labour in the area. As we shall see some of the newer 
firms staffed their new houses by systematically enticing men away 
from their old employment by the . promise of 
higher wages. 
This was the period in which the flat glass industry of the 
north-east saw its climax in terms of local prestige. It was a 
recognisably lar ge and productive part of the local economy; it was 
frequently associated with men of great wealth and social standing in 
the area; it was acknowledged to be an important local contribution to 
the national economy. Altogether it gave good cause for local pride, 
to which its emphasis in contemporary descriptions of Newcastle bears 
witness. In 1801. the glass works were said 'to be "next to the coal a 
chief force of the wealth in this opulent town". 
2 In 1807; "the glass 
works at Newcastle and on the River Tyne may be considered as the most 
extensive branch of manufacture we have to boast of". 
3 
The Northumberland Glass Company 
The Northumberland Glass Company was the most ambitious of the 
new crown glass firms. Its ambitious nature was well illustrated by the 
manner of its establishment. Whereas the other new glass firms began 
with single glass houses and gradually expanded their resourcess the 
Northumberland Company started life as a fully fledged manufactory 
consisting of the impressively high number of four glass houses and 
aptly described (see below) as "the most complete glass manufactory in 
England". 
The company*s four crown glass houses were built at Lemington, a 
little higher up the Tyne from Newcastle. The circumstances of the 
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company's establishment there were described in 1811 by the local 
4 
historian Edward Mackenzie: 
About that time (1787) a company of enterprising gentlemen 
entered into the glass trade in Newcastle under the firm of t1M 
Northumberland Glass Company but the Jealousy excited by. their 
well known talents for business created an ungenerous opposition 
and prevented them from procurring ground to build on until at 
last-they applied to the late Duke of Northumberland from whom 
they acquized convenient scites (sic) for building at this place 
Memington). In a short time there appeared four large glass 
houses one of which is particularly lofty and beautiful built 
of bricks of the most excellent workmanship. The warehouse and 
offices attached to the glass works are very extensive and the 
whole is allowed by travellers to constitute the most complete 
-glass manufactory in England. - 
The company we are interested in and almost certainly the one Mackenzie 
was referring to was in fact established in 1791. There had been some 
form of Northumberland Glass Company prior to this date for it appeared 
in the Newcastle Directory of 1787 as owning a flint glass house in 
Newcastle under their agent John Dyson. The following year Joshua 
Henzell was described at his death as "the chief agent to the Northumberland 
Glass Cofhpany at Lemington". Whatever * the details of this early 
company were, a more convincing start came in 1791 when a deed of partn- 
eiship in the Northumberland Glass Company was'executed between six 
partn. ers. 
5 
The Northumberland Glass Company 
John Graham Clarke Z6vOOO 
George Waldie ; E6tOOO 
Joseph Lamb f, 6., 000 
Aubone Surtees ; Z6vOOO 
John Dyson f, 3,, 000 
Thomas Maude f, 3., 000 
I 
Total capital f, 302000. 
These six were almost certainly the enterprising gentlemen- of whom 
Mackenzie wrote. As might be expected with such a large capital (which 
the partners agreed to advance by ; 9120000 it necessary) they were men 
with many existing and profitable interests. John Graham Clarke was 
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a merchant and ship owner with many connections in the West Indies 
where, he owned sugar plantations. George Waldie was a manufacturer 
and coal owner and a partner with Joseph Lamb in a soap manufactory, 
Heddon and Percy Main Collieries and in the Tyne Bank. Joseph Lamb was 
possibly the most enterprising of all the partners. 
6 He. was the 
youngest son of a Carlisle f armer who had come to Newcastle as a linen 
draper, from which he had-extended his interests and made a considerable 
fortune. By 1791 he owned collieries around Newcastle, a copperas works 
at Willington, a calico printing works at Carlisle, a'cotton factory at 
Dalston, a brewery at Brampton besides being a partner with Waldie in a 
soap manufactory and. perhaps most importantly, the Tyne Bank. His 
property on his death in 1800 was worth well over E30,000. The remaining 
large partners Aubone Surtees was a founder member of the older Exchange 
Bank or Surtees and Burdon, besides owning a large share of the Tyne 
Iron Company also at Lemington. He had already, of'course, had cause 
to contemplate the large profits to be made from glass manufacturing 
in his quarrel with the Newcastle Crown and-Broad'Glass Company in 1786. 
The two smaller partners were not men of such established wealth. 
Their' role in the Companyl as set out- in the deed., was "to diligently 
manage the glass houses" for which they were to receive a salary. 
Dyson was evidently connected with the previous company for he was 
described as their "agent" at the flint glass house in Newcastle in 
1787. He continued to manage-the flint glass house until 1802 when he 
left to become a white lead merchant with his son in York. He re-sold 
just over half of his shares on this occasion to the partners (one 
half of one twelfth plus one ninth of one twelfth) for f. 2,566 13s 4d. 7 
The remainder was apparently sold to Robert Ormston. Thomas Maude i 
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was in a less satisfactory position than Dyson for he did not own 
the hereditary right to his shares; the deed stated that on his 
death the other partners were at liberty to appoint a new manager 
and pass on Maude's shares to him. The money may therefore have been 
advanced to Maude by the other partners. Maude was the brother in 
law of Joseph Lamb and also connected to the Tyne Bank. 
Although the 1791 deed was one of co-partnership, its terms 
split the partners into two distinct groups: - the four major 
partners who were to constitute, a "committee-. and the two managers, 
Control was vested almost completely in the committee who were to 
control the finance and "to inspect and superintend the conduct and 
management of the said Thomas Maude and John Dyson or other managers". 
Any disputes among the partners were to be settled by vote 3n which the 
two managers were to have only one vote between them. The terms of the 
deed placed Dyson and Maude in a position only a little higher than 
salaried employees but the fact that they were share holders empahsises 
that where, as- in this case, the major owners intended taking no 
active part in the concern there was a positve need for managers 
with an interest in the firm*s profitability. There is no evidence 
that any of the major partners took an active part in the management 
of the Northumberland Glass Company. Their role was confined to 
providing the initial capital and, by virtue of their established con- 
nections in the commercial and industrial world, giving the company an 
important credit worthiness. Unfortunately no details of the financial 
arrangements enjoyed by the Northumberland Glass Company have survived 
but it seems fair to assume that the fact of its direct association 
with local bankers would have made it an eligible recipient of credit. 
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In 1806 a new partnership aeed was drawn up: 
8 
John Graham Clarke 
George Waldie 
Joseph Lamb 
Robert Ormston 
William Brown Jr 
Walter Trevelyan 
19/96 shares 
It 
It 
tl 
4/96 
16/96 
This deed was almost certainly made necessary by the bankruptcy of 
-Aubone Surtees jr. in 1802 and the subsequent 
failure of the Exchange 
Bank. The Glass Company appears to have emerged unscathed from the 
bankruptcy of a major partner but this, plus the departure of the 
two previous managers, necessitated the entrance of new partners. 
Walter Trevelyan. had been offered a share in the partnership in 1791 for 
the deed of that date stated that he should have been included "but 
for reasons best known to himself*xefused to do so 11, Robert Ormston 
was a partner with Lamb and Waldie in other manufacturing ventures 
and the, -Tyne bank. William Brown was admitted as a managing partner. 
The Joseph Lamb of the 1806 deed was not the original partner 
but his-youngest son , By the terms of his will the elder Joseph had 
divided his interests between his three sons: Humble, the eldest received 
the most valuable portion of his estate, the coal and banking shares; 
Warren Maude received the Cumbrian interests including the textile 
factory and the brewery; Joseph was left with Willington copperas 
works and the shares in the Northumberland Glass Company. Despite having 
received the smallest part of his father's estate, Joseph Lamb was to 
prove the"most successful of the three. (a saying of the day held thAt 
"Joseph Lamb mademoney,, H=ble Lamb kept it and Warren Lamb spent it"), 
As an entrepreneur he was undoubtedly a success and during his life- 
time considerably extended his interests to becomep in particular, a 
major colliery owner ofthe district. It was however the Northumberland 
Glass Company that remained the corner stone of his fortune and the 
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one in which he took the most active part. Unlike his f ather 
Joseph Lamb took an active role as the chief managing partner. He 
supervised the day to day running, was active on the firmts behalf 
in representing the interests of the glass manufacturers to the 
Board of Excise, and later was a frequent chairman of the meetings 
of the Crown Glass Manuf acturers! Association. -- 
Joseph Lamb was hard working, astute and well educated - both in 
business life and, at Edinburgh University, in more academic subjects. 
He was said to be a generous employer providing good wages, f ree 
housing and firing for all his employees, - As both manager and major 
shareholder Lamb also negotiated favourable conditions for himself. 
In 1818 he was receiving a salary of E200 per annum for management 
plus the dividend on his own shares and a proportion of 57o charged 
on the profits of the sleeping partners and distributed to the active 
partners. 
9 
In addition the Company paid the rent and taxes on the 
Great House at Dissington for him and provided* free coals. These 
conditions were much envied by the then managers of the Newcastle Crown 
and Broad Glass Company, particularly the charge of 5%'on the profits 
of the sleeping partners. 
Starting with such a large initial capital and manufacturing on 
such an extensive scale when demand for glass was increasing steeply$ 
it was Perhaps inevitable that the Northumberland Glass Company should 
have been a profitable one. In 1832 John Waldiev'the son of George, 
offered his shares to John Buddles the coal viewer, not as Waldie 
took pains to point outt because he was dissatisfied with the, , firm 
10 but because he was in debt and needed the money. Waldie claimed 
that except, for the preceeding year the shares had never paid less 
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than 10% - 12% and his capital in the firm he estimated as U8,000, 
at least "for the buildings and stock are valued at a very small 
sum in the above estimated capital. " The bad results of the 
previous year he assured Buddle were only a temporary recession. 
Although no dividend accounts for the company have survived there is 
no evidence to suggest that Waldie's claim was an untrue one. The 
firm was a large one and it had the resources of men of large capital 
behind it; given this it seems not unreasonable to assume that the firm*s 
profits followed very broadly the pattern of profits seen in the 
Newcastle Crown and Broad Glass Company*s accounts. Both firms were of 
a similar size and both manufactured c wn glass by similar, traditional 
methods. What is certain is that the partners in the firm became 
prosperous dujing the period. Joseph Lamb purchased the estate of 
Denton in 1822 for f. 28,000 and in 1830 moved to the grander surroundings 
of-Axwell Park. In 1816 Robert Ormston purchased a country estate at 
Healeyfor E22,000. 
Despite-the profitability of the Northumberland Glass Company., it 
appears Uýave been a somewhat 
T 
unadventurous firm. It did not expand 
its works in any significant way (the only 
-change 
seen at the Lemington 
works was the closure of one of the origihatJour houses, in 1833 it 
was only running three houses and in 1852 when it was finally put up 
for sale it consisted of three glass houses);, neither did it pioneer 
any. new manufacturing, methods such as the use of soda in place of kelp; 
and neitherv judging from the excise returns for 1832(p 161 ), did 
it make full use of its productive capacity. 'In 1832 'the three houses 
at Lemington only produced slightly more in total than the single 
house. of the Tyne Glass Company_at. Gateshead. The Tyne Glass Company 
is a useful contrast to the Northumberland Company in this respect 
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Both began in the same decade yet both followed different routes 
to success. The success of the Northumberland Company probably 
reflected its large initial capital and its ease of access to 
further credit rather than any dazzling display of entrepreneurial 
skill. By contrast the Tyne Glass Company began with a much lower 
capital with few of the financial advantages enjoyed by the other 
company and yet in many ways proved to be the more successful and 
certainly -the more interesting firm. The Northumberland Glass Company 
was founded in the spirit of a relatively safe investment and it could 
be said to have maintained this spirit throughout its life. 
(ii) The Tyne Glass Company 
The Tyne Glass Company differed fundamentally from the other 
north-east glass firms in that its capital and ownership came from 
London. 7be major shareholders in the company until the 1820s were 
London glaziers and glass cutters. It was thus, although far removed 
in time, the successor to the attempts made by Tainton and Policott in 
the mid-seventeenth century to gain control over the material that was 
their livelihood. It is perhaps surprising that London glaziers had 
not established a direct interest in the north-east glass firm before 
the 1790s when the Tyne Glass Company was established. This is probably 
explained by the fact that glazing in itself was, as described in 1747 
(see P. 47 "a Poor business"and it was only after the transformation 
of the wealthier members of the London GlaziersCompany-into large 
glass dealers and merchants that they could accumulate thecapital 
to finance manufacturing. The men who were involved in the Tyne 
Glass Company, although prominent members of-the Glaziers I Company$ 
were certainly not working glaziers, but'glass'merchants. 
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The Tyne Glass Company also differed from'its neighbours in 
that itcaAe dangerously close to failure. Although it ultimately was 
to prove a highly profitable enterprise, under its first partnership 
(from 1796 to 1813) it was dogged by a succession of litigations, 
bankruptcies and cash shortages which prevented any significant growth 
in the firm or indeed any satisfaction to its partners. The firm 
kept in production but it was not successful enough to induce the 
original partners to keep their money in the concern when'the first 
partnership closed in 1813. These original difficulties were 
probably aggravated by the intrinsic-problem of directing the firm 
from London but the fundamental cause was certainly the extraordinary 
circumstances of the firm*s foundation and the legal tangle that ensued. 
If Cookson-and Jeffries provides 'an example of the suitability of the 
small partnership as a vehicle for industrial growth, then the Tyne 
'Glass Company provides a memorable example of its disadvantages and 
in particular the ambiguity of the law surrounding such matters as 
the liability of the partnership to a single partners 0 debts or the 
right of an ex-partner to the firm9s profits. In addition the Tyne 
Glass Company highlights the disadvantage of a small partnership 
where the individual partners were not themselves men of great wealth; 
not only was there no recourse to supplementary funds when needed 
but'regular bankruptcies amonst the partners contributed to the general 
disorder of the company's progress. It was. not until-after 1813 when 
the company was taken over by Charles Attwodd and Thomas Oak Smith 
that the Tyne Glass Company began to realise its potential. 
The original promoter of the Tyne Glass Company was a Newcastle 
attorney named John Barber. He hardly deserves to be. called an 
entrepreneur in the full sense of the word for his -activities do not 
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seem -to have extended much beyond persuading others to invest money 
in his scheme. In August 1793 Barber entered into a partnership 
with John and Francis Banner to carry on the business of a glass 
manufactory with the initial capital of f, 4vOOO: 
11 
John Barber Z3,000 
John Banner f, 500 Total capital Z4jOOO 
Francis Banner Z 500 
John Banner and his son were London plumbers who, although not members 
of the Glaziers I Company of Londonj practised glazing. In September 1793 
John Banner had applied to the Glaziers' Company to be admitted as a 
freeman but was refused on the grounds that "He did not have the right 
to carry 
. 
on the trade not having served an apprenticeship"' 
12 He was 
described as wa plumber of Cripplegate". The smallness of the Bannerst 
shares suggest that they were not men of any great wealth. 
The site of the project was a patch of land on the south oe the 
Tyne near Gateshead known as the Saltmeadows. A glasshouse was already 
erected here. It. had been built as a bottlehouse c. 1735 by Joseph. 
Liddell, worked briefly by James King in the 1750s, and was at that time 
in the possession of Isaac Cookson under lease from the descendants 
of Liddell - Ann Ibnner of Callertonp Sarah Bonner of Gateshead and 
Joseph Liddell of Moorhouse in Cumberland. The use of this, glass 
house was secured by an agreement made in August'179513 whereby the 
Bonners and Liddell leased the premises. to Barber, described as 
"the agent for a company formed to carry on a glass manufactory", for 
twenty years at a rent of E180. (The land itself was on lease from 
Newcastle Corporation. ) Considering the low capital the company 
fortunate in being 
was intending to start with it wasAable to lease an existing glass 
house and thus economise on initial expenditure. 
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Despite the original partnership having been drawn up in 1793 
the company does not appear to have started in earnest until 1795 when 
in February of that year, a new partnership with an increased capital 
was drawn up: 
John Barber f, 29500 
John Banner Zlv500 
Francis Banner Z 500 Total capital Z5,000 
William Johnson f, 500 
William Johnson was to act as clerk in the manufactory but he 
gave up his share in March acknowledging that he was unable to advance 
his E500 and transferring his shares to John Barber. The firm started 
production in 1795 and was listed in the 1796 Directory for Newcastle 
as "Ilderton and Barber". No Ilderton was ever a partner in the firm 
but*the name provides a clue as to where Barber drew his capital from. 
Charles Ilderton was, like Barber A Newcastle attorney . and 
had married 
Barber's daughter Ann. In 1792 he succeeded to the estates and 
fortune 6f his distant cousin Robert Ilderton of Ilderton and Westoe 
but unfortunately did not live long enough to enjoy them for. he died 
in December 1793, his fortune beiyzg. ýleft to his widow. Ann Ilderton 
(nee Barber) was evidently understood to have some connection with 
the glass house for she was named as a defendant in the Banners* first 
Bill of Supplement against the firm in 1795. In reply she disclaimed 
all interest in the glass house but it seems highly probable that at 
least some ýf her fortune was being used in the company under her 
fatherts(John Barber*s)name. 
The partnership between the Banners and Barber ended in public 
argu I ment. In September 1795 the Banners inserted notices in the 
Newcastle papers stating their distrust of Barber and their refusal 
to pay bills drawn by him. In reply Barber accused them of not paying 
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up their share of capital for which he refused to execute the deed of 
partnership. 
14 Finally, in November the Banners issued a Chancery Bill 
against, Barber, Ann Ilderton, William Johnson., the Bonners and Liddell 
for money that they claimed was owed them by the partnership. In reply 
the Bonners and Liddell, Ann Ilderton and William Johnson disclaimed 
all interest in the partnership (Johnson adding that he too was 
owed money for the brief time he had worked there as a clerk. ). Barber 
admitted his interest but denied the debt. 
Before the Banners* bill had even been exhibitedg Barber had 
embarked on a new venture. On 2 November 1795 a new partnership deed 
was drawn up between himself, described as "owner and proprietor of 
a crown glass house at Saltmeadows"jand three new partners: 
John Barber f, 2., 500 
Richard Strutt Z1,000 Total capital f, 5,000 
Thomas Strutt f, 11000 
Thomas Wheeler Z 500 
The Strutts and Wheeler were all London glass cutters and prominent 
members of the GlaziersCompany. They were to be admitted into the 
partnership on the deposit of their shares into an account taken out 
in the company's name in the Tyne Bank; which money was to be used 
Oto carry on the manufactory .... until the manufactory can from its 
own returns do without it 11, In other words they were supplying working 
capital which, in this case, amounted to 5076 of the total initial 
capital. On the same day Barber raised a further 91,000 of working 
capital by selling two of hisfive shares to James Crankshaw of Newcastle 
and this money too was deposited in the Tyne Bank. 
Like its predecessor, this partnership was to prove an abortive 
one for in May 1796, before the deed had bee executed, Barber was 
declared a bankrupt. His new'partners came off rather unfortunately 
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from this; it was discovered that Barber had used the money they 
had paid into the Tyne Bank to pay of f his other debts; and although 
he had maintained there was sufficient stock at the glass house to 
manufacture E4,000 worth of crown glass this was found to be untrue 
and production had to be stopped "for want of kelp and money which 
occasioned grdat loss". Finally an extent - in - aid was issued 
against the company by the crown in order to recover duties of excise 
owed and the new partners were obliged to discharge it out of their 
own pockets. Despite these unforeseen expenses the remaining partners 
agreed to carry on the concern on their own account assuming that as 
the deed of partnership between them and Barber had never actually 
been executed they were the sole owners of the glass house. This 
. assumption was shaken in March 1797 when the two Banners issued another 
Bill of Supplement against them and Barber's assignees for the money 
still owed them, In reply the Strutts argued that the Banners had 
no claim on the manufactory and that Barber had forfeited his claim 
by becoming bankrupt. The case was heard in Chancery but a judgement 
deferred until a proper account could be taken of the company; this 
was never done and, to the probable relief of the Strutts, the case 
became defective on the bankruptcy of Francis Banner in 1797. 
The partnership of the Strutts and Wheeler was to carry on the 
Tyne Glass Company until 1813 without further assistance or capital 
from the Banners or the Barbers or any of their assignees. They 
themselves remained in London where they appear in the directories as 
"glass cutters". "glass merchants"q and occasionally and misleadingly 
"glass manufacturers". Their presence in London created the need for 
trustwortly managers at Gateshead and thus in 1797 shares were sold 
to two local men, Joseph Henzell and Robert Turnbull, on condition 
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that they jointly manage the concern; the price of the shares was 
the original Z500 each. From his name it seems probable that 
Joseph Henzell had had previous experience in glass houses; Robert Turnbull 
certainly had, since in the 1790 Newcastle Directory he was listed as 
the agent to the Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company. Further 
share assignments took place in the early years of the nineteenth 
century with the entry of other London glass cutters; - Thomas Kent, 
Samuel Parker, William Parker and Henry Hammond. -Of these new partners 
the most significant was Henry Hammond for it was through him that 
Thomas Oak Smith and Charles Attwood were to enter the firm. In 1804 
when Hammond bought his one tenth share in the Tyne Glass Company he 
was in partnership with Attwood and Oak Smith as glass cutters and 
dealers. The shares were bought on behalf of the whole cutters 
partnership and when in 1810 Hammond retired, the glass house shares 
passed to these two. Attwood and Smith were to take over the entire 
Tyne Glass Company in 1813 and it is perhaps slightly ironic that 
their entry into glass manufacturing, in which they were to prove 
so ablep was so much a matter of chance; a consequence of their 
primary business as glass dealers. 
Charles Attwood (1791 - 1885) was the sixth son of Matthias 
Attwood, an extremely wealthy Midlands iron master and banker. 
15 
There seems to be no obvious reason for CharlesO entry into the glass 
trade beyond the fact that it was a promising trade in which a younger 
son might embark on a commercial career. Charles* three elder brothers 
had been started off in more distinguished directions: the eldest, 
George had inherited the Attwood banks Matthias and Thomas had both 
gone into Parliament as M, P. s for Whitehaven and Birmingham respectively. 
The remaining sonsfollowed a more prosaic career in trade; Edward 
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began as a merchant in Liverpool, James as a Russia merchant in 
London, and Charles as a glass merchant in London. (Despite beginning 
in trade, all the younger Attwood brothers ended up in manufacturing; 
James as a mineral manufacturer and mine owner in Cumberland, Edward 
as a glass manufacturer at Sunderland and Charles as a glass manufacturer 
and later an iron master. ) From such a wealthy background and with a 
direct connection to the Attwood Bank, there seems little doubt that 
Charles was an eligible partner in any business. 
Before Attwood and Oak Smith bought up the Tyne Glass Company 
more legal troubles occurred. In June 1810 John Barber, "late of 
Newcastle upon Tyne and now of Rolls Building London". and his son 
Thomas, a jeweller, exhibited a bill of complaint against John Banner, 
the assignees of Francis Banner, the Strutts and all the other partners 
claiming that they were owed over E2,000 independent of the partnership 
account and that this money should be paid to them out of the profits 
of the glass house. Neither the Barbers nor the Banners had renounced 
their claims on the concern even though they had taken no active part 
in it for the last twenty years. In 1809 Francis Banner advertised 
for sale his "one tenth of the Tyne Glass Company plus the profits 
made since its commencement in 179411 
16 
and in 1810 Thomas Barber also 0 
put his three tenths up for sale. 
17 
Given this entanglement of claim 
and counter claim it is perhaps not surprising that the rightful 
owners should have been led to abandon the business; in 1813 a notice 
was inserted in the papers to the effect that the partnership had 
come to an end and the concern was now closed. 
18 
I 
The Tyne Glass Company did not close in 1813; it had, in fact, 
been bought up by Charles Attwood and Thomas Oak Smith. By 1813 
they had already purchased half of the shares in the hands of the 
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London glass cutters and in November 1813 they purchased the 
Strutt9s sharesq described as "one half" of the concerný for ; 93.567. 
There is no doubt that by these purchases Attwood and Smith considered 
themselves to be the sole owners of the glasshouse and, incredible 
though it appears, Attwood was evidently ignorant of its complicated 
legal history; he later claimed that he had never heard of either 
Banner or Barber until summoned to appear in the Chanctry suit of 
Banner v Barber in the autumn of 1813.19 
Attwood thus "unwittingly became involved in a law suit of 
long standing and almost interminable complication. -", He determined to 
fight it to the end but it was not until 1822 that the case was finally 
dismissed in Attwood"s favour as "the most melancholy case ever to 
disgrace the Chancery annals 11, According to Attwood's biographer 
it had taken its toll on him financially and mentally: 
'To Mr. Attwood it meant little short of absolute ruin ... Nine 
years had been frittered away in a vexatious and costly litigation 
which completely unhinged his prosperity and created a gnawing 
sense of insecurity. When the trial terminated he foundthat the 
parties from whom he should have recovered his costs were mere 
men of straw. He was thus the poorer by thousands of pounds. 
This is perhaps a slightly exaggerated account of the effects of the 
case on Attwoodfs prosperity for the Tyne Glass Company appears to 
have flourished from the takeover of Attwood and Oak Smith-in 1813. 
It is more than probable that the resources of the Attwood bank helped 
in this recovery. No financial records of the company have survived 
but we do know that the bank advanced money to the glass cutter*s 
business in London in which Attwood remained a partner. In 1817 
Henry Hammond went bankrupt and amongst his debts was his share of 
f. 10,000 advanced to him by the bank in 1815 in partnership with 
Charles Attwood and C. F. Woolcott as glass cutters and dealers, 
20 
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It seems not unreasomble to assume that money was also advanced 
to 
the manufacturing end of the business especially as there 
is evidence 
that the works were considerably improved in 1813,21 
The favourable financial connections enjoyed by Attwood should 
not however obscure a more important factor in the company's success 
after 1813. This was a patent taken out by Attwood in 1817 
22 
which was 
not merely a crucial element in the success of one particular 
firm but 
a significant landmark in the progress of glass chemistry 
in Britain. 
Briefly, the patent consisted of the use of pure manufactured soda and 
lime in place of kelp as the alkali used in the manufacture of crown 
glass. In the patentfs words it consisted of the use of I'lixiviated 
ashes (or earthy residue of kelp or barilla) combined with different 
alkaline or saline matters and lime or calcerous earth in certain very 
variable proportion! e'l, which method-, "was different from the use of 
kelp or barilia according to any mode heretofore or at present in use 
The use of soda occurred in the addition of the alkaline or saline 
matter: 
And further I do declare that I have found the addition of 
the crystalised carbonate of soda in proper proportions to the 
other materials according to the circumstances, a very con- 
venient and effectual mode of adminstering such additions of 
alkaline or saline matter as aforesaid. 
Attwoodfs patent was not the complete replacement of kelp by soda; he 
used soda in combination with the insoluble earthy residue of kelp. 
Nevertheless the wording of his patent was so general that he appears 
to have patented the use of soda in any proportions at all and not 
just his particular mixture, which the patent describes in detail. The 
patent frequently repeats that no absolute proportions can be laid down 
as "the manufacturer will be better'guided by his own observations and 
experience and by attention to the variations in the cost and charges 
in the different articles and modes than by any rate ok rule which 
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may be given for that purpose. ". His own particular mixture was therefore 
to be taken as an illustration and guidance only and not as the substance 
of the patent. 
23 By patenting the use of soda in crown glass Attwood 
gained an unassailable advantage over his fellow manufadturers. It was 
not until the fourteen year old patent expired that the use of soda was 
taken up by other manufacturers - notably Cookson and the Birmingham 
manufacturer R. L. Chance - who developed improved methods that completely 
did away with kelp altogether. 
The inspiration-fDr Attwood*s patent was his conviction that the 
standard quality of glass was poor and thýre was much scop e for its 
improvement. His patent must, thereforev be seen as dealing primarily 
with quality and not with any improvement in the cost or efficiency of 
its manufacture. The fact that it did pioneer a development that was 
ultimately to reduce costs was purely fortuitous; at the time soda was 
not being produced on a commercial scale and was not, therefore, a cheap 
alternative to kelp. The main improvement resulting- from the use of soda 
was the colour of the glass; it enabled glass "instead of being in 
colour something like a goose egg to assume the smooth and transparent 
consistency it now retains". 
24 
Further improvements were included in 
the same patent for "lessening the arching, crooking or curvature of the 
table of glass which takes place commonly, if not always, under the modes 
of operation at present in use .... while the glass is conveyed to the 
annealing arch and in the said annealing arch". This consisted of a 
metal framework designed to keep the glass in a perpendicular position 
without anylateral pressure before and during annealing. 
Attwood's success in both in improving the quality of his glass 
and, by means of his apparatus, enabling large tables to be manufactured 
I 
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is clearly apparent from contemporary comments. According to Abraham 
Rees writing c. 1810 
25 
The large crown glass of Messers Hammond and Smith is superior in 
quality as well as in size to that of any other manufacturer .... 
the glass of Messers Hammond and Smith is 6011 in diameter and will 
admit -of being cut into squares of about 33" 
by 2311 and a little 
more or less. This glass is almost free from those specks, wreaths 
etc. which discolour other glasaand distort thecbjects seen through 
it. It now supplies the place of German sheet glass for prints, 
large sashes and exportation to those foreign markets where that 
glass was formerly made. 
According to Samuel Parkes: 
26 
It was formerly thought to be a great acquistion to be ablep by 
this (crown) process, to make a perfect table of glass 4 feet in 
diameter but I understand that Messers Attwood and Smith$ formerly 
Hammond and Smith, of Gateshead in the county of Durham are enabled 
to produce tables of 5 feet which are the more valuable as they 
yield larger squares than were ever made, except in plate glass, 
and the quality of it is of the best kind. 
In addressing himself to the quality of glass Attwood was typical of 
others who took out glass patents during this period. Very little 
attention was paid to efficiency, or cheapness in the manufacturing 
process for the incentive to introduce new methods of manufacturing was 
low due to the fact that any alteration of the traditional manufacturing 
process had to pass the test of acceptance by the Board of Excise. It 
was not until the 1830s that low manufacturing costs became a significant 
factor in a manufacturer9s success and not until after the repeal of the 
glass duties that low costs became a necessity for survival. The first 
quarter of the nineteenth century was a time when competition between 
manufacturers was becoming keener and customers nicer in their choice. 
This, plus the fact of price agreements in the trade, tended to channel 
competition into the area of quality. The importance of good quality 
in the market may well have been appreciated more fully by Attwood, 
primarily a London glass dealer, than by his fellow manufacturers in the 
north-east. In 1817 Attwood was still based in London at the London 
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warehouse of Attwood and Smith in Bridge St. Blackfriars; he was 
described in the patent, as a "glass manufacturer of Blackfrix s". 
One of the first to take up the use of soda in crown glass following 
the expiry of Attwood's patent was the Birmingham manufacturer R. L. Chance. 
Chance told the 1835 Commissioners,, with every justification, "we are one 
of the most experimental houses in the trade" and it is interesting 
that like Attwood he should also have come into manufacturing after a 
successful career as a London glass dealer. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that two of the most active improvers of crown glass should have shared a 
background in the London glass trade. It is also probably no coincidence 
that Chance should have taken into his partnership, in the late 1820s, a 
man who had previously been the managing partner at Attwood's house - 
James Hartley. Attwood and Smith had carried on in partnership with 
William Richardson until January 1817 when theytook James Hartley into 
the concern as a managing partner. 
27 There seems little doubt that 
Chances' own experiments with soda would have been helped considerably 
by Hartleyts own experience in Attwood's house. However there is 
evidence that the transfer of knowledge was not entirely one way. One 
of the surviving pieces of evidence from the Tyne Glass Company is a 
notebook devoted to technical matters such as a number of9recipes-'* 
for crown glass amongst which is one marked "by letter from. J. Hartleyl 
Smethwick 30 June 1829" 28 (the comment attached to this recipe js 
"colour excellent, works well" and the ingredients listed are: 15 cwt. 
sand; 6 cwt. IL-qr. carbon; 4 cwt. Bristol best ashes; 6 cwt iron crystals). 
The recipes in the notebook serve as a reminder that what Attwood stated 
in his patent was true, namely that no absolute fixed proportions could 
be laid down and that the colour, strength and transparency could be 
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altered ad infinitum by minute variations in the ingredients. These 
conditions put a high premium on the services of men such as James 
Hartley whose progress upwards from salaried employee to managing 
partner was almost certainly not a reflection on his ability to supply 
capital but rather on his ability to produce glass of good quality 
thus giving his firm a significant advantage in the market place. 
Hartley's progress is matched by another man associated with the Tyne 
Glass Company, W31liam Richardson who also left in order to become a 
managing partner with another firm (see below). 
Attwood's Tyne Glass Company was one of the most significant of 
the north-east ccown glass firms operating during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. It set new standards for quality and size and pioneered 
a major chemical development. It is not surprising that years later 
Attwood should have been singled out for especial mention in connection 
with local improvements-to glass by R. W. Swinburne. 
29 
Swinburne praised 
Attwood, not merely for the contribution made by his patent but for many 
other improvements for which "the manufacturers of glass are much indebted" 
and which, although Attwood himself had been prevented from pursuing 
them by his other commitmentsp had since all been put into practice. 
Besides being a significant firm the Tyne Glass Company was almost certainly 
a profitable one. No financial accounts from the company have been found 
but the house was sufficiently successful to enable Attwood to expand 
by buying a second house at Southwickv on the Wear, c. 1825; this was 
the crown house that had previously been occupied by Burns and Brumell 
(see below). Attwood was also successful enough to be joined in the 
trade by his two brothers Benjamin and Edward following Thomas Oak Smith's 
retirement in 1822. Attwood's success is also suggested by the statistics 
provided by the 1835 Commissioners (see Appendix 1) which show the 
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original Gateshead house to have had the largest production of any of 
the north-east crown glass houses in 1832 and the SouthWick house to 
have had the fourth largest production. There is no doubt that both 
houses were at a considerable advantage in having a secure outlet in 
London, in the glass cutters and dealers business of Attwood and Smith, 
but the major factor in the success of both houses was almost certainly 
the ability and application of Attwood himself, and in particular his 
concern with improving the quality of the commodity he was producing. 
(iii) The North Tyne Glass Company 
The North Tyne Glass Company is linked to the Tyne Glass Company 
by the involvement in both of one man - William Richardson. Richardson's 
share in the Tyne Glass Company had come through his father, Thomas 
Richardson, a painter and glazier of Newcastle who in 1803 had bought 
from Joseph Liddell his share in the land on which the Tyne Glass Company 
was built. By 1816 William Richardson was in partnership with Attwood 
and Oak Smith all as subtenants under Thomas Richardson. The presence 
of Richardson was probably welcomed by the two major partners for whilst 
they remained in London they had need of an able managing partner in 
Gateshead. 
In 1825 William Richardson left the partnership to take up a 
presumably larger share of a new company being established at St. Peter9s 
Quay in Newcastle upon Tyne - the North Tyne Glass Company. His partners 
in this venture were Robert Gothard, a local ship builder and John Ridley 
(no relation to Sir Matthew White Ridley). Unfortunately nothing is 
known about the share agreement and capital of this company but its 
establishment is quite interesting in another respect in that it appears 
to have involved not just enterprise in glass but enterprise in the 
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speculative building of glass houses. The promoter of the speculative 
building was the owner of St. Peter9s Quay, William Row. Rowts interest 
in glass was not in the trade itself but as an element in his plan to 
establish St, Peter*s as an important commercial and manufacturing site 
on the river. His activity was therefore confined to erecting glass 
houses and offering them for sale or to let to others. Row hltd already 
built a bottlehouse on St. Peter's Quay and added to this in 1823 with 
a broad glass house which advertised that it was producing broad green 
window glass of a superior quality in August 1823.30 The fact that it 
was a broad house rather than a crown house probably says something 
about Row's lack of knowledge or commitment to the glass trade. If 
his intention was to sell the concern to another party however, then he 
was successful for in April 1824 George Dunn informed Sir Matthew White 
Ridley that "A Mr. Gothard has purchased the new broad glass house at 
31 St. Peter9s of Mr. Row ". This was soon converted into a crown house 
for in May the Newcastle Courant reported a small fire in the flashing 
furnace of the "North Tyne Glass Company" at. St. Peter's and in June 
the three partners, Richardson, Gothard and Ridley petitioned the 
Common Council saying that their manufactory was "nearly completed" and 
asking for permission to extend the quay to make it sufficiently deep 
for vessels at neap tides. 
Encouraged by the success of this venturet Row appears to have tried 
to repeat the exercise for in May 1824 Dunn wrote to Matthew White Ridley 
that "William Row is gone up to London where a connection is to be 
formed to build another crown house on St. Peter9s Quay-" (connection 
in this case meaning agreement with a dealer to buy the glass from the 
house )e Another glass house was soon built and in June 1826 Row offered 
for sale the "just completed Crown Glass Manufactory at St. Peter S,,. 
32 
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The advertisement claimed that the house could commence making glass 
immediately as "a set of Workmen are engaged and pots ready with a 
connection formed that will take all the glass they can make. " It also 
pointed out the advantage of the depth of water at the quay which could 
accommodate vessels of 9 or 10 ft. of water thereby saving an expense 
of E3-4,000 a year. The depth of water at the opays seems to have been 
an important consideration for both the North Tyne and the Tyne Glass 
companies and indeed silting of the Tyne in the 1830s and 1840s was 
certainly one factor in the decline of Newcastle and Gateshead as centres 
of the industry. Row did not find a ready buyer for his new crown house 
for it continued to be advertised until 1828. In that year it was 
almost certainly taken over by the North Tyne Glass Company which by 1833 
was working two houses at St. Peter's. 
The second interesting aspect of the foundaticn of the North Tyne 
Glass Company is that it highlighted the inevitable consequence of an 
increase in the number of glass houses in the area -a shortage of skilled 
labour. The recruiting method used by the new company-was simply to offer 
the men in other glass houses far higher wages than they were at present 
receiving; in April 1824 Dunn wrote to Ridley "the newcomers offer the 
men at liberty such high wages as throws the rest into confusion". The 
loss of men who were not boundv and the disturbance caused to those 
who were, was considerable and in May Dunn wrote that the men were all 
demanding the wages being offered by both Gothard and Attwood. Attwood's 
wages were the highest of all forl as he confessed to Dunn, he had felt 
obliged to cancel all his ments old agreements and give them higher wages 
than those offered by Gothard "as he was afraid of losing what he had 
left 11. The Newcastle Company suffered quite badly from losses of men 
and in April Dunn reported that they had hardly sufficient to work two 
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houses. By June the remaining workforce was stillolvery refractory and 
quite unreasonable in their demands for upstanding wages" 
but the 
immediate crises had been averted for new men had been got from Scotland3, 
others were being quickly instructed in the vacant jobs and the new 
house was allowing them to keep some of their men until needed: 
Those that are hired from us cannot leave before October and as 
the new concern cannot make any glass this year they won't have 
any objection to our keeping the men, if we choose, until wanted 
and these men are doing all in their power to oblige us which 
makes me submit patiently - althol very much against nature. But 
will continue to do so for the interest of the firm. 
One interesting small episode in this labour crisis suggests that the 
Newcastle Company had considered William Richardson himself as a 
prospective managing partner. In May Dunn wrote to Ridley on this subject: 
I note your opinion concerning Mr. Richardson. Theday after I 
heard they had engaged some of our men some thought struck me 
concerning that you mentioned and having a small bill to pay him 
on my account called at his house where he observed what a pity 
it was that we had not such a man as Mr. Brown who manages the 
outdoor business for Messers Cookson and Cuthbert. I repliedl 
smiling, that such a situation might have answered another persont 
he took the hint and observed he was very much obliged for the 
good opinion I had of him but that he was bound fast. 
(iv) The South Tyne Glass Company. The Sunderland Glass Company. 
The Southwick Glass Company 
One notable feature of the development of the local industry in 
this period was the growth of glass houses beyond the traditional centre 
of Newcastle. As we have seen flat glass manufacture spread up river 
to Lemington, across the river to Gateshead and to these examples we 
must add a second crown house at South Shields and two new crown houses 
at Sunderland. Unfortunately no detailed information about any of these 
firms has come to light and therefore it is only possible to sketch in 
their development making assumptions from the few available facts. 
The first assumption is that none of these firms was a particularly 
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large or ambitious venture since none was founded by men of conspicuous 
wealth. Two of the firms were founded by men who were already in the 
glass trade as bottle or flint glass manufactureis, Richard Shortridge 
and Addison Fenwick, which in their cases probably meant that the 
initial capital requirements were smaller than they would have been had 
they been entering the glass trade for the first time. 
The crown glass house at South Shields was established by Richard 
Turner Shortridge, a Quaker originally from Stocktons who already 
occupied a flint glass house in the town. It was presumably the success 
of his flint glass house that persuaded Shortridge to enter the crown 
glass trade, taking John Russell and John Barrass as partners. 
33 They 
began manufacturing crown glass c. 1806 as "The South Tyne Glass Company". 
The company established itself in an existing glass house that had been 
built by the short lived bottle manufacturinS firm of Temple and Blackett 
at Mill Dam, South Shields c. 1802. In 1805 the bottle house had been 
offered for sale pointing out that it was suitable for conversion into 
a crown glass house 
34 
and although still for sale in 1806 it was almost 
certainly bought by Shortridge in that year. It was certainly in 
Shortridge's possession in 1807 when it was damaged by fire and in January 
1808 Shortridge, Russell and Barrass bought a number of glass house pots 
from Sir John Delaval. Some idea of the size and value of the firm 
can be gLthered from an insurance policy taken out in 1811: 
Shortridge, Russell and Barrass, South Shields 
36 
Crown glass house, cutting shop, pot loft, 
warehouse, all co=unicating at the Mill Dam .......... Z20700 
Clay house, clay millp kelp mill, mixing house, 
single and double cellarp all brick and tile ......... f, 300 
This was an average size andvalue for a single house firm (see p. 144D 
for a comparison with Cooksonts three house firm in 1808). 
4- 1 
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Shortridge Russell and Barrass continued to manufacture crown 
glass until 1845. Richard Turner Shortridge died c. 1817 and was 
succeeded as major partner by his son Richard Shortridge 
(1792-1884) 37 
A second crown glass house was built during the boom of 1824 but appears 
to have been put out during the subsequent depression: by 1833 Shortridge 
was only working one flint house and one crown house at Shields. The 
building of the second crown house aggravated the labour crisis of 1824 
particularly as Shortridge was evidently not too, scrupiilous in his methods 
of recruitment. According to Dunn in April 1824: 
38 
Mr. Shortridge has acted very improperly by sending one of his men 
up amongst ours a few days after Mr. Head took ill and got one 
away who Mr. Head had privately agreed with for two years but no 
articles signed ..... I went to Shortridge's works at 
Shields on 
Wednesday last when the man was working and after bel. examined 
by Mr. Shortridge2s solicitor (himself being in London I got the 
man discharged and he came back to his work here next day. He is 
a very good workman and besides we are not well off for workmen, 
several having left since Christmas that we cannot work two houses 
together. But getting this man back will do good. 
Although the loss of any workman was a set back to the firm, a good 
workman had a crucial effect on the firm's profitability since the quality 
of the glass depended to quite a large degree on the workmants skill. 
According to G. R. Porter variation between the qualities of firsts, 
seconds and thirds, was largely caused by thesldll of the workmen: 
39 
These variations (firsts, seconds and thirds) arise principally from 
the want of sufficient care on the part of the attendants in main- 
taining the necessary degree of heat in the furnace . If this is 
once suffered to fallg the property of the glass in being a very 
imperfect conductor of heat renders it difficult to raise it again 
to the former degree. In the operation of a large glass house it 
does not happen that beyond one third of the quantity made is of the 
first quality; seconds and thirds compose the largest proportion 
of the produce and it seldom occurs that the quality sinks below 
the latter of these two denominations. 
The first crown house at Sunderland was the Southwick crown glass 
house built by Thomas Burn and George Brumell during the late eighteenth 
century; the first apparent mention of the Southwick Crown Glass Company 
is in 1788.40 Although broad glass had been manufactured at Southwick 
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in the early eighteenth centuryg the crown house was at a quite different 
site, further up the river. Both Brumell and Burn. were local men, Burns 
being a ship builder and ship owner of some local standing. 
41 
During 
the early nineteenth century the house was managed by John Brumell who 
signed petitions to the Board of Excise on bthalf of the company in 
1807 and 1813. Burn and Brumell occupied the house until c. 1825 when 
it was taken over by Charles Attwood. The crown glass house at Bishopwearmouth 
belonging to George Fenwick & Co. appears to have been erected at a slightly 
later date; the company did not sign the 1807 petition to the Excise from 
the crown glass manufacturers of Tyne and Wear but the company was 
certainly in production by 1812 when both it and the Southwick company 
complained to the Excise about the conduct of the local excise officers 
(see p. 431 ). The Fenwicks were also bottle manufacturers and owned a 
warehouse in London through which their crown glass was sold. 
It is unfortunate that not more is known about these two companies 
fort although perhaps not particularly important in themselves, they are 
significant in that they mark the beginning of the development of serious 
flat glass manufacturing on the Wear; a development that would culminate 
in the Wear usurping the Tyne9s traditional position as the centre of 
the region*s flat glass industry. The most important dates in this 
development are Attwood*s move to Southwick c. 1825 and James Hartley's 
establishment of the Wear Glass Works in 1836. The two earlier companies 
are important predecessors howevers firstly in proving1hat the Wear held 
equal advantages with the Tyne in respect of manufacturing costsv and 
secondly in establishing a pool of skilled glass workers. Whether 
Attwood would have moved to the Wear had he been required to start from 
nothing rather than merely take over the house, plant and workforce of 
Burn and Brumell is not known but it seems fair to assume that their 
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existing presence on the river must have been a considerable encouragement 
to him. 
(v) The Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company 
This period was also one of considerable change for the oldest crown 
glass company in the region. Broadly speaking this change was an attempt 
to transform the company into a type of business organisation more 
appropriate to the nineteenth century: firstly, by shifting the companyts 
resources from broad glass to crown, and secondly, by reorganising the 
partnership infavour of the minority of active partners. Both these 
changes were largely effected around 1825 and were completed by 1827 
when the company becane in effect a completely new firm, no different 
in essence from any other crown glass firm on the Tyne, headed by a small 
partnership of six and concentrating on the manufacture of crown glass 
alone. 
There is no doubt that the incentive to rationalise the company was 
considerable. Both dividends (fig. 7) and a single stock account 
of 1812 indicate that, despite a comparatively-small amount of fixed 
capital, the concern was a highly valuable ones and furthermore that 
value lay largely in their production of crown glass rather than the 
outdated broad glass: 
Crown Glass Stock, taken 31 December, 1812 
44 
Debts to sundries Z10,934 6s Od 
Duty to government U4,333 7s Id 
Balance of stock ; Z49,333 16s 9d 
Amount of buildings 
Glass on hand 
Debts due 
Raw materials 
; Z7,915 15s 10d 
; E3,, 949 5s 6d 
; Z45,516 7s Ild 
U7.219 19s 7d 
04,601 9s 10d L74,601 gs 10d 
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Fig. 7: Dividends on the Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company 
1785 - 1825 
45 
Crown Glass Broad Glass 
1785 f. 480* f, 20** 
1786 - - 
1787 456 19 
1788 - - 
1789 
1790 - 
1791 420 18ýg 
1792 - - 
1793 500 21 
1794 500 21 
1795 320 15 f, 326*** ; El4** 
1796 400 17 - 
1797 720 30 - 1798 600 25 - 1799 480 20 - 1800 600 25 - 1801 840 35 - 1802 - 1803 19440 60 312 13 
1804 lp200 50 240 10 
1805 1., 200 50 360 15 
1806 lp680 70 336 14 
1807 1., 200 50 288 12 
1808 lv200 50 144 6 
1809 lp320 55 240 10 
1810 lp440 60 288 12 
1811 19440 60 312 13 
1812 1.. 680 70 336 14 
1813 1P200 50 312 17 
1814 1., 520 65 336 10 
1815 29400 100 400 10 
1816 12200 50 240 10 
1817 600 25 240 10 
1818 960 40 288 12 
1819 lp440 80 288 12 
1820 1., 200 50 288 12 
1821 lp08O 45 288 12 
1822 ItOSO 45 288 12 
1823 2p515 115 240 10 
1824 2p515 115 - 1825 
Notes: =-Figures not available 
Dividend received by Matthew White Ridley on 24/114 of the 
crown company 
Dividend per share 
Dividend received by Matthew White Ridley on 8/24 of the 
western broad house and 16/24 of the eastern and middle broad houses. 
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Although the dividends suggest that the production of crown was 
substantially increased in 1802 it was not until the 1820s that the 
eastern and middle glass houses were given over completely to crown along 
with the existing western crown glass house. As had already been mentioned, 
labour shortages meant that the company was hard pressed to keep even 
two houses fully manned and the excise statistics for 1832 provided in 
the 1835 Commission'show the company working two crown glass houses 
and one broad house (the middle bottle house had been sold off to Robert Toddp a 
bottle manufacturer in 1823 
42 ). According to Thomas Dunn, the company's 
managing partnersin his evidence to the 1835 commission, demand for 
sufficient to keep 
broad glass was negligible and notýeven one house in work the whole year, 
nevertheless broad glass continued to be manufactured until 1842VIlen 
the company advertised the St. Lawrence house,, "a building recently 
used as a broad glass house". to let. 
43 The manufacture of broad glass 
was notq therefore, completely abandoned but from the late 1820s onwards 
there is no doubt that the company was primarily a manufacturer of crown 
glass. 
The initiators of the shift towards crown glass were, as might be 
expected, those active partners at Newcastle who managed the firm and 
were familiar with the changing demands of the market. Their motives in 
this change were almost entirely self-interested ones for at'thesame time 
as they were rationalising the company2s productive resources they were 
also attempting to rationalise its ownership by buying out all of the 
sleeping partners. This was to be a deliberate and artificial change in 
the ownership of the company but, in itself, it was the result of a more 
natural change, namely the entry into the partnership of men with more 
ambitious ideas than their predecessors. The four architects of the 
scheme to buy. up the sleeping partners were Sir Matthew White Ridley 
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(the third baronet), Robert Hedley, John Head and George Dunn. Ridley 
hadýsucceeded to his shares in the company on the death of his father 
in 3813; from whose legacy duty papers comes an interesting account of 
the value of the glass company compared to the family's other interests: 
46 
Account of the Personal Property of the late Sir Matthew White Ridley, 
1813 
Province of York 
Cowpen Colliery 
Broad and Crown Glass Company 
St. Lawrence Bottle house 
The High Bottle house 
Heaton stock (hay etc. ) 
Blagdon stock 
Bank 
Tithes 
Province of Canterbury 
3% consols 
Navy 5%s 
Globe insurance shares 
House in Portland Place 
Furniture in above 
S20,000 
Z 9,, 049 
Z 4pl8l 
f, 39718 
f, 500 
f, 500 
U51000 
; Z372000 ........ Z89p948 
f, 89 000 
Z 20000 
f, 29 000 
Z53,500 
Z 21000 ........ Z191500 
The glass shares represented his 24/114 and 24/120, in the crown 
company and broad glass houses respectively, which can be roughly estimated 
as.... one fifth of the whole. He owned one half of the St. Lawrence bottle 
house and one tard of the High bottle house. The second active partnerv 
Rober Hedley had succeeded to the 14 crown glass shares of George Lake 
having been left them in Lake2s will 
47 
as an investment until he should 
reach his majority. John Head 1-ad managed the crown glass houses since 
1791 and although only possessing 4ýg shares himself, was keen to acquire 
more. George Dunn had succeeded to his shares from his father John, a 
merchant of Tonnichside near Glasgow, who in 1777 had brought shares 
in the St. Lawrence broad house and crown house from Meg Tyseman of' 
North Shields, the daughter of PeregrineHenzell. 
48 
George Dunn managed 
the St. Lawrence house until 1818 when he became the second manager of 
the crown houses. 
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On the expiry of the crown partnership, in 1809 the active partners 
at Newcastle took legal advice on the possibility of excluding from a 
new partnership those partners "who have become such as personal 
representatives of deceased partners whom the majority know little of 
and who, residing at great distance. from the manufactory,, cannot con- 
,, 49 
veniently be consulted or give assistance to the co-partnership business 9 
A list of shareholders in 1812 confirms that the proportion of non-resident 
ýO or sleeping partners was indeed large. Shares 
Matthew White Ridley 24 
R. Hedley 14 
F. Hall Staindish 12 x 
Alexander Adams 8 
William Hargreaves 12 x 
Mary Wilton 14 x 
Thomas Shadfor. th 8 
Elizabeth Rawlinson 8x 
Elinor Hays 4x 
James Hamilton 3ý, 2x 
John Head A4 
Henry French 2 
x= non resident partners 
The non resident partners included a minor, F. Hall Staindish, the heir of 
Anthony Hall of Wombwell in Yorkshire. With him in mind the active 
partners had also taken advice on the possibility of excluding minors from 
the partnership but had been told thatalthough minors could not carry on 
trade, their trustees-could. Hall Staindish's trustee was George Baker 
of Elemore Hall in -Durham. 
The other non-resident partners included a 
variety of people. William Hargreaves was the High Sheriff of Northumberland 
and lived on his estate at Shawdon in the north of the county . He had 
come by his shares by being the assignee of Catherine Henzell, the sister 
of Thomas and daughter of Peregrine Henzell. Mary Wilton was the 
daughter of Paul Henzell who had been chief managing partner to the 
company until his death in 1790. Mary Wilton lived in London as did 
Elizabeth Rawlinson, the grand-daughter of Peregrine Tyzack. James 
Hamilton was a merchant of Tonnichside near Glasgow and Eleanor Hays, the 
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widow of John Hays of Durham who had held shares in the company 
during the 1780S. All of these people contiibuted nothing to the 
partnership and yet received the profits on 5114 of the 114 shares. 
Following the increase in crown production at the beginning of the 
century the profits thus being dispersed were quite substantial ones; 
in 1815 the dividend had reached ZlOO per share which meant a total 
of Z51,000 being paid out to the sleeping partners. It is easy to see 
how this could be termed a "loss" by the active partners; either a loss 
to the firm itself which had need of re-invested profits to further 
increase the producticn of crown, or a loss to their own pockets. Either 
way, it was evidently not seen as a satisfactory state of affairs by 
the active partners and by 1818 there was written mention of a plan 
to buy out the sleeping partners. 
Besides draining profits from the firms the high proportion of 
partners living at a distance from Newcastle produced another problem. 
For the first time in its history the company found itself with a shortage 
of suitable managing partners. In the early years of the century the 
managers had been John Head and Henry French but French's death in 
1815 and Head's increasing age led Matthew White Ridley in 1818 to 
offer the management to someone outside the partnership - William 
Lorraine. 51 Lorraine was offered a salary of Z200 per annum plus the 
profits on two shares which he would be permitted to buy at a low 
price. Pierce objections to this offer were raised by John Head on 
the grounds that to admit a new partner would harm their "plan"s under 
which he hoped to receive 141-4 shares, which would now have to be 
revised. His objections proved unnecessary for Lorraine declined the 
offer saying that two shares were not enough and neither was the 
salary considering the age and infirmity of Head. The management 
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was eventually given to George Dunn who was already the manager of 
St. Lawrence broad house. Dunn appears to have bought the eight 
shares of Alexander Adams who died in 1817. Head himself died in 1824 
and his intestate death added in a small way to the problems of the 
active partners; George Dunn wrote to Ridley in 1824 expressing his 
concern that "should Headts trustees agree to continue with the glass 
house trade the owners may one day be very numerous and am afraid. this 
may damage our plan. ". 
The plan to purchase the sleeping partners" shares was not Put 
into operation until 1824. Why the active partners delayed their 
moves until 1824 is not known but it may have been a consequence of 
the depression in trade of 1817 - 1818 and the lack of sufficient 
profits on their own shares to finance the purchases. In retrospect 
their timing was badly judged for to delay until the boom conditions 
of 1824-5 meant purchasing the shares when their value was atits highest 
and this meant a not inconsiderable expense which could possibly have 
been avoided had they acted earlier. Approaches were made to all the 
sleeping partners by Sir Matthew White Ridleyts solicitor, Armorer Donking 
and an early success was the purchase of Mary Wilton9s shares in March 
824.52 This was followed in April by the purchase of Miss Rawlinson's 
eight crown and broad shares for 45,371 cash and in that month Donkin 
was able to inform Ridley that he had provisionally agreed for the 
purchase of Mrs. Hayts shares and had high hopes of getting those in 
Scotland (by this time in the possession of James Hamilton and Ralph 
Ironside, both of Tonnichside). By June negotiations were going well 
with all parties bar two - George Pawson of York,. the assignee of 
William Hargreaves, and Frank Hall Staindish. Staindish's shares were 
still in the trust of George Baker who, being in the locality, was in 
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a good position to judge the value of the concern. Staindish had 
in fact considered selling his shares in 1820 which Baker firmly 
recommended against - "the., glasshouses are a very valuable property and 
53 
sold would not bring in one quarter of their value. "* It was probably 
on Baker's advice that Staindish rejected Donkin's initial offers in 
1824 and the active partners were certainly aware of Baker"s influence in 
this matter; in June 1824 Dunn reported to Ridley that when Baker had 
come to collect Staindish's dividend he had asked about the new firm 
at St. Peterts Quay and whether this would mean a reduction in their 
profits, which Dunn had heartily assured him would most certainly be 
the case from henceforth. Dunn also told Donkin to press this point with 
both Staindish and Pawson; to emphasise that "so many new manufactures 
are beginning in the same branch both here and in other places" and that 
this would reduce their own future profits. 
In December 1824 Pawson took the initiative in the negotiations by 
setting his price at V50 per share. Donkin replied by offering 9725 
which represented the purchase price paid to Mrs. Wilton plus the profits 
for 1824. This offer was not accepted but in March 1825 Pawson did 
agree to sell for the slightly reduced price of L710 per share. This 
slight reduction was said to be due to a "reduction in value" but this 
may have been deliberately engineered by Donkin; in March he told Ridley 
that although the crown profits for 1823 and 1824 stood at U15 per share 
"actually the profits are more but in the book stand as cash in hand 
Staindish was not long in following Pawson9s example and in May 1825 
he sold his twelve shares to the remaining partners for a total. price 
of Z10,000 which represented his twelve shares valued-at Z710 plus the 
profits for 1823-5. 
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The purchase of StaindishOs shares completed the major stage 
of the plan. It left the finals and in many ways equally difficultv 
stage of deciding how the shares should be re-allocated among the remaining 
partners. Following some arguments a proposal was drawn up by Donkin 
and put to the partners in August 1825 for their approval: 
Shares purchased of the non-resident Partners ,,,,, 591-z 
Shares divided among the old partners ............... 541' 
Matthew White Ridley 24 existing shares plus 16 40 
Mr. Hedley 14 tf it it 10 24 
George Shadforth a 4 it it 04 18 
George Dunn 8 tt it 14 22 
Joseph Sewell - 10 10 
50-4 5 04 114 
George Shadforth was an old partner whos although not taking as 
active a part in the firm as Ridley or Hedleyo livid in Newcastlep was 
a man of considerable wealth and influencep and thus was a useful partner 
(his shares had been inherited from his father, Thomas, who had married 
Elizabeth Orde to whom shares in the glasshouses had been left by 
Jane Roddam). Joseph Sewell was a new partner. He was to be admitted 
as a managing partner and this proposal resurrected the old argument 
over whether a new manager should be offered shares. In the same way 
as Head had objected to Lorraine in 1818 so, in 1825, did George Dunn - 
the existing manager - to Sewell. Following Head*s death in 1824 Dunn 
had written to Ridley assuring him of his loyalty but insisting that 
he should continue as the sole manager: 
It is impossible that more than I can have the sole management ... 
... Fromthis year's experience if there had been another manager 
with myself the business would not have been got done as it has, 
altho9 not as well as I could have wished for. When clerks and 
men have two men to apply to daily no command can be had over them 
the reverýe would be the case. But when a manager satisfies himself 
and makes up his mind to act firmly they pause before they complain 
again. 
In Dunn*s opinion all1hat was wanted was an "outdoor manager" who would 
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0 
be salaried and subservient to Dunn. The company employed three 
clerks (on salaries of E150y U00 and f, 50) wd in the event of the 
manager's indisposition one of the partners could step in to supervise 
with the help of the outdoor manager and the three clerks. 
Dunn's protestations were in fact a prelude to his suggestion 
that his son Thomas succeed him as the sole manager; a suggestion that 
the other partners did nottake kindly to and they continued in their 
search for another managing partner. The first man they considered was 
Robert Todd who owned the nearby bottle house. Dunn objetted and they 
turned to another candidate, Joseph Sewell. Sewell, like Toddl was 
already in manufacturing on his own account and owned the St. Anthonyts 
pottery in partnership with Armorer Donkin. It was Donkin who had 
first put Sewell9s name forward vouching for his character and pointing 
out the many useful qualities he would bring to the-company, including 
an extensive foreign connection. Donkin*s espousal of Sewell's cause 
was not entirely disinterested for, as he confided to Ridley., "Entre 
nous, if Sewell were to be engaged in any way we would avail ourselves 
of the first opportunity of getting rid of the pottery. It has paid 
us well but I only entered into it to save Seviell and would be glad 
to be out of commerce altogether. ". It was considered quite in order 
for 'Sewell to divide his time between the two concerns and it was 
suggested that he spend three mornings a week at the glass house "which 
would be ample for all the purposes of general supervision and check". 
Despite continued objections from Dunn,, Sewell was eventually admitted 
into the partnership and Donkin9s Proposals of August 1825 were accepted 
with the proviso that should Sewell quitthe pottery four of Ridley*s 
shares should be transferred to him. 
- 137 - 
The establishment of a new and smaller partnership did not result 
in the immediate large profits that the new partners hopel for. The 
boom of 1824-6 was followed by a severe depression in trade and in 
consequence the reduction of the firms profits to, at its lowest point 
in 1831 . nil. The total profit for 1332 was only Z914 4s 5d which, as 
Dunn wrote to Ridley,, "is certainly an improverwnt as compared to 
1831 but is a miserable profit for so large a capital". The dividend 
was an equally miserable ZIO per share,, "which is the most we can do 
because of the long credit we are obliged to give 11. The fact that the 
profit was so low for so large a capital was certainly the most miserable 
aspect of the whole situation. Altogetker the partners had spent at 
least Z20,000 and possibly as much as f. 40,000 merely in purchasing 
shares. This money was money invested in the company and yet it was 
entirely unproductive for it represented nothing more than the paper 
value of the shares when their value was at its highest. As has already 
been described, at the same time as the capital was being Increasedt the 
fixed resources of the firm and its productive capacity were being 
contracted. The result was a company whose large capital was not 
fully matched by its productive capacity and therefore a company that 
afforded little satisfaction to its partners in times of bad trade. 
The bad trade of the early 1830s resurrected the problem of 
management. In'1833 George Dunn wished to retire but as trade was so 
unprofitable could find no one to purchase his shares from him at their 
proper price. His anxiety either to sell his shares or have a new manager 
appointed contrasted sharply with his hostility to a second manager in 
1824-5; so keen were both he and Sewell to give up some of their duties 
of management that they offered to give up part of their salaries to 
an outside manager if a new managing partner could not be found. This 
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outside manager would live in and supervise early and late whilst 
Dunn would keep the books and Sewell supervise the mixing department. 
They suggested for this post a Mr. Brown who had been employed at 
Cooksons but who was leaving "because he cannot effect a great improve- 
ment in the glass". Dunn was eventually replaced by a new managing 
partner Anthony Nichol. Nichol, like Sewell, was a protege of Armorer 
Donkin. He had left Newcastle to try hisland at farrxing and trade in 
London but "distance having made a God of him among his few personal 
friends in the town he was through their agency promoted to a situation 
in an extensive glassworks". 
54 
The disappointments of the bad trade immediately after the boom of 
the mid twenties should not obscure the good performance of the Newcastle 
Crown and Broad Glass Company during most of this period. The dividend 
accounts-clearly show that profits for the first quarter of the century 
were high and far exceeded anything realised in the eighteenth c(ýntury. 
The down swing in trade after 1825 was not something that could have 
been avoided and the fact that the company had by this time been 
transformed into a more typical nineteenth century crown glass company 
meant that at least it was able to survive this depression; had the 
company remained as a broad glass firm with a high proportion of 
sleeping partners then it almost certainly would not. The only qualification 
tolhe achievements of this period is the considerable expense involved in 
Purchasing the sleeping partners' shares which was a direct consequence 
of not acting until 1824 and could perhaps have been avoided. Why the 
partners did delay until 1824 remains something of a mystery; as we 
have seen the "Problem" of the sleeping partners was seen as such as early 
as 1812 and a plan to buy them out was certainly in existence by 1818. 
ll 
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Isaac Cookson & Co. 
In such a prosperous period for the glass trade it was perhaps 
inevitable that the Cookson company should share in the general good 
fortune and experience a period of high profits and expansion. What was 
not inevitable was the spectacular degree to which the company exploited 
these favourable conditions for its dramatic growth in this periodifar 
exceeded anything achieved by any other company. The major factor 
behind this spectacular growth was, arguably, the skill and dedication 
of the company's proprietors, and in particular the Cooksons. This 
company was most fortunate in its family for the Cooksons provided four 
generations of almost faultless-'entrepreneurial skill from which the 
firm benefited. The major Cookson of this period was Isaac Cookson(1745- 
1831) who had taken over the management of the firm on his father9s 
death in 1783. To himrust go most of the credit for the achievements 
of this period although his sons John and Isaac took active parts in the 
glass companies from at least 1802. 
1802 marked a major re-organisation in the Cookson glass companies, 
which was brought about by the death of Isaacts brother John Cookson 
whose interests in the bottle house on the river Tyne were advertised for 
sale in August of that year. 
55 His death put the glass interests entirely 
into Isaac Cooksonts hands and he appears to have used this opportunity 
to re-organise the various partnerships in order to bring his two sons, 
John and Isaac, into the trade. The bottle house at Bill quay was 
given to a partnership headed by his eldest son John and including 
Jane Deers the daughter of Evan Deer, and Samuel Wilson, a one time manager 
of the crown house at South Shields. The company traded under the name 
Cookson, Deer and Wilson, or just John Cookson & Co. Isaac Cookson jr., 
the third son, was given a half share in 
ýhe two bottle houses at Newcastle 
which became known as Isaac Cookson & Son. In addition both Isaac and 
John were given a'share in the crown and'plate company at 
became known as Isaac Cookson & Co. This company included one outsider 
William Cuthbert (1778-1815) a wealthy Newcastle - attorney and a founder of 
the Tyne Bank. Cuthbert does not appear to have had any previous formal 
connection with the Cooksors and it is possible that"'he merely bought the 
shares of the late John Cookson. In 1802*the bottle company at Shields 
became known as Cookson and Cuthbert instead of, its previous name of 
Cookson, Deer and Blackett. 
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The exact composition of Isaac Cookson and Co. is not known but 
there is no evidence to suggest that the partners included anyone apart 
from the three Cooksons and William Cuthbert. A third house had been 
built at the site c. 1807 and an insurance policy taken out in 1808 
gives a good indication of the size and value of the firm at that 
time: 56 
Isaac Cookson & Co. of Newcastle upon Tyne; glass manufacturers 
1. Kelp mills, potlofts and cellars, warehouse., 
all under one roof at Milldam, S. Shields 91,500 
2. Stock and utensils there E11000 
3. Glasshouse, adjacent but not communicating f, 300 
4. Building called "The Calkers" f, 100 
5. Cutting houses warehouse, clay cellar and 
mill Z2. '000 
6. Stock and utensils therein L33,000 
7. Middle glass houset only near Z 600 
8. Round glass house, only adjacent f, 500 
9. Joiners shop and fret rooms underneath z 400 
10. New houses under one roof at Milldam f, 500 
11. Old houses in tenure of T. Johnson and others f, 100 
All brick or tiled as aforesaid 
Total f'11,000 
Additional policy covering houses near t he market 
place, S. Shields. In tenure of Isaac Cookson, 
Samuel Wilson, T. Dixon, glassmaker, C. Maddison 
glassmaker, Thomas Lee victux Iler and Isaac Cookson Jr. 
f, 22000 
The comparatively low vduation of the actual glass houses is interesting 
and underlines that the fixed capital demands for the industry were not 
large; production methods had not, after all, materially altered since 
the adoption of coal fired furnaces in the seventeenth century. 
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Although under excise regulations., plate glass was permitted to be made in 
a crown house, it seems likely that two of these houses were crown 
houses and the remaining one devoted to blown plate. 
The major expansion seen by Isaac Cookson & Co. in this period was 
not a further expansion of their existing capability in crown and blown 
plate glass, but an entirely new departure; the introduction of cast 
plate glass. Cast plate, as its name suggests, was plate glass made 
by casting or founding the metal on a large iron table. The advantage 
of this method as compared to blowing it in cylinders was that plates 
of a larger size could be obtained. Until the entry of Isaac Cookson 
& Co. there was only one other cast plate firm in England; the British 
Plate Glass Company at Ravenheady which had been founded in 1773 with 
an incorporated joint stock of 970,000.57 The large capital of this 
company and its unfortunate history of financial loss in its initial 
years had perhaps disuaded others from. followingits example and it 
enjoyed a complete monopoly in the plate glass trade until Cooksonts 
entry in 1815. It was said that a London firm, Quintin and Windleg 
attempted to establish cast plate in the early years of the nineteeth 
century but this attempt was not a successful one and the credit for 
breaking the Ravenhead Company*s monopoly must go to Isaac Cookson. 
Cookson9s entry into cast plate must then be seen as a move of 
considerable significance not just in the history of one firm but in 
the national development of the flat glass trade. It had very real 
' Parfli, 
effects on the trade for by breaking the monopoly Cookson was, ýesponsible 
for reducing the price of plate glass by about 5076 (this figure was 
mentioned in the 1835 Report as an example of the beneficial effects 
of free competition, but it should be pointed out that price reductions 
in this period were also the result of the reduction in duty of 1819)o 
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These reductions in the price of plate glass around 1826 were of 
great importance in encouraging the wider use of plate glass for 
ordinary glazing purposes. There is no doubt that polished plate glass 
had occasionally been used in windows throughout the eighteenth century 
but that its price successfully prohibited its potential as a glazing 
glass being fully realised. It was not until the 1850s that plate glass 
came into its own as a cheap glazing glass but the movement towards 
this end was significantly accelerated by the expansion of production 
and the reduction of prices around 1820. 
Information about the establishment of cast plate glass is to be 
found in a series of cash books belonging to the Newcastle offices of 
Isaac Cookson. 58 Although the actual manufactory was at South Shields, 
the crown and plate glass company was known as Isaac Cookson & Co. 
"of Newcastle upon Tyne" and in practice the finances were managed from 
the Newcastle office. In fact the Newcastle office appears to have 
acted as a general office for all the Cookson glass concerns, - the 
bottle houses at Newcastle, the Bill Quay house and, laterv the Jarrow 
Alkali Company - receiving large remittances and paying out bills on 
their accounts, receiving export debentures and transferring money 
to and from the Newcastle Bank of Ridley Bigge & Co. Thus the cash 
booksp whilst not being able to give a complete picture in day to 
day detail of any one of these concerns, provide an invaluable overall 
view of the finances of the Cookson industrial interests. 
Two aspects of the transition to cast plate are immediately 
obvious from the cash books. Firstlyq the transition was spread out 
over a decade for although the actual casting of the plate at the 
South Shields house appears to have been successfully accomplished by 
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1815 it took until 1826 for the plate glass works at Forth Banks in 
Newcastle to be brought to completion. The Newcastle works housed the 
polishing and grinding stages of the manufacture which in some respects 
were the most important parts of the whole process in that it was on the 
polishing that the value of the commodity depended. Unpolished or 
rough plate glass was comparatively worthless and for a cast plate glass 
concern, with its' large initial capital, to yield a satisfactory return 
on the capital invested it had to be able to sell the glass completely 
finished and ready to use as polished plate glass. The works at Forth 
Banks were begun in 1815 on land leased from Major Anderson. 
The second aspect of the venture revealedby the cash books is 
that in terms of investment in fixed capital and labour saving machinery 
the polishing works at Forth Banks waS far more significant than the 
Plate glass house at South Shields; indeed it seems fair to say that 
the Newcastle plate glass works was the nearest the early nineteenth 
century north east glass industry ever got to the mechanisation of its 
manufacturing methods. The difference between the two, sites is well 
illustrated by their respective amounts of insurance; by 1826 the cast 
plate house at South Shields was insured for Z3,000 in the County Fire 
Office whereas1he Forth Banks works was insured on two, policies; one 
of f, 5slOO for the grinding sheds and steam mill and one of 98,200 for 
the "high plate works" or polishing house. It is true that the 
insurance on the high plate works included a stock of polisled plate 
glass but even so the difference inthe policies reflects a difference 
in the amount of machinery particularly steam powered machineryq at 
each site. 
"1 
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Before describing in more detail the two sites, something should 
be said about the moving of the polishing works to Newcastle which 
physically separated the different stages of the manufacturing process. 
Basically the move seems to be a simple reflection of the predominance 
of Newcastle as the main commercial centre on the Tyne during this 
period. and in particular of the fact that Newcastle had a customs house. 
There were mom opportunities for shipping plate glass, both within 
the British Isles and abroad, at Newcastle than at South Shields and 
thus by moving the polishing works to Newcastle Cookson avoided the risk 
of transporting the polished plate glass up the river for shipment. 
The risk involved in transporting the rough plate was small since 
the plates were not fragile (rough plate was manufactured twice as thick 
as it would eventually be after polishing) and neither was the cost of 
transporting it large; at the end of every year Cookson deducted a sum 
from the accounts for "bringin3 the rough plate from Shields, boat hire$ 
unloading the boxes and labouragell which never amounted to more than 
VO. The company's acceptance of the redominance. of Newcastle is 
well illustrated bya comment made by William Cuthbert to the 1835 
Commissioners. As 0. mam1facturer whose factory was in South Shieldsj A 
he might have been expected to support the movement for a customs 
house at South Shields but Cuthbert declared himself uninterested and 
predicted that "a customs house at Shields will have little to do, all 
the export business will remain at Newcastle". 
The length of time taken for the full perfection of the plate 
glass works at Newcastle suggests that the operation was financed from 
the internal resources of the existing company and indeed there are no 
indications in the cash books of any external source of capital; there 
are no payments of interest on loans or mortgages until 1826 when 
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the site of the Plate works and the whole Westgate estate was bought from 
Major Anderson on a mortgage of E10,000. Although internal capital 
was undoubtedly the most important source for the company,, Cookson also 
received an unexpected cash boost from the government in the shape of 
the drawback on exported rough plate. As Cookson himself told the 
1835 Commissioners, when theJ irm began to manufacture cast ph te the 
workments efforts were so poor that he exported the plates rough merely 
for the sake of claiming the drawback. By doing so he unintentionally 
profited from the badly drawn up legislation which made no distinction 
between polished and rough plate, (seepp. 3,77-378); 
-. 
the draw- 
back was calculated per square foot of glass making an allowance for a 
loss of 50% of the glass during polishing. Cookson made the matter known 
to the Excise as soon as he realised-he was claiming back about three 
times what he had paid in duty, but it was claimed that he had pocketed 
nearly V0,000 from the whole affair, which indeed the excise statistics 
would seem to confirm (see Fig. 20). 
The site at Forth Banks comprised a large grinding house2 a steam 
mill and a polishing house. The steam mill,, or "Knox*s Mill",, was used 
for grinding the plaster of paris in which the plates of glass were 
secured during grinding and polishing. All the buildings had been erected 
by the company c. 1816-1818 and the first insurance policy was taken 
out on the site in 1818. In 1819 the high plate works was insured 
separately from the steam mill and grinding shed and both policies were 
gradually increased to reach their eventual levUs of Z8,200 for the 
high plate works and Z5,100 for the grinding shed in 1826. The cash 
books show a'steady increase of machinery and steam power at both sites. 
Machinery components usually came from the iron and steel foundry of 
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I. & T. Cookson and in the cash books were usually itemised in 
general terms as, for instance, "Cast Metal for the steam mill"; 
occasionally an item was described more completely, as, for instance, 
in August 1818 when as "iron curtain for the emery machine" was 
purchased. Purchases of and repairs to boilers and pistons occur from 
1816 onwards, which indicates that steam power was being used right 
from the beginning, but the two original engines were replaced by larger 
ones in 1822 and 1823. In 1822 Robert Wilson, an engine builder and 
whitesmith whose works was also at Forth Banks, was paid for "a new 
engine at Knoxts Mill" and in 1823 payments began to be made to Robert 
Hawthorn, whose works was nearly adjacent to the plate glass worksv 
for a new 50 h. p. engine. Hawthorn9s total bill came to Z2,480 including 
U. 500 for the new engine, Z352 for additional power to Knoxts engine and 
E441 for an engine and a new inclined coal way at the crown house at 
Shields. This 50 h. p. engine was still doing sterling work in 1863 
and was mentioned with pride at the British Association meeting as an 
59 
example of Tyneside engineering skills. Hawthorn built another 
25 h. p. engine for the plate works in 1831 at a cost of Z700. 
The grinding and polishing of the glass were both well suited for 
adaptation to steam power. Essentially the process was the same as that 
described by Campbell in 1747 ;a plate of glass was held horizontally 
in a frame and moved backwards and forwards on a surface on which sand 
and running water constantly played. The only requirement for the job 
in Campbell's time was strength and therefore it was an obvious candidate 
for the substitution of steam power for muscle power; the Ravenhead 
Company had used a Boulton and Watt engine since 1789. Cookson's works 
and the employment of steam power is well described in'The Penny Magazine 
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of June 1844.60 The first stage of the process was the grinding which 
was done "in an immense room filled with machinery in a, constant state 
of rotation". The plates of glass were cemented into flat frames with 
plaster of paris and inverted, one over the other, the top one being 
attached to the engine which kept it constantly moving in a rotary motion. 
Sand and water were fed between the plates by small boys. After grinding 
the plates were roughly polished in a similar fashion and finally the 
plates were polished, again assisted by steam, by a system of wooden 
polishers covered with felt and a polishing paste of red oxide, emery and 
putty. The cash books include regular and large purchases of all these 
raw materials; emery and plaster of paris were usually purchased from 
other Newcastle merchants, felts from hatters and leather straps from 
coach makers. 
The brief description of the works given in -The Penny Magazine- is 
amplified by the evidence given to the Children's Employment Commission 
of 1842,61 this evidence creates a rather depressing picture of the 
nature of the labour demanded by the use of steam powered machinery. 
Glass grinding had never been a skilled job but by abolishing the require- 
ment of strength the use of machinery had put the task within the capacity 
of women and boys. In 1842 the plate glass works employed 109 women, 
91 men and 30 boys and of these it was the women and boys who attended 
the machinery. The women were largely employed in the polishing house 
and the boys in the grinding shed where they stood or sat on benches 
beside the machine and fed sand and water on to the glass whilst trying 
to avoid being hit by the "runners" constantly moving back and forth. 
Many, -of the boys had in fact been injured by the machinery and the 
Commission inspector, John Roby Leifchild, noted that he had frequently 
pressed the case for fencing off the machinery to the manager but had 
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been told it was impossible due to the necessity of constantly 
inspecting 
the glass. Not only was the work hazardous it was also unhealthy 
for 
the windows were not permitted to be opened as "outside dust would be 
injurious to the polishing process"; as a result Ahe air was thick with 
dust from the sand, th4emery and the ground glass. 'The machines were 
kept going all day from six in the morning until six at night or 
occasionally later if demand was strong and the boys were expected to 
work these hours and to eat their meals in snatches whilst standing 
at the machinery. The picture of the glass works that emerges from the 
Commissioners'Report is of a place of unrewarding and unpleasant labour 
being performed by unskilled boys from poor families. 
The writer of The Penny Magazine also visited the plate glass house 
at South Shields which provided a striking contrast to the noisy labour- 
saving machinery at Newcastle; "here everything is changedý the men 
are different, the buildings, the processes, the materials, the machines 
all are so totally distinct as to appear like a different'subject of 
manufacture altogether 11. The South Shields glass house was a larges 
gloomy and silent place and the actual casting of the glass was a 
most impressive sight; the intense light from the molten glass produced 
dramatic effects of light and shade and the temporary oxidisation caused 
when the glass was rolled out produced a swirl of brilliant-colours-on 
the surface of the glass. 
The cash books begin in 18162 after casting had begun, and there- 
fore there is no information about the initial expense of the new method. 
However it seems fair to assume that it was not too large since most 
of the necessary iron equipment - the casting table, cuvettes, rollers 
chains, etc. - could have been supplied by the Cookson foundry. There 
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was not the expense of building a new casting house for the first 
castings were performed in the old blown plate house and it was not 
until 1820 that a new casting house was built. This new house was first 
insured in 1820 for Z2,000 with an addition of Z600 in 1821 for a new 
loft and stock of pots. In 1824 a fire destroyed the roof and the 
insurance was renewed at f. 3,000. This new plate house-was said to have 
been built for Cookson by the Newcastle architect and builder John Dobson, 
which seems perfectly plausigle in view of Isaac Cookson jr. 's later 
employment of Dobson at the Westgate estate and in designing Cookson's 
country house at Meldon Park. 
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Although the polishing works at Newcastle was a significant step 
towards more efficient production it still depended 
completely on the cast plate house at Shields whkh continued to 
produce cast plate by the only known method which although practicable 
was somewhat lengthy and wastefulsý_J- Production of platet using cheaper 
and more efficient re thods, did not become a reality until the actual 
casting of the plate had been improved and this problem was not tackled 
with any great success until the late 1830s and 1840s when the lifting 
of the excise regulations permitted greater scope for experiment and 
improvement. Cookson9s cast plate did not pioneer any new methods or 
equipment and it-therefore was important only in that it substantially 
increased the amount of cast plate in the market thereby encouraging 
a reduction of prices and the use of plate glass for glazing. 
As previously mentioneds the claim made in the 1835 Commission 
that Cookson9s entry into plate glass reduced prices by 5076 was probably 
confused with the effects of the reduction of duty in 18190 however 
there is'no doubt the competition Cookson provided did have an effect 
(: av 
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on the prices of the British Plate Glass Company. Some idea of the 
effect can be seen in the many advertisements taken out by the British 
Company in the Newcastle papers during the early 1820s advertising their 
reductions in prices and firmly pointing out that "it is acknowledged 
that the Companyls plates are far superior to any others manufactured in 
63 England ". Their first price reduction of 2s 9d per sq. ft. occurred 
in 1819 which was of course merely an effect of the reduction of duty 
but in 1820 they advertised a further reduction in price of 0-2 - 2076 
depending on the size; this was almost certainly a response to Cookson. 
It is difficult to draw a direct price comparison between the 
British Plate Glass Company9s, glass and Cookson's as the glass quoted 
in the Company9s advertisements is invariably silvered whereas Cookson 
appears only to have marketed unsilvered glass, and the only comprehensive 
price list that has been found for his glass consists entirely of unsilvered 
glass. 
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One direct comparison can be made, but it is in the Irish, 
market. The evidence given to the 1825 Commissicn into the Revenue 
included price lists supplied by two plate glass dealers in Dublin. One 
of these dealers, Mr. Donovan, was the agent for the British Plate Glass 
Company,, the other. Mr. Kearney, did not name his supplier but as 
Cookson was the only other cast plate manufacturer in England at the 
time it seems fair to assume that it was him. The price comparison is 
interesting for it shows Cookson with a price advantage in the smaller 
squares of plate but the Company providing cheaper glass of large 
sizes: 
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Size Mr. Donovan Mr. 
_Kearney 12 x 101, 3s 7d 
. 
3s 4d 
15 x 11 6s Ild 6s Od 
18 x 14 10s 6d 
20 x 16 17s 8d 19s 4d 
19 x 18 18s 3d 20s Od 
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24 x 18 23s 5d 26s Od 
35 x 22 49s ld 53s 2d 
48 x 22 92s Od 94s 3d 
56 x 30 192s 3d 200s Od 
62 x 47 487s 7d 
The f act that Cookson marketed only unsilvered glass and that he was 
cheapest in the smaller sizd panes suggests that he was aiming at the 
market for glazing rather than for mirrors. This is also suggested by 
one of his major complaints to the 1835 Commission which was that the 
wastage. allowance was inadequate for the maufacture of small panes 
of glass; Cookson claimed that the duty per ft. on a plate 14411 x 8011 
was 30% of the price but that on a smaller plate 1411 x 1011 it was 
60 - 70%. 
Cookson*s ccncern with producing a glazing glass is also suggested 
by the fact that his glass appears to have been of a slightly lower 
quality than that produced by the British Plate Glass Company; mirror 
glass had to be virtually perfect with no distortions whatsoevert 
window glass had lower standards. The quality of Cookson's glass did 
in fact create some difficulties with the Board of Excise in 1819 when 
Cookson was forced to petition the Treasury complaining that the 
export officers at London had been rejecting his glass as "not perfect" 
with the result that "the whole of the respectable part of the trade 
in London have given your memorialist notice that they decline further 
transactions until the matter is settled with the Board of Exciselle 
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The difficulty had arisen as a result of the 1816 legislation closing 
the loophole allowing the export of rough plate which had directed 
that all exported plate glass should be "free from stains and blisters 
and be perfect and fit for immediate use as and for ground and polished 
plate glass". The export officers had takento interpreting this definition 
to the letter which Cookson pleaded was quite unreasonable as there was 
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no such thing as a completely "perfect" plate and so long as the glass 
was polished and fit for immediate use it should be allowed to be 
exported. 
The Excise*s report to the Treasury on the subject sympathised with 
Cookson and a new definition was drawn up and inserted into the plate 
glass act of July 1819. This act made Cooksonts position worse in 
several respects for its main purpose was to reduce the duty on plate 
glass from fA l8s per cwt. to Z3 per cwt. which left Cookson with a large 
unsold stock of plate glass on which the higher duty had been paid but 
which he was not now able to pass on to the customer. He approached the 
Excise solicitor, Mr. Carr, who agreed to allow the firm a discount of 
duty of ls 9d per ft. on its complete stock of glass as taken on 
July 5th 1819. The stock amounted to 742 ft. at the Newcastle warehouse 
and 13,821 ft. at London, plus a few cwt. of rough plate glass and the 
total discount amounted to S2,175 4s 4d. This sum was eventually paid 
to the firm but not without some reluctance on the Boardts part on 
account of the informality of the agreement made between Carr and 
Cookson. The affair underlines the tendency of the Excise to bend 
according to the standing of the glass manufacturer it was dealing with; 
Cookson enjoyed the advantage of being on gooa terms with the Board, 
and in particular Mr. Carr. Cookson & Co. was thecnly glass house to 
receive this rebate of duty: according to Carr "the stock of that house 
was the only one on which it was agreed to be allowed and they alone 
claimed it, tt. 
Most of Cooksonts cast plate went to the London warehouse but the 
cash books disclose a regular trade to local'_customers and a certain 
amount exported by the company from Newcastle. The export entries 
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illustrate well the considerable benefits to be gained by being able 
to export direct and claim the immediate cash payment of the 
drawback: 
from the manufacturer9s point of view the drawback almost amounted to 
the government advancing money on behalf of the foreign customer, since 
a large proportion of the home value of thegtass could be in the manufact- 
urer9s pocket before it hadeven reached its destination. In April 1817, 
for instance, a cargo of 680 ft. of plate glass was sent to-Antwerp; the 
drawback was Z222 but the remittance from Vanderhoeven Bros. of 
Antwerp for 678 ft,, and received four months later in August, was only 
V6 14s 5d. The following year Vanderhoevans were sent 999 ft the draw- 
back of which was E321 and the remittance only L108 7s 2d. The most 
frequent destinations for crown and plate glass were, as might be expected, 
North America and the Baltic. To the 1835 Commission Cookson and Cuthbert 
declared their principal export markets to be Canada and the East Indies 
with themselves sending direct to Canada but using the medium of the 
London East Indies merchants for exports to India; there is one 
instance of the Company sending direct to India in the cash books. 
The drawbacks noted in the cash books were neither regular nor partic- 
ularly frequent, occurring for the mbst part in the spring months. In 
all they usually amounted to about 30 shipments per year, including 
cargoes of bottles, but the amounts were occasionally quite large 
claiming drawbacks of up to Z700. 
Remittances from English customers were collected by travellers 
who were sent out regularly on journeys to the South, the North and 
Ireland. London customers paid the warehouse and local customers paid 
the Newcastle office directly. Not surprisingly among these local 
customers are found the builders of some of the more notable buildings 
of the time. Richard Grainger ordered f, 368 worth of plate glass in 
I- 154 - 
February and June 1833 at which time he was engaged on his projects 
at Eldon Square and Leazes Terrace. 
It is unfortunate that not more is known about the structure of 
the partnership of Isaac Cookson & Co. . and in particular who was the 
moving spirit behind the move into cast plate. Whilst there is no 
doubt that Isaac Cookson snr. continued to hold the major proportion 
of shares in the company the fact that he was approaching 70 in 1815 
suggests that the move was perhaps planned and executed by his children 
Isaac and John, 39 and 43 respectively in that year. Isaac certainly 
appears to have been controlling the Newcastle offices from at least 
1816 since the cash books are clearly his and contain some of his personal 
financial transactions. It is especially unfortunate that the exact 
shares in the partnership are not known for it is thus impossible 
to deduce the exact value of the whole concern from an account of the 
estate of Isaac Cookson snr. on his death in 1831 (see Fig. 8). The 
stock in trade of the crown and plate glass company is certainly a 
proportion of the whole (the leasehold estate perhaps remained his own 
personal property) but it seems safe to assume that it was a large one. 
The only known share holding of any of the partnersis that of Isaac 
Cookson jr. who held 3/32 shares. One interesting point from this 
account isthat Isaac Cookson snr. had no interest in the Jarrow Alkali 
Company despite the fact it had grown out of the soda works in the plate 
glass works. The Jarrow Alkali Company was entirely the concern of 
Isaac Cookson jr. and William Cuthbert jr. 
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3. 
4. 
Figure 8: Account of the Personal Estate of Isaac Cookson snr. 1831 
67 
Cash - in house and banks (Ridley & Co. & Roberts & Co. ) 16,, 187 
Furniture etc. 10600 
Farming stock 250 
Stocks in trades viz; 
Wrought iron and steel 95., 264 
Cast Iron Foundry 3v930 
Crown window & plate glass works 35,506 
South Shields bottle works lj718 
Newcastle bottle works 3,, 272 
Paper mill 177 
5. Leasehold estates, viz. 
Iron and steel tenements 
Cast iron foundry ' 
Crown & plate works, premises 
& tenements 
South Shields bottle works 
Crow Hill tenements 
Westwood farm 
"The Tygar" public house 
oooo**.. eooooso 49,868 
Z200 
650 
182212 
21785 
158 
598 
19200 
osooosooooooooo 239804 
6. Rents due at death 560 
7. Bonds, Bills, notes and interest 62167 
8. Canal shares viz. Grand Junction Canal + dividend 930 
9. Book and other debts., . viz. 
Wrought iron and steel 6., 762 
cast iron foundry 7,, 420 
Crown & plate works 24v927 
South Shields bottle works 10196 
Newcastle bottle works 10,479 
Burroden Quarry 187 
Corporation of Newcastle(ballast) 709 
Johnston and Brandling 82 
oosooooosooooooo 51,765 
10. Bank stock, consols 232939i 
11. Dividends on above 4,301 
Total of Property ; 9387,829 
PAYMENTS 
I. Administration and funeral expenses 159814 2. Rents and taxes due at death 
3. Debts, various 29086 
Net amount of Property Z369.928 
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Altogether the growth of Isaac Cookson & Co. during this period 
was extremely impressive. The works at South Shields had doubled in 
size, crown glass production had increased and cast plate had-been 
successfully introduced. Perhaps most important of all the foundation 
of low cost production had been laid with the adoption of soda 
in crown glass and the mechanisation of half of the plate glass process. 
The Cooksons had shown great technical and commercial initiative and 
their activities had affected not merely their own firm but the whole 
glass trade in England, in particular the plate glass trade. By the 
1830s the use of plate glass as a glazing glass was well established; 
in 1835 Charles Babbage pointed to its increased consumption and the 
fact that all the better class, shop fronts were glazed with 
plate. 
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By this time the use of plate glass for glazing'had been further 
encouraged by the establishment of several new, large cast plate firms 
such as the Thames Plate Glass Company and the Liverpool and Manchester 
Plate Glass Company which beganin 1836 with a joint stock of U00000 
(and advertised for a manager in the Newcastle papers in February 1836). 
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1830 - 1850 
The changes experienced by the north-east flat glass industry 
during the 1830s and 1840s were if aything more dramatic than the 
spectacular growth of the preceding four decades. According to the 
statistics appended to the 1835 Excise Report, the north-east possessedq 
at that time, a remarkably healthy flat glass industry; in 1832 eight 
flat glass companies were in operation in the region producing between 
them a substantial portion of the national production of crown, plate 
and broad glass. By 1850 none of these eight companies were still in 
existence, the number of companies had dwindled to four, all of which 
were comparatively newly established concerns or partnerships: 
R. W. Swinburne & Co. had been formed in 1845 to take over the Cooksonst 
works: James Hartley had established his glass firm in 1836: the Wear- 
mouth Crown Glass Company had taken over Attwood9s Southwick works 
c. 1838: the Tyne Tees Glass Company had taken over Shortridge9s 
old crown house in 184ý. By 1850 only three of the old works were 
occupied by flat glass firms, the remaining five being either vacant 
demolished or converted to some other purpose: Attwood9s Tyne Glass 
Company had closed in 1840; the North Tyne Glass Company in 1845: 
Addison Fenwick9s Crown Glass Works at Sunderland had been demolished 
in 1846 in order to make way for a ship building yard; the Northumberland 
Company*s Lemington works had been taken over by a bottle manufacturer 
and the Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass Company, which had been put 
up for sale in 1848, was being sold off to small manufacturers such 
as an artificial manure manufacturer . The north-east flat glass 
industry of the 1850s bore little resemblence, at least on the surface, 
to the industry of 1830. How can these changes, and in particular 
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the disappearance of the older established crown glass companiesq 
be accounted for? 
The period in which most of these changes were concentrated was the 
1840s, and inparticular the five years following the repeal of the glass 
duties in 1845. To contemporary commentators there was no doubt that 
repeal was the root cause of these changes, although they were at a loss 
to explain exactly how repeal had had such an injurious effect: as the 
Newcastle Guardian reported "The cause of the present depressed state of 
the trade is attributed toNarious causes, none of which appears to us 
satisfactory", 
69 Later commentators have provided a mcre detailed explan- 
ation by pointing out that the repeal of the duties removed the fiscal 
advantages which had favoured crown glass and handicapped sheet glassp 
and therefore that the older firms who manufactured crown glass alone 
were suddenly placed in a vulnerable and unprofitable Position. 
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There seems no doubt at all that repeal did play a crucial role in the 
collapse of the old crown glass firms in the region but what precisely 
was this role? Did repeal itself initiate sudden and dramatic change 
in the industry by creating conditions inwhich the old crown glass 
firms were suddenly unable to function? Or did repeal merely bring an 
existing trend to its inevitable conclusion; were notth-east flat glass 
firms already weak beyond the point of recovery and did repeal merely 
accelerate a decline that was already irreversible? Before looking at 
repeal and its effects in the period that immediately followed it, it 
is to the period leading up to repeal that we must first look. 
The 1830s 
The major factors affecting the progress. orlack of progress, of ' 
the north-east flat glass industry during the 1830swere mtional rather 
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than local. On the whole the decade appears to have been one of 
severe difficulties for the national flat glass industry as a whole, 
thanks to a number of factors in combinaticn: firstly considerably 
increased competition within the flat glass trade, secondly the deter- 
ioration of trade during the last half of the decade, and thirdly the 
government's prolonged uncertainty over whether the glass duties were 
to be repealed. Individuallyrone of thesefactors could be said to have 
been encouraging but in combination they created a positively discotr aging 
economic environment, in sharp contrast to the favourable conditions 
that the industry had enjoyed during the building boom of the 1820s. 
Perhaps the most important factor from the north-east's point of 
view was the increased competition within the trade. The boom in crown 
glass production of the first quarter of the nineteenth century was not 
confined solely to the north-east. The period saw the establishment 
of many new firms in other parts of the country and, given the improve- 
ments in transport facilities, the inevitable result was ampetition 
between manufacturers greater than had ever been seen before. 
The most important new area of growth was in South Lancashire, 
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particularly around St. Helens. The area had long enjoyed many of the 
natural advantages possessed by the north-eastv'most importantly coalq 
and this was confirmed by its choice as the home of the British Plate 
Glass Company in 1773. The major disadvantage of the area when compared 
to the north-east was the difficulty of transport to London but this was 
remedied with the opening of a direct canal link to Londqn in 1805. The 
first crown glass house in the area, Mackay West & Co., had-been established 
in 1792 but it was not until the 1820sthat the area began to realise its 
full potential for glass manufacturing. With hindsight the most 
i 
- 160- 
important of th e houses that were established in the 1820s was that 
of Greenall & Pilkington which began production in 1826. The other 
large rival to the north-east was the large Spon Lane Works of R. L. Chance. 
Like Pilkingtonsl this too dated from the mid 1820s although Chance 
had previously had connections with the crown glass works at Bristol. 
Chance had begun, like Charles Attwood, as a London glass merchant and 
therefore the distribution of his glass in the capital was well assured; 
he had a warehouse at St. PaulO-s wharf. 
London Trade Directories give clear evidence of an expansiaiand an 
increasing sophistication in the trade during the 1820s, Partly no doubt 
" direct result of the increasing amount of glass coming into London from 
" variety of sources. Window glass dealers, who took larger amounts of 
glass than the ordinary glaziers began to usurp the position of the 
glaziers/glass cutters in the trade (a distinction made between dealers 
and glaziers in 1835 defined dealers as those who took above 20 crates 
at any one time). By 1826 there were fourteen windowglass dealers in 
London of whom two - Attwood and Smith, and R. L. Chance - were also 
described as manufacturers. By 1833 there were. 21 and in addition to 
the previous two manufacturers, Thomas Choll of Liverpool and Joshua 
Bower of Leeds also owned their own warehouses. Broadly speaking, the 
1820s saw a significant increase in the number of firms engaged in the 
flat glass industry and a shift in the trade towards dealers, who were 
prepared to accumulate large amounts of glass, rather than working 
glaziers. 
The excise statistics for 1832 illustrate the degree to which these 
new firms had grown and competition had increased since the early years 
of the century(Fig. 9) but also that the north-east still apparently 
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Figure 9: The amount of duty paid by crown glass houses in 
England for the year ending 5 January 1833. 
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retained its lead in terms of quantity of glass produced. The lead 
that was still apparent in the 1832 was to diminish -rapidly throughout 
the remainder of the decade wh6n the younger and more vigorous firms 
such as Pilkingtons and Chances steadily expanded their works and 
increased their production whilst, as we shall see, the majority of the 
older crown glass firms experienced little or no growth at all. 
Increased competition was reflected in the formation of the Crown 
Glass Manufacturers* Association in the mid twenties. The first recorded 
meeting of the Association occurred in 1826 and although it cannot be 
certain that the Association did not exist before this date it seems 
unlikely; if manufacturers* agreements had existed before the 1820s they 
were almost certainly informal and, perhaps, regional. The traditional 
regional base of the national glass trade was reflected in the first 
price list drawn up by the Association which effectively divided up 
the country into spheres of trade each with a separate price list. The 
major purpose of the Manufacturers'Association appears to have been to 
maintain a kind of order in the trade by reducing the oportunities for 
undercutting prices and minimising the effects of the new competition 
within the trade. Some more detail about the Association has been given 
elsewhere, 
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but it is worth saying here that Lts activities bear witness 
to the increasing authority of the new younger firms in the trade at the 
expense of the old established north-east firms. At its conception 
the Association appears to have been a designed to maintain the status 
quo within the trade and in particular to preserve the traditional 
predominance of the north-east in the London market. It was largely 
due to the efforts of the younger Birmingham and Lancashire firms who 
wished to expand their sales on a national basis that the original 
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principic of separate regional price lists was replaced with a single 
national price list in 1836. In the same way the restriction of make 
proposed by, the north-east manufacturers in 1838 was designed to preserve 
the status quo by basing the restriction on each firm9s production for 
the last four years. As William Pilkington, 'correctly,, saw it "their 
object is to keep us out of the market and to prevent us upstarts from 
growing greater". In this instance the younger firms again were successful 
in not allowing the north-east firms to use the Association as a protective 
device and when the restriction of make was finally accepted in 1841 it was 
on terms that were far more favourable to the younger firms. 
The effects of increased competition within the trade were compounded 
by the severe deterioration of trade durin g the last half of the 1830s 
culminating in the severe depression of 1840 - 2. The bad conditions in 
the flat glass trade were certainly not unconnected with the effects of 
the government9s indecision about whether and when the glass duties were 
to be repealed. This was a crucial factor underlying the whole period 
between 1831 and 1845 and indeed it could be argued that the actual 
repeal of the duties in 1845 had less impact on the trade than the prolonged 
and damaging uncertainty about repeal that preceded it. As will be seen 
in the chapter on the excise, the repeal of the glass duties had actually 
been introduced into the 1831 budget by the Vkiq administration but had 
been hastily dropped in order to placate opposition to other proposals. 
Understandibly, this was seen as evidence of the government's commit- 
ment to repeal at the earliest possible moment and expectation that 
the glass duties would soon disappear ran high throughout the earl 
ly 
1830s; it was said that R. L. Chance had commenced manufacturing sheet, 
glass in 1832 in anticipation of the imminent repeal of-the glass duties 
I 
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(see p. 174 ): in 1832 a petition from the Edinburgh and Leith Glass 
Company to the Treasury pleaded that sLnce it became known that the 
abolition of these duties was intended it was impossible to effect sales 
in proportion to make: according to evidence given(in 1833)to the 1835 
commission "Trade has not recovered since 1831 when Lord Althorp proposed 
taking off the duty on glass glass immediately fell 25-30% and the 
trade is still in that uncertain state" (see P 405 for more details 
on this point). Even as late as 1838 the Crown Glass Manufacturers' 
Association felt compelled to send a memorandum to the Treasury complaining 
of "the vexatious and embarrassing uncertainty as tothe views of the 
goverment with regard to repeal" which had lost to the trade "many 
thousands of pounds per annum. for several years". 
73 
The hiatus between the abortive attempt at repeal in 1831 and the 
eventual repeal in 1845 affected the whole character of the industry and 
not merely trade and prices. In many ways the governmentts indecision 
could be said to have paralysed the industry in that the uncertainty 
of the situation almost certainly discouraged newentrants to the trade 
and, hence made it difficult for the older manufacturers to leave: anyone 
considering purchasing a share in a glass house during the 1830s would 
almost certainly have been advised to wait until the duties were repealed 
as it was believed they soon would be, and this must have been particularly 
true of the period after the publication of the 1835 Commissioners' Report 
which gave wide publicitytD the enormous difficulties of the industry 
under the excise. One example of the effects of this uncertaintý is 
perhaps the crown glass house at Dumbarton which, following the death 
of its proprietor in 1831, was put up for sale and continually advertised 
without success until 1838 when it was finally restarted. 
74 
The works 
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appears to have been a profitable one and there seems to be no reason 
for its unattractiveness apart from the uncertainty over repeal. 
In the north-east this prolonged period of uncertainty was partic- 
ularly inconvenient in that it made it more difficult for older 
manufacturers, many of whom had entered the trade in the early 1800s 
and were reaching the period when day to day devotionVo their manufacturing 
interests was no longer necessary nor rewarding, to quit. Men such as 
Richard Shortridge, William Richardson and Joseph Lamb were men who had 
shot their entrepreneurial bolts and appear to have been looking forward 
to repeal not for the boost to the glass trade that would result but 
for the opportunity it would give them to sell up and retire. When 
Shortridge put his glass works up for sale iný845 he was said to have 
been "retiring" after 40 years in the business. 
75 When The Broad and 
Crown Glass Works was put up for sale in 1848 it was "in consequence of' 
J6 the partners intending to retire from the business . Some indeed did 
not survive to repeal; the North Tyne Glass Company had beenput up for 
sale in 1840 following the death of Robert Gothard (aged 74) in 1838 but 
lack of purchasers forced the remaining partners to carry on with it until 
their deaths , John Ridley died in 1843 aged 69 and William Richardson 
died in 1845 aged 53. 
In the difficult and unpromising conditions of the 1830s it is 
clear that the key to a flat glass firm9s survival was astute entre- 
preneurship. It was no longer sufficient for a crown glass manufacturer 
to rely on an automatic demand for his product, andin the case of north- 
east crown glass manufacturers, to rely onthe regionts traditional 
advantages and predominance in the trade. Several manufactures did in 
fact meet the severe conditions in a positive and imaginative way. 
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Younger manufacturers such as the Pilkingtons and Chances looked 
forward to a more favourable future after repeal and, despite their 
immediate difficulties, increased the size of their works and explored 
new production techniques such as sheet glass in anticipation: Pilkingtons 
built two additional glass houses in 1836. Unfortunately this imaginative 
response to the depression wassadly lacking in many of the north-east 
crown glass firms and it was this lack of initiative and lack of 
preparation for the post repeal conditions that left many of the region9s 
firms ill equipped to take the opportunities that repeal certainly 
provided when it eventually came. None of1he old north-east firms 
appear to have extended their works and only Cooksons thought it 
worthwhile enough to introduce the manufacture of sheet glass alongside 
crown. A useful contrast illustrating the consequence of this lack 
of initiative can be found in the respective sizes of the Newcastle 
Broad and Crown Glass Works and Pilkingtons. According tothe Children's 
Employment Commission, in 1842 the Newcastle Company employed a workforce 
of 77 men, 27 male apprentic. es and roughly 60 boys. Pilkingtons, 
however, employed a workforce of 500 in 1845.77 
The north-east was not completely lacking in entrepreneurial initiative 
In contrast to the older firmsp two firms in the region showed evidence 
of the same positive and foresighted attitude that the Lancashire and 
Midland firms possessed. The most impressive example of growth in the 
region was that experienced by the Wear Glass Works established in 1836 
at Bishop Wearmouth near Sunderland by James and John Hartley. The Cookson 
firms alone among the older establishments, also showed 'an interest in 
improving and extending its production. This was largely due to the fact 
that during this period the initiaiive behind the firm passed into the 
hands of its able manager R. W. Swinburne who, like 11artleys was a man 
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of considerable technical skill. Swinburne and Hartley will be discussed 
in more detail in the followingsectionv for the moment they serve as the 
two exceptions to the overall response of north-east manufacturers to 
the difficulties of the 1830s which was to hold on to theirvorks without 
investing any further capital in the hope that repeal would once more 
make glass works an attractive investment. Perhaps typical was 
Sir Matthew White Ridley, the fourth baronet, who had inherited his 
father9s estate in 1836. Unlike his father he proved distinctly uninterested 
in the industrial and commercial activities that his father had done so much 
to promote and by 1840 had leased out the workings of the Ridley owned 
collieries and sold the family interest in the Newcastle Bank. The 
Glass Company was not offered for sale until 1848 but in view of the 
fourth baronetts previous departure from more profitable commercial interests 
it seems fair to assume that he was only waiting for repeal in the hope 
that the glassworks would then realise a reasonable pHce on being sold. 
During the 1830s the management of the company had. been given over entirely 
to Anthony Nichol and Joseph Sewell but unfortunately neither proved as 
creative in their management as R. W. Swinburne at Cooksons. 
One exception amongst the older crown glass manufacturers was 
Charles Attwood who had the good fortune, or perhaps the foresighto to 
quit the trade before the depression of the late 1830s: there is no doubt 
that this was in part a consequence of his new found enthusiasm for iron 
as much as any dissatisfaction with glass. His Sunderland house was 
taken over by his brother Edward Attwood under the title the Wearmouth 
Crown Glass Company. The Gateshead glass house was sold to a Mr. Banks 
but Attwood retained a share in the, new manufacturing company in partner- 
ship with Banks and Edward Hart. The Sunderland, glass house survived 
Charles Attwood*s departure and became one of the two works from the 
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excise period which survived well. 'into the second half of the century. 
The Gateshead house however closed in 1840 and, typically for the houses 
the immediate cause of its closure was a legal dispute over the partner- 
ship. 
78 When the new partnership took over the works in 1836 a new 
partnership agreement was drawn up and a new capital of Z129000 was 
advanced. In 1839 Attwood wished to retire completely from the concern 
and in April an agreement was signed exonerating him completely from the 
companyts debts which included a creditcf-E33,000 from Ridley's bank. 
Unfortunately disputes arose over some sums of money, including Z800 
owed to a Mrs. Hartley, and over who exactly owned the land on which the 
glass works was built. Eventually the remaining partners decided to 
make Attwood a bankrupt and persuaded Ridley9s bank to file an information 
against him for the large su+wed to them.. Attwood claimed that the 1839 
agreement had cleared him personally from this debt, which plea was upheld, 
with the result that in June 1840 Edward Hart was made a bankrupt and 
the Tyne Glass Company was put up for sale. Another suit had in the 
meantime been brought against Attwood by the owne3s: of West Townley 
Colliery, Humble Lamb and John Buddle, for Z550 owed them for coal but 
this too was dismiss6d. From the list of stock put up for sale in 
18402 it is clear that the house was manufacturing only crown glass and 
had not attempted to introdýce sheet glass. The stock'included a 
condensing steam engine, a stone mill with an engine and fast sailing 
wherry. 
If the older crown glass manufalcturers were hoping that repeal would 
transform their works into attractive and saleable properties then they 
were to be disappointed. Although repeal did attract new capital to 
the flat glass industry many of the speculator's appear to have preferrýd 
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to erect new glass works on a large.. scale rather than take over old 
works with small furnaces and workforcesunskilled in the production of 
sheet glass: all the new houses that were erected immediately following 
repeal were said to be sheet glass houses. 
79 
Only one of the old crown 
glass houses advertised for sale during the late 1840s was bought with 
the intention of continuing the manufacture of flat glass. This was 
Shortridge0s South Tyne Glass Works which was taken'over by the Tyne 
and Tees Glass Company headed by the Stockton Quaker, James Bowron. 
main glass manufacturing interest was bottles and it owned The company' 
several bottle houses at Stocktong however there is no doubt that the 
Shields works was intended for flat glass and the manufacture of sheet 
glass was soon introduced. The venture was short lived and the company 
closed in 1855, a victim of the powerful alliance of Chances, Pilkingtonso 
and Hartley and their policy of buying up smaller firms in order to 
close them down. It-was reported in July 1855 that the works had been 
bought by Hartley who intended to restart them in the near future but 
this never happened. 
80 
(ii) James Hartley, Cookson & Cuthbert 
Perhaps the most important event in the north-east flat glass 
industry during the 1830s was the establishrýent of a new glass works2 
the Wear Glass Works, at Bishopwearmouth near Sunderland by James Hartley 
in 1836. Hartley*s firm was to dominate the local industry in the 
second half of the century. James Hartley (1811-1886) was the son 
of the James Hartley who, after a period as managing partner for Attwood's 
I 
Tyne Glass Companyq had gone into partnership with R. L- Chance at 
Birmingham. Like his father, James Hartley*s business career was to 
rest on his practical abilities and his thorough understanding of glass 
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making. 
81 He was given a practical education by his father in all 
aspects of the manufacture and was thus enabled to become a junior 
partner in the firm on the death of his father c. 1832. Hartley's 
skills were clearly in evidence during the time he spent at Chances. 
He was said to" have ýeen the first to make use of commercial sulphate 
of soda (instead of carbonate of soda) in the manufacture of crown 
glass. In 1834 he and his brother John took out a patent 
82 
which 
introduced a significant economy into the crown glass process; instead of 
the "bullion bar" whichvas traditionally used to hold the table of glass 
whilst it was being finished, the Hartleys introduced a smaller tube or 
"thimble" which had the advantage of reducing the size of the central 
bullion and hence the wastage per table. James Hartley was also a 
crucial figure in the introduction of sheet glass into the country in 
1832 and this was probably the most important event of his early career. 
Sheet glass was flat glass produced by the cylinder process whereby a 
cylinder of glass was opened out and flattened. Its manufacture was well 
established on the Continent and in order to introduce the manufacture 
to England, William Chance sent James Hartley to the French glass works 
of George Bontemps for the purpose of learning the method. Hartley's 
understanding of the cylinder process wasthus unrivalled by any other 
English glass manufacturer and this was almost certainlyý significant 
encouragement to him to leave Chances and set up on his own at Sunderland. 
The introduction of the manufacture of sheet glass to England in 
1832 by Chance with the aid of Hartley has, rightly, been recognised 
as an event of great significance in the development of, the country9s 
flat glass industry. 
83 
Sheet glass was eventually to usurp crown glass9s 
position as the country's leading glazing glass, partly because of1he 
large panes able to be produced, partly becauselhe cylinder process was 
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a more economical way of producing flat glass and was therefore better 
suited to the industryts needs during the last half of the century. 
This was not to occur, however, until after the repeal of the glass duties 
in 1845. During the 1830s sheet glass9s position in the market was very 
different and something needs to be said abut this, and about the position 
of the two manufacturers who pioneered it, Chance and Hartley. 
Most importantly, the extent of both Hartley*s and Chance*s 
resourcefulness in persevering with the new process had not perhaps been 
fully appreciated. Both manufacturers of sheet found themselves faced 
with considerable difficulties during the 1830s and it is to both manu- 
facturers' credit that they overcame these difficulties in an imaginative 
and resourceful way. It was later said of the Sunderland manufactuter 
that "Mr. Hartley*s active brain was ever fertile in expedients for the 
removal of obstacles to successt, 
84. 
and this is certainly borne out by 
his continued faith in sheet glass during the 1830s. The difficulties all 
stemmed from the excise which affected all aspects of the introduction 
of sheet glass and its subsequent development. Indeed the excise was 
largely responsible for the fact that although it had been experimented 
with during the eighteenth centurys sheet glass had not been attempted 
in England earlier in the nineteenth century. It has already been pointed 
out1hat because of the thickness, *. under the conditions created by the 
excise, sheet glass was unprofitable to manufacture compared with crown 
glass and it was this which prevented its introduction into England' 
at an earlier date. This was certainly true but a more fundamental 
reasonfDr its late appearence was that from 1809 (the glass act 49 G3 c. 63) 
the regulations governing the manufacture of flat window glass specifically 
stated that the annealing arch for annealing crown or German sheet glass 
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should only have one mouth or entrance. German sheet 'lass, which 9 
vas flattened in a separate flattening kilnv needed an annealing arch with 
two mouths and before embarking on. his expetiment R.. L. Chance was forced 
to petition the Treasury for permission to contruct an annealing arch 
with two mouths. 
85 
This was granted and a suitable clause was inserted 
into the flint glass act of 1832: 
86 
It shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Excise to permit and 
allow any annealing arch or oven intended to be used for annealing 
German sheet, glass to be made and constructed With.. "'tijo mouths or 
entrances to the same, provided such arch be built9constructed 
and made in other respects in conformity with the directions and 
regulations of the Act of 49 G3. 
When seen in the context of the excise regulations in operation in 
the early 1830s Chance*s JLntroduction of sheet is ýuzzling. From the 
evidence given, to the 1835 Commission it is clear that whilst it remained 
unpolished sheet glass was only a slight improvement on broad glass and 
certainly not a competitor to crown glass: according to Sir Francis Doyle, 
the Chairman of the Board of Excise,, "it is an inferior article, fit for 
the cottages of the poor"; Isaac Cookson agreed that it was inferior and 
described it as "cockled" and "more like horn". Their comments are 
confirmed by a builders handbook 
87 
German sheet glass is of an excellent quality, particularly as 
respects colour; but from the manner in which it is manufacturedo 
one side - which of course is placed outermost in the sash - has 
an uneven and consequently unpleasant appearance. -It was formerly, 
however, much in use; but latterly in consequence of the improve- 
ments which have been made in the manufacture and flattening of 
crown glass together with the reduction that has been made in the 
price of plate glass, it is not much in request in this country. 
Polished, of course, sheet-glass would be more attractive but under 
the excise regulations then in-operatiai Chance, was forbidden to manufacture 
sheet thicker than one ninth of-an, 'inch which effectively prohibited 
it being manufactured, thick enough'to stand polishing., Thia regulation 
had been introduced as a protectionragainst, a type of cylinder glass 
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that was already manufactured in England but which paid a higher 
rate of duty, namely blown plate glass, Although often classed with 
broad glass, and indeed in its unpolished state sheet glass did resemble 
broad in appearance, in respect of manufacturing method-sheet had more 
in common with blown plate than broad glass. Whereas broad glass was 
made of poor quality materials, split whilst hot (traditionally by 
holding the elliptical bulb of glass up to the furnace, which caused 
the air inside to expand and split the glass, and dropping cold water onto 
the split), and was spread on sand in a triangular diape, both blown plate 
and sheet glass were blown in a cylinder and split with a tool once the 
glass had slightly cooled. There were differences between the two 
methods of manufacture but when the 1835 Commissioners questioned Chance 
closely about the similarities between his German sheet and plate glass 
k 
he admitted that they were more or less idenlical: both were produced 
inb fke fol-A of 
by blowing the glas SA a cy inder and splitting it, the materials used 
were exactly the same, the only difference as Chance saw it was that "they 
go to more expense to make the article more perfecV ie. to polish it. 
The restrictionon the thickness of crown and sheet glass was seen as a 
necessary protection to the plate glass maufacturers, and a protection 
that the only manufacturer of blown plate at the time, Isaac Cooksonv 
evidently valued highly for according to Chance "the restriction would 
have been removed some years ago if it were not for the objection of 
Mr. Cookson who was appraised that the window glass be polished and 
used as plate". Chance maintained that his fears on this g; Dund were 
without foundation which was certainly true as regards crown glass whose 
glossy surface needs no further treatment, but wasIcertainly not true 
in the case of sheet. Whilst sheet remained unpolished it-threatened 
neither crown glass nor plate in, the market., but it must have been very 
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clear to Cookson in 1835 that should sheet be polished it would 
provide an effective competition to plate glass when used as a glazing 
glass. 
Why then did Chanceaid Hartley go to the expense of introducing 
a type of manufacture that, under the excise regulationss was no improvement 
on crown glass? One comment on Chance9s action noted that he had embarked 
on the manufacture at a period when he was fully aware that the government 
had expressed its intention to repeal the glass duties altogether, 
88 
in 
other words that he was anticipating the immediate repeal of the duties. 
This seems a highly probable explanation. As we shall see in Chapter 5 
the duties had indeed been on the brink of being repealed in 1831 and 
that expectation continued to run high throughout the early 1830s. 
From Chance9s evidence to the 1835 Commission, it is clear that he was 
convinced that what hadlappened on the Continent, the replacement of 
crown glass by sheet, "must" happen in England once the dutieswere repealed. 
The introduction of sheet glass in 1832 was then an attempt by Chance to 
prepare for what he saw as an inevitable and imminent development in 
the flat glass industry. When repeal eventually came in 1845 Chance's 
view that the development was inevitable was proved correct but it was 
not as imminent as he had hoped in 1832; it seems more than likely that 
neither Chance nor Hartley had envisaged the long delay between their 
expensive preparations for repeal in 1832 and actual repeal in 1845. 
The other question that must be asked about the introduction of 
sheet glass is why did Chance not call his cylinder glass blown plate. 
- 
which would have enabled it to be polished? The f act that the only 
manufacturer of blowngLass in_Britain by the'early 1830s was Isaac Cookson 
bears witness to the fact that plate glass was an unattractive branch 
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of the industry for the manufacturer. Although the high plate duty 
had been reduced in 1819 it was still sufficiently high to discourage- 
the use of plate glass as a common glazing glass, although the Cookson 
firm had certainly made some progress in this market. Furthermore plate 
glass was the only branch of the glass industry still to pay duty on 
the gauge rather than on the manufactured goods,, which system had been 
greatly disliked by glass manufacturers for its inconvenience and unfairness 
(see Chapter 5). After voicing his dislike of the "extremely objectionable" 
gauge to the 1835 Commissioners, Chance clearly implied that the plate 
glass duty was really a higher net duty than-the crown and sheet duty 
even though ostensibly sheet paid E3 13s 6d per cwt. and polished ýIate 
only Z3 per cwt. 
89 
It thusseems probable that the difficulties surrounding 
the manufacture of plate under the excise were sufficiently strong to 
have persuaded Chance to name his glass in such a way as to avoid the 
plate glass duty and in particular the gauge. 
Unfortunately for both Chance and Hartley the duties were not 
repealed during the 1830s leaving them with the manufacture of a rough 
surfaced glass of limited. use. Fortunately, and probably unexpectedly2 
it proved profitable on being exported but whilst it remained unpolished 
it was no challenge in the home market to either crown or polished plate. 
Both manufacturers were therefore forced to adapt the manufacture of 
cylinder glass to the excise conditions and both displayed great resource- 
fulness in doing so. With his patent of 1838 Chance successfully 
developed a way of polishing sheet glass without breaking the excise 
regulations on thickness. He thus produced what was in essence polished 
plate under the excise definition of crown and sheet and, as it was 
cheaper than plate, it was an immediate commercial success. Significantly 
Chance named his polished sheet glass "patent plate". Hartley went even 
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further by attempting to produce a cylinder glass underlhe excise 
definition of broad glass and thus pay an even lower duty. He patented 
his new improved "broad glass" in 1838 but its manufacture came to 
an abrupt end in 1840 when the Board of Excise, with the support of 
the other flat glass manufacturers, raised the duty on broad glass. 
Since it involved legislation, the details of this episode will be 
looked at in the chapter on the excise (see pp. 397-402). Here, the 
episode underlines Hartley"t's entrepreneurial flair both in his ability 
to exploit the situation created by the excise regulations and in his 
practical skills. The 1838 patent included improvements to the flattening 
furnace and Hartley was later to develop improvements to the flattening 
of crown and sheet glass by means of a perforated flattening stone. 
The Wear Glass Works was established in 1836 and experienced a rapid 
growth during its early years. By 1839, despite a fire in which 92,000 
worth of damage was done to the warehouses and packing sheds, two houses 
were fully operational and three more were under construction-. 
90 
The 
worla also included a small alkali works and, in common with most alkali 
manufacturers in the neighbourhood, Hartley was prosecuted for supposed 
damage to nearby crops in 1838.91 Compared to the older-crown glass 
manufacturers on the Tyne Hartley certainly met the depression and the 
difficult conditions of the 1830s in an energetic and imaginative way. 
By the 1840s the Wear Glass Works had eclipsed the older firms in size 
and was, until joined by Cooksons, the only fi= in the region to 
manufacture sheet glass which put it in a good position to make use 
of the opportunities that repeal eventually brought. Hartley brought 
over Frenchmen to manufacture his sheet although it was said that he 
himself frequently took a spell of work-alongside them in the sheet 
glass house. There is no doubt that the success of the firm waslargely- 
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due to Hartley*s own energies and skills, he was said to spend up 
to fifteen hours a day at the glass house supervising every aspect 
of the manufacture. John Hartley quit the firm c. 1840 to pursue a success- 
ful career in the Staffordshire iron trade and during the decade the firm 
was joined by J. J. Kayll who was to manage the firm most ably until 
the 1860s. 
The second example of entrepreneurial initiative in the north-east 
flat glass industry during the 1830s was the Cookson firm whichs thanks 
to the activities of R. W. Swinburne, also succeeded in adapting to the 
changing circumstances of the industry. 
The death of Isaac Cookson snr. in 1831 was a crucial event in the 
development of the Cookson firm. Firstly, it altered the composition 
of the partnership that owned it: a new firm of Cookson & Cuthbert* was 
created with equal shares being divided up amongst five partners - 
Isaac Cookson, John Cookson and William Cuthbert (the three other partners), 
Isaac Cooksonts son John Cookson jr., and William Cuthbert's son William 
Cuthbert jr., Perhaps more important than this however was the effect 
the death of Isaac Cookson and the dispersal of his fortune had on the 
interests and ambitions of his sons. Curiously for an 89 year old man, 
Isaac Cookson snr. died intestate and his fortune was therefore divided 
up amongst his sons and daughters. His manufacturing. interests remained 
intact with the glass company going to John and Isaac and the iron and 
steel interests to Thomas Cookson but the apparent consequence to the 
sons9both of the immediate realisation of their father's other capital 
plus their access to the profits of his estate, was to emancipate them 
from the Cookson manufacturing interests and to enable them to turn 
to the safer and more prestigious investment of land. The death of 
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Isaac Cookson was followed by a rush of Cooksons to country estates. 
The most spectacular example of this was Isaac Cookson jnr. whoin - 
April 1832 purchased the 2,070 acre estate of Melden in Northumberland 
from Greenwich Hospitalfor 56,900 guineas. The estate included 171 
acres of plantation and rents worth U. 119 per annum. It had recently 
been improved by the Hospital at a cost of Z7,000 and was said to be 
a most valuable property. 
92 In July, John Dobson was commissioned to 
design and erect a house which he did at the reasonable cost of Z7,188.93 
Dobson also built a house in 1834 for Colonel James Cookson, the second 
son, at Newsham in Durham. Thomas Cookson moved to The Hermitage near 
Chester-le-Street at about the same time and Cooksonts partner William 
Cuthbert followed the trend by purchasing the estate of Beaufront near 
Hexham in 1836 and also commissioning a new house from Dobson. John 
Cookson, as the eldest gon, inherited the family house and estate at 
Whitehill. 
The movement to country estates was perhaps to be expected given 
that Isaac Cookson snr. Os long life had prevented his sons from enjoying 
the benefits of their inheritance until they were well into middle age: 
John and Isaac Cookson were 59 and 56 respectively on their father's 
death in 1831. Both had already devoted many years to the Cookson 
manufacturing interests and it is probable that both felt more than 
I 
entitled to the well earned reward of a life of a country gentleman. 
There seems no doubt that by this time both the crown and plate company 
and the Jarrow Alkali'Company were large and profitable enough to sustain 
the diversion of a comparatively'small amount of their profits into 
the estates and life style of their'owners but what was more potentially 
dangerous to the firms was the loss of interest and initiative in manu-7 
facturing that this shift in circumstances inevitably entailed. Although 
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the Cooksons and Cuthbert did appear before the 1835 Commission and 
did frequently represent the comPany, 'at the meetings of the Crown 
Glass Manufacturers Association the daý to day work of the firm appears, 
to have been increasingly left to the manager R. W. Swinburne. 
Fortunately for the Cooksons, Swinburne proved an exceptionally 
able manager and fully capable of looking after the firm's interests 
without direction from above. He was a trained chemist and, from the 
evidence of the cash booksq appears to have been employed first at the 
Jarrow Alkali Works. Around 1834 he moved to the plate glass works as 
the metal mixer, a crucial position in the firm. Swinburne's first 
important contribution to the firm was a patent taken out in his name 
in 1836.94 This attempted to solve a problem that Cookson himself had 
complained about to the 1835 Commissioners - the wastage and expense 
in the manufacture of small plates of glass. Swinburness patent reduced 
wastege by cutting out the smaller plates whilst the glass was still 
hot by means of metal bars, knives and shears. The small plates were 
then annealed in an upright position which, in addition, made a considerable 
saving on space (the larger plates were usually annealed in a horizon- 
tal position). This patent underlines1he concern of the South Shields 
firm with small plates for glazing rather than large plates for silvering. 
The second important contribution made by R. W. Swinburne was the 
introduction of sheet glass in 1837 which appears, to have been done 
largely through his own initiative. Following Hartley*s example, Swinburne 
himself went to France in order to learn the. method but was unsuccessful:: 
a slightly more devious approach however yielded results;., 
95 
On his return to-England, a foreman mason in his employ volunteered 
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t: )-obt. ain the information if his expenses were paid. He went to 
France, obtained employment as a mason's labourer at one of the 
glass works and remained until he had mastered all the details 
of the construction of the furnace used in sheet glass making. 
He returned-to Shields with the plans he had prepared, erected 
a furnace and again journeying to France was able to induce 
several expert workmen to return to this country with him, and 
sheet glass making commenced at Cookson*s works in 1837. 
was 
As manufacturers of blown plate glass the firmA already manufactu. ýing, a 
type of cylinder glass but there were evidently advm tages in using the 
continental methods. -Chief among these was the greater efficiency and 
speed of the continental process in which the blown cylinders were smaller, 
thinner, easier toranipulate and were formed by the help of a wooden 
mould and by swinging the cylinder downwards in a cleft in the floor to 
elongate it. It was said of blown plate that only one large plate 
could be produced per hour whereas it was specifically remarked, by 
one visitor to Cookson9s sheet house in 1844 that the quickness with 
which the cylinders were produced was one of the most remarkable features 
of the process. In 1844 the sheet glass at Cooksons was still being 
produced by foreign glass men (whom the writer of The Penny Magazine 
article commended for their tidiness of person and dress) and. mt. on a 
very Jxge scale. Cooksont had been given a quota of sheet glass under 
the restriction of make adopted by the Manufacturers'Association in 
1839 but in 1842 they had exchanged some of this for an increase in 
their quota of crown glass. Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm 
for sheet glass the techniques had been introduced and would stand 
the firm in good stead after the repeal of tle glass duties. 
The 1836 patent and the introduction of sheet glass in 1837 can 
certainly be taken as evidence that Cookson and Cuthbert as a firm 
were meeting the challenge of the new changes in the industry and 
continuing their tradition of experiment and improvement. This is 
underlined by other, smaller changes seen by tIr-firm in this decade 
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In the early 1830s a railway, part of which was undergroundq was 
constructed from the glass works to the beach for depositing ballast 
and bringing sand for the use of the glassworks. The wharf and quay 
were improved at a cost of f. 10,000 and in 1832, under the Durham 
University Act, the whole premises was enfranchised from the Dean and 
Chapter of Durham, which. it was said, gave rise to many further small 
improvements to the premises. 
96 Access to the works was improved both 
by road and rail and the Company sold some of its land to the Brandling 
Junction RailwayA., them way leave, and permission to erect a coal drop 
on their quay. 
(iii) The repeal of the glass duties 
What effect did repeal have on the north-east flat glass industry? 
Did it initiate sudden and dramatic change in that it suddenly removed 
the fiscal advantages of crown glass and made it an uneconomic product 
or did it merely enable the decline of the north-east crown glass houses, 
a decline that had been suspended by the uncertainty in the trade of the 
1830s, to reach its conclusion. Both aspects of repeal seem to be true 
but possibly the latter was the more significant: repeal, rather than 
initiating sudden change in itself, rapidly brought existing trends to 
their conclusion. 
Repeal did of course have a sudden and dramatic effect on the flat 
glass industry as a wholev including those firms such as Swinburnes and 
Hartleys which had in some measure prepared for it. Repeal suddenly 
reduced manufacturing costs, liberated manufacturers from tiresome regu- 
lations such as the restriction on the thickness of sheet glass, and 
above alltby enapling prices to fall,, created an unprecedented demand 
for glass. Repeal also attracted a number of-speculators to the trade, 
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and it was said that the number of flat glass firms increased 
from 
14 in 1845 to 24 in 1846-7 only to fall just as rapidly. 
97 These 
sudden changes inevitably caused a degree of disruption in the trade and, 
at least in the north-east,, created a temporary but severe depression. 
Even Hartley was forced to dismiss 300 of. his work force 
98 
and he was 
said to have commenteci later that all the money had had made out of 
his sheet and crown works in the 1830s was "melted down in the crucible 
of the hard times that succeeded the repeal ofthe glass duties". 
99 
The main cause of this depression appears to have been the increase in 
the number of producers plus unrealistically low prices; as the Newcastle 
Guardian noted in 1846 "with glass of a fair quality at 20d a tablet 
even to continue the manufacture is in question". 
100 
These low prices 
appear to have been established by the new firms with large capitals 
who were able for a time to sustain their losses. 
This depression was, however, a temporary one, Once trade had 
settled down and most of the. new firms had disappeared with the same 
speed with which they had appeared, the nature of the effects of repeal 
was more apparent. Most striking was the reduction in the number of 
producers: in 1845 fourteen firms were engaged in the trade, by 1855 
there were only seven dominated by the three largest firms, Pilkingtonsq 
Chances and Hartley, who together claimed 75% of the national production. 
It is ironic that one of the political economists2 main complaints 
against the glass duties was that they encouraýged the concentration of 
the manufacture in a few hands. Repeal revealed that the opposite was 
the case, under the conditions created by the duties comparatively small 
manufacturing units based on one or two houses w- ere able to survive. 
Repeal heralded the rise of a new type of flat glass firm meeting the 
demands of a mass market by producing-'on a unprecedentedly large scale. ' 
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The signif icaace of -repeal was not merely that the duties had 
protected crown glass but also that they had protected the small firm. 
The collapse of the crown glass houses was not merely the collapse of crown 
glass but the collapse of the small scale firm producing glass in the 
traditional costly way. What the post repeal. market demanded was a cheap 
selling price and this was impossible for crown glass manufactured on a 
small scale by a one or two house firm. The new conditions were summed 
up by William Pilkington who, in speaking of a rival crown and sheet 
glass manufacturer, noted that. his danger was that'he understood the 
crucial fact "the more he makes the cheaper he gets it". 
101 The new 
conditions demanded largerscale, low cost production, largercapital 
investment and a greater degree of technical skill and scientific 
knowledge than was previously necessary. As we shall see technological 
innovation and the introduction of new scientifically based manufacturing 
processess, was a significant factor in the success of the three leading 
flat glass firms during the 1850s and 1860S. 
It should also be said that crown glass itself did not suddenly 
disappear after repeal with the disappearance of the crown glass firm. 
It remained an economically realistic product for firms who produced 
other more profitable types of flat. glass as-well as crown. Swinburnes 
continued to manufacture orown until 18579 Pilkingtons until 1872 and 
it was not until 1854, ten years after repeal, that the firm's production 
of sheet overtook that of crown. The. evidence of. building specifications 
for the 1850s clearly shows that glazing buildings vith a variety of 
glass continued to be common practice and crown glass becamet as broad 
glass had once been, a second class-glass for. use where appearance was 
not particularly-important. 102, For instance-the glass used in a dwelling 
house in Cavendish Square in 1856 included, best British plate for the, first 
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floor and front room windows, best crown for the back windows to the 
entrance and back windows of the first floor, and crown seconds for 
the back. second and third floor windows. John Dobson's specifications 
of 1847 for Newcastle Central station also included a mixture of glass. 
Polished plate was to be used for the hotel doors and best staircase 
windows, best crown for the windows and fanlights, rough plate 8 
thick for the top of the arcades, and obscured crown glass for the 
kitchen skylights. The repeal of the glass duties had resulted in a 
greater variety of glass'at competitive prices being put on the market 
but it had certainly not driven crown completely from this market. 
Once the temporary disruption caused by repeal had subsided it was 
clear that repeal had indeed brought unprecedented benefits to the British 
glass industry. According to R. W. Swinburne writing in 1863: 
103 
The abolition of the excise duty on glass together with the numerous 
and most obstructive regulations which that impost involved has had 
an effect beyond all anticipation' in improving the glass trade in 
general (especially the crown, sheet and plate) both in its manu- 
facturing and commercial character. 
It is perhaps understandable that what Swinburne saw in the 1860s as improve- 
mentsq namely the establishment of a modern flat glass industry based on 
the l6w cost production of sheet and plate'in place of the old 
fashioned industry based on the labour'intensive crown glass processs 
should have been interpreted in'the 1840S as a disastrous collapse. The 
pessimistic contemporary comments on the collapse of the north-east crown 
glass industry must be'qualified with hindsight sinceo with handsight, 
the collapse of cr, own glass was in many respects a healthy sign indicating 
that the British glass industry, was at long last discarding its old fashioned 
methods and adopting processes that were far'more suitable for the glass 
industry of the mid nineteenth century and for the emerging mass market. 
Looking at the changes of the 1830s and 1840s in the north-east flat glass 
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industry it is clear that there was indeed a collapse of what was 
traditionally the major branch of the industry, crown glass, but that 
this was one part of thejndustry9s adaption'to new economic conditions. 
A useful summing up of the changes, useful because it brings together 
both the positive and negative aspects. was made in 1863 by 
J. Collingwood Bruce: 104 
Probably no section of the manufactures of the Tyne and Wear has 
experienced more marked changes during the last 25 years than that of 
glass, during which period there has been witnessed a decadence of 
one branch and entire extinction of another. Nor is this all; for 
out of this partial wreck has sprung a state of activity which 
surpasses all that of the previous history of the trade. 
The unprecedented activity is borne out by the statistics provided by 
both Bruce and R. W. Swinburne in the same year. Whereas the previous 
productive capacity of the six crown glass houes on the Tyne had been 
71000,000 sq. ft. of window-glass per year,, Hartleys alone now produced 
8,000,000 sq. ft. of sheet glass and 1,000,000 sq. ft. of patent rolled 
plate. The previous capacity of Cookson*s plate glass works had been 
312,000 sq. ft. and this, unler Swinburne, had almost quadrupled to 
1,240,000 sq. ft. per annum. Thus in terms of quantity the north-east 
flat glass industry could certainly not, be said to have collapsed during 
the late 1840s even though the traditional staples of the industryg 
crown and broad glass9did indeed disappear from the region during that 
decade, and even though the region*s industry now rested almost entirely 
with two firms rather than the eight that had made up the north-east 
flat glass industry during the first half of the century. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE MANUFACrURE OF BOTTLES 
1.1700 - 1800 
Unlike thefLat glass industry, history gave no especial advantage 
to bottle manufacturing in the north-east; bottle manufacturing enjoyed 
nothing of Mansell*s heritage that had so favoured the development of the 
flat glass industry in the region. Although the emergence of the manufact- 
ure of dark bottles in the mid-seventeenth century was almost certainly 
a consequence of the coal firing process pioneered by Mansell, in every 
other respect the dark bottle industry developed quite independently from 
Mansell's regime. The dark bottle did not emerge as a distinct type of 
manufacture until the 1650s, well after the decline of Mansell's influence 
and owing nothing to the industry he had established in Newcastle and 
London. 
The invention of the dark bottle is usually credited to Sir Kenelm 
Digby, the courtier and amateur scientist. 
1 Digby was named as the 
inventov in a petition to Parliament in 1662 which also claimed that his 
invention had been put to public use at several glass houses in England 
for many years. Although other contemporary claims were made for the 
invention, what all of them were agreed on was that there had indeed 
been an invenlion, and that the new dark bottle was quite distinct from 
the type of bottle that had been manufactured previously. Previously 
bottles had been manufactured out oý ordinary green window glass. The 
dark bottle was a considerable impcovement in that it was stronger, thicker 
and, therefore, more practical,. It has been suggested that Digby est- 
ablished a glass bottle house at Newnham, on Severn, ' and this is quite 
plausible in view of the fact that bottle manufacturing first appears 
to have become established in the Severn basin with bottle houses being 
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recorded at Gloucester and Bristol at quite early dates. John Houghton's 
table of 1696 suggests that by the late seventee. nth century at least 
Bristol and its environs had emerged as the major provincial centre of 
the industry and the city appears to have maintained this position 
throughout the eighteenth century; in the same way that Stourbridge was 
constantly referred to by the north-east manufacturers in connection 
with broad glass, so Bristol was always mentioned in connection with 
bottles: 2 
Bottle houses 
London district 9 
Topsham I 
Oddam, Somerset I 
Bristol district 5 
Gloucester 3 
Newnham. on Severn 2 
Swansea I 
Stourbridge 5 
Nottingham 1 
Custom More, Notts. I 
Newcastle upon Tyne 4 
Kings Lynn I 
Yarmouth I 
Silkstone, Yorks 2 
The four bottle houses listed at Newcastle must have included two at 
Sunderland. 
Although at the beginning of the eighteenth century the north-east 
could not claim any major importance as a centre of bottle manufacturing$ 
by the end of the eighteenth century it could. The industry experienced 
a rapid growth with the result that by 1800 the region included thirteen 
working bottle houses and eight bottle manufacturing companies. This 
growth reflected certain aspects of bottle manufacturing that made it, 
in some respects, a more attractive investment for north-east merchants 
and industrialists than flat glass manufacturing; bottle manufacturing 
enjoyed a more integral role in the local economy as a whole than flat 
glass. Firstly, as has been mentioned in the initial chapter, bottle 
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manufacturing appears to have been the most suitable form of sub- 
sidiary investment for a coal owner who wished to find a profitable 
means of consuming his small coals. Secondly, bottles were a more 
accessible branch of the glass industry than either flat glass or flint 
glass: the necessary equipment of a bottle house was simple; the coarse 
materials were cheap and easily available; the workmen, although constantly 
in demand, were less skilled than flat or flint glass makers and conse- 
quently in greater supply (see appendix 4 for a description of the process 
of manufacture in 1799), Bottles, when compared to flat glass and to a 
lesser degree flint glass, made modest demands on capital and was therefore 
accessible to a wider range of entrepreneurs. 
Thirdly3, bottles had considerable potential as a trading commodity 
and therefore was doubly attractive to men like John Cookson who, although 
concerned in manufacturing, were primarily merchants. The market for 
bottles was far wider in range than the market for flat glass since it 
extended to private and commerical customers in more or less every part 
of the country; anywhere,, in fact, where wine or-spirits were imported 
or consumed. In 1764 the bottle trade was described by John Cookson as 
"very nigh a ready moneytradell which is understandable in view of the 
quantities of wine and spirits imported into the country and the favourable 
legislation which, by encouraging the bottling of wine after it had been 
imported2 gave the full benefits of these imports to the English and 
Scottish bottle manufacturers. Most important in this respect was an 
act of 1728 which, in an attempt to prevent smuggling, had prohibited 
the importation of wine in bottles. In practice the act was imposed 
loosely and, after moves to repeal it in the 1760s, was relaxed in 1784 
when French wine was permitted to be-imported in bottles via the 
Channel Islands. By this time however English bottles enjoyed the 
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added protection of heavy customs duties which had been considerably 
increased in order to offset the excise duties on home manufactured 
glass; in 1777 for instance the excise duty on English bottles was 
2s 4d per cwt. (532d per dozen) whilst the customs duty on imported bottles 
was 2 shillings per dozen. Immediately after the act of 1784 permitting 
the import of Prench wine in bottles further penalties were added to 
the importation of foreign bottles-by subjecting them to an excise duty 
in addition to the customs duty. 
Bottles were then an attractive and marketable commodity and 
bottle manufacturing increased the attractiveness of Newcastle as a 
trading centre. Bottles were also a commodity that was highly suitable 
for export since the strong dark bottle was a distinctively English 
product and not manufactured in countries whose glass industry retained 
wood burning furnaces. A good illustration of the usefulness of bottles 
as a commodity for export can be seen in the activity of the Newcastle 
merchant William Row who, during the 1780s, took regular quantities of 
bottles from the bottle works at Hartley which he shipped to the Baltic 
as part of a' trade whose main purpose was the import of timber. Row 
later built his own bottle house at St. Peter! s quay. It is quite inter- 
esting that the combination of bottle manufacturer and timber merchant 
also occurred in one of the most successful of the early nineteenth 
century bottle manufacturers - Robert Todd. Perhaps surprisingly there 
is no example in Newcastle of a wine, spirit or porter merchant becoming 
directly involved with bottle manufacturing but there is no doubt that 
they., plus the importers of Geneva and Dantzig black beer, benefited 
from the locally produced bottles. The obvious connection between 
bottle manufacturing and brewing should also be mentioned. Although 
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there is only one example of a direct personal link between the two 
activities - the Fenwick family were bottle manufacturers at Sunderland 
and also owned the Sunderland and Chester-le-Street breweries - again 
it seems fair to assume that local brewers made use of local bottles and, 
with the growing trend towards bottled beer, benefited from the presence 
of the manufacture in the area. 
Bottle manufacturing was a quite different type of industrial and 
commercial undertaking to the manufacture of flat glass. Its accessibility 
and attractiveness resulted, on the one hand, in the rapid growth of the 
industry, on the other, in a trade that was potentially more volatile than 
the flat glass trade since the greater number of producers in the market 
made trade agreements on prices less easily enforceable. The commercial 
side of the bottle manufacturing, the relationships between the individual 
manufacturers in the bottle trade, has emerged as one of the most inter- 
esting aspects of the industry's development; in particular the replace- 
ment of a well ordered trade in which most manufacturers considered 
their interests best served by a high degree of mutual cooperation %AL th 
a more individually competitive one. Before looking at the bottle trade 
in more detail, the histories of, the individual bottle firms in the 
area must be sketched in. 
M The Closegate, Bill Quay and South Shields bottle houses 
These three bottle houses fall naturally into one group for two 
reasons. Firstly, they were the earliest bottle houses in the region; 
the Closegate house was established in 1684, Bill Quay c. 1690 and the 
house at South Shields c. 1710. Secondly, they were all associated 
with two families of entrepreneursl- the Cooksons and the Dagnias - 
and all eventually cane under the control of-John Cookson. Although 
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the Cooksons are certainly the more important of the two families the 
role of the Dagnias as pioneers was crucial to the development of bottle 
manufacturing in the area. It was the Dagnias who first introduced the 
SUC 6 
manufacture of different types of glass A as bottles and 
flint. to the 
area alongside the traditional broad glass. It was also the Dagnias who 
first established glass manufacturing beyond the boundaries of Newcastle. 
at South Shields. In many ways the Cooksons could be said to have 
by 
followed in the Dagnias9 footsteps both entering the bottle trade and by 
siting their first flat glass house at South Shields, and it is apt that 
all the Dagnia glass houses should eventually have been absorbed by the 
Cooksons. 
Who were these pioneering Dagnias who introduced bottle manufacturing 
to the north-east in 1684 when John and Onesiphorus Dagnialeased a parcel 
of land at the Closegate in Newcastle on-which to erect a glass house? 
Not surprisingly., iniview of the early development of bottle manufacturing, 
they were from a family of glass makers last recorded at Bristol: 
Edward Dagney "ingeneous glassmaker from Bristol" is mentioned in I'Metallum 
Martis" (1660) as attempting unsuccessfully to smelt iron in furnaces 
made from glass house, clay 
3: John and Onesiphorus are presumed to be 
the sons of this Edward Dagney and their peculiar surname suggests that 
they were descendants of Italian Altarist glass workers encouraged into 
England by Mansell in the early sixteenth century to staff his crystal 
glass house in London (see appendix 3c for a family tree). 
The Dagnia, brothers' first glass house was erected on land on the 
south side of the Closegate leased from Nehmiah Blaigdon in 1684 to 
the two Dagnias, Benezer Durant (almost certainly another glassmaker 
descended from the Altarists) and Richard Wall. 
4 
This original glass 
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house was a bottle house. Although the Dagnias are often associated 
solely with the introduction of flint glass to the regionv and although 
they certainly established a flint glass house on the north side of the 
Close c. 1690, there is no evidence of flint glass being manufactured 
systematically or in large quantities as early as the 1680s. The few 
contemporary references that are available all mention bottles: in 1697 
Onesiphorus Dagnia was fined Z200 for fraudulently concealing over 
2,679 dozen bottles from the excise; 
5 John Dagnia described the brothers* 
first glass house specifically as being "for making and vending green 
glass bottles". 
6 It is possible that small amounts of flint glass were 
manufactured at the original house but its main production was almost 
certainly bottles. 0 
Disputes between the two brothers caused the temporary closure of 
their two original houses in Newcastle. A new start was made c. 1704 
at a new bottle house erected by Onesiphorus Dagnia at South Shields 
but this too came to a temporary halt when John Dagnia broughta Chancery 
suit against his brother accusing him of not honouring their partnership 
agreements and stocking his Shields house with the stock of the two 
dormant Newcastle houses. The outcome of this suit is not known but 
both1he South Shields house and the two Newcastle houses appearlDluve 
resumed production well before 1720. The Common Council lists of glass 
houses on the Tyne in 1732 and 1742 both list the Dagnias* broad and 
bottle house at South Shields, one bottle house at the Closegate, and 
one flint glass house at the Closegate. 
7 Throughout the 1730s all three 
houses appear to have been managed-by John Dagnia of South Shields, the 
son of Onesiphorus Dagnia. The South Shields house, to which he added 
a second bottle house c. 1740., was his own property but the two Newcastle 
houses remained the joint property of the Newcastle and South Shields 
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branches of the family. John Dagnia. - had been requested to manage the 
Newcastle house on behalf of the widow of Onesiphorus Dagnia (son of 
John) by the terms of Itis will. There seems little doubt that the 
bottle houses at Newcastle and Shields flourished under John Dagnia's 
evidently able managment. On his death in 1746 his glass interests 
passed to his four sons and from them his Shields bottle houses passed 
to John Cookson and his share in the bottle and flint houses at Newcastle 
to John Williams (see below). 
The second bottle house to appear in the area was at Bill Quay. Its 
early history is obscure. It was mentioned in the Common Council Minutes 
in 1694 and it seems unlikely that it dated from very much earlier. The 
names of its founders are not, unfortunately, known but it is possible 
that it was connected with Isaac Cookson. Cookson was certainly a part- 
ner by 1722 when it was described in the Common Council books as " 
"Mr. Cookson's and Atkinson's glass housett, 
8 
The Bill Quay bottle house 
thus perhaps has the distinction of being the first of the Cookson 
family*s glass interests. For most of the eighteenth century the Bill Quay 
house was run under the name "Airey and Co". Joseph Airey was an 
associate of Isaac Cookson and the merchant to whom Isaac's son, Johný 
was apprenticed. Cookson's share in the Bill Quay bottle house at his 
death amounted to one quarter whichýwas divided between his sons John 
and Isaac. Following the death of Isaac Cookson jr. in 1762 John Cookson 
purchased his late brother's shares after a law suit which yields a few 
minor details about the concern; for instance in both 1762 and 1763 
Isaac Cookson's three sixteenth share received a profit of L252 10s. 
9 
There were evidently close connections between Zrohn Cookson's flat glass 
house at Shields and the Bill Quay bottle house. Cooksonts day book 
of the 1740s shows that Bill Quay bottles. were frequently shipped at 
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Shields and that materials such as kelp or crown cullet were 
frequently 
sold to the owners of Bill Quay. 
John Cookson's interest in bottles was given a new impetus in 
1753 when he purchased a half Ahare in the broad and bottle houses at 
South Shields owned by James Dagnia. James Dagnia was the son of John 
Dagnia who had died in 1746. Cookson*s letter book bears witness to a 
considerable-increase in his dealings in bottles both by taking over the 
accounts of some of Dagnia*s existing customers and by soliciting new 
outlets for trade amongst his existing contacts. For instance 
in 1753 
he wrote to David Nesbit, a Glasgow merchant who already took 
flat 
glass from him: 
10 
Since you were at Newcastle last Me engaged in the bottle and 
broad house carried on by Mr. Dagnia and would be glad to know 
if a good quantity of bottles is consumed with you, and what 
would be the charges at your port. If they would answer I would 
send a parcel along with the glass. 
Cooksonts half share in the houses was almost certainly accounted for 
by Dagnia mortaging both the glass houses to him for E3,182 Us 7d. 
In 1756 James Dagnia died and his half share was advertised for sale 
11 
noting that the property was heavily mortgaged to John Cookson. It was 
purchased by Evan Deer to create the partnership of Cookson and Deer. 
Evan Deer was the existing manager of the Dagnia houses who had married 
Sarah Dagnia the daughter of John in 1748 (see appendix 3c). He had 
previous connections with Bristol. 
The partnership between-Cookson and Deer was a profitable one for 
both sides. From Deer*s point of view there was the advantage 
of Cookson9s access to working capital and his commercial connections. 
I 
Through Cookson Deer was able to enter alum manufacturing and was 
enabled to buy a small estate and some salt pans in South Shields 
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that had previously belonged to Isaac Cookson of Sherbourne, and which 
were also under mortgage to John Cookson. 
12 From Cooksonts point of view 
the partnership gave him the benefit of Deer"s technical and managerial 
skills. Particularly important in this respect was the patent taken 
out in Deer9s name in 1764 for manufacturing bottle glass and soap with 
alum slam, (see chapter one). 
The partnership of Cookson and Deer came to an end with Deer9s 
death in 1790 leaving as his only heir his daughter Jane. Another 
managing partner, Francis Blackett, was admitted to the firm which 
from 1790 to 1801 became Cookson, Deer and Blackett. 
By the 1760s John Cookson*s interest in bottle manufacturing was 
extensive. Besides his shares in the two houses at South Shields (under 
Cookson and Deer both the Dagnia houses were turned *, over to bottles)., 
the Bill Quay house, and possibly the Closegate house (see below)p since 
13 1758 he had been a partner in a bottle house at Glasgow. Cookson9s 
Glasgow bottle house should certainly be mentioned for although not a 
particularly long lived venture it is an interesting one in several 
respects, not least as evidence of Cookson*s interest in the American 
trade. A major figure in the'Glasgow firm was James King who managed 
the works besides acting as g o-between for the partners on the Tyne and 
those at Glasgow. (This oJames King is almost certainly not the same 
James King who was the chief-clerk of the Newcastle Broad and Crown Glass 
Company and who was connected with the bottle houses at Ste Lawrence 
and the South Shore). The Glasgow bottle house appears to have developed 
out of a bottle house at Ellenfootl(Maryport) in which both King and 
Cookson were concerned. It is possible that-the Ellenfoot house had 
been established with the aim of supplying the, Glasgow market and by -I 
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transferring their operations to Glasgow the partners were merely 
moving their manufactory.. nearer to the market. When the Glasgow 
house was about to be opened King was instructed by Cookson to dispose 
of the existing stock (some at a warehouse in Glasgow) as best he could 
by travelling in Lancashire: 
Go as low as you-can to save ourselves but if you do not succeed 
we give you discretionary powers to open a warehouse in Liverpool 
and the Isle of Man to sell bottles upon commission upon the 
easiest and best terms. You can inform yourself at what freight 
the Ellenfoot bottle house carry their bottles to those markets 
and also the freight from Glasgow. 
The connection between the Ellenfoot house and the new Glasgow house is 
also clearly suggested by the apparent transfer of the Ellenfoot workers 
en masse to Glasgow. Cookson instructed King that he was to make the 
partners at Glasgow pay a yearly premium for the bottle makers and they 
would then have "half the property in them according to their articles". 
Among the Glasgow partners in this venture were George Murdochs the 
wealthy tobacco merchant William Cunninghamg and the Brewery Company 
which was admitted to a quarter share in the bottle house in 1763 on 
condition that they took 2,400, dozen bottles. a year "at stipulated prices". 
The entry of the Brewery Company 
14 
as partners is one of the particularly 
interesting aspects of the venture for there is no evidence of any English 
brewery taking a direct interest in bottle manufacturing at this early 
date, well before the full development of the market for bottled beer. 
In 1767 the Brewery Company made a take-over bid for the whole concern 
by proposing to limit each partnerts interest in the house to his lifetime. 
Cookson wrote to George Murdoch on this occasion urging him to oppose 
the proposal; "it is plain the whole glass house must in a few years 
become the sole property of the Brewery Company which can never die. ', 
Besides Cookson, another Newcastle merchant was also involved in the 
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partnership. This was Ralph Carr, a merchant with extensive interests 
in the American trade. His presence in the partnership underlines the 
suspicion that the reason behind north-east men establishing manufacturing 
concerns on the west coast was trade with America. From Cookson's day 
book of the 1740s it is clear that Ralph Carr was supplied with glass 
and bottles for America shipped directly from the Tyne however th-ere 
would have been many more opportunities for shipping from both Glasgow 
and Ellenfoot. Interestingly enough, the American trade is mentioned 
in a letter from Cookson to his partner in the bottle houseq William 
Cunningham, assuring him that if necessary he could supply him with 
extra bottles from Shields: 
15 
I carry on a considerable bottle manufactory at Shields-and can 
supply you with any quantity. The export price of commons is 16d 
per dozen ...... 5% discount ready money on bottles. none on salt. 
If your ships are intended for New York I think a larger quantity 
of bottles would do as we have some we could afford cheaper being 
seconds. We have sent none there since the stop and there is 
nothing they'll stow better on than salt. 
Cookson does not appear to have continued in this partnership into 
the 1770s. It is possible that the whole venture came to ai end in 1770 
for in that year James King left to establish a new bottle house at 
Dumbarton., 16 and'Cookson and Deer established a new venture at Glasgow 
I'Verreville", this time for the manufacture of flint glass (see Chapter 4). 
Cookson's bottle interests on the Tyne were consolidated with his 
absorbtion of the Bill Quay house and finally the Dagniast Closegate 
house. In 1771 the Bill Quay house "recently occupied by Airey & Coll 
was advertised to let 
17 
as a going concern with a full set of workmen 
under a manager, Jacob Wilson. By the 1790s the firm was being run 
as Cookson, Deer and Wilson and as this particular name is first 
recorded in 1779 
18 it seems likely that it dated from 1771 with 
Cookson and Deer taking over the whole house and admitting Wilson as 
the managing partner. 
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From the 1740s to the 1760s the Closegate bottle house had been 
leased out by the Dagnia family to a company headed by John Williams. 
19 
Williams had come into glass manufacturing by marrying the widow of 
Onesiphorus Dagnia, in 1738 and thus becoming an eligible lessee of the 
familyts glass houses. Williams had business connections with the 
Cooksons and indeed appears to have settled in Newcastle only as a con- 
sequence of a partnership with Isaac Cookson in iron foundries in 
Cumberland and Durham. & At the time of his partnership in 1729 Williams 
was described as a "gentleman" from Stourbride. 
20 In view of this 
business connection with Cookson it seems quite possiblelhat Cookson 
had a share in the firm of Williams and Co., but this is not known. 
John Cookson did however have a share in the successors to Williams & Co. 
an entity called "The Owners of the Closegate Bottle and Flint Glass House" 
which appears to have been composed Of the sons of John Williams running 
the flint glass house and John Cookson running the bottle house. When 
this association was dissolved in 1785 (following the destruction of Willies 
flint glass house in 1782 by fire and the death of John Cookson in 1783) 
a notice in the paper informed the customers of the bottle house that 
it was henceforth to be carried on by Isaac Cookson alone. 
21 
By the time of John Cookson9s death in 1783 he was the major share- 
holder and controlling influence in all three of the early bottle houses. 
They were to remain in the Cookson family until the middle of the nine- 
teenth century, but because of the number of eligible sons 1, 
the family 
constantly provided were never again to be under-the control of one 
Cookson. John Cookson set the pattern when his will divided his bottle 
houses between his sons: Isaac the eldest took the Closegate house, 
John the South Shields house and possibly. Joseph the Bill Quay house. 
With the death of Joseph in 1800 and John in 1802 the shares passed to 
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Isaac to be divided in turn amongst his sons. 
(ii) The St. Lawrence, Ouseburn and South Shore bottle houses 
These three bottle houses mark-a second wave of activity in the 
bottle industry of the north-eaqýj and one that occurred in the second 
and third decades of the eighteenth century: the High Bottle House was 
built c. 1720. St. Lawrence c. 1721 and the South Shore c. 1735. The 
first two of these houses are further connected by their links with the 
Newcastle Company of Broad and Crown Glass owners at the Ouseburn. The 
High Bottle House was established by the owners of the middle broad glass 
house and therefore marks an extension of the activities of the broad 
glass owners. In 1720, when the corporation9s lease of the middle glass 
house was renewed by Matthew White, Peregrine Henzell and Jane Roddams 
permission was askedtand granted, to build a new bottle house on the 
site immediately adjacent to the middle glass house. 
22 
Like the existing 
broad glass houses the bottle house was to all intents and purposes a 
part of the Broad and Crown Glass Company yet it remained at least 
nominally under the separate ownership of the owners of the middle glass 
house. Thus the house was sometimes described as belonging-to Matthew 
White and Co. or Thomas Henzell and Co., and from the 1780s was most 
usually described as the house of Catherine Henzell and Co. 
The bottle house at St. Lawrenceq although sharing a site with 
the St. Lawrence broad glass house belonging to the larger companyt was 
an even more distinct enterprise in terms of nominal ownership. Until 
1811 the house remained the property of two Quaker familiesp the 
Middleton s and the Hewitsons and thus has the distinction of being the 
only wholly Quaker owned glass house in the region'* The partners taken 
0 
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by the Quakers to carry on the glass house were members of the larger 
Broad and Crown Glass Company, notably James King and Sir Matthew White 
Ridley, but the house never became a part of the company. The land at 
St. Lawrence had originally been leased by the corporation to Joshua 
Middleton the Quaker in whom the Tyzackts shares in the broad glass had 
temporarily been vested., - The lease was renewed in 1721 
23 
by his son John who was granted liberty to build on the site. A glass 
house had certainly been erected by the time of John Middletonts death 
in 1730 for in that year his widowp Isabella, admitted Richard Ridley to 
a partnership in order to carry on the bottle house. 
24 The price paid by 
Ridley was a yearly "rent" of Z45 plus his share of repairs and expenses. 
Richard Ridley was a prominent local figure, an alderman, coal fitter and 
the owner of the nearby Byker and Heaton colieries. Ridley9s entrance 
certainly involved the supply of coal to the bottle house for a later 
partnership agreement mentions that his yearly rent (by 1760 this had 
risen to UO) was to be part paid in coal. Ridley9s involvement also 
benefited the house by giving it the protection of an influential local 
figure and one who could use his influence in the house! s favour. For 
instance in 1743 his son Matthew Ridley attempted to negotiate a favourable 
lease from the Corporation: 
25 
The Corporation will only renew the lease on such higher terms than 
the former. I used my utmost endeavour to obtain a lowering on the 
yearly rent and fine and did get abated f. 6 from the former and 0 
from the latter. 
Both Isabella Middleton and her heirsv her daughters Jane Gomeldon 
and Ann Hewitson, were happy to leave the running of the-glass house to 
agents. From 1739 to 1755 the house was under the agency of a fellow 
Quaker Joseph King., and from 1755 to 1780 under the agency of Middleton 
Hewitson, Ann Hewitson1s husband. The partnership agreements with 
Matthew Ridley were renewed in 1760 and 1767 but judging from the few 
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references to the house in Matthew Ridley's letter books, he too was 
happy to leave much of the business to agents. In 1780 Jane Gomeldon died 
intestate and this gave rise to some confusion over the actual owner- 
ship of the bottle house. Jane Gomeldon_ left no obvious heirs or assignees 
and so, according to a later account, James King (the chief agent of the 
Broad and Crown Glass Company and probably the brother of Joseph King) 
volunteered himself as administrator of her effects. Whilst ostensibly 
sorting out the books at the bottle house King conveniently destroyed all 
references to the previous partnership agreements with the result that 
from 1780 the house was treated as the joint property of Middleton 
Hewitson and Sir Matthew White Ridley. King*s deception was not discovered 
until 1806 when an independent enquiry found that the bottle house was the 
sole property of Middleton Hewitson (the son of the previous Middleton 
Hewitson) and that he was owed E1,659 by Sir Matthew White Ridley for 
arrears of rent and repairs since 1780; charging only the last agreed 
rent. of f. 60 a year even though the glass house had been much extended 
since 1767 when the sum had last been fixed. 
James King was also involved in the third bottle house in this group, 
The South Shore or Saltmeadows bottle house. This was built some time 
before 1735 by a partnership headed by Josepli Liddell, a Newcastle 
merchant and owner of collieries on Gateshead Fell; a man with no 
obvious previous connections with glass manufacturing. In 1735 Liddell, 
John Stephenson and Thomas Hodgson petitioned the Common Council for a 
lease of land in the Saltmeadows previously leased to Thomas Turnbull 
claiming that they had recently erected a glass house there. 
26 
The 
lease was renewed in 1752 by Grace Liddelli the widow of Josepht and 
John Liddellp his brother. At this time Grace Liddell owned three quarters 
of the house and John Liddell the remaining quarter. In 1775 the lease 
- 202, - 
was renewed agiin by John Andrewsv the executor of Grace Liddell 
in trust for Sarah and Ann Bonnerv and Joseph Liddell of Moorhouse in 
Cumberland. 
Neither Grace Liddell nor her heirs took an active part in the bottle 
house which therefore was leased out to others. In 1752 it was advertised 
to et 
27 
and in November 1753 passed to James King for a period of 
nineteen years. King's occupation of the South Shore bottle house proved 
a rather negative episode in its history for in 1756 King signed an 
agreement with the six other bottle manufacturers on the Tyne whereby 
in return for an annuity of Z60 per annum he agreed not to work the bottle 
house and to sell the others his stock of materials and bottlese 
28 
Whether King took on the lease of the bottle house with the intention of 
closing it down is not known but in view of his evident partiality for 
schemes it is certainly possible. 
What happened to the house immediately after King's lease expired 
in 1772 is not known. The next recorded sub-letting by the Bonners and 
Liddell is in 1792 when the house was leased to John Barber of the newly 
formed Tyne Glass Company. In the deed between the Bonners and Barber the 
house is described as being "at present in the occupation of Isaac 
Cookson" but it is not known for how many years previously Cookson had 
occupied it. In a letter to Sir Matthew White Ridley in 1781 
29 Joshua 
Henzell notes that a meeting is to be fixed "about the business of the 
South Shore bottle house" which suggests that the matter had not at 
that date been settled. 
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(iii) Sunderland 
The development of the bottle industry at Sunderland during the 
eighteenth century was on a far smaller scale than at Newcastle. In fact 
it could be argued that there was no development at all. Bottle manufact- 
uring was established at Sunderland in the late seventeenth century with 
the erection of a bottle house at Ayres Quay and one at Bishopwearmouth. 
During the eighteenthoentury there was little change; the two houses 
continued in production without competition from rival firms. They them- 
selves were linked through their common owners, "The Company of Glass 
Owners at Sunderland". who also owned a broad glass house at Ayres Quay 
(which appears to have manufactured . bottles more often than broad glass). 
Until 1741 both bottle houses were managed by the Company of Glass Owners 
but in that year the houses were advertised to let. 
30 In 1743 the Company 
of Glass Owners called in its debts and declared itself dissolved as a 
trading company. The leasing of the glass house in 1741 established a 
pattern that was to continue for the next half century. The houses were 
let by the owners to smaller partnerships for periods of fourteen years 
and advertised as going concerns at the end of each period. The advert- 
isements., in'1754,1768,1781 and 1795, all describe the housesas having 
full sets of workmen and, as the 1768 advertisement makes clears quite 
capable of being carried on by the existing occupiers: "whosoever chooses 
to apply for those works are desired to be speedy in their application, 
otherwise the owners will agree to carry them on themselves". In 
practice the lessees of the glass houses appear to have frequently been 
members of the company of owners. This was certainly the case in 1768 
whens two weeks after the advertisement of the glass houses, a notice 
was put in the papers that the two Ayres Quay houses had already been 
let to one of the proprietors and that "seven out of the ten proprietors 
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of the said glass houses executed a lease thereof to the lessee named 
in the said agreement". 
Exactly who the proprietors of the Sunderland glass houses were 
is not known but they aýpear toluve included members of many powerful 
Sunderland families: - the Pembertons, Fenwicksq Featherstonhaughsq Carrss 
Donnisons and Wilsons; men who were River Wear Commissionersq coal fitters 
and land owners. The proprietor to whom the Ayres Quay houses were let 
in 1768-was Thomas Wilson who had occupied them since at least the 1740s 
and as early as 1723 had appeared in a list of River Wear Commissioners 
as"Thomas Wilson of Ayres Quayt Bottle Manufacturer". Cooksonts letter 
book of the 1750s occasionally mentio-s Wilson and on one occasion described 
him to a London bottle merchant as "Mr. Wilson who works two houses at 
Sunderland"s 31 From 1768 the Ayres Quay houses were run under the name 
"Wilson and Russell". William Russell was a wealthy man who had inherited 
large fortunes from both his father and his uncle Matthew'Russell a 
Sunderland ship builder and timber merchant. On Thomas Wilson's death 
in 1776 Russell carried on the houses as Russell and Co. until 1783 when 
he quit Sunderland to take up the proprietorship of Wallsend colliery. 
Russell was an energetic proprietor who in 1780, as we have seenjunsucc- 
essfully attempted to revive the production of broad glass at Ayres Quay. 
He was occasionally mentioned by the bottle agents at Hartley: for 
instance in 1781 Joseph Oxley wrote to Sir John Delaval from Colchester 
saying that he could not make any bottles sales there because three days 
previously Russell of Sunderland had landed 3,000 dozenv but that he 
f1made them pay 2d per dozen over the Newcastle prices so eventually they 
might come to you", 
32 
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When the Ayres Quay houses were next advertised to let, in 1795, 
they were "now' in the occupation of certain persons under the firm of 
'The Proprietors of Ayres Quay Glass Works"'. a modern version of the 
Company of Glass owners. Amongst these proprietors were William Carr who 
took an active part in the bottle manufacturers' campaign against the 
Excise over moiles, and William Featherstonhaugh who signed a memorial 
to the Treasury on behalf of Ayres Quay in 1795.33 After 1795 the 
houses were taken over by Richard Pemberton who was almost certainly also 
a proprietor. The Bishopwearmouth house was not advertised to let after 
1768 and it is possible that it fell idle as the broad glass house at 
Ayres Quay was given over to bottles. It was restarted around 1794 
under the firm of George Fenwick and Co. whose name first appears in 1794 
as being prosecuted by the Board of Excise. 
34 The firm also signed a 
petition to the Treasury in 1795 asking to use firestone in their furnaces 
free of duty. 
35 
George Fenwick of Lambton is thought to have been the 
son of John Fenwick of East Heddon and it is probable that he too was 
one of the proprietors of the Sunderland glass houses. 
(iv) The Hartley bottle works 
In any account of the north-east bottle industry the Royal Northumber- 
land Bottle Works at Hartley must take a central position. Firstly for 
the simple fact that the records from the manufactory are extra- 
ordinarily complete. Despite the destruction of some of the bottle 
houses papers in the nineteenth century, more detailed information about 
the Hartley works survived than about all the other north-east bottle 
houses put together. The second reason for the importance of Hartley 
is that it is quite unique and provides information about areas of 
economic history, suchas the industrial development of landed estates, 
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that could not have been provided by other bottle houses even had 
their records been as complete. Although sharing the same trade as 
the bottle houses on the Tyne and the Wear the Hartley works was, in 
many respectsl quite different. It operated within a different economic 
environment and was subject to different constraints and influencesupon 
its growth. The difference between the H%rtley works and the other bottle 
houses in the area is very simply seen by looking at the size. Most 
bottle firms began their existence with a single bottle house. The Hartley 
works began in 1762 with two houses, and with the erection of a third in 
1788 laid claim to being not only the largest bottle manufactory in the 
north-east but the largest in Britain. This claim was possibly correct. 
Hartley's three houses do not appear to have been matched by any firm 
until the 1800s when the Edinburgh and Leith Bottle Company at Leith and 
Cookson and Cuthbert at South Shields both worked three houses. 
The size and growth of Hartley reflected its immediate economic 
environment which was altogether far more favourable than that enjoyed 
by other bottle houses. Broadly speaking the Hartley bottle works flourished 
because of the considerable benefits of being directly associated with a 
titled and landed family. The works was erected on the Northumberland 
estate of the Delaval family and until 1812 was run directly-by the 
Delavals; first Thomas Delaval and from 1771 Sir John Delaval. Perhaps 
i the most beneficial aspect of this situation was the support provided 
by other parts of the estate. The "mutual and inseparable" relationship 
between the colliery and the bottle works has already been mentioned but 
, it seems fair to say that nearly all features of the estatesp particularly 
the industrial featuress enjoyed a mutual and inseparable relationship 
with every other-feature. The bottle works for instance was supplied 
with mineral alkali from the salt pans, the bottle workers were supplied 
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with an allowance of ale from the brewery at Hartley and provided with 
accommodation, services and a community by the village at Hartley 
which had grown up primarily to serve the colliery and manufactories. 
All the industries at Hartley relied onthe harbour at nearby Seaton 
Sluice which in turn had been improved to meet the needs of the industrial 
undertakings. Most of the bottle sloops that were employed in transporting 
bottles to. London were owned by local men and were employed solely in 
the DelavalsO trade. Even the agricultural parts of the estate could 
supply materials, such as timber, forage and even food, to the manufact- 
ories at Hartley and Seaton Sluice. Altogether the Delaval estates were 
remarkably self sufficient and interdependent. Thiswas particularly true 
of the industrial undertakings and is reflected in the fact that profit 
and loss aa: ounts were frequently taken on Hartley as a whole, including 
the colliery, bottle works, brewery and salt pans, rather than on one 
enterprise alone. 
A second beneficial aspect of the bottle workst situation lay in 
having as the proprietor a man of considerable capital resources. 
John Delaval, although by no means possessed of surplus cash, owned 
sufficient land to make him an eligible recipient of-capital from others 
whether by mortgage or short term credit. Immediately after he took on 
the Delaval estates in 1756 
36 they were mortgaged for a total of f, 43,000 
which money was used to rescue, develop and improve them. The sum was 
one of the largest granted by the Sun Insurance Company to a private 
person in the eighteenth century and was only exceeded by the f. 50,000 
37 mortgage granted to the Duke of Leeds. In. addition the glass houses 
were mortgaged c. 1788 for f. 4,000. The income from rents and agricultural 
activities on the estates was considerable; in 1756 it was estimated to 
be Z6,000 per year. Because of this assured income Delaval was able 
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to raise short term loans should his industrial enterprises require it. 
The Newcastle bank of Surtees and Burdon received Delavalts agricultural 
rents and remitted them. to Londong and in return favoured him with a short 
term credit account. In 1788 Delaval took out a bond for a credit of 
up to f, 3,, 000 which was extended to Z4,000 in 1796. In extending credit 
Surtees and Burdon pointed out that in this respect Delaval was unique: 
38 
No colliery either on the Tyne and Wear have any credit account 
with us and in granting to your Lordship the indulgence of a 
credit account we depart from our rule. 
Despite the close ties with the rest of the Delaval estates, the 
bottle works began with at least the appearance of being a separate and 
distinct enterprise. The bottle works was established and originally 
owned by Thomas Delaval quite independently from the rest of the estate 
which was entrusted to his brother John; the works in fact represented 
the efforts of a younger son to find himself a profitable career. Thomas 
Delaval had been intended for a commercial career and for that purpose 
had been apprenticed to a merchant house in Hamburg where he was said 
to have developed a passion for trade and returned to England determined 
to channel his energies into manufacturing and trade. Considering that 
a coal mine was already in operation on his familyts estates this was 
the obvious site for his manufacturing project. John Delaval was 
evidently content both to help his younger brother and have him add 
value to the estates; he later commented to Thomas "You say it was my 
idea to start the glass works but I was ready to accommodate you with 
an advantageous situation". 
39 
Thomas Delaval's improvments to the 
J14SS 
kOWSeS 
estate were considerable. Not only did he erect the two squareA but he 
established a copperas works and improved the harbour by cutting a 
kfj#,, ý PO 
new entrance to the sluice. He must also be credited. with A introduce, 
steam powered winding engines at the colliery and inventing the mineral 
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alkali for use in bottle manufacturing which he patented in 1766. 
The separation of Thomas Delaval*s concerns from the rest of the - 
estate was underlined by a private Act of Parliament passed in 1771 which 
gave Thomas freehold possession of the glasshouses and granted a 99 
year lease to Thomas and John Pelaval of the colliery. 
40 According to 
the Act Thomas Delaval wished for freehold possession of his glass works 
after "having. invested much larger sums than were at first intended in 
the said manufactory" and intended to invest still much larger sums if 
the property could be secured to him. The Act was ultimately of no 
benefit to Thomas. He had first suggested it in 1768 but because of 
some disputation with John Delaval the Act was not passed until 1771 by 
which time Thomas's financial position had deteriorated to such a degree 
that in May 1771 he offered the glassworks to John Delaval in return for 
a life annuity. John Delaval was at first reluctant to take on such a 
risk bearing enterprise but was eventually persuaded to. This, plus the 
death of his elder brother Francis in August 1771, reunited the glassworks 
with the rest of the estate under a single owner. 
The purchase of the glass works in 1771 provides us with some 
indication of the value and potential of Thomas Delavalts enterprise. 
According to Thomas U0,000 had already been invested in the Hartley 
estate and U5,000 was needed tOicarry on the works. The whole estate 
produced a yearly income of E3,700 (made up of E2,500 from the glasshousev 
U50 from the brew house, Z1,000 from rent on the OloverplUS Of land" and 
Z50 from the"Dissington Annuity"). Minus interest on capital and an 
annuity of U. 200 to be paid to him, this left an income of U. 750: 
"therefore the undertaker will be a gainer of Z25,000 capital invested 
producing a net incomelo-himself of Zl,, 750 per annum". 
41 
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This was almost certainly a highly cptimistic valuation as was his 
elaboration of the yearly income of f. 2,500 from the glass houses: 
With ease the factory can produce annually 100,000 dozen bottles 
Both calculatiors and experience prove that we can fabricate them 
for 12d per dozen. Our contracts are made for 18d per dozen which 
upon the above mentioned quantity is ; Z2,500 per annum. There is 
no more risk attending this than the coal, norindeed so much 
these works being not subject to any of the subterranean accidents. 
The agents are Sir John9s people and the difficulty never lay in 
the management nor in the establishment which is most perfectly 
complete. 
Even allowi4g for Thomas Delaval's optimism it is clear that the bottle 
works at Hartley waS an ambitious venture, involving large sums of 
capital. The claim that ZlOpOOO had already been invested in it cbes 
not appear to be unreasonable in view of a further point made by Thomas 
Delaval; that the Z15,000 needed to carry on the works was easily 
guaranteed by the existing stock and property belonging to the factory 
including items such as his share in the London warehouse "doubled in 
value since the building of the bridge". 
Thomas Delaval was quite adamant that his brother's apprehensions 
were ill founded; "there cannot be a more plain mr simple undertaking 
and as Lleave so large a capital in the works there can be nothing easier 
to becarried on". In retrospect his prediction was apt; the subsequent 
history of Hartley leaves the impression that success was well assured. 
This was not entirely due to the lavish establishment left by Thomas and 
a large part of the credit for Hartley*s success must, go to the conscient- 
iousness and ability of Sir John Delaval. The mass of letters from the 
agents on the estate to Sir John during his seasonal residence at London 
bears witness to the depth of his involvement in the works. He was kept 
informed not just of extraordinary events but of the smallest detail of 
routine. He was notified of every shipment of bottles to London, including 
the number and type of wares sent, he was sent fortnightly pay bills, 
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weekly production'figures and near daily letters informing him of the 
general state of the works. The running of the estate from day to day 
was left to his salaried agents 
42 but Sir John Delaval was consulted 
an even the most minor of decisions and was kept intimately informed of 
their activities. 
The bottle works flourished under the proprietorship of Sir John. In 
1771 the productive capacity was 100,000 dozen bottles a year. By 1800 
this had doubled to 200,000 dozen. The major cause of this increase 
was the replacement of the two square houses with three round9or coneg 
bottle houses erected in 1778,1782 and 1788. Cone bottle houses were 
more efficient than the older square houses in that the cone created a 
more powerful draught and a more efficient furnace. It is perhaps worth 
looking at the erection of the round house in some detail for the advent 
of the cone glass house is generally acknowledged to-be an important and 
uniquely English development in glass technology ye-b one about which IiWe 
detail is known. 
A plan of a round bottle house was included in Diderot's Encyclop- 
aedia of 1751 - 1770 and specifically described as an English bottle 
house. The cone bottle house is generally understood to have developed 
in England because of its particular suitability for coal fired furnaces. 
Depsite the evidence of Diderot it has been suggested that by 1750. the 
round cone house was not typical of English glass houses since England 
was a part of the northern European-tradition of furnace building con- 
structinj square glass houses as opposed to the southern European 
tradition of round bee-hive furnaces. 43 The Hartley evidence tends to 
support this theory. First, as confirmation of-the link to a north 
European tradtion of furnace building; Thomas Delaval almost certainly 
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constructed his square houses in imitation of glass houses he had seen 
at Hamburg (it has been suggested that he originally staffed his glass 
houses with German workers but there is no evidence for this). Second, 
as evidence that square glass houses continued to be used in England 
until the 1780s at least; and third, as evidence that when in the 1770s 
and 1780s round houses were introduced, their construction was sufficiently 
novel to cause much argument and uncertainty. 
This final point is best illustrated by the building of the first 
round glass house at Hartley in 1778.44 A first attempt to build it 
miscarried and the builder, "Mr. Grey the master builder of Newcastle". 
was forced to abandon it. It was eventually completed by a new builder, 
William Blacklock of Tynemouth, at a considerably advanced price to 
compensate, he claimed, for the disadvantage of not doing the work from 
the beginning. Theeventual cost of building a new round bottle house 
was entered in the accounts as Z928 18s 7d noting that t1is allowed 
nothing for the miscarriage in building it. During its construction it 
is clear that the glassmen had some say in altering the plans in order 
to make the house more practical. 
Despite the difficulties of building it the new glass house was 
generally agreed to be an improvement. In 1782 when the square glass 
house stood in need of considerable repairs it was suggested thatitte 
replaced with a second round house on the pattern of the first since 
"nothing can be made so safe or permanent". 
45 
It was hoped that the cost 
of this would be less than the first house and John Crooks estimated it 
at Z640 allowing for using the stone in the existing house and using 
bricks made on the estate costing 5 shillings_. per thousand instead of 
the 10 shillings per thousand charged for the'first house. -This house 
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too was the subject of same argument. One of the main complaints 
against the old square house was that the roof timbers were in constant 
danger of catching fire from the furnace. Joseph Oxley suggested that 
this could be remedied without the expense of constructing a completely 
new round house by building a small round house of brick within the 
square one just to circumscribe the furnace and ash arches. 
46 One argument 
against this was that the round house would leave too little room in the 
house to set the new pots, besides which the timber roof of the square 
house would still be in danger from the pot arch fires. A round house 
was eventually agreed on and constructed but it was by no means as 
satisfactory as the first house largely because of ventilation problems. 
In July 1783 the main chimney was raised by 6f - 89 in an attempt to 
clear the house of sulphur 
47 but'even as late as 1793 the house was still 
causing trouble and, on one occasion, the men stopped work in it because 
of1he heat "and want of cold water to drink". 
In January 1788 the remaining old square house was pulled down 
and the foundations laid for a new round house. 
48 This house took some 
time to construct; by April only the foundations had been completedo in 
June work stopped for three weeks for want of burnt bricks for the 
main wall. It started work in October and was 130 foot high. This house 
appears to have been a considerable improvement on both the previous 
houses to which alterations were made in the light of the experience of 
the third house: 49 
Some improvements have been made in the two old houses by heating 
the bottle arches quicker and making the-ash arches of stone 
instead of brick as the new house was done. The workmen wished 
much for them to be done so and it was found to be a great saving 
of coals in heating the arches and also of bricks in the ash arches 
which, from their circular formsowere very weak and often fell by 
the weights of the tops pressing outthebottoms. 
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In addition the porches in. one of the old houses were renewed with 
pantiles instead of timber which was also considered an improvement. 
One aspect of the erection of round glass houses that emerges quite 
strongly is that they were considered desirable not just because they 
were more efficient but because they were durable and fireproof; Crook's 
comment that "nothing can be made more safe and permanent" is a useful 
one to remember. The old square houses with their roofs of timber were 
acute fire risks and demanded constant working capital to repair and 
even rebuild them. Although the cone bottle house could not be said to 
have been completely permanent in that the furnaces needed replacing 
every three months or so, they were considerably more permanent than 
their predecessors. At Hartley, the three cones - named in the early 
1800s Charlotte, Antigallican and Success -'lasted nearly a century until 
they were pulled down when the works closed in 1872. In 1801 they were 
valued at 9231, f. 83, and Z214 respectively; the valuation being made 
on the cost of the furnace 40) and the number of fire bricks in the 
cone. 
Other improvements were made to the bottle works during the prop- 
rietorship of Sir John Delaval. In 1784 a carriage way was laid from 
the warehouse to the crane on the quay "with sleepers and rails in form 
of the coal wagon ways and the carriages run upon small metal wheels which 
13 50 
answers very well and A much safer for the bottles than the old way was". 
In 1788 another wagon way was planned in order to lead coals and bricks 
to the glass houses. 
51 
An important improvement was the mechanisation 
of the delivery of water to the glasshouses. Inýthe 1770s John Crooks., - 
fixed a horse pump for use of the glass house which-. was capable of delivering 
70 gallons per hour; the expense of fixing it was, f, 42 5 shillings. 
52 This 
was replaced by a steam engine in 1801 after John Bryers had visited the 
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glass houses at Lemington to look at their machine which was used for 
grinding clay for the pots and grinding kelp. At Hartley all these 
operations were done by horse power: 
53 
It more and more appears to us to be a saving and a considerable one 
to have a machine instead of horses for the three mills which can at 
little expense be made to sift the ashes, colours9or at least to give 
motion to the sieves or screens for that purpose; to lift the salt water 
zhould the flux pans be brought over; and also to fill the ponds with 
fresh water out of the burn or the other pond for the use of the glass 
houses in summer when the ponds now used are dry. 
As the work grew in size so various subsidiary departments were added. An 
inventory of stock taken in 1801 (see figure 10) 
ý4 lists, in addition to 
the basic bottle making equipment, a joinerts shop, smitl? s shop, cooper's 
shop and various equipment for making bricks and grinding kelp. A smith 
had been employed by the glass works since the 1770s and a pay list of 
1775 indicates that at 17 shillings per week he was one of the highest 
paid employees. In addition various improvements and additions were made 
to the village of Seaton Sluice. By 1790 the village included 43 cottage 
houses, of which 12 were occupied by glass men, 31 houses one stomy highp 
12 houses two stories high and four larger dwelling houses occupied by 
the agents and Mr. Ridley of the brewery. There were also three shopst 
a school, a windmill, the brewery and malting, a public house and a 
stables. 
55 
In terms of the size of production and the size of the establishmentv 
the Hartley works certainly experienced a steady growth. Whether this 
growth was matched by a parallel growth in profits is by no means as 
certain. The major problem in looking at profits is that there appear 
to be very few profit and loss accounts for the glass houses alone and 
what few exist are estimates rather than actual accounts. If Thomas 
Delavalts 1771 estimate of Z2,500 yearly profit on two houses is to be 
believed then the profits per house declined since an estimate of 
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Figure 10 
Inventory of Stock at the Royal Northumberland Bottle Works, 4J[ily 1801 
Zsd 
-In the warehouse yard and shades 
Bottles @ Is Id per dozen 
Inferior bottles @ Is 8d per dozen 
Packing and carriages 881 1 0 
-In the Warehouse 
Bottle carriages, weights etc. 45 1 6 
-In the coopers shop in the warehouse 13 9 4 
-Blue and Brown ashes 
600 tons blue @ 12s 
30 tons brown @ 12s 378 0 0 
-Cullet 
12 tons @ 35s 21 0 0 
-Coals 100 tons @ 5s 25 0 0 
-Cellar at glass houses 
18 tons kelp @ 90s 
Other materials 92 10 0 
-Pots and clay 
Pots 0 f. 6 each 
Pot clay @ fA 5s per ton 29307 10 0 
-Mineral alkali @U per ton 40 18 0 
-Warehouse office 
Excise noticesp bottle marks etc 31 13 11 
-Cellar beneath 1 12 0 
-Staithe and straw 65 2 0 
-Glasshouse pay office 
The Great Clock E40 44 0 0 
-Joiners shop 
Carriagesv wheels and frames 33 15 4 
-The Calkers 7 4 6 
-"Charlotte" the first glass house 231 19 8 
-"Success" the second glass house 283 14 8 
-I'Antigallican" the third glass house 214 5 5 
-In the South Mill 15 9 6 
-In the North Mill 14 3 0 
-In the east or pot clay mill 39 1 0 
-Furnace stones 105 0 0 
-Stables* 35 0 0 
-Mason9s cottage 6 9 0 
-Brick making equipment, sundrie gears 5 0 0 
-Kelp making equipment, sundrie gears 4 10 0 
-First colour room %12 13 0 
-Second colour room 12 13 0 
-Third colour room 12 15 0 
-Five bottle vessel platforms 
FortThe Polly', 'The Speedwell's 
9The Hartley9v 'The Delaval9l'The' 
Williamf 75 0 0 
-Clay lying at Gainsborough 
54 tons 0 ; Z4 6s per ton 233 14 1 
-The Smith9s shop 
Shears, old pipes, shovels etc. 228 1 2 
5p680 13 1 
- n7 ý 
profits in 1790 judged ESOO per house to be the average yearly income 
56 
however Thomas Delavalts claim was certainly exaggerated. The 1790 
claim seems far more realistic, especially in,, view of another bottle 
manufacturer*s comment that he considered U9000 per house to be a 
proper return (see p. 254 ). The only reliable real profit and loss 
account for Hartley is for the year 1796-7 and in fact shows an actual 
Profit considerably beneath the estimates. 
57 
On a production of nearly 
230,000 dozen the net profit was Z1,772 4s 04-d or roughly f, 600 per 
house. Delaval was never concerned however with comparing profits with 
what had been: rather he constantly compared his profits with what he 
believed the other Tyne houses to be making at the present time. In 
1784 for instance he calculated that on a production of 100,000 the 
Tyne houses made almost Z1,000 more selling on their terms 
58 (this was 
quite a false calculation and based on a misunderstanding of their 
expenses). In 1800 Delaval calculated that he received a net profit 
of 3ý-2d per dozen and was thus mortified to hear in 1803 
59 
that Cookson's 
three houses at Shieldsnwere clearing a profit of 4ýkd per dozen. All 
that. can be said with certainty on the subject of profits is simply 
that Delaval's tottle works did make a profit and that with three houses 
in work this was likely to be within the range of S2,000 - Z3,000 which 
was not an unreasonable sum. The few available figures for payments of 
excise duty certainly indicate that by the end of the century the bottle 
workts average production was large: 
60 
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Eight Weekly Payments (in f. ) 
Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
1793 953 975 1., 027 993 1,, 049 
1794 - - - - - - 
1795 942 931 11121 923 19167 19152 
1796 873 1,, 033 948 977 928, 11104 
1797 - 822 - - 918 - 
1798 - 644 592 664 683 
1799 567 - - - - 
1800 - - 
1801 970 881 - 983 
1802 804 870 899 931 
1803 824 923 881 m - 
The total payments for 1795 and 1796, the only two years for which full 
figures are available, show that the works paid f. 6,236 and ; E4,763 or 
13% and 1076 of the total bottle duty in those years. 
(v) The Bottle Trade 
(a) London 
The entry of bottles from Hartley into the London market during the 
early 1760s had a startling effect on the established trade; so startling 
that it forced a reduction of up to 2d per dozen from the previous retail 
price of 28d - 30d per dozen. The size of this reduction makes some 
comment on the state of the London bottle trade previous to this date. 
been 
The London bottle trade appears to have one in which goods were priced 
with little re ference to the actual cost of manufacture but according 
to what was agreed by the trade. The lower prices of the bottles from 
Hartley was essentially not a, reflection of lower manufacturing costs 
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but of Delaval's whole method of supplying the London market which 
was quite independently of the established trade. Delaval by-passed 
the trade in that his bottles were sold through his own warehouse 
rather than through the warehouses of the bottle merchants used by 
the other bottle manufacturers. Delaval's "Royal Northumberland Glass 
and Bottle Warehousellvas first established at Southwark but later moved 
to Blackfriars. 
61 
It was not altogether novel for a manufacturer to 
establish his own warehouse in London, John Cookson for instance sold 
his flat glass through his own warehouse in Fleet Street, but it was a 
novel development in the bottle trade. 
It is interesting thatv although sane of Cookson's bottles were 
sold through his Fleet Street warehouse, Cookson made use of, and indeed 
preferred, the bottle merchants who served most of the other north-east 
bottle manufacturers, namely John Webb whose warehouse was at the Steel- 
yard and Thomas Farmer whose warehouse was at the Three Cranes. Cookson 
had started to send bottles to Webb in 1753 after agreeing with the other 
Tyne manufacturers that he should be permitted to do so. 
6-2 After ten 
years he found the connection so satisfactory that he was forced to re- 
consider his arrangement for bottles at his own Fleet St. warehouse. 
In 1764 he wrote to James Dixon at the warehouse complaining that his 
remittances for bottles sold were so slowthat the amount stood out as 
three times the value of what was sold through Webb and Farmer although 
the return per month was considerably short of either. In order to 
remedy this he proposed to bring the Fleet St. warehouse on to thesame 
footing as the other two; which proposal gives us a useful picture of 
63 the business arrangement between the bottle merchant'and the manufacturer: 
They send a monthly account and sell for 'ready money so that we have 
no bad debts. We draw on them at 60 days date for the amount of whats 
sold the month preceeding so-that amounts to near ready money. 
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These were certainly the terms on which Webb and Farmer dealt with 
all the other north-east manufacturers and there is evidence that they 
acted as agents for all of them. Cookson9s letter book mentions that in 
1759 Mr. Airey, Mr. Hewitson, Mr. Henzell and himself were to share the 
cost of f, 800 insurance of the stock in Webb's warehouse. 
64 
Mr. Wilson 
of Sunderland is mentioned in connection with Farmer. Indeed as Webb 
and Farmer are among only three bottle warehouses to be mentioned in a 
London Directory of 1763,65 it appears that the north-east manufacturers 
were to a certain extent forced to share their facitlities if they did 
not wish, or could not afford, the trouble of retailing the bottles in 
London themselves. Webb and Farmer both sold the bottles for the manu- 
facturers deducting sums for commission plus the expense of warehousing. 
In 1781 Joshua Henzell laid out the details of their deductions which 
by this time he considered far toolarge; he considered the whole 
arrangementfar too favourable to the merchant at the expense of the manu- 
facturer: 66 
Out of the London retail price of 2s 9d per dozen: 
Ad paid on Farmer's terms, viz: 
Leaving 2314-d for the manufacturer 
43 14-d commission 
1ýd freight 
ý4ý 
risking debts 
'-4d breakage and risk at sea 
Id breakage in the warehouse. 
krom which deduct: 9d excise duty 
12d materials and wages 
Leaving the utmost profit 05d - 21ad per dozen 
Hartley bottles were marketed under a different arrangement. The 
services of an independent merchant were not entirely dispensed with 
but he was placed in a position far more advantageous to the manufacturer. 
On the one hand the merchant was less independent in that he dealt only 
in Hartley bottles and relied completely on the works for his livelihood; 
he was more of an agent and a warehouseman. On the other hand he took 
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more of the responsibility and risk of bad debts for he was obliged 
to buy the bottles from the works at an agreed price as soon as they 
were delivered at the warehouse. The advantages of this latter provision 
from the manufacturerts point of view are obvious: the merchant was in 
effect advancing him the price of the bottles before they were finally 
disposed of, and it was the merchant who shouldered the entire risk of 
bad debts. In practice this arrangement worked almost identically to 
the more traditional arrangements in thatlalthough in theory Delaval*s 
interest in the bottles ended once he had delivered them to the ware- 
house and received payment for them, in practice his merchant kept him 
closely informed on the state of trade in London so that he could increase 
or decrease the shipments as required. 
The first merchant to take on the sales of Hartley bottles in 
London was Charles Broughton, a merchant with a variety of other interests 
including salt and alum. When the bottle works passed from Thomas Delaval 
to his brother Broughton took the opportunity of negotiating a more 
favourable position for himself by suggesting that he take on the 
freight of the bottles from Hartley to London in return for a reduction 
in the price he paid to l7d per dozen. This was not agreed to by. 
Sir John, largely on the advice of Thomas who told him to begin by 
paying all the charges himself so that he would know exactly what they 
amounted to. 
67 
Broughton also wanted six months credit for payment and 
when this was refused threatened tQ terminate the contract and make 
an alterný; tive arrangement with a Bristol house wheres he claimed, he 
could get the bottles 576 cheaper with credit into the bargsin. Despite 
this threat a contract was drawn up between Broughton and John Delaval 
in December 1771. By the terms of this Broughion'was to take all the 
bottles manufactured at Hartley except those sold by Sir John to private 
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people in Northumberland and those for his own use. The prices to 
be paid on delivery of the bottles alongside the warehouse at 
Blackfriars were: 
Double quarts 43d per dozen 
Common quarts 213ýd 
Common pints 19d 
(These prices were about 7d below the final retail price). Broughton 
was to unload the cargoes within eight days and notify Sir John by letter 
of their arrival. Z576 discount was given on discharge of the Bills of 
Exchange with an extra 2-'ý7o if discharged within 40 days. Both sides 
gave a security to guarantee this contract which Broughton took great 
exception to doing. He even complained about having to formalise the 
agreement into a contract at all saying that contracts were "unheard of 
in mercantile affairs". 
Contracts continued to be made between Delaval and his bottle merchants 
until Delaval9s death. In some respects they became increasin3ly unnec- 
essary as thegmwing capital invested by both sides in the trade guaranteed 
their commitment to each other. However they did provide some measure of 
security which both sides appear to have found reassuring. From the point 
of view of the historian they are extremely useful in providing an outline 
of the changing circumstances in the trade plus the increases in production 
at Hartley (see Fig. 1i). 
The 1771 contract with Broughton came to an abrupt end in December 
1772 when, largely as a result of the Scottish circulation crisiss 
Broughton was declared a bankrupt. At the time his balance with Sir John 
Delaval stood at U0904 but fortunately most of this was accepted by 
Benjamin Harrison who had gone into partnership with Broughton in January 
1771.68 Harrison was extremely keen to continue the correspondence with 
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Figure 11: Contracts made between Sir John Delaval and Charles 
Broughton or Benjamin Harrison. " 
Date Quantity to be delivered 
1771 All bottles manufactured 
at Hartley except ihose 
sold in Northumberland 
1773 120,000 dozen except those 
sold 90 miles from London 
Price Discount 
Quarts Pints 
2131d 19d 71ýý% at 40 days date 
2V2d 19d 71ý76 on the first 
80j, 000; 102-76 on 
the remainder 
1777 1202000 dozen except those 22d* IVýgd* 876 at 50 days date 
sold 40 miles from London 
1779 1002000 dozen except those 22kd 20d 876 
sold 40 miles from London 
1780 1002000 dozen except those 22kd 20d 876 
sold 40 miles from London 
1781 150,000 dozen except those 22ýkd 20d 8% at 6 months date 
sold 40 miles from London 
1782 L122000 worth except those 26d 2332d 1276 at 30 days date 
sold where Delaval "thinks 
proper" 
1783 Z12,000 worth except those 26d 23kd 1276 at 30 days date 
sold where Delaval thinks 
proper 
1784 Z12,000 worth except those 26d 233! 2d 1276 at 30 days date 
sold where Delaval thinks 
proper 
1789 All bottles manufactured 27d 2432d 876 at 60 days date 
at Hartley except 15,000 
dozen 
1793 All bottles manufactured 271, -ýd* 
25d* 876 at 60 days date 
at Hartley except 15,000 
dozen 
1800 All except 15,000 dozen 29d 26d 1276 at 6 months date 
1801 All except 15,000 dozen 30d 26d 1276 at 6 m(n ths date 
These additions were Harrisonts half sha re of an extra Id 
charged for freight. 
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Hartley and wrote to Sir John "I neither wish to dissolve my capital 
in the business which is just under Z10,000 ... nor embark on new 
connections in these risky times". Delaval was at first reluctant to 
commit himself rather preferring to consider the possibility of staffing 
the warehouse with his own salaried agents. He eventually agreed to give 
Harrison a year9s trial with the possibility of a contract following 
after being reassured by his London lawyer that "both Lady Harrison and 
all her sons are people of very great property": Harrison was in fact 
the second son of Sir William Harrison, the Chamberlain of the City 
of London. 
70 His main commercial interest was bottles and until 1786 he 
owned a bottle house of his own at Gravel Lane in Southwark. He proved 
a most satisfactory corresponde-nt for Delaval and continued to manage 
the Hartley warehouse until his death in 1797 when he was succeeded in 
the position by his son. Both Harrison and his son were also Treasurers 
of Guy9s Hospital. 
Following the success of the year's trial a contract between 
Harrison and Delaval was signed in December 1773. This differed from 
the previous contract in that the number and type of bottles to be 
sent to London was specified as not more than 120,000 dozen of which not 
more than 1,500 dozenwere to be Winchester quarts and not more than 
500 dozen marked bottles. Marked, bottles were bottles ordered by 
private customers with their own monogram or crest, usually in the 
form of a seal, on the neck of the bottle. They were ordered by 
Harrison from London in quantities as small as 12 dozen although innss 
, 71 clubs or other establishments might order larger quantities. During 
the 1780s and 1790s large quantities of bottles marked "Guys" were 
ordered for the hospital. Marked bottles were invoiced at the ordinary 
prices despite the extra cost of cutting a seal. The other difference 
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in the 1773 contract was that Sir John was permitted to extend his 
direct sales to customers not living nearer than ninety miles from 
London plus"such bottles as may be sold by him for exportation". 
The fact that this contract survived unchanged until 1777 can 
perhaps be taken as an indication of both sides' satisfaction with it. 
Shipping notices from Hartley certainly suggest that the trade between 
Hartley and London settled down into a regular routine. The bottle 
sloops were loaded with 3,000 - 4,500 dozen bottles and left for 
London more or less once a week. They returned loaded with cullet from 
Harrison plus ashes bought by Harrison at the best price he could obtain; 
most usually 6 shillings per cwt. There were occasional complaints from 
Harrison about the shape or colour of the bottles, and occasional 
complaints from the agents at Hartley that Harrison was breaking sub- 
standard bottles instead of returning them to the works to be sold in 
Northumberland where the customers were "less nice in their choice", 
but no seriousdLfferences of opinion. 
This amicable state of trade was not, however, seen. assatisfactory 
by the other north-east manufacturers who had been forced to reduce their 
prices as a result of the new competition. When Thomas Delaval first 
began to sell Hartley bottles in London they were sold 2d cheaper than 
the established retail price. As a result in 1764 bothWebb and 
Farmer wrote to the other manufacturers pressing them to reduce their 
prices to match. This the manufacturers were reluctant to do and Cookson 
wrote to Webb informing him of. this: 
72 
The manufacturers are of the opinion that with regard to quality 
their bottles deserve better 2s 6d than the otherts 2s 4d 
(2s 6d was of course the final retail'price) Later Cookson argued 
further that: 
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The Northumberland Warehouse must sell their bottles at one 
price or another, if we fall 2d per dozen still they would go 
below you so you would not be any better ina fortnights time. 
By what you say Mr. Farmer is a man of! pirit and will not be 
beat off his trade by anybody. 
Efforts were made to persuade Delaval to raise his prices but evidently 
without success for in 1765 Cookson wrote to Dixon. 
74 
I think it will hardly be possible to hold the p: ices of bottles 
long. Mr. Deer and Mr. Ridley9s partner have been twice with 
Mr. Delaval but I think nothing will come of it. 
Prices were reluctantly reducedtaccording to a later comment made by 
Evan Deer 75 champaign quarts were never sold for less than 30d per 
dozen before Mr. Thomas Delaval established his warehouse since when 
the other manufacturers "were under the disagreeable necessity of 
lowering their price so they could serve on the same terms as that 
warehouse". 
At the end of 1776 an effort was made once more to. persuade Delaval 
to conform to a trade agreement. Evan Deer first wrote to Harrison: 
76 
There is a general complaint throughout the glass hodsesat Newcastle 
and Sunderland of the insufficiency of the price for which bottles 
are sold in London. Please let me know your prices and your 
agreei4ent with Sir John so he can settle with the other proprietors. 
Delaval was invited to a meeting of thetrade at Loftus's coffee house in 
the Bigg Market which he did not attend himself but was sent a copy of 
the meeting*s resolutions for his co=ents. The resolutions were in 
essence a price agreementý not of retail prices but the prices at 
which bottleswere sold wholesale to bottle and wine merchants: 
Resolutions of the trade 
1. To be no difference in price between champaign and common bottles 
2. Bottles to be sold from the houses at 23d quarts; 20d pints (per doz) 
3. Bottles to be sold coastways at 23d it 20d 
except to Lynn 22d of 20d 
and the Channel Islands The best terms available 
4- Bottles to be sold at London at 21d it 19d 11 
5.576 discount for ready money at the Channel Islands. 576 discount 
and three months credit at London. 
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Delavalts reply to these resolutions is interesting and brings 
out some of the main differences between him and the Tyne manufacturers. 
Above all he maintained that he had to sell independently of the trade 
in order to secure a market and his profits. He had no desire to sell 
at lower prices. and, as he saw it, make a lower profit in consequence,, 
but it was'forced upon him by his situation. With landsale bottles, 
for instance, his bottles had to be Icheaper in order to induce people 
to come to Hartley. With coastwise sales the difference between the 
ports of Hartley and Newcastle was greatly against him. He had no 
opportunity at Hartley of sending occasional small quantities and as 
coastwise sales were usually to customers who did not require large 
supplies this was a considerable disadvantage. In essence Delaval felt 
himself to be a newcomer to the trade and at a natural disadvantages 
he therefore felt he had to push for trade by selling ccmpetitively. 
He was also reluctant to conform to an agreement that he could not be 
absolutely certain hisreighbours would conform to and he noted that he 
had recently been told of ash ships from the Tyne manufacturers at 
Yarmouth selling bottles far beneath these prices. (Deer acknowledged this 
to be true but justified it on the grounds that they were substandard 
bottles). The trade also asked Ddaralls opinion on the possibility of 
raising the price of quarts in London to their old price of 30d but 
Delaval was against this on the grounds that the houses at Bristol 
Stourbridge and Liverpool could sepý bottles to London at that price; 
to which Deer replied that he was sure they never could for the navigation 
was too long and tedious. 
Delaval did not commit himself to the resolution but when, in 
December 1777, a new contract was made with Harrison the prices of both 
quarts and pints rose by Id, In addition Harrison was to pay an extra 
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sum equal to the amount of the new excise duty plus an additional 
32d per dozen "so long as the Newcastle proprietors of glass works continue 
to pay the sum of 2d per dozen for the freight of their bottles to 
London". This latter point is not entirely clear; it may well have been 
that his own carriers had insisted on payment at the Newcastle rates and 
the cost was being passed on to Harrison. The other major change in 
the contract was that Delavalts selling area was extended to include 
customers living not nearer than 40 miles from London. 
The problems inherent in trade agreements came to the surface in 
periods of depression in the trade when sluggish sales created an incent- 
ive to depart from the trade agreement in order to get stocks moving. 
The price agreement of 1776 was soon put under strain by a severe decline 
in demand beginning in 1778 and blamed, at least by Harrisons on the out- 
break of hostilities with America. In December 1778 Harrison wrote to 
Delaval asking him to hold shipments because of his heavy stock on hand, 
caused by the loss of the American trade, the "precarious state" of the 
trade to the West Indies, and its dull state to the east: 
77 
The last two months used to be the briskest of the year with the 
shipping to the east Indies but this year it is dull. Two ware- 
houses that used to take considerable quantities off me have 
stopped. At Bristol it is the same, all have heavy stocks on hand. 
The following June at Harrison's request the contract was alteredp 
reducing the quantity to be delivered from 120,000 dozen to 100,000 dozen 
and extending his credit from 40 to 50 days. The badtstate of trade was 
echoed in a letter from Middleton Hewitson of St. Lawrence to Sir Matthew 
White Ridley in November 1779 acquainting him of the difficulties all the 
bottle houses were experiencing in attempting to vend the quantity made: 
78 
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Some houses, as formerly when times were bad, have exported 
and adventured large. Quantities of bottles are supposed to have 
been sold at considerable loss, others Otis apprehended have 
departed from their agreement with the trade and by underselling 
have got off considerable quantities. 
During the depression, and perhaps as a consequence of it, the 
Ouseburn bottle houses made an attempt to establish a new and independ- 
ent method of selling in London. 
79 This episode is interesting as 
evidence of growing dissatisfaction on the manufacturerst part with the 
established trade methods; andin particular the amount of commission 
taken by the London merchants. During 1780 an approach was made by 
Joshua Henzell and Sir Matthew White Ridley to the London Glaziers' 
Company,, to which they already sent broad and crown glass, suggesting 
that they start retailing bottles. This was to be done on a partner- 
ship basis; the manufacturers presumably hoped that a partnership would 
spread the profit from the retail sale more evenly between the manufact- 
urer and the retailer. The London Company was not however keen to 
enter into a new line of business except as selling agents only which 
would have meant a similar arrangement to the existing one with the 
bottle merchants. The, were not even particularly keen on the idea 
of acting as selling agents and sent back their estimate of the cost of 
fitting out a warehouse which, set against the fact that they would have 
to push for trade by offering bottles at a competitive price, led them 
to doubt whether the whole operation would answer the expense plus 
leaving something for their trouble as agents. 
Although this scheme came to nothing it is perhaps a significant 
indication of a trend towards bottle warehouses owned directly by manu- 
facturers. This trend can certainly be seen by the early years of the 
nineteenth century when, besides the Hartley warehouse, London included 
bottle warehouses owned by the Ayres quay Bottle Companys George Fenwick9s 
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Sunderland Bottle Company and, brieflys Francis Blackett. 
80 
In addition 
Cookson appears to have reverted to selling bottles through his own 
warehouse and his own agent, John Maxwell. The two Ouseburn houses 
continued to use the independent bottle merchants but, according to a 
comment made by Middleton Hewitson in 1811, with increasing dissatisfaction 
81 
(also see P. 266 ): 
I have before stated my opinion upon the advantage to be derived 
from the pursuit of the bottle trade, and am still convinced no 
certain return can ever be reckoned on without the medium between 
the manufacturer and consumer is set aside. This certainly would 
require an increase in capital. 
The depression in trade which had begun in 1779 continued until 
1783. In 1782 trade was believed to have improved sufficiently for 
Harrison's reduced contract of 1009000 dozen to be increased to 150,000 
dozen. This proved impossible for both sides to meet and in 1783 a 
new contract was drawn up. This had the significant difference that 
the amount of bottles to be delivered was specified in value,; E129000 
worth, rather than quantity (although it was specified that this was 
to include not less than 100,000 dozen bottles and squares). This 
change was almost certainly a reflection of Harrison's growing interest 
in the retail rather than the wholesale trade, and more specifically 
in the retail of goods other than wine bottles such as large "hollow 
ware" and small bottles of pint size and under. 
In September 1780 Harrison had written to Hartley asking if he 
could be supplied with "large hollow ware and retorts for chemical manu- 
factories". These had previously been made at his own glass house which 
he had recently relinqýished and Harrison was able to recommend a worker, 
William Oxley, capable of making such vessles. Oxley was sent up to 
Hartley, a large -hole knockeq in one of the furnaces to accommodate him 
and trial workings passed off successfully. 
82 By 1781 the deliveries 
I 
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to Harrison included such items as gallon receivers to hold 43ý-5 
gallons, boltheads (between gallons and pottles in size)t sublimerss 
retorts, large globes 3 feet in diameter and small globes 2 feet in 
diameter. Hollow ware was never a particularly large section of 
Harrison's trade but small pints and half pints sold to chemists and 
apothecaries. were. They were also, according to Harrisong the section 
of trade on which his profit, and Sir John's. depended for they were 
sold at full retail price. Harrison had occasionally spoken before 
of his dependence on his retail trade. For instance in 1776 when towards 
the end of the year the factory foun d itself unable to deliver the 
full quota of bottles, Harrison commented that if he had known sooner 
he would not have disposed of so many to the wholesale trade for he 
was left with none for his retail trade "on which alone my profit arises". 
what he disposed of to the trade was "at a profit by no means equivalent 
to the risk". In 1783 Delaval proposed a general increase in prices 
and Harrison argued that thisýwould lose him his trade in hollow ware 
and squares and that "without these my bottle retail would fall off 
considerably. Risks are so great on wholesale that I must decline 
being the middle man if you raise the price". In-May 1789 Delaval again 
proposed a general increase in price and again %rrison objected on the 
grounds that this would harm his retail trade. He was particularly 
concerned with his trade in the smaller bottles for he saw it as a 
growing trade and one that should be encouraged by a reduction in price 
rather than an increase, particularly in view of the fact thats in terms 
of the cost of manufacture and the amount of metal used per bottle, 
they were already overpriced: 
83 
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As a manufacturer I know that at the time of the pots giving way 
much advantage arises from being able to dispose of the metal 
in pints and smaller bottles, and I verily believe that the 
existence of the only glass house now working in London is owing 
to the advantage taken of the inequality of the prices, and selling 
to the apothecaries and trades who use the bottles rather than 
the phials and who would use more if the price of them was more 
fairly proporti(ned to that of sized bDttles. Excepting what are 
sold at the (this? ) glass house I sell more pints and small articles 
than all the warehouses in town. It would in fact be more for the 
advantage of the factory to increase the consumption if it could 
be done by lowering the price rather than discouraging it by the 
least addition. 
The phials Harrison mentions were phials made out of flint glass which 
was the traditional material for small apothecariest bottles. It seems 
probable that the competition frm small bottles had developed as a 
consequence of the excise duties, particularly the doubling of the duties 
in 1777, which made flint glass expensive for this particular use. As 
the treasurer of Guys Hospital it seems fair to assume that Harrision 
had ready connections in the pharmaceutical field. The stock accounts 
of the Ouseburn glass houses in 1780 indicate that, unlike Hartleyv 
they dealt entirely in sized bottles so it is probable that Harrison's 
excursion into the retail trade was not typical of other bottle merchants. 
By the 1790s the variety of articles manufactured at Hartley and sent 
to London was large including, mustard squares, "gooseberries"Oround 
snuffs, olive half pintss winchester half pints, plus the retorts and 
other chemical ware. 
Delaval was by no means convinced by Harrisonts argument that 
because of the size of his trade in small ware it should be encouraged 
by a reduction in price. In fact it seemed to him to be a good argument 
for increasing the prices. He instructed his agents at Hartley to 
find out what the amount of small bottles sent to Harris(n yearlywas; 
"if they are not many then I would not differ with himp if it be many 
then he ought to give a proper advance". The agents reported that in 
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fact., as Harrison claimed, the amount of small bottles he dealt in was 
quite large and in the preceding year had amountedto 14,525 dozen. 
Eventually Delaval prevailed and in the resulting contract the prices of 
all bottles were advanced by ld per dozen. In addition the quantity 
of bottles to be delivered to Harrison was redefined as "all the 
bottles manufactured at Hartley except 15,000 dozen". This was 
probably meant to cover the potential production from the third glass 
house which had been built in 1788 but which, because of difficulties 
in hiring sufficient workmen, was not working at full capacity. This 
particular wording proved a good bargaining point for Delaval in 1793 
when the owners of the bottle sloops at Hartley demanded an extra ld 
per dozen for the freight of bottles. Delaval passed half of this extra 
charge on to Harrison threatening to reduce his production to the 
absolute minimum if he refused: 
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I might sustain less loss by reducing the bottles made to a 
small quantity sufficient to keep my best workmen together until 
our agreement expires in August 1794.1 have it in my power to 
make as little as 15,000 dozen above what9s made for other 
customers. 
Another severe-depression in the bottle trade developed in 1795 when 
both the amountpcoduced and the amount sent to Harrison were reduced. 
Despite these precautions another large stock of bottles accumulated at 
Hartley and the main preoccupation became the lack of cash with which 
to pay the excise, wages and other expenses. This was somewhat overcome 
by agreeing that some expenses be paid for in goods, for instance the 
bottle sloop owners were paid in part with coals. The excise bills were 
sent to Delaval in Lond(n to pay through his London bank, and an extra 
credit was taken out with the Newcastle bank of Surtees and Burdon. 
This depression was not confined to the bottle trade. In May 1796 
Delaval's clerk Stephen Oxley wrote that: 
85 ' 
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Nothing can exceed the outcry for want of money in Newcastle and 
its environs. The banks have now agreed to discount no notes of 
hand or drafts except on London and the coal owners are selling 
at what price they can get. 
By 1797 trade was still, according to Harrison,, "stagnant" and he still 
had an over large stock, however in October 1798 he wrote to say that 
demand was increasing and that they might possibly consider returning 
to the previous quantities sent. He was nevertheless hesitant$ 
86 
The present demand is so confined to particular sizes that Iaa 
at a loss to say if it is likely to continue, the present demand 
being chiefly for the West Indies. 
Despite this hesitation he very soon agreed to accept an extra 80,000 
dozen with certain provisos: 
I see no objection to extending the manufacture of bottles provided 
the bottles are properly finished for since there has been so much 
competition in the sale of bottles the wine merchants have been 
very particular in the make and shape. Since you reduced the 
quantity your finish has been much improved. 
By 1799 trade had recovered sufficiently to cause Harrison to complain 
that he had not been supplied with bottles for five weeks and was much 
in want of them. 
There is no doubt that the 1790s saw a great increase in competition 
in the trade, not merely as a consequence of the depression but because 
the number of manufacturers supplying the market was increasing. Harrison 
occasionally commented on this, most usually describing the new competition 
as "speculators" but nevertheless noting their potential danger: "if 
their trade increases ours must diminish". In view of this increased 
competition it is perhaps hardly surprising to see evidence of continuing 
attempts to regulate prices in the trade. In 1799, Delaval was approached 
by a Bristoluanufacturer, Lucas Chances noting that because "the general 
opinion" of the bottle trade was that an advance in price was necessary 
to meet the increased costs of manufacture a meeting was to be held at 
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Ferrybridge between the bottle manufacturers of Bristol, Stourbridge, 
Coalbrookdalev Thatto Heath., Warrington and Scotland. 
87 This appears 
to be the earliest evidence of price agreements between bottle manufact- 
urers on a national scale and may well have been a consequence of their 
recent co-operation against the Board of Excise over moiles. (See Chapter 
Five). The previous price agreements made between the north-east manu- 
facturers had almost certainly been confined to the region. Unfortunately 
there is no indication of whether any north-east manufacturer attended 
this meeting or indeed whether any price agreement emerged from it. 
However there was certainly a pricerise introduced by the north-east 
manufacturers in 1800 which may have been a consequence of a national 
agreement. In March 1800 Mr. Blackett and Mr. Carr delivered a list 
of advanced prices to Delaval which in fact increased prices by the 
large sum of 2d per dozen. 
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The contract price between Harrison and 
Delaval was increased to match but after the usual argument about the 
small bottles the pints were only increased by V-ýd and the price of half 
pints remained the same. A year later there was another price rise of 
Id per dozen, excluding again the pints and smaller sizes. This rise 
also appezrs to have been initiated by "Mr. Blackett and the other 
manufacturers". 
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If these price rises were the result of national agreements then 
it seems clear that the national accord did not lastfor in 1803 some of 
the Newcastle manufacturers reacted independently. In June 1803 Harrison 
wrote to Hartley in alarm saying that Mr. Cookson and the other Newcastle 
manufacturers had suddenly reduced their prices by 2d per dozen and as 
the bottle merchants and customers were invoicing at the lower prices 
he had been forced to follow suit. 
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Harrison9s reason for their 
action is quite interesting; they acted., he'reported, "to'enable them 
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to keep the trade in the usual channels". By 1803 the bottle trade was 
in another depression and this reduction of prices was certainly a con- 
sequence of the decreased demand and increased competition. In 
September Harrison described trade as totally stagnant and overwork at 
Hartley was reduced by half in an attempt to cut the yearly production 
by 2002000 bottles. By April 1804 trade had improved but was still 
dull. 
(b) The coastal and export trade 
Information on the coastal and export trades, like the London trade, 
comes primarily from the Delaval papers. However unlike the London trade 
Delaval's activity in the Coastal trade was more typical of his fellow 
bottle houses: firstlý, in that his coastal trade was less important 
overall than that to London, and secondlythat trade to other towns 
and-cities was irregular and unpredictable and depended much on chance 
and personal connections. 
The Hartley works had been established specifically to supply the 
London demand and it was not until the period 1778 - 1783 that the 
coastal market developed an importance of its own. A comparison of the 
production figures for the year ending July 1778 and the year ending 
July 1783 shows the growth of the coastal market within this period: 
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1) Year ending July 1778: 
Doz. bots. 
Delivered to Harrison 1202524 6 
Broke in the voyage 3ý911 10 
Broke in the warehouse 618 10 
Sold by landsale 209 7 
Sold coastways 9j271 2 
Total vended and broke 1349554 11 
Total bottles made 1452618 6 
2) Year ending July 1783 
Delivered to Harrison 100$000 
Coast and landsale 17., 000 
Total bottles made 135,600 
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As these figures. imply a major reason for the growth of the coastal 
trade during this period was the reduction of Harrisonts contract to 
100,000 dozen in 1779. At Hartley a new round house had been completed 
in 1778 and with a potential production of 140,000 dozen bottles a year 
the agents were to a certain extent forced to turn to the coastal 
market in order to avoid a large stock building up at the works. A 
large stock on hand was not merely an inconvenience, sluggish trade 
meant a lack of incoming bills; Stephen Watson the clerk at Hartley, whose 
main concern was cash, wrote to Delaval in June 1779 bemoaning the slowness 
of trade, "great stocks of bottles and coal remain on. hand. We need a 
quicker sale of both to answer the great expense". 
92 By summer 1780 
an exceptionally large stock of 50 - 609 000 dozen bottles had accumulated 
at the works and the agents were told to make extraordinary efforts to 
reduceit., Before looking at these efforts it is perhaps worth saying 
something about the coastal trade up to this time. 
There had always been some small trade to coastal towns from 
Hartley largelyq it seemss in order to dispose of the bottles that were 
not of sufficient quality for the London market. In 1773 an agent 
had been told by John Delaval to try to establish a vend for bottles 
and salt at Hull and York but to make sure that "no bottles must go 
thither that are fit for the London market". 
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Coastal trade was also 
useful inthat it could be combined with trade in other commodities from 
Hartley - salt, copperas, coal or timber - or help in the supply of 
essential materials to Hartley. For instance bottles were occasionally 
accepted in part payment for the Stourbridge clay delivered to Hartley 
by the Gainsborough merchants Joseph and Aaron Smith. These arrangements 
with coastal merchants were always individual transactions; there were 
no regular supplies sent and although some merchants were regular 
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customers of Hartley they were only sent bottles in response to a 
definite order. One regular customer of Hartley was Sam Baker of Lynn 
who offered to take bottles "on consignment" from the works, in other 
words to act a! i a commissioned agent for selling them at Lynn, but 
this offer was refused by Delaval. 
94 He insisted on the bottles being 
purchased by a merchant no doubt as a precaution against possible 
bad debtsfrom private customers. 
The export trade was, like the coastal trade, subsidiary to the 
London trade and carried on for similarreasons namely as a means of 
disposing of substandard bottles and as a useful complement to trade 
in other commodities. Until the relaxation of the regulations surrounding 
the export ofglass in 1777 manufacturers appear to have involved them- 
selves very little in the actual export of glass, leaving it entirely 
to other merchants to whom they would sell the glass at an export price 
and claim the drawback themselves. In 1775 the Hartley works sold 616 
dozen bottles to Messrs. Rayne and Row of Newcastle at the export price 
of 16d per dozen champaignss and 14d per dozen commons. On this 
occasion Delaval calculated that the transaction left him U better off 
than if the same quantity had been shipped to Harrison 
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and that "the 
export trade is better than my trade with Harrison". Perhaps as a 
consequence of this he attempted to open a correspondence at "Dunquerque" 
later in that year learning from Mr. Watson, a Blyth ship owner, that 
bottles were sent there from Sunderland, delivered sound, atl3d per 
dozen e: kcluding freight. Watson was told to offer the French merchants 
14d per dozen including freight but nothing appears toluve come of this. 
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The importance of both the coastal and export trade increased con- 
siderably around 1780. Efforts to reduce the large stock at the works 
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began with letters being written to merchants in Hull, Yorkshire, the 
coastal towns and even the clay merchants at Bristol where it was 
thought a vend might possibly be got as most of the Bristol bottles were 
for export. When letters yielded no response Joseph Oxley, the chief 
land steward at Hartley, suggested sending out a traveller and was 
himself given the task, with the a; m of securing sales for Hartley 
bottlesp copperas and kelpplus collecting debts. Oxleyts journey lasted 
from November 1780 to January 1781 and took him to Yorkshire, East Angliag 
London and the south coast. Hereported to Sir John by letter almost 
daily and the result is quite a comprehensive survey of the provincial 
bottle market in 1780.97 His approach was a. simple one: he stayed at 
inns and inquired of the innkeeper who were the local wine merchants 
or dealers in bottles. To these he offered bottles at 22 shillings per 
cbzen shipped free with a 5% discount for ready money. This was undoubtedly 
a generous offer and it is hardly surprising that his journey was, in 
respect of bottle sales, a successful one. 
Oxley*s first stop%.. was a York where he secured an order from 
John Wormwald a merchant who was later to extend his interest in Hartley 
(see below). At Scarborough there was no vend for bottles at allý it 
being "cattle country". Nor was there a vend at Boston where, besides 
being impressed by the beauty of the church, he noted that Hartley coals 
were not liked because they burnt too quickly. At Wisbech orders were 
secured from two bottle dealers and a wine merchant, Mr. Horrocks, and 
Oxley was also successful at Spalding and Lynn where he got an extremely 
large order of 300 gross from Sam-Baker to be sent at intervals through- 
out the coming year. Baker was a previous customer of Hartley and one 
must assume he was taking the fullest advantage of the cheap pricesbeing 
offered. Oxley continued to Swaffham, Norwich, Acle and Yarmouth where 
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"the people have a good stock on hand but promise to take from you 
in the future". The Yarmouth trade was one sought after by all the 
north-east manufacturers because of the suppliers of soapers* ashes 
to be got there; Oxley saw a ship loading ashes for Hartley whilst he 
was there. Also at Yarmouth he tried to sell kelp but without success 
for 11 the soap boilers here use wood ashes in place of it". At Ipswich 
the three wine merchants had stocks of bottles on hand and at Colchester 
where there were five bottle dealers he unfortunately arrived three 
days after Russell of Sunderland had landed a large bottle cargo. 
From East Anglia Oxley went to London in order to sell kelp to the 
soap boilers. London he found to bella surprising place but by no means 
a desirable place to live". From London he set off along the south coast 
to Portsmouth and Southampton where he had little success as most of 
the wine merchants were supplied with bottles from Bristol. Bristol 
bottles, he noted, "are better made than yours and rather heavier. 
Three of them probably make 5553ý,; lbs, yours only Y-4 lbs. 1' By the end of 
January Oxley was back at Seaton Sluice having secured orders for 4,548 
dozen plus the 300 gross to Baker at Lynn. He returned with a great 
enthusiasm for the coastal trade and estimated that with some effort 
they could sell 4,000 dozen at Lynn, 3,000 dozen at York and Hull and 
the Fen towns, 3,000 dozen at Colchester and Ipswich and 4,000 dozen 
in the Portsmouth area. The main difficulty he sawvas not in getting 
orders but in getting ships to carry the bottles to market. This was 
something constantly complained of at Hartley and some of Oxley's 
orders were in fact dispatched from St. Anthony's quay in Newcastle. 
By April 1781 most of Oxley"s orders had been dispatched but as 
the stock at Hartley was still around 50,000 dozen Oxley was sent on 
a journey. to Scotland for a similar purpose. This journey was less 
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successful and resulted in orders for only 116 dozen. This was 
partly no doubt due to-the presence of bottle manufactories in Scotlandt 
and also to the interest in the Scottish market taken by the other 
Tyne bottle houses. Oxley attributed most of his lack of success to 
the fact that he seemed to be following in the footsteps of a traveller 
from the Closegate bottle house. He noted that many merchants were 
already well. stocked withbDttles from the Tyne or Sunderland. At Montrose 
he noted with surprise that although large quantities of bottles were 
sent there from Newcastle the towns., people got their coal and cinders 
from Sunderland. 
In the same way that Hartley bottles upset the London market in 
the 1760s so Hartley*s increased activity in the c! oastal townsamund 1780 
caused complaints from the other manufacturers; again they were being 
undersold. In July 1781 Joshua Henzell wrote to Sir Matthew White Ridley 
asking his opinion on a "scheme" drawn up by James King to purchase 
Delaval's interot in the bottle trade by offering him f. 500 a y(ft r to be 
paid for by the bottle houses in Scotland, Newcastle and Sunderland 
raising their prices as soon as he had quit the trade. 
98 Henzell himself 
did not think this a realistic idea for "if he sees them suing for peace 
his terms will be high especially as an object for him was the consump- 
tion of his small coals". Instead Henzell suggested-"a small war and a 
short one" by underselling Delaval at every port where he had recently 
sent bottles. Henzell wasý:, convinced this plan would succeed because 
Delaval*s bottles had to be inferior otherwise he could not be selling 
them at 22s per gross when the trade price was 25s, 26s and 27s. 
Neither of these plans to destroy Delaval9s interest appear to have 
been executed. By September 1781 Henzell was still complaining about 
being undersold by Delaval: 
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He has disappointed me of some orders from Scotland by his 
selling price being 22 shillings per gross, yours is 27 shillings 
I know the Closegate bottle owners sell at 25 shillings per gross 
shipped free on board at that price here for Montrose and Aberdeen. 
Thecoastal trade continued to be an important, if not a partic- 
ularly vitalt element in Hartley0s whole trade. One of the main dis- 
advantages of opening trading connections at low prices was the 
difficulty in trying to maintain the trade at a more reasonable rate. 
In 1782 Oxley approached the same merchants for repeat orders but could 
only succeed in getting theta., at the old price. In 1783 he wrotes 
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"I have not been able to raise the price of bottles to be sent coast- 
ways more than Id per dozen after delivering all those ordered at the 
old price (which have not all been delivered for want of opportunity of 
ships)". Despite this the trade continued. Shipping notices for 1783 
and 1784 show that orders were being dispatched to new destinations 
including points as near London as Billericay and Gravesend. This was 
a consequence of an alteration made in the contract with Harrison in 
1783 which permitted Delaval to sell "where he thinks proper" instead 
of beyond the previous forty miles from London limit. 
The logical conclusion of this growth in the coastal trade was 
to enter into a regular contract with a coastal merchant. This was first 
tried in 1782 when the York merchant John Wormwald offered to take 
309000 dozen bottles a year from Hartley, 
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The only problem with 
this, arangement was that Wormwald proposed to sell these bottles in 
London through afriend. Delaval was understandably worried as to 
whether this would break his contract with Harrison but wasjunfortunately 
as it turned out, persuaded by Wormwald that it would not: 
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My taking your bottles on my o, wn account 
works fully clears you of any contracted 
agents do , not 
know (or ought not to ask) 
consigning them. In London the place is 
interfere with your friendt-s sale. My f 
be among his set in the wine business. 
in my own ship at your 
limits as you or your 
to what market I am 
large enough not to 
riend*s sale will only 
The whole adventure miscarried. Not only did Wormwald9s friend prove 
bad and unable to sell the bottles but WormwaJ4 in an attempt to salvage 
his investment, attempted to sell the bottles to Harrison who knew 
nothing of the affair. Despite Delaval*s insistance that it was only 
something done- to oblige a friend, Harrison was angry and sternly reminded 
him that"occasional customers can in the end be of no benefit to you". 
A contract was again suggested in 1783 and this time was brought 
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to a successful conclusion-. William Rowq the Newcastle merchant, 
agreed to take 12,000 dozen bottles during the year at the export price 
for whichIm was to deliver a quantity of square timber and waggon rails 
at Hartley. Row*s ship left Hartley at the end of April 1781 loaded with 
6,000 dozen bottles. It was certainly destined for the Baltic for by 
June it had returned with timber to be reloaded. An added advantage 
of this arrangement was that Row agreed to take common bottles which 
in 1782 Harrison had said were no longer saleable in London and which 
had always constituted a substantial proportion of Hartley's make. 
Commons differed from champaignscaly in shape and finish, they were made 
from the same metal in the same capacitites but because of their lack 
of finish were quicker to manufacture. 
What of the other north-east bottle houses and the extent of their 
coastal and export trade? Details about their activities are scarce 
but it seems fair to assume that, like Hartley, they relied on personal- 
connections in other towns whom they supplied with bottles when requiredt 
and often did so in combination with other commodities. This was 
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certainly the case with John Cookson whose letter book reveals him 
to have been carrying on a varied trade in bottles, grindstones, salty 
butter and coallamongst other things. There is no evidence that any 
of the Tyne or Sunderland houses maintained stock in a warehouse in a 
coastal town; stock accounts for the Ouseburn bottle houses in 
1780 show that they at least only maintained stock in the three London 
warehouses. The Scottish market should perhaps be mentioned as partic- 
ularly important for there is evidence that the Tyne houses had a 
sufficient interest in Scotland to establish a trade agreement. In 1767 
John Cookson wrote to John Inglis of the bottle house at Leith justifying 
some measure of retaliation fcom the Tyne bottle houses after the breaking 
of "a good agreement in trade": 
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You must remember when you could not vend more than 35 weeks9 work in 
every year your hands went to Glasgow. When it increased the Glasgow 
agreement was dropped and you made the whole year. All that time we 
had the coast and some at Leith but that was grudged us, another 
house was erected and we were driven out of the whole trade. Such 
treatment produces the steps we have taken .... you cannot but blame 
yourselves as the ayessors, not us. 
The "us" almost certainly referred to all the Tyne houses. A letter of 
same date to John Inglis in Matthew Ridley*s letter book 103 expresses 
equal concern about the confusion in the trade at Leith. This letter 
is also interesting as an illustration of Cooksonts and Ridley's different 
degrees of involvement in the trade, While Cookson has a complete grasp 
of the situation Ridley admits that: 
For my own part I am not so much master of the trade as to under- 
take to say what is best to be done but have communicated the contents 
of your letter to the gentlemen concerned in the manufactory and you 
will hear from theqn-ore particularly. 
It is difficult to imagine this interest in the Scottish market being 
maintained in the later years of the eighteenth century with the est- 
blishment of other bottle houses at Grennock, Leith, Alloal Dundee 
and Dumbarton. Before Joseph Oxley set out on his journey to Scotland 
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in 1781 he collected Customs House entries of the amounts of bottles 
sent from Newcastle to Scottish provincial towns the preceding year; 
the total was not a large one: 
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Aberdeen 432 gross 
Montrose 265 
Dundee 318 
Perth 119 
Banff 70 
Galloway 50 
Arbroath 48 
Inverness 30 
Kirkwall 19 
Dunbar, 12 
Total 1,363 gross or 16,356 dozen bottles. 
The available figures showing export of bottles from the Tyne 
indicate that, like the coastal trade,, the export trade never approached 
the importance of the London trade in terms of quantity (see Fig. 12). 
The destinationso as might be expected, are largely within northern 
Europe. The most surprising aspect of the port book figures is that 
they indicate an enourmous trade in bottles from Sunderland to Holland 
and Belgium. Quite why this should be so is not known and it can only 
be presumed that it was a long established trade connection. Both the 
1780 figures collected by Joshua Henzell and the 1789-90 port book 
figures indicate'that by far the largest exporter was Isaac Cookson with,, 
in 1790, Cookson Deer and Wilson. The names entered for the 1760 figures 
are of individuals rather than firms. Many of them appear to be merchants 
with no connections to manufacturing bottles but some names are those 
of bottle manufacturers or managers of bottle firms; for instance 
Jacob Wilson of Bill Quay, Middleton Hewitson, James Kingo and Paul 
105 Failie who was connected with John Williams. Vý 
Cookson*s interests in the export trade is confirmed by his letter 
book which i. ncludes letters to foreign merchantsp many of whom Cookson 
appears to have acquired as a consequence of taking over James Dagniats 
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bottle house, Among these merchants were John and Stephen Van Os of 
Amsterdam to whom Cookson sent "Holsteen quarts" and negotiated prices 
in guilders and stivers, 
106 Thomas Hozitsky of Dantzig and Messers Welder 
of St. Petersburg were also supplied with bottles on consignment. The 
letter book also shows that the export of north-east bottles cannot 
be measured just by bottles exported directly from the Tyne. Cookson 
quite frequently supplied bottles at export prices to other merchants 
in other towns and cities. Alexander Baxter and Sons of Edinburgh were 
important customers for Cookson in this respect. According*to letters 
from Cookson to Baxter in 1763, Cookson was keen to encourage the trade, 
via Baxter, to the Baltic; "it is in our interest to support the bottle 
trade to the East, if it is attacked from any quarter we must support 
our footing". 
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This apparently referred to a proposed increase in 
priceswhich it was thought might encourage the erection of bottle 
I 
houses abroad. In a later letter Cookson declared his own feelings to 
be that they should stay competitive in order to keep the trade: 
It certainly would be wrong to have the prices of bottles so 
high as to encourage erections abroad. Mere are some houses 
at Dantzig and for all that their supply is from here and they 
are nox4 at 2s 6d there ..... if anything of that sort should 
happen we must support the merchant in regard to price not to lose 
the branch. 
Baxter also took bottles from Cookson to send to St, Petersburg for when, 
in 1764., Cookson was approached by another customer for bottles for the 
same market he felt obliged to inform Baxter, 
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A gentleman here is applying for a large quantity of bottles and I 
am apprehensive they are intended for Russia. I cannot supply 
both you and he provided your quantity is m ything near what it 
was last year. If I do not hear from you soon I must engage with 
my friend here but I shall not do till I hear from you on the 
matter. 
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Figure 12: Exports of bottles from Newcastle, 1760,1776,1780,1790 
A: 1760 
cwts. 
The Sound 1., 710 Exports of bottles from Sunderland 
Rotterdam lv700 Rotterdam 3,830 cwts 
St. Petersburg Iv400 
New York lj070 
Boston 975 
Dublin 765 
Oporto 307 
Drontheim, 307 
Nova Scotia 160 
Christiansand I 
B: 1776 
Holland 4j284 
Russia 3., 002 
Africa 565 
Portugal 457 
Ireland 418 
Guernsey 248 
Jersey 213 
Gibralter 203 
Denmark & Norway 96 
Germany 41 
C: 1780 dozens 
Copenhagen 68,988* 
Elsinore 422800* 
Channel Islands 14., 384 
Ostend 22228 
Hambro9 2.. 399 
Emeldon 760 
Amsterdam 720 
Lisbon 380 
Dantwich l., 764 
Christiansand 192 
Mundhole 84 
D: 1790 cwts 
Guernsey 29428 Exports of bottles from Sunderland 
Lisbon 11276 Ostend 21,600 dozen 
Rotterdam 313 Havre de 
Jersey 220 Grace 12,000 dozen 
Drontheim 200 
Jamaica 40 
Denmark 23 
Maudelle 20 
(Cori. ) 
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(C omh) 
Sources: 
A: PRO E190 259/6 
B: Hutchinson A View of Northumberland (Newcastle 1776) Vol ii 
p. 464, said to be taken from Customs Books. 
C: ZRI 36/1. Joshua Henzell to Ridley 24 October 1781. Figures 
taken by Henzell from the Customs House in Newcastle. 
D: PRO B190 289/4 
*The quantity exported to Denmark was the result of a government 
commission. Denmark usually prohibited imports of glass in order to 
protect their own manufactories, but the sudden destruction of their 
national glass house led to this large order from Newcastle. Cookson 
secured the commission, to the disappointment of the Hartley agents 
(see 2DE 4/3/36 and 2DE 4/9). 
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2.1800 - 1850 
This period was one in which the north-east industry, building 
on the potential established in the eighteenth century, made full use 
of the new trading opportunities of the nineteenth century. Although 
certain firms quit the trade because of financial dissatisfactionv or in 
one case bankruptcy, and a few works dicreased in size; overall the 
local industry saw an increase both in the number of firms engaged in 
the'trade and the number of bottle houses in the region. By 1832 Tyne 
and Wear boasted seventeen working bottle houses and an additional five 
temporarily dormant. Some of these bottle houses represented the 
expansion of the older firms; at Bill Quay, Closegate, Bishopwearmouth 
and South Shields additional bottle houses were erected. Others repre- 
sented entirely new establishments notably at St. Peterts in Newcastler 
Deptford and Ayres Quay in Sunderland. There is no doubt that the 
north-east's share of the total national production during this period 
was a substantial one. The 17 bottle houses working in the area in 
1832 represented nearly half of the 39 bottle houses. licensed by the 
Excise in that year. However, the size of the north-east bottle 
industry should not be taken as evidence of the region9s complete pre- 
dominance in the trade. Although bottle manufacturing at Bristol is said 
to have seen a decline over this period, other areas, notably Lancashire 
and Yorkshire, certainly increased their share of the national market. 
This incrvase in. then=be, r_of*manufacturers can roughly be measured 
by the corresponding increase in the number of bottle merchants in London. 
During the late eighteenth century London trade directories never list 
more than seven. By 1817 twenty-one are listed 
I 
and of these only 
eight are known to have had dealings with north-east bottle houses. 
Before looking at this increased competition within the trade, the 
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histories of the individual north-east houses must be outlined. 
(i) The Cookson Houses: Closegate, Bill Quay and South Shields 
In 1802 the ownership of the Cookson bottle houses was reorganized 
following the death of John Cookson, the eldest son of John Cookson. 
All his shares "in his bottle houses on the river Tyne carried on to 
very great profit" were advertised for sale in August. 
2 
These shares 
certainly included shares in the South Shields bottle houses for in 
March 1803 Middleton Hewitson wrote to Sir Matthew White Ridley that 
"the bottle houses late Mr. John Cooksonts are at last disposed of 
Mr. Cookson with Mr. Cuthbert I understand take the whole of them.. 
3 
The firm of Cookson and Cuthbert was to occupy the South Shields bottle 
houses until the 1850s. Previously the houses had been run as Cookson 
Deer and Blackett but c. 1801 Francis Blackett had left to establish a 
completely new bottle firm with Simon Temple a South Shields ship 
builder. They were, interestingly, also in partnership as common brewers. 
The bottle house of Temple and Blackett came to an untimely end in April 
1804 when it was completely destroyed by fire, wre4king f, 3vOOO worth of 
damage. 4 The enterprise was abandoned and Blackett eventually took up 
the post of manager in Lord Delaval's Hartley works. The brewing 
partnership was also dissolved but Blackett continued to mn the brewery. 
at Mill Dam in South Shields, on his own. Under Cookson and Cuthbert a 
third bottle house was added and by 1842, the works employed 118 adults, 
22 "young persons" and 16 children. 
5 
John Cookson may also have had a share in the Bill Quay house for 
around 1802 it too appears to have undergone a change in ownership; 
from Cookson, Deer and Wilson to John Cookson & Co. This John Cookson 
was the eldest son of Isaac Cookson. (It is quite interesting that 
most of Isaac Cookson*s sons began their careers in bottle manufacturing. 
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Besides John md Isaac, who were given shares in the Tyne bottle 
houses in 1802, Joseph Cookson bought a bottle manufactory in Bristol 
in 1809 where he was later joined by his brother Septimus. According 
to Joseph bottle manufacturing was a second choice. It had been 
intended that he should go into a career in banking but this plan fell 
6 through. ) Cookson, Deer and Wilson had purchased the land on which the 
bottle works was built in 1802, which transaction provides a useful 
map of the property at that date (Figure 13). Around 1815 John Cookson 
took John Coulthard into the partnership. Coulthard (1777-38) was a 
Sunderland man and had previously been the clerk of the Deptford bottle 
works. He was a vigorous Wesleyan and whilst at Bill Quay wassaid to 
have made strenuous efforts to improve the morals of his employeese 
He was succeeded at Bill Quay by his son who later purchased Heworth 
Chemical works. The firm remained Cookson and Coulthard until it was 
sold in 1847. A second glass house was built c. 1825 and the firm also 
took over the St. Lawrence bottle house in Newcastle for a brief period 
from 1835 to 1839. By the time of the work's sale in 18481t consisted 
of two large bottle houses and a recently erected flint house, ninety 
workmen*s cottages, a manager9s house of twelve rooms, plus twelve acres 
of land. A large gacometer had recently been erected with pipes all 
over the works. 
8 After quitting1he works John Cookson remained owner 
9 of the land until 1883 when it was sold to the Ecclesbstical Commissioners. 
The Closegate bottle works also mw little change in its ownership. 
From 1802 it was run by Isaac Cookson and Son, the son being Isaac 
Cookson jr. The series of cash books belonging to Isaac Cookson jr. 
provides some quite detailed information about the Closegate works. It 
is clear that by 1816 a second bottle house was in operation but exactly 
when this was erected is not certain. It is possibleit dates from c. 1802 
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1. Glass houst-, 
2. Pot arch 
3. broken glass house 
4. Smith's shop 
5. Kep house 
6. Two cottages 
7. A cottage 
S. Laiker' s house 
9. Sifting house 
13 
10. Coal yard 
32 11. Two cottages 
41 12. Battle warehouse 0 13. Crane yard and 
warehouses 
7(? 14. Joiner's shop and 
clay house 
15. Mill houses 
24 16. Two cottages 
202 17. Five cottages 
3 
W 
18. Three cottages L- 
22 
01 
-'1- P 19. Public House 
"0. Two cottages 
21. Stables 
22. Coal house 
23. Owner's dwelling ho 
24. Agent's dwelling hc 
25. Two cottages 
L- 26. Gardens 
U1234b6 chains 27. Summer house 
Figure 13; The Bill Quay B. ttle. House, 1802 
Sourý e: Bell CoLlection, Ga_teshead Public Library. 
k, 
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for in that year the CooksonS completed their takeýover of the 
Dagnia heritage by purchasing all the remaining Dagnia property in 
the Close from Elizabeth Dagnia 
. 
the widow of John Dagnia. 
10 This pur- 
chase included eight separate plots plus all the glass bottle manufact- 
ory which up till then the Cooksons had occupied only as tenants. The 
cash books also suggest that most of the Closegate houses' trade was 
with regular customers; merchants who remitted quite large sums on a 
regular basis. Amongst these merchants were John Mann, who appears to 
have taken over Farmer*s warehouse at the Three Cranes and who was also 
used by the other Newcastle houses, and John Combs and Son who appearS 
in the 1817 London Directory at Bush Lane, Webb9s old address; Combs 
also owned a bottle sloop,, the "Hope" in partnership with Cookson. 
Large monthly remittances were also sent by John Maxwell who dealt 
in bottles from. Cookson9s own warehouse in Upper Thames Street. Another 
regular customer for bottles was Alexander Sinclair of Liverpool who 
was almost certainly Cookso0s agent for he is listed in the Liverpool 
Directories as owning a warehouse for crown, plate and bottle glassp 
and later soda. Payments from smaller customers were collected by 
travellers who were sent out regularly on journeys to the Southl Scotland 
and Ireland. One other interesting aspect of the bottle houses revealed 
by the cash books is that coal was purchased from a number of different 
collieries, amongst them Benwell, Elswick, Walker and Walbottle, instead 
of being supplied by one colliery on a regular basis. By 1842 97 adults 
were employed in the two houses 
11 
under a manager Mr. Dawson. 
(ii) Newcastle 
The early years of the nineteenth century were not a particularly 
profitable period for the St. Lawrence bottle house. Middleton Hewitson's 
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letters to Sir Matthew White Ridley are mostly concerned with spec- 
ulation as to why the house was working to so poor an account. Besides 
the difficulties of selling through a Lond6n agent (see P. 266 ) the 
disappointing return was usually attributed to producticn difficulties 
particularly the pots breaking which Middleton Hewitson guessed was 
caused by using them before they had matured. sufficiently. The few 
available profit and loss accounts for the house suggest that Hewitson 
and Ridley did not actually make a loss but Middleton Hewitson was 
certainly not satisfied with the return and wrote to Ridley in 1809: 
12 
The profit of the bottle house is certainly inadequate to the 
pursuit, I conceive Z1,000 is what ought to be produced annually 
as only a fair profit. 
Despite the profit in that year being "more than I could have expected", 
Hewitson felt that only ; Z. 600 could be divided between the partners. 
He was particularly unhappy with the housel's performance in view of the 
fact that its neighbour, the High Bottle House, was far more successful 
and in 1808 out'of net proceeds of U. 281 had given ad ividend of Up200. 
According to Middleton Hewitson: 
There is little difference if any in the materials they use and our 
bottles are acknowledged equally good, that would the pots stand the 
results of both houses ought to be the same. 
The pELrtnership between Middleton Hewitsion and Sir Matthew Ridley 
was renewed in 1806 on an entirely new basis after an enquiry into the 
muddled history of ownership found that the house was the sole property 
of Middleton Hewitson and awarded him U. 659 as arrears of rent since 
1780. As part of this renewed partnership a valuation was made of the 
property which gives a useful picture of its size and extent. Besides 
the bottle house itself the manufactory included a clay houseo ash 
yard, iron houseo cullet house, clay mill, kelp houseq crane, quay, 
40 rooms occupied by workmen and a house of 5 rooms occupied by an agent. 
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A fair rent for the property was agreed to be U80 a year. A new 
managing agentq Mr. Calvert, was appointed to oversee the day to day 
working of the house with the intention that Hewitson should "just 
be left the amusement of doing the books". In fact the difficulties 
the house experienced meant that Hewitson continued to take an active 
part in the concern. 
In 1811 the partnership came to an end with the death of Middleton 
Hewitson snr. and the reluctance of his son Middleton Hewitson jr. to 
continue as the manager of the house. Sir Matthew White Ridley was 
not, as he stated in a letter to Hewitson, anxious to give the business 
13 
up: 
I cannot but sincerely lament that the bottle house should have 
afforded so little satisfaction to either of us of late ..... I 
certainly cannot pronounce it as my wish that the concern should 
be altogether abandoned although profits do not appear to have 
been altogether favourable. 
However Hewitson repeated his conviction that returns would never be 
certain without an increase in capital in order to open a warehouse 
in London, and soon after this the partnership was dissolved and the 
house put up for sale. 
14 
St. Lawrence was bought by Thomas Clarke, a merchant with a variety 
of interests. He ran the bottle house in partnership with Robert Plummer, 
an insurance broker. Clarke and Plummer were also partners in a flax 
spinning mill at St. Lawrence. Neither merchant appears to have taken 
a particularly active part in their bottle manufactory although-Robert 
Plummer was, during the 1820s, the secretary of the Tyne Bottle Manufact- 
urers* Association. This association was a formal one with meetings 
and a yearly subscription of 5 guineas per house. 
15 It does not, 
howeverg appear to have been a particularly powerful association 
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and almost certainly did not regulate prices as its informal eighteenth 
century predecessor had done. Its main purpose s eems to have been to 
add weight to petitions to the Board of Excise and the Treasury. 
During the 1820s St. Lawrence was leased out by Thomas Clarke to Robert 
Todd who also purchased the High Bottle House from the broad glass 
owners in 1823. Todd was one of the most successful Newcastle bottle 
manufacturers of the second quarter of the century and eventually took 
over Isaac Cooksonts Closegate bottle works. 
16 
Like Clarke and Plummer 
Todd had other commercial interests and owned a large timber yard in the 
Close, Todd remained in occupation of the High Bottle liouse2 or the 
t4orth Shore bottle house as it came to be called, but gave up the 
St. Lawrence house in 1835 when it was advertised to let. 
17 The house 
was briefly leased to Cookson and Coulthard, advertised to let again in 
18 1839, and eventually came into the possession of John Smith & Co. who 
advertised it to let in 1852 noting that the cone and furnace had 
recently been rebuilt. 
19 
The most important development in bottle manufacturing at Newcastle 
during this period was the establishment of a completely new site at 
St. Peter's Quay. The owner of the quay was William Row an4ý as was 
suggested in connection with flat glass, he appears to have been anxious 
to build up St. Peter's as a major manufacturing ce--tre on the river. 
It is hardly surprising that Row should have started by building a 
bottle house for he had already had considerable experience of the trade 
during the eighteenth century as a customer and shipper of Hartley 
bottles. The St. Peter*s bottle house was erected c. 1815 and was 
originally carried on by William Row jr. in partnership with his father. 
This partnership came to an end in 1820 when "in decayed and embarrassed 
circumstances" William Rowjr. was forced to petition the Exchequer for 
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an extent - in - aid to enable him to pay Z1,552 owing in glass duties. 
20 
His deposition claimed that he was owed over ; 91,000 by Messers Westbrook 
and Jones bottle merchants of London and therefore only needed the money 
as a bridging loan. Unfortunatelyin 1821 he was obliged to apply for 
another extent, Ihis time for U. 214 to cover duty charged from 18November 
1820 to 26 March 1821. Again Row claimed he was in a completely decayed 
state with no floating capital: 
The deponent further saith that the stock in trade at the manufactory 
is of trifling value, the bottles made there being taken away as 
fast as they can. 
The inquisition made on Row9s bottle house confirmed that this was indeed 
the case; the whole stock was valued'at L43 lls 6d (although it must be 
said that many items in the inventory seem undervalued). This sum plus 
E48 in cash and a debt of Z40 from a bottle merchant in Leith amounted 
to Rowts total assets. 
The ownership of St. Peters during the 1820s is not entirely clear. 
Either it was carried on by William Row snr. or it was leased to Richard 
Lambert who appears in the directories of 1825 and 1827. In 1826 the 
cone bottle house at St. Peter*s was certainly advertised to let. 
11 
From 1830 its ownership becomes quite clear for it passed into the 
capable hands of Thomas Ridley, 
22 
Thomas Ridley was the brother of 
John Ridley who already owned the North Tyne Glass Company also at 
St. Peters. He proved highly successful as a bottle manufacturer so 
much so that he was joined by his brother. By the 1840s there were 
two bottle works. at St. Peter's, the Albion Glass Works under Thomas 
Ridley and Co. and the Byker glass works under Ridley Brothers. The 
Byker Glass works also included a sod& works established by John Ridley. 
In 1843 one of these bottle works, probably the older house, was advert- 
ised for sale noting that it was let to a highly respectable firm. 
23 
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(iii) Sunderland 
Perhaps the most significant growth in the area occurred at 
Sunderland. By the time of the 1833 Commission Sunderland produced more 
bottles than any other local centre of manufacturing; in 1832 Sunderland 
paid f, 22,480 in bottle duty, Newcastle U5,003, Shields E81876 and 
Hartley 46,480. It was during this period that the foundations of 
Sunderland9s later importance in the industry were laid. 
Both of the originhl Sunderland bottle house sites continued to 
be occupied; Ayres Quay by Richard Pembertonv and Bishopwearmouth by 
George Fenwick of Lambton and his family. It was reported to Delaval 
in 1807 that Mr. Fenwick was erecting a second bottle house and this 
was correct. This second house was worked under the name Addison 
Fenwick, George Fenwick"s son, who also managed and was a partner in 
the original house working under the name of George Fenwick and Co. 
24 
The Fenwicks owned a warehouse in London through which their bottles 
and crown glass were sold. This was sold in 1813 after a compulsory 
purchase order from the government made under an act empowering the 
purchase of land in Upper Thames Street in order to build a new 
Customs House. 25 The Fenwick warehouse then moved to Bull Wharf Lane and 
finally Lower Thames Street where it rem; Uned as the Sunderland Bottle 
and Glass Warehouse. It is possible that the manufactory was not a 
particularly productive venture since in the returns of 1832 Addison 
Fenwick appears to be working only one bottle house. The second 
continued to exist however for when George Fenwick9s estate was 
advertised for sale in 1848 
26 
v it included "two cone bottle houses on 
the Ford estate". The Fenwicks were also interested in two breweriesp 
at Chester-le-street and Sunderland, which certainly would have com- 
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plemented their bottle manufacturing. Despite the fact that the 
works was advertised fcr sale in 1848 the family appears to have 
continued as owners and occupiers. In 1859 Robert Fenwick gave his 
sons George, a banker of Newcastle, and Robert, a bottle manufacturer 
of Sunderland, all his shares in the two breweries and the Sunderland 
Glass Company. 27 At this time the bottle manufactory was carried on 
by four equal partners, Robert Fenwick snr. and Robert Fenwich jr. 
plus Henry and John Watson. John Watson was the companyts agent in 
London and sijiet the 1820s had appeared in the directories at the 
Sunderland Bottle WarehouseT address. 
From c. 1797 to 1818 the Ayres Quay houses were occupied by Richard 
Pemberton. In 1817 they were advertised tolet for a period of 17 years 
and were taken on by Pemberton*s son Thomas. Thomas Pembertonts occupation 
of the bottle houses is chiefly memorable for his feud withlis excise 
officer and his trial in the Exchequer in 1824 (see chapter fivet section 
5, iii). Unfortunati! ly the trial throws'up little additional information 
about the works beyond the fact that its production includedl besides 
"common wine and beer bottlesllp utensils and octagonal half pint bottles. 
After being fined 9600 Pemberton put the manufactory up for sale 
28 
and 
included with it the London warehouse, "the bottle warehouse carried on in 
ther=e A. Major and Co. at Allhallows Lane'19 which the Ayres Quay 
Company used and which Pemberton evidently owned. 
The Ayres Quay houses appear to have been taken over by Walker 
Featherstonhaughl the proprietor of a new bottle works at Deptford. 
Exactly when the Deptford house was erected is not certain but it was in 
existence by 1816 when an extent-in-aid on account of glass duties was 
issued to Marmaduke George Featherstonhaugh of Durham County and London. 
29 
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By the 1820s the Deptford works was known as the Wear Glass Bottle 
Company with Walker Featherstonhaugh as its managing partner. In 1828 
the "premises occupied by M. G. Featherstonhaugh on the south side of 
the River Wear at Deptford "was advertised for sale 
30 
. but the works 
continued under Walker Featherstonhaugh who was working it, plus the 
two Ayres Quay houses, in 1832. The 1832 returns show that one of his 
houses paid an extremely Jarge amount of duty, E5,095, which was by far 
the largest of all the bottle houses in the area. In 1849 the Ayres 
Quay Bottle Manufactoryllat present in the occupation of Walker Feather- 
stonhaugh" was offered for sale 
31 
and was purchased by William Kirk who 
occupied it until 1881. 
Around 1820 a second bottle firm established itself at Ayres Quay. 
The works became so successful that it usurped the title "Ayres Quay 
Bottle Works" from the elder neighbour which, in the later nineteenth 
century, became known as the Ballast Hill Bottle Works. The new firm 
was established by five local men, Thomas Bonner, Philip Laing, John 
Hubbard, John Scott and Nathan Horn jr. -'IIn 1821 the partnership was 
dissolved in respect of Thomas Bonner and carried on by the remaining 
32 
partners as John Hubbard and Co.., 6r later Laing, Horn, 
_, 
Scott & Co. 
In 1832 two houses were in production and by the 1850s the firm had 
expanded to six houses. The Ayres Quay Bottle Company. was to become 
the leading bottle firm in Sunderland during the latter half of1he 
century and one of only two bottle firms in the town to survive into 
the twentieth century. 
Finally one other new bottle house should be mentioned. This was 
the bottle house run from 1809 to 1828 by Hilkiah Hall on the south 
side of the Wear at Bishopwearmouth. This house was said to be on the 
- 261 - 
site of the flint glass house occupied during the eighteenthcentury 
by John Hopton, which Hall purchased in 1809 for Z2,500.33 Hall 
appears to have had a turbulent career as a manufacturer. He was said to 
have mortgaged his property heavily to the Backhouse Bank and by the 
time he quit the trade was in debt. to them for Z9,700. He also appears 
to have fallen out with the Excise and was prosecuted three times in 
the Exchequer: 34 in February 1822 he was fined S50 for making a false 
declaration and removing glass; in November 1822 he was fined f, 300 for 
similar offences; and finally in June 1827 was fined yet again (the exact 
sum is not known but it was sufficiently large to force him to apply 
for an extent-in-aid 
35 
and to force him to quit the trade). In 1828 his 
bottle house was put up for sale 
36 
and it is quite interesting that his 
property included lime kilns, for a report in the Newcastle Courant of 
1826., 37 describing a patent taken out in France for manufacturing 
glass without alkali, noted that the process was "exactly as done by 
Mr. Hall ten years ago on the Wear"; it is quite probable that Hall's 
"glass without alkali" was a lime soda glass of the kind mentioned by 
Parkes in 1815 (see p. 9). 
(iv) Hartley 
The death of Sir John Delaval in 1808 brought to an end the 
family's direct involvement with bottle manufacturing. Under his heirl 
his widow Lady Delavalp the bottleworks was leased out to other companies. 
Delaval naturally foresaw the situation that would develop after his 
death and a year previousl5had tried himself to lease out the works. The 
potential lessee was the newly formed company Cookson and Cuthbert 
which, in March 18079 wrote to one of Delaval*s agentsýinquiring if it 
was true that Lord Delaval was intending to lease the works. 
38 
Cookson 
and Cuthbert received a favourable reply and, by April Lord Delaval and 
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Cookson were exchanging proposals on the terms of the lease. The issue 
that immediately 'emerged as an irreconcilable one was the terms on 
which the glass works should be supplied with coals from the colliery 
which was to remain under the direct ownership of Lord Delaval. Delaval 
offered what he called the "market price" for coals but Cookson was quite 
adamant that this was too vague and he had to have the security of coals 
at a fixed price. Cooksonts main argument was that "market price" was 
a debateable thing and as the bound tenants they could not make the 
manufactory profit if they had to pay as much as 13 shillings per 
chaldron which the owners of the colliery might decide to be the market 
price. He reminded Delaval that although the trade was at present in 
a state of briskness the present establishments were fully capable of 
supplying the demand and with the recent increase in the number of 
bottle houses ("Mr. Featherstone and Mr, Fenwick have each built an 
additional house and get glass house coals at 5 shillings per chaldron") 
competition must increase and costs had to be kept low. Delaval argued 
that it was impossible to foresee exactly what price coal would be for 
the next twenty one years and the lessee of the glass houses would 
have hissecurity guaranteed by the "mutual and inseparable profit" 
between the glass house and the colliery. The issue was not resolved, 
neither side altered their stand and negotiations came to an end. 
The first lessees after Delaval9s death were Matthew and Benjamin 
Harrison, the London bottle merchants, who signed a 21 year lease in 
January 1813.39 The lease does not mention the price of coals but it 
is clear that they were to be supplied with coals at "the market price"s 
and, as Cookson had forseen, this definition led to different inter- 
pretations (see chapter one). The rent of the houses was fixed at Z300 
per house whilst the war continued, should peace come it was to be 
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raised to f, 400 per house. In addition the Harrisons paid Lady Delaval 
M of the value of the materials and stock on hand. An inventory was 
taken of the works on the Harrison's entrance and another when they 
prematurely quit the works in May 1820. One of the most interesting 
differences between the two inventories is the presence of alkali in 
the 1820 list; in 1813 there were twelve tons of kelp and ten tons of 
patent flux at the works, in 1820 this had changed to five tonszof flux 
and seventy four tons of alkali. This difference provoked a complaint 
from Lady Delaval's lawyer who maintained that she was under no obligation 
to buy_back from the Harrisons any materials that they had addeds ýartic- 
ularly as the alkali "is of very little value; so little that the present 
occupiers of the glass works will not take it as they can make bottles 
of flux and salt a great deal cheaper: 
40 
There are two possible reasons to explain why the Harrisons quit 
the works so soon after entering it. Firstj there was certainly the 
difficulty of carrying on the glass works independently from the colliery. 
Second, their operations were adversely affected by a law of 1812 which 
forbade the manufacture of bottles in smaller capacities than "a reputed 
half pint". 
41 The importance of Harrison's trade in small bottles has 
already been mentioned and it appears that they maintained a large 
interest in this trade into the nineteenth century. Immediately after 
the 1812 Act Benjamin Harrison wrote to Richard Wharton, the Treasury 
Secretary who had framed the bill, saying that he had been informed 
from Hartley that the excise officers were halting the manufacture of 
the type of bottle called "eight square half pints" because they did 
not contain the full measure. 
42 
According to Harrison the bottles 
were indeed strictly less thm half pints in capacity but 
_, _. 
they 
had been known by their present appellation for more than twenty-five 
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years. When he had approached Wharton before the regulation was 
adopted they had agreed that these bottles should be allowed to be 
manufactured by permitting the manufacture of "half pints and reputed 
half pints"; in other words that bottles which were traditionally called 
I 
half pints and yet which traditionally were only 6 ounces in capacity were 
not prohibited by the 1812 Act. The Excise Report confirmed that reputed 
half pints were allowed and issued positive instructions to the officers 
at Hartley accordingly. 
The Harrisons were not the only manufacturers to be affected by 
this new regulation. In 1811 Middleton Hewitson asked Sir Matthew 
White Ridley on behalf of Isaac Cookson, vhat he had heard about the 
proposed measure; Cookson was concerned as "he manufactures a great 
many bottles approaching to phials". 
43 
In April 1818 Isaac Cookson 
signed a petition to the Treasury (on behalf of the Bottle Trade on 
the Tyne) on the subject. The petition echoed one sent by the Harrisons 
I a fortnight earlier complaining that the Excise had decided toput a 
new construction on the wording of the 1812 act and were halting the 
manufacture of reputed half pints. 
44 
Cookson*s petition insisted that 
since the passing of the act the black bottle manufacturerts right to 
make reputed half pints had never been questioned. The report of the 
Excise. confirmed that they had recently ordered their officers to confine 
black bottle manufacturers to the legal size of half pint bottles and 
they justified this on thegmunds that the measure had been introduced 
to protect flint glass manufacturers whol as the act was now interpreted2 
received no protection at all. They also submitted a report from their 
solicitor on the legal size of half pint bottles. The outcome of this 
difference of opinion is not known but it seems likely that the Board 
of Excise succeeded in suppressing the manufacture of "reputed half 
pints". 
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The Harrisone successors at Hartley were the most obvious 
candidates for the glass workst tenancy - the lessees of Hartley 
colliery which since 1809 had been occupied by a partnership headed 
by John Carr, previously a farmer at Ford, and James Jobling a colliery 
viewer. In 1820 Carr and Jobling took the glass works on trial and 
by January 1821 were sufficiently confident to be able to take it 
on a permanent basis. The rent they felt they could pay was only 9200 
per house "but should trade improve we would have no objection to 
paying Z300 per house". Carr and Jobling continued to run the Hartley 
bottle works until its closure in 1872. It did not expando indeed by 
1832 only two houses were in operation. By 1842 97 men were employed. 
(v) The Trade 
Although there is little objective evidence on the subject of 
competition in the very early years of the nineteenth centuryq comments 
from manufacturers bear witness to their own impressions of growing 
competitiveness, The St. Lawrence house felt this particularly keenly. 
In 1806 the house was "thrown into a great stock of bottles" 
45 by what 
Middleton Hewitson called"the loss of Major*s House". This loss was 
not, as it perhaps appears, a bankruptcy but the loss of a London selling 
agent. The bottle warehouse of Ann Major in All Hallows Lane continues 
to appear in the London Directories but as the bottle warehouse for 
the Ayres Quay Company at Sunderland. The problem of selling in London 
continued to cause c(? ncern fo.; -St. Lawrence. In 1805 a large stock 
accumulated at the works which led Middleton Hewitson to suggest that 
they consider opening a, warehouse of their own in London, as other 
manufacturers had done: 
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Indeed we shall be under the necessity soon of either adopting 
some plan to relieve our warehouses or stop the work. It grieves 
me to trouble you at all upon the business but am at a loss how 
to act for the best and as I believe the Upper Bottle House 
wareho 
' 
uses are also nearly full, 9tho with a quantity far short 
of ours, it may be the interests of both concerns to act in 
concert as the Trade is now situated upon this river -I mean 
by hairing a warehouse in London. 
This suggestion was not acted upon and in 1809 Middleton Hewitson took 
up his complaints about the London merchants again; this time he accused 
them of a deliberate discrimination against St. Lawrence bottles provoked 
by competitors: 
One thing our house suffers from as well as the pots not standing 
.... is the want of a ready demand for bottles. Thb I can't 
account for in the London market as I believe they get no better 
from any house whatever, but they are an article that always will 
admit of a fault being found in some, where there is a disposition 
to do it - and this does seem to have been the case towards ourso 
and from whatever cause it carries I trust this view may be 
frustrated ......... How bottles may be supplied to the London market 
upon better terms than ours I have not grounds to speak but when 
it is considered the quantity manufactured by our neighbours which 
must necessarily be forwarded - also their views as regard to the 
wo houses clearly seen in their intentions towards Mr, Rutherford 
you will agree with me any steps to retard our sales will not be 
wanting, moreespecially at periods there may be a slackness in 
demand. The Upper House has more connections in London than oursv 
as no doubt Mr. Rutherford would have found*, himself similarly 
situated to us Oere now. 
Whether St. Lawrence w4s typical in e: kperiencing increasing competition 
in the London market cannot be said for certain but in view of the 
increase in the number of bottle merchants in London it can certainly 
be said that larger numbers of bottles were coming in to London, Many 
of these bottles were being retailed through warehouses belonging 
exclusively to individual manufacturers. Manufacturers like Ridley 
and Hewitson who did not have the security of a warehouse ran a far 
greater risk. It was this situation that gave rise to Hewitsonts later 
comment that he believed no return could be secured without removing 
the medium between the manufacturer and the customer. 
- 267 - 
The evidence of competition in the later decades of the century 
is more substantial: above all there is the evidence given to the 
Commissioners of Excise Enquiry into the Excise on Stone Bottles. Glass 
bottles were relevant to this enquiry in that the duty on stone bottles 
had been imposed in 1812 primarily as a. protection to glass bottles. The 
question the 1834 Commissioners addressed themselves to was whether 
this protection was a necessary one. Among the evidence given was a 
table of retail prices of glass bottles in London (in part supplied by 
John Watson the agent for the Sunderland Glass Company). This showed 
a distinct decline in price which was specifically attributed to the 
effects of competition: and in particular the increased number of 
manufacturers: 
46 
Prices of Glass Bottles from 1811 to 1833 
Period Duty 
1811 - July 1812 4s Od per cwt 
1812 - Jan. 1820 8s 2d to 
1820 - Jan. 1822 to to 
1822 - Oct. 1825 tt it 
1825 - Sep. 1828 it tt 
1828 - Aug. 1829 7s 10d ft 
1829 - Jan. 1831 to of 
1831 - Oct. 1833 it to 
Price per gross 
40s 
52s 
45s 
42s 
44s 
42s 
40s 
38s 
The Commission found that the stone bottle tax was an unnecessary protection 
for glass bottles. The main market for glass bottles was the wine trade 
which would certainly never consider the use of stone bottles. The 
Commissioners conceded that there was some competition in ginger beer 
bottles and bottles for beer and porter but that this was not sufficient 
to justify the tax. Their findings did not stop the glassbDttle manu- 
facturers complaining about competition from stone bottles once the tax 
was lifted. Another constant complaints although again probably an 
unjustified onev was the Competiton they suffered from dealers in second 
hand bottles. This was even mentioned in Parliament by Sir Matthew 
White Ridley in 1825: 47 
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The manufacturers of English bottles had now to compete with a 
new class of tradesmen who had lately risen up and were known by 
the title of 'Dealers in Old Bottles9e 
Sir Matthew's remark was made in the context of the debate on 
HuskissonýJ, -. Customs Consolidation Bill, and specifically on his pro- 
posal to reduce the customs duty on imported bottles which, naturally, 
Ridley was opposed to. Imported bottles represented by far the biggest 
threat to the English manufacturer and the largest potential source of 
competition. Fortunately for the English manufacturers they remained 
only a potential threat, heavily penalised by both custoqF and excise 
duties. Since 1787 foreign bottles had been subjected to an excise 
duty and by 1802 paid 5 shillings per dozen customs duty plus 4s Id per 
cwt for the excise. The one exemption to this was a large one - bottles 
full of wine. In 1815 bottles of wine were finally included in the 
penalis ed bottles by an act 
48 
which stated 
as 
tsspecific purpose Ifto Aý 
encourage the manufacture (of glass bottles) in Great Britain". This 
act imposed an excise duty of 8s 2d on all imported bottles. Predictably 
the heavy duties on imported bottles came in for some criticism from 
those advocating afreer trade. Huskisson attempted unsuccessfully to 
reduce them in 1825 in his Customs Consolidation'Bill, calling attention 
to the fact that the duty on the bottle amounted to over half the value 
of the wine it contained. 
The competition in the trade during the first half -of the nineteenth 
century must be seen in the light-)of an expandingdamand and the establish- 
ment of new markets for glass. Particularly important in this respect 
was the development of a market for bottled beer. Unfortunately there 
seems to be very little detailed information on the adoptiol If bottles 
as a packaging for beer. The only observation that can be made is a 
general one; that it appears to have occurred during the period 1790 
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- 1830. Certainly the market for the north-east bottle manufacturers around 
1790 consisted primarily of wine and claret bottles, by 1830 they were 
also producing bottles for beer. "Bottled Liquor Dealers" have been 
noted in 1819 and it was during the 1820s that bottles began to be used 
for the export of beer to hot climates. 
49 It is particularly unfortunate 
that not more is known about the development of the bottled beer trade 
since during the later nineteenth century the north-east was associated 
almost exclusively with the "black bottle" trade,, or dark bottles for 
beer and stout. The description "black bottle" is usually thought to 
have arisen in order to distinguish the older type of bottles from the 
new pale bottles manufactured in Yorkshire from the 1850s onwards. It 
is therefore quite interesting to find the term being applied to the 
north-east houses as early as 1835. William Powell of Bristolý who 
appears to have been primarily a manufacturer of wine bottlesq described 
the north-east men as "those in the black bottle trade" to the 18357 
Commission. 
An important element in this new market for beerbDttles was the 
suitability of bottles for the export of beer to countries with hot 
climates; bottling enabled beer to survive through, for instancev tropical 
Indian summers. By the 1830s the importance of the export trade in 
bottled beer, and indeed bottled wine and spirits, was fully apparent 
to the 1835 Commissioners and the Board of Excise. The Commissioners 
seized on the fact that nearly half the duty paid on bottle manufacture 
was repaid in drawbacks of duty (on export) as a good reason why the duty 
should be repealed. The Board of Excise were also concerned about the 
high proportion of duty being repaid in drawbacks particularly as they 
suspected that the drawback on the bottles gave a small bounty to the 
export of wine. However it recognised the importance of the beer 
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and wine trade and for that reason was not anxious to alter the 
drawback arrangements; in the words of the Supervisor Genera1v "It 
comes simply to the question of what the effect of withholding the 
drawback would be upon the beer trade and the wine trade". 
The importance of the export of bottles as containers for other 
commodities is underlined by a series of related complaints to the 
Board of Excise from the manufacturers. All were concerned with the 
method of awarding the drawback to full bottles. When bottles were 
exported full, or in large quantities, it was not practically possible 
to weigh them in order to calculate the drawback and so, in 1806p a new 
method was introduced whereby the drawback wasgLven not on the real 
weight but on a weight calculated on an average weight of l8lbs per 
dozen. This method was introduced primarily to frustrate frauds in the 
shipping of empty bottles loose rather than packed. Previously the 
loose bottles had been put, ten dozen at a time, into large baskets to 
be weighed by the excise officers before being stowed loose in the 
holds of ships like bricks or tiles. Some frauds had been discovered2 
namely different baskets of bottles being substituted for the weighed 
baskets before they were put on board, and in 1806 the Board issued 
instructions that no bottles were to be stowed loose at all. This 
was impracticable and they eventually settled on the method of averaging. 
The change provoked an immediate protest from the Bristol bottle 
manufacturers claiming that their bottles weighed on average 21 lbs. 
per dozen and that they could not afford the alternative of packing 
bottles in sealed crates-(in which.,, case the bottles would be weighed 
and the crates marked by the excise officer to avoid any possibility 
of fraud); "we are obliged to ship loose or not at ail as the article 
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will not bear an extravagant freight". 
50 Receiving no reply to their 
petition the Bristol manufacturers attempted to enlist the help of 
those in the north-east by writing to both Lord Delaval and Isaac Cookson. 
Cooksonts reply is quite interesing for it implies that the method of 
averaging had been introduced laiggly on the suggestion of the north- 
east manufacturers: 
51 
The trade here have for some months past been corresponding with the 
Excise particularly respecting their former injunction which made it 
necessary to pack in crates on board whatever might be exp ted and 
thereby in a great measure nearly ruined our trade. Were were our- 
selves principally the cause of the Excise substituting the present 
system of averaging rather than submit to the plan of packing but 
we did not, we confesss conceive they would limit the allowance 
to l8lbs per dozen which we are perfectly aware is much too little. 
The Excise did not alter its ruling and averaging on the basis of 18 lbs 
per dozen continued to be the method whereby bottles shipped loose, and 
bottles full of wine or beer, received their drawbacks. The Bristol manu- 
facturers appear to have been particularly hard hit by this ruling and 
, 52 in-1812 petitioned again on the subject (bearing in mind the comments 
of Joseph Oxley-ifi 1781 on the greater weight of Bristol bottles it 
seems probable that their complaintg were justified). The English manu. - 
facturers were however fortunate in being able to export loose at all; 
in 1813 the Scottish bottle manufacturers petitioned the Treasury claiming 
that the Scottish Board did not allow them to "stow" bottles at all. 
The issue re-emerged in 1825 when certain excise duties were transferred 
to the customs. By this time quart bottles were still being given a. 
drawback at 18 lbs per dozen but bottles of lesser size had to be weighed. 
Two petitions, (from the Bottle trade on the Tyne and the Bottle Trade 
on the Wear) from the north-east complained that neither customs officers 
nor excise officers would assume responsibility for the weighing, 
53 
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By the time of the 1835 Commission the average weight had been 
altered to what the manufacturer entered but the method still created 
dissatisfaction. William Powell of Bristol complained that spot checks were 
made on the bottles and if one dozen were underweight the whole shipment 
was confiscated even if the total weight tallied. This had also been com- 
plained of in the 1825 petiticnfrom the Tyne manufacturers who claimed they 
were obliged to enter bottles at less than their real average weight in order 
to prevent the whole cargo being seized. In 1835 the Newcastle manufact- 
urers also complained that in busy ports like London nothing was weighed 
and the bottles were given drawback at 20lbs per dozen when in fact they 
only weighed 18 lbs. Another large complaint was that the customs ad 
valorem duty payable on export was calculated on the home valuev i. e. 
that they paid a duty on the drawback. A further complaint was that the 
bottle manufacturer could not avoid paying-, the duty on the commodity inside 
the bottle; Willian Cuthbert gave the example of bottles full of oil Of 
vitriol, ten of which would receive a drawback of 8s 6d yet would pay- 
bonds and debentures amounting to 10s 6d which was a tax not so much on 
the bottle as the oil of vitriol. All these points, plus the great break- 
age of bottles at sea meant, in Cuthbert's view, the drawback was not 
sufficient: 
If we paid duty on 100 cwt. of metal and exported the whole we 
should be saddled with a duty ... We arepaying a duty on every bottle we export and break: the loss is very great. Indeed I will 
venture to say that all the bottles exported from London are 
saddled with a duty of 1076 upon the present duty ... which 
is a 
bounty to the foreign manufacturer. 
Despite these many complaints about the drawback system the export 
of bottles does not appear to have been inhibited. All the evidence for 
the north-east manufacturers suggests that they at least exported large 
quantities of bottles to a variety of destinations. Bottleswere usually 
loaded on board last with the result that there was frequently found to 
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be not sufficient room. There were many petitions to the Newcastle 
Customs House. 54 from bottle manufacturers asking for a return of duty 
after only a proportion of the bottles entered was' actually shipped. 
Destinations includect Gothenburg., New York, Rio and India. The export 
trade was sufficiently important for Cookson and Coulthard to petition for 
a customs searcher to examine the bottles at the manufactory in order to 
save them having to send them up river to Newcastle to be*examined. 
55 
They begged to be allowed"the same indulgence allowed the manufacturers 
of glass at Shields" which is an interesting suggestion that even without 
a Customs House at Shields customs business was carried on. A similar 
petition was received from William Row whose house was at St. Peters. 
56 
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3. The Bottle Workers and their Wages 
Before leaving the bottle industry in this period, 'someihingshould 
certainly be said about the bottle workers and wagý arrangements. It 
is an interesting subject in its own right but it also needsto be 
looked at in order to put later developments in the bottle industry into 
a context. During the latter half of, the nineteenth century the develop- 
ment of the bottle industry was dominated by a series of strikes, lock 
outs and disputes between masters and men most of which centred on 
attempts to alter the r-ýte of wages and the archaic method by which they 
were calculated. 
The time honoured basis for a bottle worker*s wage was that he 
should manufacture 62 dozen bottles per journey and work five journeys 
per week. This continued to be the basis on which he was paid despite 
technological advances and increased expectations which made a normal 
weekts work produce a far greater quantity. There is no doubt that the 
survival of this system owed a lot to the general prosperity of the 
industry up to the 1850s. All the evidence points to the fact that until 
the 1850s wages and earnings maintained an upward trend and that this 
was primarily due to two things in combination: the willingness of a 
manufacturer to entice workmen to his bottle house by offering higher 
wages and the willingness of a bottle worker to travel to a new job 
should higher wages be offered. If either of these factors was the 
more important of the two it was certainly the action of the manufacturers 
A good early example of higher wages being offered is, Thomas 
Delavalts recruitment of bottle workers in the early 1760S to staff 
his new houses at Hartley. Inevitably his recruiting was done in Ek 
neighbouring glass houses and John Cookson w as a manufacturer who lost 
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bottle workers and a smith to Hartley. In 1762 Cookson was so appre- 
hensive about losing more workmen that he wrote to Thomas Farmer in London 
asking him to retrieve and bind some of his workmen who had recently 
left in search of work there: 
57 
Deer and I think it best to secure the hands. The wages of a bottle- 
maker (finisher) is 18 shillings per week, house and fire, a blower 
12 shillings with the same allowance. Fix with them before they 
come down or they will be going to Scotland or elsewhere. 
The wages offered by Cobkson can be compared with the earliest surviving 
indentvres from Hartley which offer two skilled blowers 14 shillings a 
week plus board and lodgings. 
58 
One of the blowerst Simon Pattersony 
was from the High Bottle House at the Ouseburn, the otherv John Catchsidex 
was from South Shields. Farmer in fact was not able to secure Cookson's 
hands at the wages he suggested and went higher which was not to Cooksonts 
liking: 
The method you speak of reducing them (wages) afterwards will have this bad effect. All our hands will be displeased if persons of 
inferior ability are given advanced wages. 
Other indentures from Hartley show that Delaval was employing boy 
apprentices from Northumberlandt South Shields and even London. He 
was also said to have taken two men from Ayres Quay but returned them 
immediately he found out that they were already bound. 
59 
-A-complete'list of the workmen at Hartley and their wages in 1775 
exists, and from this it can be seen that the wages were certainly higher 
than those offered by Cookson in the previous decade (fig. 14). The 
total number of workmen and the total wage bill of Z33 17s 6d was 
not extravagant for two houses, and in fact represented the situation 
after, in an effort to reduce costs, four blowers and one carpenter 
had been dismissed. By 1778 the number of employees had increased to 
95 with the addition of a smith, a joiner, a warehouse manager, two 
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colour mixers, pattern makers and fourteen labourerý. When three 
houses were in work the number of employees nearly doubled. 
The competition amongst manufacturers for good workmen led to 
quite a high percentage of the workforce being bound, particularly when 
a potential threat was seen. For instance in 1781 William Allen wrote 
to Delaval that he had heard some men were taking over Mr. Hoptonts 
glass house at Sunderland and therefore thought it prudent to bind all 
of the workmen. The disadvantage of binding was that in times of bad 
trade the manufacturers were obliged to pay wages. In 1779-Middleton 
Hewitson wrote to Matthew White Ridley that he had only bound two of 
their men "knowing much had beedgiven away in one house paying full 
wages to bottle makers when they could not be employed". 
60 An echo 
of this is found at Hartley where, in 1780, two finishers (Benjamin Leck 
and Henry Gilroy) were discharged not because they were bad workmen 
but'because they were the only two not under articles. The two were not 
able to find alternative work at Shields or Newcastle and returned to 
Hartley where they were looked on with sympathy and given one finisherts 
place between them to work alternate weeks until they found work. 
Un-bound workmen were a permanent risk to an employer in that in 
times of good trade certain manufacturers were not loth to tempt them 
away with promises of higher wages. In 1778 Ralph AshwOrthj a finisher 
in Mr. Kingts bottle house at Dumbarton (Ashworth himself had at one 
time been employed at Hartley but was discharged as a trouble maker) 
"came among the glass workers in a clandestine manner" 
62 
to lure them 
away with the promise of I shilling more than their present wages. 
He even persuaded an articled workman to get drunk and abuse the agent 
in order to be discharged. Hartley had already lost its pot maker to 
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Figure 14: Glassmen in the employ of Sir John Delavall 20 September 1775 
61 
Finishers Weekly Wage 
John Manchester 20S 
Jo. Henderson 20S 
Cuthbert Hepderson 20S 
Andrew Berry 20S 
John Bailes 20S 
Jas. Grooves 20S 
Robert Brotherton 20S 
Benjamin Gilroy 20S 
Martin Spur 20S 
Blowers 
Henry Leck 14s 
Wm. Henyside 13s * 
John Nelson 13s * 
James Mustard 12s 
Jas. Sykes 14s * 
Richard Ashworth 12s 
John Bell 13s 
Ralph Potts 12s 
Ratcliffe Manchester 12s 
John Crawford los 
Robt. Abernethy 7s 
Gatherers 
six from 5s to 12s. All* 
(not named) 
Boys 
Eighteen from 3s 6d to 5s. All* 
(not named) 
Miscellaneous 
4 teazers 12s 
4 founders 9s 
2 caskermen 8s 
3 ash sifters 8s 6d 
2 coal wheelers 13s 
I mason lls 
1 carpenter los 
I apprentice pot maker 7s 
I smith 17s 
1 packer 9s 
2 drink finders 4s 
2 boy runners 6s 6d 
I labourer 7s 
Bound workmen. 
Total weekly wages payable: Z33 17s 6d. 
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Dumbarton, which was quite a serious loss; again he had been secured ýj 
clandestine means in thatKing had made a private agreement with him 
whilst he was still under articles and had even paid him an allowance 
until he was free to go to Dumbarton. 
63 A similar poaching of workmen 
occurred in 1791 when the agent of Ramsey Williams and Co. of Leith 
came to Newcastle and Hartley to hire hands and after-treating three of 
Delaval's workmen with drink got them to sign new contracts at higher 
wages (2s per week more for blowers and is for gatherers plus an extra 
5ýg guineas to defray travel expenses to Leith). These particular work- 
men were already under articles and the case was taken to the magistrates, 
64 
Unfortunately for Delaval the case was won by Ramsay who claimed that the 
previous contracts were null and void as the workmen had not been given 
duplicates of the documents. 
Clandestine poaching was not altogether typical of manufacturerst 
recruitment methods. Most manufacturers appear to have behaved in a more 
honourable way as, for instance, did Robert Scott of Glasgow who wrote 
to Hartley in 1777 asking if they had any blowers to spare "because of 
the new works which has carried off some of ours"v presumably another 
reference to Dumbarton. The well established manufacturers were the 
ones most likely to lose by the offering of higher wages. Not only did 
they lose men but they were also forced to increase their wages to match. 
In 1803 Delaval himself wrote to Isaac Cookson complaining that one of 
I 
Cookson's agents had approached a Hartley man and offered to agree to 
whatever terms he asked for. Delaval felt sure that Cookson would not 
approve of this as such tactics would result in all the manufacturers 
having to increase their binding money and their wages. 
Evidence on wage rates in'the first half of the nineteenth century 
is, unfortunately, unavailable but, it is quite certain that they maint- 
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ained the upward trend that had been established in the eighteenth 
century. Almost immediately after the repeal of the glass dutiesAthe 
issue of bottle makers wages began to divide masters and men, not at 
first in the north-east but certainly in Lancashire and Yorkshire. In 
1853 the Newcastle Courant stated that the bottle makers strike had 
extended to Newcastle and reported a case of breach of promise brought 
before the magistrates concerning two workers at St. Peters bottleworks. 
65 
The report included a useful table of the wages paid in all the local 
factories at that date which certainly shows an increase on the eighteenth 
century rates: 
Finisher Blower Gatherer 
Bill Quay 28s 24s 19S 
South Shields 24s 20s 17s Wages 
Hartley 24s 20s 17s per 
Blaydon 24s 20s 17s Week 
Seaham 28s 24s 19S 
The Tyne 24s 20s 17s 
The bottler workers* weekly earnings did not, however, consist 
entirely of his weekly wage. The weekly wage was only payment for the 
62 dozen bottles per journey specified in his articles, anything above 
that was paid as overwork. Although 62 dozen may at one time have been 
the average of a journey9s production it is clear that by the late 
eighteenth century it was far beneath theaverage. The Day Book for the 
Hartley works in 1780 
66 
shows that 62 dozen was only not exceeded when 
the pots burst and that as many as 73 dozen 'Could be manufactured depending 
on the amount of metal in the pot. In 1783 John Bryers told Delaval that 
"the usual quantity of overwork at a mean is near about eight dozen each 
pot per journey". 
67 
Overwork is never mentioned in indentures but it 
q)pears that the traditional method of payment for overwork was to pay it 
at the same rate that the ordinary work was paid. In 1783 Bryers reported 
that the men had finished their fifth journey by nine o1clock on Friday 
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and were given the opportunity of working an extra journey but that 
theyrefused without something extra allowedo "more than 1/5th their 
usual,, weeks wage", 
68 
which implies that the proper amount'should have 
been exactly one fifth of their usual weekly wage. By 1807 it is clear 
that overwork was being paid at a higher rate than the basic wage. A 
calculation was made on the cost of working an extra sixth journey in the 
week which estimated the labour on an ordinary journey of 248-dozen (four 
holes producing 62 dozen) cost h4d per dozen whilst the sane journey 
paid as overwork cost 4d per dozen. 
69 
The proposal to work a sixth journey at Hartley underlines the fact 
that a manufacturer could not avoid overwork; it was an essential to himq 
as a means of increasing his production, as it was for the worker, as a 
means of increasing his earnings. Overall the expense of working a 
sixth journey as overwork was considerably less than the expense of building 
a completely new glass house, and the results in terms of increased pro- 
duction could be remarkabley similar. Hartley did introduce a sixth 
journey in 1807, worked on Saturday by only one of the three houses$ with 
the result that the overwork for one week amounted to: 
Overwork 
House 1 (five journeys) 330 dozen 
House 2( 11 it 357 
House 3 (six journeys) 708 
The total of 1,395 dozen amounted near to what an extra house might 
produce. Another indication of the increasing importance of overwork 
to Hartley can be seen in a sample of the fortnightly wage bills 
for the glass works: 
70 
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Fortnight Ending Wee] 
2 Aug. 1775 Z33 
Z32 
13 Sept. 1777 Z35 
f, 37 
clv waj 
Os 
16s 
16s 
4s 
ges Overwork 
lo'A U 8s 3d 101-2d] 
Aýzd I 
Z7 4s Ill-2d 1 Aýdj 
15 Oct. 1784 L36 Us 10d Z4 10s 6d 
Z37 9s O! 2d U 16s 3d 
8 Nov. 1790 Z50 los 3ý-2d Z7 8s Od 
951 2s Ild Z6 9s Od 
29 Sept. 1810 V6 9s Ckd 918 13s 5d 
V5 3s lld U5 8slld 
The extra cost of overwork does not appear to have been resented by the 
manufacturers during this period. At Hartley the debate on whether to 
introduce a sixth journey or not centred not on the cost but on the 
effect on the workmen's sobziety; paying them wages on a Saturday night 
would, it was claimed, lead them to spend the rest of the weekend in a 
state of inebriation which would leave them unfit for work on Monday. 
It was only later in the century that manufacturers began to question 
the practice of apying high rates for "overwork" that was only defined 
as such by an archaic standard of production. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE FLINT GLASS HOUSES 
1.1700 - 1800 
Unlike both flat glass and bottles the flint glass produced in the 
north-east dependedlat least for the greater part of the eighteenth 
century. primarily on a local consumption. Although this local consumption 
included a slight demand from local merchants for export and coastwise 
shipping, thereis no evidence t hat flint glass was shipped to London 
regularly or in large quantities. The reasons for the provincial character 
of this branch of the north-east glass industry are not hard to find 
given both the nature of the market for flint glass and the nature of the 
nortfi-east as a location for glass manufacturing. As we have seenp the 
igajor advantage of the north-east for flat glass and bottles was the 
low cost of manufacturingt due above all to the cheapness of the coal. 
Whilst low costvas undoubtedly a significant advantage in the manufact- 
ure of utilitarian types of glass, in the manufacture of flint glass, 
the one type of glass that could fairly be described as a "luxury"p it 
was not so significant an element. Although low manufacturing costs 
were clearly desirable, the demand for flint glass depended as much 
on the quality of the pnoduct and the taste of the purchaser as on 
cheapness. The JLondon manufacturer whose costs were high was not) therefore, 
necessarily at a disadvantage. The London manufacturer in fact enjoyed 
certain advantages over his provincial rival: he was at the centre of the 
major market for flint glass and could respond to fashionable tastep he 
could employ skilled craftsmen, in particular decorators of glass, who 
were largely based in London. 
The decoration on a piece of glass can perhaps be taken as a rough 
measure of its quality in eighteenth century terms; the more cut or 
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I 
engraved the glass, the more fashionable and expensive it almost 
certainly was. Measured by decoration alone there seems little doubt 
that provincial flint glass rarely approached the standard of London 
flint glass. The decorative techniques of cutting and engraving were 
largely confined to London, and in particular to a colony of German 
emigres who were said to have introduced glass cutting into England. 
1 
The only decorative technique that appears to have been practised on any 
scale in the provinces was white enamelling but at best white enamelled 
glass was only a poor and distinctly provincial imitation of engraved 
glass. 
2 
By the 1770s the London flint glass industry included a number 
of "cut glass manufacturersIlp firms who merely decorated already 
manufactured glass. 
3 
By 1787 there was at least one glass cutter and 
engraver at work in Newcastle, 
4 
but neither technique was fully adopted 
by provincial glass houses until the last quarter of the century. The 
predominance of London flint glass is to a small degree confirmed by 
the evidence that London flint glass found a ready market in the north- 
east: 
5 
Robert Barker at his warehouse in Middle Street Newcastle, has just 
laid in an elegant assortment of cut and plain flint glass in the 
newest fasion and the best London polish; as reasonable as at any 
warehouse in Great Britain". 
Miss Hodgson from London has laid in at her warehouse in Sunderland 
a large and elegant assortment of plain and cut drinking glassesv 
decanters etc. which she intendsselling at the very lowest London 
prices. 
London possessed the additional advantage of being the city where 
flint glass had first been developed. Like bottles, flint glass owed 
nothing to Mansellts glass industry beyond the fact that its development 
was in part a consequence of the introduction of 'the coal firing process. 
Flint glass (or glass containing lead o-Xide*which rendered it translucentp 
lustrous and highly refractive) was patented in 1684 by George Ravenscrofts 
a London glass merchant previously engaged in importing Italian crystal; 
- 284 - 
as later research has shown Ravenscroft's patent 
. should be seen as the 
culmination of the researches of a number of people. 
5a When the patent 
expired the manufacture of flint glass spread to other glass houses 
in London. By the end of the century it was also being manufactured in 
the provinces although in 1696 it was claimed that two-thirds of all 
English flint glass was produced in London. 
6 This claim is to some 
extent backed by John Houghton*s table of glass houses in 1696 which 
clearly illustrates London9s Predominance: 
7 
Flint & Flint, Green & 
Ordinary Ordinary 
London district 9 
Woolwich 1 
Isle of Wight 1 
Bristol district 3 
Worcester 
Stourbridge 5 
Coventry 
Liverpool 
Asworths Notts, 
ýrýcAswqrth 
e astle 
Glass houghton 
Yarmouth 
Total 22 5 
The limited local market available to the north-east flint glass houses 
inevitablj restricted the-growth of the industry in the area. Until 
the 1740s only one flint glass house was at work in the area and as 
late as 1780 there were only two. Those who embarked on flint glass 
manufacturing were,, for the most part, men with existing interests in 
other branches of glass manufacturing. It is perhaps also significant 
that flint glass saw more failures than in any other branch of glass; 
a short lived house at Sunderland-closed c. 1775; in 1785 another 
unsuccessful attempt was made toýset up a flint glass works at the 
South Shore near Gateshead. - The last two decades of the century did 
however see the successful. establishment of two new flint glass houses 
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and these two can be seen as the beginning of a growth in the industry 
that was to continue well into the nineteenth century. ' It was not 
until this period that north-east flint glass joined flat glass and 
bottles as a significant local contribution to the national glass 
trade. 
The first flint glass house in Newcastle was established by John 
and OnesiPhorus Dagnia on the north side of the Close in 1690, six 
years after their original bottle house had been built on the south 
of the same street. Their partnership continued until 1707 when the 
stock of both the Newcastle glasshouses was transferred to the new 
Dagnia bottle house at South Shields. The Newcastle houses were certainly 
restarted by the Dagnias and both the Common Council lists of glass 
houses, in 1732 and 1742, include one bottle house and one flint glass 
house at the Closegate. As we have seen in the previous chapter, following 
the death of Onesiphorus Dagnia (the son of John Dagnia) in 1724 both 
glass houses appear to have been carried on by his, cousin and partner 
John Dagnia of South Shields and following the death of John Dagnia 
in 1743 the ownership of the two Newcastle houses appears to have been 
split between the Newcastle Dagnias, who took the whole of the bottle 
house, and the sons of John Dagnia of South Shields who took the white 
glass house. In June 1749 a freehold glass house, "without the Closegatelly 
was offered for sale by James Dagnia, John*s eldest son, and this was 
certainly the white glass house for in January 1750 James and his 
three brothers sold it to John Williams. 8 (The deed of sale included 
a covenant that the property should remain on lease until certain 
claims to the premises made by Messrs. Wall and Pearson were settled. 
This minor point suggests that the white glass house had been restarted 
on the site of the original bottle house on the south of the street. 
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Richard Wall had been a partner in this bottle house2 the Pearsons 
a leased4 yehouse on the south of the Close and had previously had 
cause to complain of the damage done by the neighbouring glass houses. 
9 
John William! Ps purchase of the white glass house can perhaps be 
taken as evidence of its previous profitability. In 1731 he had married 
the widow of Onesiphorus Dagnia and therefore had had some experience of 
the income to be got from the house. The same could also be said of 
Williamts partner in irons John Cookson, who entered the flint glass 
trade as a manufacturer atabout the same time, and whose Day Book for 
10 the 1740s contains occasional shipments of flint glass for the Dagnias. 
Cooksonts venture in flint glass manufacturing took the form of a 
partnership, Airey Cookson & Co. which occupied a glass house at the 
Closegate. It has been suggested that the partnership was established 
in 1728 11 but there is no evidence of this (the Common Council lists 
of 1732 and 1742 only list one flint glass house Ln the Close),. 
- 
and 
it seems likelythat the partnership was founded on the death of 
Joseph Airey in 1749 by Cookson with Airey9s two sons, Thomas and 
Joseph; the first apparent reference to the company isin 1749 when it 
appears in the Port Books as an exporter of flint glass (see Fig. 15). 
Thomas Airey was a lead merchant and by this time John Cookson himself 
was also concerned in the working of the lead mines at Fallowfield 
in Northumberland which may well have provided further encouragement 
to him to embark on this particular branch of the glass industry- 
12 
Although it is possible that the partnership of Airey Cookson & Co. 
lapsed during the 1760s, John Cookson at least maintained some interest 
in flint glass. In 1763 he informed the Edinburgh merchant Alexander 
Baxter that he was concerned in making flint glass as well as bottles 
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and suggested that Baxter take a cargo on consignment to St' Peteisburg: 
13 
I have a prity quantity of flint glass which is of sundry sorts 
and not so saleable here. To get rid of them (I) would go as 
low or lower than the German, the quality of which you know is 
indifferent. Would it be amiss if a trial was made in St. 
Petersburg? If you approve of it I shall consign to your house 
thirty or fourty pounds worth for a trial. 
In 1770 the partnership of Airey Cookson & Co. was revived but with 
new partners and a new capital: 
14 
John Cookson 15/30th 
Thomas Airey 9/30th 
Joseph Wilson 4/30th 
George Dickinson 2/30th 
Z3v750 
Z2,250 Total Capital V9500 
f, 1,000 
f, 200 
George Dickinson was a merchant with an existing interest in the flint 
glass trade. Thomas Airey was a general merchant and, as agent for 
Greenwich Hospital mines, well placed to supply the concern with lead. 
Joseph Wilson was almosi certainly to act as the managing partner 
(whether he was any relation to Jacob Wilson, Cookson's manager at 
Bill Quay, or Samuel Wilsong Cookson9s manager at South Shieldsv is 
not known). He was succeeded b'y his son William Wilson who was 
eventually to take over the fikm. 
The revival of Airey, Cookson & Co. in,, 17.70 was one part of a 
sudden investment on the part of the Cookson family in flint glass. 
1770 also saw the establishment of a new flint glass works at Glasgow; 
the grandly named I'Verreville" which was built to manufacture "crystal 
glass according to the finest manner of the Continent" for which glass 
cutters and engravers were brought from Germany 
ý5 
The partners in 
this venture included two Glasgow merchantsl Alexander and John Ritchiev 
and four Tyneside glass manufacturers; Isaac Cookson, the eldest son 
of John Cookson, Charles Williams, eldest son of John Williams who had 
died in 1763, Joseph Robinson and Evan Deer. Unfortunately the partner- 
ship came to grief during the American wars and the house passed to 
anothers wholly Scottish, company, Hamilton, Browns Wallace & Co. 
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Figure 15,: Flint glass exports from Newcastle 1730 - 1790 
Year Destination Quantit y or weight shipped Exporter 
1730 none 
1739 Rotterdam- 17,004 drinking glasses Wm. Errington 
Amsterdam lv650 tt 11 Wm. Selby 
Hambrot 216 ti Thomas Slater 
South Caroline 200 it James Proude 
The Sound 36 it Thomas Hervey 
Boston 480 water glasses Robert Fenwick 71 coarse glasses 
Bremen 600 coarse glasses William Kent 
1745 Dublin 10,000 pieces flint glass John Cookson 
Dram 584 drinking glasses Fenwick & Watson 
Dort l"800 it Robert Roddam 
Hambro' 720 John Cpokson 
Norway 480 George Marshall 
Moss 36 Ralph Carr 
cwts qrs. lbs 
1749 Rotterdam 26 0 11 Joseph Aireyp 
Amsterdam 28 3 11 Airey Cookson and 
Company 
New York 9 2 9 Robert Carrick 
Dort 4 2 2 Joseph Airey 
Drontheim 36 wine glasses Thomas Waters 
1750 New York 67 0 0 John Cookson 
Rotterdam 64 3 3 Joseph Airey, Airey ý 
26 glass lamps 
jCooksdn 
& CompAny, 
' Bates (Thomas 
Hambrot 6 2 18 John Cookson2A. C. I& 
Co. 
Dort 3 0 0 Thomas Airey 
Christiansand 20 doz. drinking glasses John Williams 
1780 Amsterdam 1 73 3 22 Charles Williams, f 
A. C. & Co. 
Rotterdam 118 2 0 Charles Williars JAX. 
& Co. 
Guernesey 17 0 24 George Dickinson 
C. Williams 
Hambro' 12 0 0 John Cookson2 
William Row 
New York 6 0 0 Thomas Scarth 
Lingsound 0 1 0 An alien merchant 
Frederickstalle 0 1 0 Hindmarsh & Co. 
1790 Rotterdam 294 0 0 Airey Cookson & Co. 
Amsterdam 100 o 0 The Northumberland 
Hambro' 138 0 0 
1 
Glass Co. 9 Walter 
t 
Trevelyan & Co. 
Copenhagen 17 0 0(mustard bottles) George Dunn 
Nossingen 4 0 0 Hindmarsh & Co. 
Elsinore 22 o 0 W. Trevelyang Thos. 
Robinson 
Guernsey 0 22 0 Cooksong Deer & 
Blackett 
Jamaica 6 0 0 Walter Trevelyan 
(conf 
-) 
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Figure 15 (Continued) 
Year Destination Quantity or weight-shipped Exporter 
EXDorts from Sunderland 
1770 Amsterdam 45 casks, 3 boxes 
Sources: PRO E190/ 235/6: 242/15: 245/1: 249/2: 250/8: 
These figures are only taken from sample years and are 
to give a general indication of the geographical range 
trade fromý. the Tyne. The port books between c. 1755 a 
distinguish between flint and crown glass. 
******* 
John Hopton 
279/5: 289/4. 
intended onýy 
of the export 
nd c. 1775 do not 
The capital for this Glasgow venture was almost certainly provided in 
part by John Cookson and there seems to be no obvious explanation for 
his sudden interest in flint glass beyond the possibility that he felt 
it to be a branch of the glass industry whose potential, at least in 
the provinces, had not as yet been realised. 
Airey., Cookson & Co. proved more durable than the Verreville 
partnership. It continued until 1803 and export figures bear witness 
to the boost to the local industry to which it gave rise. The Williams" 
house however was not so long lived and ceased production in 1782 after 
the whole building had been destroyed by fire. 
16 This particular house 
appears to have been extremely susceptible to fire and had previously 
suffered damage in 1760 and 1764.17 The hotse does not appear to have 
been rebuilt as a flint glass house after the 1782 fire, although it 
is possible that it was_absorbed,, into Cookson*s Closegate bottleworks. 
Cooksonts new investment in the flint glass industry on the Tyne 
was slightly predated'by the building of the "New Glass House" on the 
Wear by John Hopton in 1769. ''During 1769 Hopton advertised a reward 
for the conviction of those "ill disposed persons stealing timber work 
on the arches of the new glass house now building near Sunderland", 
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and by September he was able to advertise "all sorts of Doubleftint 
glass, white enamel, fine blue and green glass, etc. " for sale. 
18 
Nothing certain is known about John Hopton but it has been suggested that 
he was previously a partner in a London flint glass manufactory. 
19 
if 
that was the case then his mve to Sunderland was a most interesting one 
and a clear suggestion that by the 1770s the advantage of the north-east's 
low manufacturing costs were beginning to become apparent. Despite 
evidence of a growing export trade to-Amsterdam (see Fig. 15) Hopton's 
venture did not last. In 1775 Sir John Delaval was informed that Hopton 
had come to his bottle works seeking to exchange a large quantity of 
ashes for bottles. 
20 The house was certainly dormant by 1781 for in 
that year William Allen reported to Delaval that he had heard some men 
were taking over Hopton9s house but later found that-the rumour was 
unfoundedýl The house was eventually sold to Hilkiah Hall and converted 
to a bottle house. 
There was no further activity in the local flint glass industry 
until the mid 1780s which saw the establishment of two new flint glass 
houses on the Tyne, one successful the other not. The unsuccessful 
house was built on the south shore of the Tyne at the Saltmeadows near 
Gateshead by Joshua Henzell, John Grey and Richard Shortridge who pet- 
itioned the Common Council in September 1785 saying that they were 
"desirous of establishing a manufacture of flint glass and other types 
of glass ware" and asking for a lease of a parcel of land in the 
Saltmeadows which they thought would be most suitable. They were granted 
a 21 year lease and the house was erected. By the time it was able to 
advertise goods for sale ("all kinds of flint glass and phials, at the 
customary prices and usual discounts for prompt payment? ') 
22 
the partners 
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also included James King and son, and the house therefore became a 
casualty of Kingts and Henzellts bankruptcy in 1786. In 1787 Joshua 
Henzell's five sixteenths' shares in the house, consisting of working 
utensils and large stock of manufactured goods2 was offered for sale 
by auction. 
23 
James King9s share was probably the three sixteenths 
of the stock and utensils offered for sale in July 1786.24 The remaining 
partners do not appear to have continued to occupy the house which in 
1791 passed to three London merchants, creditors of Joshua Henzell) 
25 
and the site eventually became a part of Hawks, Crawshay & Co's iron 
works. The remaining partners, Richard Turner Shortridge and John Greyl 
did however continue as flint glass manufacturers. In 1791 a new flint 
glass house was erected at South Shields by R. T. Shortridge on land 
leased from the Dean and Chapter of Durham. This house appears to have 
been thesote property of R. T. Shortridge but it seems probable that 
John Grey, who on his death in 1796 was described as a flint glass 
manufacturer, continued in partnership with him. R. T. Shortridge was 
a Stockton man by birth and possiblys like James King, a Quaker. 
house 
The other flint glass k that was established in the mid 1780s was the 
more successful Northumberland Glass House. As its name suggests it 
was owned by the same company which in 1791 erected the large crown 
glass works at Lemington. The single flint glass house was situated quite 
separately in the Close in Newcastle and, as it is listed in the 1787 
Newcastle Directory, appears slightly to predate the larger 'ýemington 
works. The managing agent named in the 1787 directory was John Dyson 
who became a partner in the 1791 company. Dyson possibly had some 
connection with the lead trade for when he quit the glass house in 1802 
it was in order to become a white lead merchant in York, 
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Unlike the existing glass houses in the Close, the Northumberland 
Glass House was within the town-walls. The property,, which bordered 
on the town*s Mansion House, had previously been a dwelling hotse owned 
by the Peareth family. 26 Perhaps inevitably emissions of smoke from the 
house created a public nuisance and in 1797 the Company was indicted in 
the local assizes on this account but reprieved when it promised to 
raise the cone of its glass house a little higher and make other alter- 
ations in order to render th e house as little offensive as possible. 
27 
By the 1790s the Close had become the clear centre of the Newcastle flint 
glass industry housing not only the two glass houses but, according 
to the 1796 directorys three independent cutters and engraves: Thomas 
Alexander, Edward Jackson and Robert Hudson. 
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1800 - 1850 
The first quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of growth 
for the flint glass industryo as indeed it was for all branches of the 
glass industry in the north-east. By 1825, in addition to the three 
older houses at Newcastle and South Shields, three new houses at 
Gateshead were in operation plus new singlelDuses at Sunderland, North 
Shields and Carr Hill near Gateshead. This growth was in large part a 
consequence of the industry9s emancipation from a purely local demand. 
Although there is evidence that London flint glass continued to be 
offered for sale in Newcastle, 
28 
there is no doubt that the products 
of the local houses were also being shipped for sale in London and other 
parts of the country. 
Two reasons could be put forward for this extension of the north- 
east houses' market. Firstly the expansion of the market for cheap 
glass goods, and'secondly the improvement in the quality of provincial 
glass which made it well able to stand comparison with London glass. The 
first reason is perhaps the most important of these. The north-easto 
with its cheap manufacturing costs, reaped the full benefit from the 
increasing use of flint glass not as a luxury but as ordinary household 
ware. The north-east was particularly well suited to the production of 
"tale goods". or goods which were sold by the dozen rather than by the 
pound weight, such as ordinary plain glasses or phials and small medecine 
bottles. 29 
The corollary of the increase in the number of provincial glass houses 
was the decline of those in London. By 1833 there were only two flint 
glass houses left in London and both of thoses belonging to Apsley 
Pellatt and William Holmes, were establishments of great prestige 
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producing high quality and expensive goods. The banishment of the 
coarse manufacturers from London was something that was frequently 
blamed on the effects of the excise, 
30 but there is no doubt that at 
root it was simply a consequence of the difference in costs between 
London and the provinces. 
Coal was, of course, significantly cheaper at Newcastle than at 
London and so was another expensive ingredient, lead. The proportion 
of lead (or litharge) used in the flint glass batch varied according to 
the quality of glass that was required: for particularly fine quality 
glass it could be as high as 40% but 17% - 337o was more usual for 
ordinary glass. A recipe, for flint glass was included in a patent 
taken out by the Gateshead glass manufacturer, Joseph Prices in 1814: 
31 
420 lbs. Lynn sand 
280 lbs. Litharge 
147 lbs. Pearl ash 
14 lbs. Nitre 
336 lbs. Cullet 
3; '4 lbs. Manganese. 
This appears to be a typical recipe for a reasonably good quality glass. 
It would perhaps be a mistake to over emphasise the association of 
the north-east houses with cheap ordinary glass for there is no doubt 
that they also produced expensive, highly decorated glass. 'The second 
reason for the growth of the industry in the early years of the nineteenth 
century was the almost certain improvement in the quality of provincial 
glass and particularly in its decoration. A major component of this 
improvement was the adoption of steam power for glass cutting machinery 
which put the major decorative technique ofthe period within the capa- 
bility of the ordinary glass house and the ordinary'glass. worker. By 
1825 most of the leading north-east houses possessed machinery for cutting: 
when the Wear glass house was put up for sale in 1822 it possessed a 
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6 hp engine and machinery for twenty cutters; 
32 in 1819 the North 
Shields glass house invited proposals for erecting a4 hP engine and 
apparatus for turning glass cutters* wheelso when it was put up for 
sale in 1821 it included an "excellent steam engine and apparatus for 
24 cutters" 
33 
; the Skinnerburn glass houset put up for sale in 1819 
included machinery for cutting glass: 
34 in 1832 a glass cutter at Carr 
Hill was killed whilst oiling the 14 hp enginee 
35 
Cutting was done at the 
factory and the list of employees of the Northumberland Glass Company 
in the 1842 illustrates the size of the cutting department as compared 
to the rest of the works: 
36 
25 glass makers over 18 
16 11 to under 18 
22 glass cutters over 18 
2 11 of under 18 
13 men variously employed 
2 women variously employed 
5 clerks and agents. 
The cutters worked continuously from 6 am to 7 pm andq like the glass 
makers9were paid a basic wage for an agreed quantity of work plus 
overwork for the rest. Engraving was done at the factory but it was 
also practised by independent engravers who worked to commission. 
Robert Hudson was the chief among these in Newcastle, by 1800 he was 
fully established as a "cut glass manufacturer" and advertised 
"coats of arms, crests, cyphers or any other devices engraveýon flint 
glass in the neatest manner". 
37 
In Sunderland independent engravers 
such as Robert Pyle and Robert Haddock were also at work in the town. 
38 
A memorable illustration of the skilled and high quality work that 
the local glass houses were capable of producing can be found in the 
description of the glass makersO procession of 1823.39 The workers 
of the five leading housest (the Northumberland house, the Wear houses 
the South Shields houses New Stourbridge and the Durham glass works) 
organised, at the expense of the masters, a large procession in order 
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to see who could produce "the most curious and best piece of workmanship". 
They walked through Newcastle and Gateshead holding their creations which, 
besides ornately cut and decorated goblets, decanters, salvers and 
ordinary table ware, included glass trumpets, bird cages, top hats, a 
glass fort complete with cannon, a curious tube that by the action of 
different fluids represented the circulation of blood in the human body, 
and a large model of a glass house. 
Despite the advantages of the north-east which favoured the growth of 
the local industry in the early nineteenth century, the local manufacturers 
did not escape the difficulties that were so apparent by the time of the 
1835 Commission. By this time the local industry showed some signs of 
decline and R. T. Shortridge told the Commission that there were only five 
houses in work in the area as compared to seven previously. This decline 
in numbers was put down largely to the effects of fraudulent competition 
the interference of the excise regulations and the insufficiency of the 
drawback of duty on export. 
(i) Newcastle, North and South Shields 
By the early nineteenth century flint glass was firmly established in 
Newcastle as a local industry of which the town could be proud. According 
to the Reverend Baillie, writing in 1801, the Closegate glass houses were 
one of the sights of the town: 
40 
Viewing the glass warehouses in the Close, the eye is struck in 
beholding vast piles and arrangements of beautiful vases of crystal 
or white glass, lustres etc. The artists who have served their 
apprenticeships at this business earn two or three guineas a week 
with ease. 
This enthusiastic view of the flint glass trade was not however shared 
by the partners in Aireys Cookson & Co. who dissolved the company in 1803. 
In April 1803 5/30ths of the partnership was advertised for sale, in May 
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a further 15/30ths was-advertised for sale, and in September it was 
announced that the works woL5 to be carried on from henceforth by 
William Wilson & Company. 
41 Wilson was the previous managing partner 
and by the time of the end of the partnership in 1819 his partners 
included Thomas Hopper, Francis Innes and the executors of the late 
William Ellison. 
42 By 1819 the firm occupied a completely new glass 
house at the Skinnerburn to which they had moved in 1811.43 The old 
Closegate house was put up for sale by Isaac Cookson but without apparent 
success although it is possible that it was taken over by Joseph Price 
in the late 1820s. On thedissolution of William Wilson & Co. the 
Skinnerburn House was put up for sale and was eventually taken over by 
the Northumberland Glass Company. 
The Northumberland Glass Company was one of the few firms to remain 
in the hands of the same partnership throughout the first half of the 
century. It did however change glass houses after the original house in 
the Close suffered a disastrous fire in 1821. The fire destroyed the working 
area, the warehouse and UOvOOO worth of stock. This was not in the least 
covered by the U. 800 insurance taken out on the property. 
44 Only the 
cone was left standing and immediately after the fire Joseph Lamb considered 
giving up the flint glass trade altogether. He was encouraged to do so 
by his friend John Bowes Wright: 
45 
With respect to one subject mentioned by you (viz) that you think of 
abandoning the flint trade, it'is the firm and matured opinion of both 
Humble and myself that you ought'to do so without hesitation. The 
crown glass and your other numerous avocations will be ample employ- 
ment for you and you will sieze an excellent opportunity to rid 
yourself of a ccastant and vexatious tie to a petty concern. 
Lamb did not act on this advice and the trade was resumed at the recently 
vacated Skinnerburn house of William Wilson. This was a far more appro- 
priate location for a glass house in view of the permanent risk of fire., 
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The Forthumberland Company remained at the Skinnerburn. In 1844 it. was 
taken over by J. G. Dodd., who, like William Wilson, had previously been 
the manager of the house, 
A price list from the Northumberland Glass Company exists which gives 
us a comprehensive picture of the type of goods it produced and their 
prices, 
46 The house produced goods in five types of glass, the basic 
prices of which were: 
per lb. 
All plain flint glass Is 4d 
Strong flint glass for cutting. Is 6d 
Common green glass Is Od 
Best green glass Is 6d 
Best blue glass Is 4d 
Common green glass was a Pale greenish clear glass, coloured only by the 
presence of impurities in the rawraterials. Best green glassVas a deep 
green colour produced by the addition of copper scales to the metal. Best 
blue glass was also a deep colour and was produced by the additicn of 
oxide of cobalt. Articles were variously priced at these prices or above 
according to the degree of skill necessary for their production: for 
instance, deep blue and green decanters with two or three rings cost Is 8d 
per lb; pitchers with coloured edges cost Is 9d per lb.; candlesticks 
with square feet cost 2s Od per lb. Most expensive of all were those 
articles which demanded faultless glass: prisms cost 2s 6d per lb. p and 
thermometer tubes 4s Od per lb. In addition the price list contains a 
large proportion of tale goods which were priced by the dozen; or for 
smaller articles by the gross. Tale wine glasses cost 4s Od per dozen$ 
tale pint beakers 8s Od per dozen and common flint ink wells 24s Od per 
gross. The list also includes a number of small phials named after the 
medicine they contained: Turlingtons (cello shaped bottles used for 
"Turlington's Balsalm, of Life") sold at 24s Od per gross, a-id Daffys (used 
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for "True Daffy*s Elixir") at 30s Od to 40s Od per gross depending on 
their size. 
47 
R. T. Shortridge9s house at South Shields also remained in the hands 
of the same company until 1840s. Shortridge! s partners in the flint 
glass house do not appear to have been the same men as those he took as 
partners in the crown house. In 1817 the flint glass house was put up 
for sale 
48 
. possibly on the death of R, T, Shortridge, but was carried 
on by his son in partnership with G. E. Sawyer and Edward Walker. By 1833 
Walker had been replaced by Charles Henry Cook. 
49 The house appears to 
have continued in production without any major upsets apart from the loss 
of several workmen in 1810 after they had been "seduced" into going to 
the United States by one William Richmond, a Dumbarton glass maker who 
had emigrated to America and had been sent back to England deliberately 
to poach hands. 
50 
In 1814 two new flint glass firms were established on the Tyne, one 
at Newcastle and one at North Shii! lds. Both of these firms were short 
lived and both met ignominious ends as guilty defendants in an excise 
prosecution. The establishment of two new flint glass houses in 1814 is 
I first quite surprising since 1814 was only two years after the introduction 
of the double duties which, according to most flint glass manufacturerst 
had had a disastrous effect on the trade. In these two cases however it 
appears that the disadvantages of the double duties were outweighed by 
the advantages of the system of assessment also introduced in 1812. This 
system provided that the duty on the glass was assessed by the weight of 
the manufactured goods rather than the weight of the materials before 
manufacture. It had been welcomed by the manufacturers but not by the 
Board of Excise which saw it as providing too many opportunities for 
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fraud. Both these cases served to justify the Board of Excise's fears 
for both appear to have been deliberate attempts to defraud the revenue 
by means of the new system of assessment. 
In June 1815 John Bell and Mr. Carnes$ flint glass manufacturers of 
Newcastle, were tried in the Exchequer on charges of not providing a 
secure weighing room and removing glass. 
51 The prosecution's case was 
straightforward. The officer of the Excise had seen candleligIt in the 
weighing room at a time when it was supposed to be locked and on invest- 
igating further found a secret panel in the door to the room that could 
be removed in order to permit entry. The door was exhibited in court and 
agreed to be a piece of villainous invention. On the same day an identical 
case was heard agairE t James Turnbull a flint glass manufacturer of North 
0 
Shields. 
52 Turnbull had commenced manufacturing on 8 December 1814 and 
his foreman, Benjamin Wilcox, had come to him from Bell and Carnes in 
Newcastle. The excise officer had become suspicious about the amounts 
of glass being charged with duty and on examining the door to Turnbull*s 
weighing room found a secret panel identical to that found at Bell and 
Carnes. Both cases were undefended and in both bases'a verdict was 
found for the crown. 
Bell and Carnes appear to have given up manufacturing quite soon 
after their prosecution. In Janua; y 1817 the "newly erected glass house 
at East Ballast Hills late in the occupation of Messers John Bell and Co. " 
was advertised for sale. 
53 James Turnbull carried on but in December 1815 
was prosecuted again. 
54 
This was a rather more complicated fraud but 
basically Turnbull had devised a method of concealing whole trays of goods 
in the lear thus preventing them ever reaching the weighing room; a 
fraud to which his workmen were party. Again there was no defence and 
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Turnbull was fined E600. In August 1816 his manufactory was put up for 
sale "by order of a writ of venditioni exponaslt,, 
55 
along with a large 
quantity of manufactured goods (decanters, chandeliersp smoke shades, 
tumblers, salts, pepper castors, goblets, cut glass bowls etc. ) and 
materials (Lynn sand, emery, cullet, manganese., pearl ash etc. ). Turnbull 
was also the subject of an extent-in-aide 
56 
The North Shields glass house was sold to a company headed by George 
Burrell-, - a Tynemouth ship owner. who renamed the works the Tyne Flint Glass 
Wokks. The main improvement Burrell introduced was a steam engine to 
power the cutting machinery (see p. 293ý. Following Burrell's death in 
1821 the works was advertised for sale without success. 
57 In 1826 the 
premises were taken over by Tyzack Dobinson and Co., manufacturers of 
cables. 
(ii) Sunderland 
Although the manufacture of flat glass and bottles became firmly est- 
ablished at Sunderland during this period, the same was not true of flint 
glass. The only flint glass works in operation on the Wear until the 1840S 
was the Wear Flint Glass Works which was situated at Deptford on the south 
bank of the river. The works remained in production until 1843 but the 
available details of its history suggest strongly that it was not the 
stable concern that it appeared to be. 
58 
At least six different partner- 
ships attempted to run the works during its existence and none appear to 
have been able to produce sufficient profits to enable the works to operate 
relatively independently and without regular injections of new capital 
through new partners. Indeed it is certainly possible that the works 
would not have survived at all had it not been owned by the White family 
which waýs able to support the works when needed with short term loans 
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or extra capital; had the workst owners been less comfortably off it 
is probable that the works variable profits and large expense would 
have caused its closure at an earlier date. 
The original company was founded by John White c. 1805 in partner- 
ship with C. T. Thornhill and Andrew Young. White (1764 - 1830) was a 
wealthy ship owner, land owner, and proprietor of Bishopwearmouth iron 
works. He was also a. Wesleyan' as was Andrew Young who was connected to 
White by marriage. Young was a shipsO chandler. C. T. Thornhill was a 
merchant of Antigua and the heir of a wealthy Sunderland coal fitter and 
land owner. Two further partners were admitted (as managing partners), 
Joseph Tuer and William Formain (previously of the new Stourbridge house 
at Gateshead, see below) who left in March 1816.59 The subsequent partner- 
ship (in which White and Young owne. six sixteenth shares each and Tuer 
the remaining four) was dissolved in 1822 when Tuer left to go to a 
pottery in Newcastle. Stock accounts for the company reveal its declining 
fortunes: in 1818 when White calculated his share to amount to f. 4,000 
but by 1821 it had declined to Z2,500. Unsurprisingly the works was put 
up for sale and was described as consisting of one glass house with an 
eight pot furnacep a six horse power engine, two lears, twenty eight 
workmees cottages and a manager9s house. 
60 
Lack of purchasers forced White and Young to continue but a new 
capital of 0,200 was advanced between them)and a new manager, Edward 
Leadbitter. who had previously been at the Carr Hill Glass House (see 
below) 
) was appointed. New investment vas made in cutting machinery and by 
1824 the works included an eight horse power condensing engine with 
machinery for twenty cutters (this was valued at Z800 in, 1824 although 
it had cost U. 245). This appears to have been a reasonably prosperous 
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period for the glass works. White and Young were certainly helped by 
the commission of a large glass 200 piece dinner service from the 
Marquis of Londonderry-'Iin 1824.61 In 1827 the Duke of Wellington visited 
the works which can also perhaps be taken as evidence of the works 
prosperity and reputation. 
62 Nevertheless the works was not sufficiently 
prosperous to persuade the families of White and Young to continue manu- 
facturing. In 1830, on the death of Andrew Young and the ill health of 
John White, the works was put up for sale 
63 
and eventually taken by a 
partnership headed by William Booth and including John French (who was 
lateAo become manager of Sowerbyls glass house at Gateshead)v Thomas 
i 
Turnbull, William Wilkinson and William Perry. In 1832 Turnbull quit to 
go to the Carr Hill glass house (see below) and a new partnership was 
formed between Booth (holding 5/12ths), James Vint (5/12ths) and French 
(2/12, ths). 64 Vint was another Wesleyan and, besides being the owner of 
a Sunderland newspaper The Herald, was also a retailing chemist which could 
in part explain his interest in a flint glass since phials and medecine 
bottles were a standard part of a flint glass housets production. The Wear 
house had certainly been manufacturing small mustard bottles in 1812 
when White and Young petitioned the Treasury over the export of bottles 
filled with mustard. 
65 
This partnership was equally short lived and in 
1834 it was found necessary to raise new capital by introducing new 
partners. These new partners were the two sons of John Whitev Andrew and 
Richard White, who besides buying two shares from Vint agreed to advance 
the company a further Z3,500 at ; Z576 interest. They also agreed to reduce 
the rent of the works from Z260 to Z240 per annum. In addition all 
partners were to advance a further E500 each bringing the total new capital 
advanced to E49000. This was almost certainly used to erect a second 
glass house which was completed in March 1836.66 
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Despite a fire in 1839 which destroyed Z2,000 worth of the property 
but which left the working area unaffecteds Booth continued to occupy 
the house until 1834-when it was put up for sale "by order of the 
mortgagee". 
67 Booth was undoubtedly a victim of the general depression 
that afflicted the flint glass trade during the late 1830s andearly 1840s 
but his departure from the trade may have been accelerated by his prosecut- 
ion in the American courts in 1840 for invoicing .. goods at a 
false 
valuation. 
68 In 1840 Booth shipped a cargo of goods to Barclay and 
Livingstone of New York but the articles were seized by the American 
Customs service on the grounds that they were valued at a lower price than 
their real worth; the valuation was important in that the goods were 
subject to an ad valorem import duty, The differences between Booth's 
valuations and those settled on by the New York Customs were indeed quite 
considerable: 
Invoice price 
tumblers 
decanters 
wine glasses 
hooks 
finger basins 
Is 9d per doz. 
4d per lb. 
Is 3d per doz. 
2s Od per doz 
5d per lb. 
Customs Valuation 
3s 6d per doz. 
10d per lb. 
3s Od per doz. 
3s 6d per doz. 
10d per lb. 
Booth defended himself on the grounds that the New York Customs were 
valuing, the goods according to what they would fetch in the British 
market. The American priceg he insisted, was the home value minus the 
drawback and free of freight, which was customary when the customer was 
a large buyer. He maintained that the prosecution had been[pt up by 
American manufacturing interests in order to protect their home market. 
Whatever the motives of the prosecution Booth lost the case and was not 
granted an appeal for a re-trial. It should perhaps be noted that 
according to Joseph Price, giving evidence to the 1835 Commission, the 
American import duty was indeed payable on the British value: 
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There is a great deal of up-hill work now in getting goods into the 
foreign market; we cannot go into the American market without paying 
on plain or uncut glass a penny a pound, and twenty per cent ad 
valorem 
' 
on the value here; there are freight, insurance, commission 
consular certificates bond and debenture etc. to be paid ...... then 
on cut glass they charge three halfpence a pound and thirty per 
cent on the value here. 
Despite the reduction of the flint glass duty in 1841 and 1844 plus 
the abolition of the glassdities in 1845, the Wear Flint Glass Works 
remained unsold and was eventually absorbed into the neighbouring 
Deptford Bottle Works. 
Gateshead 
Perhaps the most impressive growth of the flint glass industry 
during this period was its growth at Gateshead where three new houses were 
established in the first decade of the nineteenth century. There seems 
to be no obvious explanation for this sudden growth on the south bank 
of the Tyne. The first house was that of Atkinson and Wailes in 
Pipewellgate. Exactly when it was founded is not known but in 1805 the 
partnership of Thomas Wailes, John Atkinson, James Seager and William 
Formain was dissolved when Formain left to go to. the Wear glass house. 
69 
The Gateshead glass house was carried on by the first three partners. 
Thomas Wailes of Newcastle was the receiver of Greenwich Hospital 
70 
and 
the brother in law of John Atkinson of Heworth Shore. This partnership 
probably came to an end c. 1811 from which date the house was carried 
on by James Seager alone. Seagerts occupation came to an abrupt end in 
1814 when he was prosecuted in the Exchequer for an offence committed the 
previous year and fined f. 600.71 Seager vehemently denied the charges 
which, judging from the account of the case, do indeed appear to have 
been based only on circumstantial evidence (see the excise chdpter for 
an account of the case). Seager was found guilty and forced to quit the 
trade as a result; during the case he was described as "a manufacturer 
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not advanced far in the world". In July 1814 the Union flint glass 
house in Pipewellgate was put up for sale along with "good quality warett 
and materials. 
72 The house appears to have been taken over by Joseph 
Price, owner of the neighbouring flint glass house, on-lease from 
Thomas Wailes; in 1839 a glass house in the occupation of Joseph Price 
but the property of George Wailesj eldest son, of Thomas Wailesj was 
advertised to let. 
73 
histoc"He's 
Thomas Wailes$ second son was William Wailes, one of . most celebrated 
Victorian stained glass manufacturers. In view of the family's connection 
with a glass house and Joseph Pricets production of stained and painted 
glass (see below) it seems more than probable that William Wailes was 
connected in some way with the Pipewellgate glass house in his early years - 
perhaps being employed by Price as a glass painter or colour mixer. When 
Wailes went into business on his own in February 1836 it was quite clear 
that he had already had experience of the craft: 
74 
William Waileso having studied the science of glass staining and 
enamelling for some years has now commenced the practice professionally 
at his premiscs in Mosely Street, William Wailes considers that the 
high prices hith6-rto paid have almost acted as a prohibition and is 
therefore determined to execute works committed to his careq though 
necessarily rather expensive from the costliness of the colouring 
materials and the tediousness and risk in the process, at such a 
price as shall offer an inducement for the more general introduction 
of what has always been considered the most gorgeous appendage of 
buildings -a profusion of stained glass. 
Wailes* reputation grew rapidly, thanks no doubt to his 
' 
employmený5., 
, ý-, by Pugin to execute some of his earlier designs in stained glass. 
Joseph Price'was the most interesting of all the Gateshead flint glass 
manufacturers. He was an inventive and imaginative man who was involved 
in a number of other projects besides his glass works: - he invented a steam 
powered river tug, a gas apparatus and an improvement in railway carriages,. 
76- 
His fertile mind is certainly-evident in his career as a glass manufacturer 
for he produced a far wider range of goods than any of his rivals. Besides 
- 307 - 
ordinary table ware Price produced lighting and illuminating apparatusq 
coloured enamelled and stained glassv glass steam tubes for boilers, 
optical glass, a patented kind of obscured glass and his unpatented but 
unique "Imperial Sheet Glass". Like Atkinson and Wailes, Price2s glass 
house was in Pipewellgatep and was , known as the Durham Glass 
House. Price probably commenced manufacturing c. 1809 and in 1810 opened 
a shop in Dean Street Newcastle from which to sell his products. 
77 The 
shop was short lived and closed in 1811 selling of f cheap its stock of 
girandoles, candlesticks in Grecian patterns and a variety of other goods. 
78 
Price's personal history is not in the least complete but he was certainly 
a local man and had previously been a wine and spirit merchant. 
79 
enterprise in glass appears to have been largely self financed and the 
only indication of any partnership is a partnership between Price and 
Thomas Arbuckle as "The British Flint Glass Co. " which lasted from C. 1825 
to 1832. Price than took his son in law, William de Pledge into the business 
and the works occasionally traded as Price and de Pledge. 
Lamps,, illuminating and coloured glass appear to have been always an 
important part of Price*s production. In 1818 Price announced that he 
had engaged several artist9zand could supply painted or stained glass for 
churches, black glass for blank windows, bent glass for shop windows with 
coats of arms, designs or figures painted on them. 
80 
In 1821 he advertised 
that he had 100,000 dozen coronation illuminating lamps ready to be sent 
out to any part, complete with burners, in flint, green, blue, purple or 
81 82 
amber coloured glass. His patent of 1814 was for a kind of obscured 
glass made by blowing a gather of flin% glass with a gatheýbf white 
enamelled glass within it so that the glass would transmit light without 
being transparent. Price was also active in the production of optical 
glass and in 1830 and 1840 petitioned the Treasury asking for allowanceSin 
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order to manufacture optical glass (see the excise chapter). 
Price9s optical glass was minufactured from what he grandly named 
"Imperial Sheet Glass" which was basically flint glass blown in a 
cylinder and flattened. In 1835 Price and de Pledge petitioned the 
Treasury on the subject 
83 
after an order from the United States had been 
prevented from being shipped bacause the excise export officer had 
suspected the Imperial sheet glass of being crown glass fraudulently 
claiming a flint glass drawback. According to Price and de Pledge the 
glass was flint glass "flatted by us in a peculiar way yet unknown to 
the trade" and because it was quite void of colour, whereas crown and 
sheet glass had a bluish or greenish cast, was used for more costly 
purposes such as framing pictures and spectacle eyes; it was also 
coloured or stained for use in stained glass windows. This type of 
flint glass was also mentioned by Shortridge and Hawks to the 1835 
Commission although named by them as "British Sheet Glass". They main- 
tained that because it was so costly and difficult to manufacture it 
would never become a serious rival to crown or sheet glass, even if the 
duty on flint glass was removed. 
There is no doubt that Joseph Price was successful. In 1822 he 
employed 130 men, 
84 
and in 1839 - 139, which was said to be a decline from 
previous years. 
85 In 1832 he was working a third glass house in Newcastle 
which was possibly the old Closegate house. Price was also a public 
spirited man. In 1821 he donated a stained glass window to the new 
Lying In Hospital in Newcastle 86 and in 1847 donated a massive and beauti- 
fully cut six sided bottle to be placed in the foundation stone of the 
Gateshead Mechanics Institute as a "brilliant memorial to posterity of 
the local manufactures of our time". 
87 
Price continued to occupylthe 
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two glass houses in Pipewellgate until 1846 when they were bothq one a 
twelve pot furnace and the other a smaller seven pot furance , put up for 
sale. 
88 
With no buyers coming forward, Price was forced to continue until 
his death in 1852. In 1850 when the chimney from one of the houses 
collapsed killing two men he was still taking an active part in the 
business. 
89 
The third of the Gateshead glass houses was established c. 1808 by 
a partnership headed by John Robertson. It was almost certainly the 
premises insured by Joseph Willis & Co. in 1808 with the Sun Fire Insurance 
Company and described as "buildings on the pot house quay Gateshead, 
unfinished but intended for a flint'glass house". 
90 The first partnerships 
which was dissolved in 18099 consisted of Joseph Willis, John Robertson, 
James Seager, Thomas Thompsong Richard Sowerbyq Hindmarsh Thomson and 
91 
William Birkinshore. Seager left in 1809 and the other partners continued 
as John Robertson and Company until 1812. The companyts glass house was 
built on land leased from Cuthbert Ellison at the far west end of 
Pipewellgate. It was named by the company the "New Stourbridgell glass 
house, no doubt to match the "New Deptford" and "New Greenwich" works 
on the other side of Gateshead. 
Robertson and Co. came to an end in 1812 following the prosecution 
of the company by the Board of Excise in December 1811.92 The offences 
had taken place in January 1810 and had been discovered when an officer 
entered the house suddenly and found men workingglass from an unstopped 
pot. The manufacturers attempted to give this a plausible explanation by 
saying that the pot had suddenly cracked and theybad sent off a little 
boy to notify the officer that they were going to unstop the pot in order 
to save the metal. The officer had not met a little boy and on gauging 
the pots with the help of the two clerks Mr. Thompson and Mr. Sowerbyp 
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found 10 inches of metal missing and no crack in thepDt. The following 
day the pot was found to be cracked and broken but the prosecution9s 
case was cemented by the evidence of Robert Butler, the metal mixer, who 
swore that the pot had been cracked after the officer had left and 
cullet thrown into the teaze hole to make it appear the pot had leaked. 
The company was found guilty and soon after this was. reformed by John 
Robertson, George Sowerbyp Robert Hood (a rope manufacturer'-and brewer), 
and William Birkinshore. 
93 The company again fell foul of the excise in 
1814 when they were prosecuted again and fined E200.94 As the company 
consented to a verdict for the crown the case was not tried and the 
charges not known. The offence oould have been something as minor as 
altering the position of the glass in the lear pans after the pans had 
been filled. On the same day Joseph Price also consented to a verdict 
for the crown and was fined U00. 
The owners of the New Stourbridge glass house were next prosecuted in 
December 1816.95 By this time the owners were George Sowerby and John 
Lowry who were said to have entered into the house on the 18 February 1813. 
This prosecution was another instance where the charges were vehemently 
denied by the accused whoý despite being found guilty, continued to 
protest their innocence (see the excise chapter). John Lowry left the 
partnership quite soon after this and the house was continued by George 
Sowerby inpartnership with his brother Thomas and John Phillips who were 
already in business together as timber importers. Both the glass house and 
the timber trade must have been reasonably profitable for in 1831 the 
Sowerbys and Phillips felt able to take a lease of Waldrige colliery 
near Chester le Street, 
96 
This was perhaps a little too ambitious for 
97 it necessitated large borrowing of capital from the Backhouse bank. In 
1832 Lhe partners mortgaged a leasehold estate in Cumberland to the bank 
f 
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"to induce them to continue their dealings with Sowerbyt Sowerby and 
Phillips". In November 1833 Waldrige Colliery was mortgaged to the 
bank for f. 30,000 at 5% interest. In April 1834 the New Stourbridge Glass 
works was mortgaged for Z5,000 as "further inducement" to the bank: by 
this time the Backhousets capital in the Sowerbys amounted to f, 35,000; 
after George Sowerby's death in 1845 the debt stood at Z41,794. In 
November 1857 the Backhouse bank stopped payment and the following year 
the debt was discharged by realising the colliery. The glass house was 
never realised and in 1863 was granted to the executors of Thomas Sowerby 
and John Phillips by the executors of George Sowerby who had by this time 
transferred their glass manufacturing interests to new premises. 
The New Stourbridge works appears to have been a reasonably healthy 
concern. In 1839 it employed 87 men. In February 1844 George Sowerby, 
with the permission of the Backhouse bankp transferred the whole property 
to his eldest son John who was to prove a highly successful glass manufacturer 
in the last half of the century. 
The fourth and final glass house established at Gateshead was of a 
slightly later date. It was also quite unique in that it was the only 
glass house in the area not situated directly on a river. It was situated 
some miles from the Tyne on Gateshead Fell at the small village of Carr Hill. 
This lack of a river side position does not appear to have disadvantaged the 
glass house in any significant way since it continued in production until 
the 1890s. The advantage of a glass manufactory at Carr Hill was almost 
certainly the nearby flint m-1 11 which provided a basic silicaeous 
material instead of fine river sand. The existence of a white sand ware 
pottery during the eighteenth century was probably also due to the 
availability of ground flint. 
98 
The first occupiers of the Carr Hill 
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glass house were probably John Coulson and Edward Leadbitter who went 
bankrupt in 1821.99 Leadbitter became manager of the Wear glass works 
soon after this. In 1822 Carr Hill was taken over by George Stevensonj 
who had previously been manager to the Northumberland Glass Workso in 
partnership with his brothers Anthony and Joseph. 
100 
Stevenson continued 
in occupation until 1833 when it was taken over by William Perry and 
Thomas Turnbull 101 who had previously been partners-with William Booth 
in the Wear Glass Works. In 1836-William Ferry and John Booth (whether 
he was any relation to William Booth is not known), carrying on business 
with Thomas Turnbull as Perry & Co., were declared bankrupt. 
102 
The 
house was then taken over by Swanston Coulson & Co, 
103 
and finallys in 
1844, by James Angus. Angus was af lint glass and china merclia nt who 
followed up his purchase of the Carr Hill works with the purchase of the 
newly erected flint glass house at the Bill Quay bottle works. Neither 
of these enterprises- lasted long and in 1852 the Carr Hill works passed 
to A. Elliot and Co. whihwas to occupy it until 1868. The rapid turnover 
of owners plus the fact that many of them were ex-managers of larger 
works is almost certainly a reflection of the comparatively modest size 
of the works which made it a suitable situation for a manufacturer whose 
finances were limited. The 1832 returns show the house to have had an 
extremely small production. 
The 1840s 
The 1840s was a decade of great change in the north-east flint glass 
industry. The two major aspects of this change, the establishment of 
new firms and the departure of old manufacturers from the trade, are both 
illustrated in a court hearing that took place in 1847 in order to deter- 
mine the compensation to be paid to. the owners of the North British Glass 
Works. 104 The North British Glass Works was one of the many new firms 
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that entered the glass trade, on the wave of speculation that followed 
the repeal of the glass dutieý. It had originally intended to manufacture 
crown glass at its small glass house in Pipewellgate but soon turned 
to less ambitious undertaking of flint glass. The house came to an 
abrupt end when it became the subject of a compulsory purchase order. Uld was 
removed in order to build the approaches to the High Level Bridge. 
The owners of the works claimed Z5,000 compensation from the assignees 
of the house; a sum calculated on the valuation of the stock and fixtures, 
E1.833, plus the expectation of U. 000 a year profit. The assignees on the 
other hand offered f, 493; calculated from interest at E127o on the 91,500 
capital for the time the works lay idle, plus 000 removal expenses to 
another works for, as they pointed out, there was no shortage of vacant 
flint glass manufactories in the area. Richard Shortridge and Joseph Price 
were called'to the hearing by the assigneezý, largely-tcrýydorroborate their 
assertion that the U, 000 a year profit on which the other-side based their 
claim was a prepostorous sum. Both Shortridge and Price had recently put 
their works up for sale and both gave their reasons for selling as poor 
piofits. Their evidence turned the hearing into something of a lament for 
the past prosperity and present unrenumerati'Výness of the flint glass trade. 
Shortridge stated that he had made his fortune in the-glass trade but was 
unwilling to go forward with his works when they ceased to yield him a 
fair profit: 
At present prices the flint glass trade would not yield common intev-St 
on capital because prices were falling before repeal and had since 
continued to fall andmre. His friend Mr. Price and other manufacturers 
would be glad to get out of the trade. The reduction of prices was 
partly owing to the introduction of foreign goods but principally to 
increased competition at home. 
It was put to Shortridge that he had recently quit his works because of a 
strike among his men, but he repeated that the root cause was falling 
profits. 
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The strike was for higher wages but he could not give these because his 
profits were so unsatisfactory. When he explained his position to his 
were 
men they accepted it "but taid theyebliged to strike. So he struck too and 
the works were closed". Similar sentiments were expressed by Joseph Price. 
He had been in the trade for 41 years and had madehis fortune in glass 
but "those were his golden days., nothing was to be made now". He had 
also lost a fortune but not through glass,, "by railways,, collierys, by 
over-reaching and swindling". 
Although both Shortridge*s and Pricets works were put up for sale 
following the repeal of the glass duties, neither found a buyer. Price 
decided to continue in the trade but Shortridge dismantled his works and 
sold the stock and fittings by auction in July 1847.105 The glass house 
remained idle until 1860 when it was restarted by Edward Moore as a pressed 
glass minufactory. The compensation eventually paid to the North British 
Glass Works was Z2,500 after it had been argued that although other flint 
glass works were vacant in the area they were all too expensive for a 
small company. 
All of the other new flint glass houses erected in this decade appear 
to have been comparatively small concerns. In 1845 a new flint glass 
house was built at Oakes Place in Newcastle, next door to the North 
Elswick colliery. It was briefly occupied by Baker and Pallister but put 
up for sate in 1848 and advertised as a small six pot furnace, making 
only 60cwt. of goods per week and therefore suitable-for a small capitalist. 
106 
The house was sold to the Wright brothers who had already established them- 
selves in another new flint glass house built in 1845 at Regent St. near 
Forth Banks: this house was known as the Newcastle Flint Glass Works. 
Another new house had been erected in, Newcastle following the reduction 
of the flint glass duties in 1841. This was at New Mills on Barrack Road 
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and was occupied until 1844 by Nicholson and Dixon, until 1850 by Jackson 
and Johnson, and until 1853 by Johnson and Selby. This also appears to 
have been a small house. One of the final owners, James Johnson, went 
bankrupt in 1853 and the bankruptcy hearing 
JL07 
makes it quite clear that 
he was not a wealthy man. The New Mills house appears to have been 
demolished soon after Johnson9s bankruptcy. A new flint glass house was 
also built at the Bill Quay bottle works, perhaps to make the whole works 
more attractive to a potential buyer. The whole works was put up for 
sale in July 1848, The flint glass house plus the stock was bought in 
December by James Angus, largely, it seems in order to acquire the stock, 
and in June 1849 the flint glass apparatus, "the whole. being nearly new 
having been only a very short time in use". was told by auction. 
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The fifth new flint glass house built following the repeal, the 
Gateshead Flint Glass House, was like the others in that it was small. Its 
builder put it up for sale in June 1846 describing it as "moderate in size". 
with a six pot furnace capable of producing 9200 worth of goods per week. 
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This house however deserves particular attention for it has the distinction 
of being the first flint glass house in England to be devoted entirely to 
the manufacture of pressed or stamped goods. 
The beginning of the manufacture of pressed glass in the north-east 
must be counted as the most important development ofthe decade !;! A(eduring 
the later half of the century the north-east was to emerge as the centre of 
this particular branch of the glass industry. The establishment of pressed 
glass in the area can be credited to John Sowerby and his achievement must 
be seen as a substantial one for it was a pioneering move accomplished in 
the face of cc; nsiderable opposition and quite independently from the 
other north-east manufacturers, Without Sowerby2s initiative it is con- 
ceivable that pressed glass would never have been manufactured in the area 
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other than as a small subsidiary department in blown flint glass houses. 
It is also . c.. 3nceivable that Birmingham rather than the north-east would 
have emerged as the centre of pressed glass manufacture which by 1845 
was quite strongly established in the Midlands. The Birmingham manufacturer 
Rice Harris, with the help of James Stevens a die sinker, was the first 
to explore the possibilities of pressed glass and Sowerby was only able 
to transplant the technique into the north-east with the help of Samuel 
Neville, a Birmingham glass house manager, Birmingham workmeng and the 
two sons of James Stevens as his mould makers. 
The Gateshead Flint Glass House was taken over by Sowerby in November 
1847 and converted to a pressed glass manufactory. According to Samuel 
Neville this was the first glass house in Great Britain to be devoted 
entirely to pressed glass, even in Birmingham it was only made in a 
subsidiary department of blown flint glass houses. 
110 This was als the 
case in the north-east where pressed glass machines were said to have 
been in operation at the Northumberland Glass Works, the Carr Hill glass 
works and the Newcastle Glass Works, for several years. The machine in 
use at the Gateshead Flint Glass House was said to have come from the 
recently closed North British Glass House. The technique of pressed glass 
had been known in England since the 1830s but it was not, as we shall see, 
until after the repeal of the glass duties that its potential was able tobe- 
fully realised. 
Sowerby's first attempt at pressed glass manufacture was abortivev thanks 
solely to the opposition of the local Glass Slowers'Priendly Society which 
forced him to close the new house in March 1848 after only one year and 
four months in operation. 
ill 
The glass blowerst opposition was not, they 
claimed., on account of the actual machinery used to manufacture the glass 
but the houzs of work and methods of payment that Sowerby introduced. 
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Chief among their complaints was the fact that Sowerby paid his men 
by a fixed wage, 30 shillings per week, rather than by piece work which 
was customary in the blown flint glass houses. In December 1846 the 
committee of the Glass Blowers t Friendly Society wrote to the Gateshead 
Observer in reply to a report that their members had been iaolesting 
Sowerby's men. They accused Sowerby of reducing the price of labour and 
destroying jobs: he paid them 30 shillings a week whereas on piece work 
they could earn up to Z2 a week, and he had halved the housets tiny work- 
force from twenty-four men to twelve. The charges were replied to by 
Samuel Neville, Sowerby*s manager. Firstly he pointed out that as 
Mr. Sowerbyts factory was entirely for pressed glass, the glass blowers' 
union had no business to be interfering in it. Secondly he maintained that 
30 shillings per week was af air and just wage considering that it was the 
machine, not the man, which was actually making the glass. Neville was 
supported on this last point by editorial comment from the newspaper which 
likened the introduction of pressed glass to the introduction of the 
printing press; how absurd, it said, to demand the same wage for printing 
a book as for copying it. The paper called on good sense to prevail partic- 
ularly as Sowerby was not known as a hard master and as pressed glass held 
out such potential benefits for the British Flinb glass industry which was 
increasingly hard pressed by foreign competition. The reply to this from 
the Glass Blowers'Friendly Society was slightly4moderate-in tone. It 
repeated that the Society was not opposed to the principle of using 
machinery to manufacture glassq merely the method of payment and the hours 
of work; Sowerby had also instituted a working week of six twelve hour 
shifts. 
The argument between the two sides came to a head with a case of 
breach of contract brought against one of Sowerby9s workmen in January 1847. 
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The contract, dated 25 Noevember 1846., bound John Coulson (whether this 
was the Coulson who had previously been a partner in the Carr Hill works 
is not known) to John Sowerby to work at the pressed glass trade for 
thirty shillings per week taking twelve turns of six hours each. Coulson 
had broken this contract and absconded but only, he maintainedl under 
duress from the glass blowers'union. The case turned into an argument 
as to whether the contract was a reasonable one or not. Both John French, 
the manager of Sowerby*s blown glass house (previously a partner with 
Booth at the Wear Glass Works), and Samuel Neville, the manager of the 
pressed glass houses testified that thirty shillings was a fair weekly 
wage and compared well with the wages of a glass tLower, particularly as 
wages could be earned whether glass was manufactured or not. Coulson was 
eventually found guilty but Sowerby asked the magistrates to use their 
power to discharge him from his contract "as he had no desire to enforce 
an agreement which, althotg h voluntarily entered into, the defendants 
through some influence or other, was now reluctant to fulfill". 
The opposition of the local 
a major cause of Sowerby putting 
sale in March 18480 particularly 
the manufacture of pressed glass 
glass works in 1852, he brought 
Birmingham in a special train to 
glass blowerslunion was almost certainly 
the Gateshead Flint Glass House up for 
in view of the fact that when he restarted 
on a large scale at his new Ellison St. 
fifty workmen and their families from 
staff the new works. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EXCISE ON GLASS, 1745 - 1845 
There are two good reasons for looking at the excise on glass in 
some detail. Firstly, the effects of the tax on the industry were so 
extensive that it is difficult to come to any adequate conclusion about 
any aspect of the industry during the period 1745 - 1845 without being 
aware of. and taking into account , its context within the chronological 
framework of the development of the glass duty. Secondly, north east 
manufacturers played a decisive role in shaping the legislation surrounding 
the glass duty and this in itself is therefore one aspect of this partic- 
ular study. 
The first reason is perhaps the most important one. From 1745 to 1845 
glass manufacturers were working in an artificial context where "natural" 
economic conditions did not exist and where all aspects of their activities 
were, to a greater or lesser degree, distorted by the existence of the 
tax. Without possessing some understanding of this artifical context it 
would be easy to draw quite misleading conclusions about certain aspects 
of the development of the glass industry during this period, particularly 
as the statistics which form the basis of our understanding of the 
industry's development originate from the excise. This much is'perhaps 
obvious since the effect of taxation on various other, excised commodities 
has already been pointed out. What is perhaps less obvious is that the 
glass duties themselves underwent a considerable development during their 
existence and in order to look at the effects of the tax on the industry 
at any one point in time it is important to know exactly what glass 
legislation was in operation at that time: the glass, I excise of, say, 
1750 was very different to the glass excise of 1830 since the former 
was a relatively simple tax, levied at a low rate, the latter was a 
dense and complicated body of legislation affecting almost every aspect 
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of production from the specific gravity of the glass to the length of 
time the glass should be left to be annealed. 
Before looking at the effects of the glass tax on the industry then, 
it is necessary to devote some space to the development of the tax itself 
from 1745 to 1845. This is in many respects a more interesting subject 
than its effect on the industry for it touches on an important area of 
historical interest - the relationship between government and manufacturers. 
Three bodies of interest went into shaping the glass taxts development - 
firstly, the Treasury with its need for revenue, secondly the Board of 
Excise with its need for a workable system to manage , and thirdly the 
manufacturers with their need fcr a satisfactory economic context in which 
to work. It was the conflicts and compromises between these three bodies 
of interest that caused the glass tax to develop and diversify during the 
hundred years of its existence; to end up in 1845 with a very different 
character to what it had been in 1745. 
Of these three bodies of interest, the Treasury interest was always 
the predominant one. The state's need for revenue over-rode all other 
needs, as both the Board of Excise and the manufacturers were well aware. 
Increasesin the rates of duty coming from the Treasury were never directly 
challenged, The manufacturers accepted them without question so long as 
the increases were accompanied by protective measures against$ for 
instance, foreign competition. The conflict and the compromise occurred 
for the most part in the relationship between the Board of Excise and the 
manufactuiers. Although one might imagine that of the two the Board of 
Excise held the greater authority, this was not so. The Board was an 
arm of government but one that held very little power beyond the power 
to prosecute for actual statutory offences. Its job was essentially a 
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Figure 16: The Glass Legislation 
1745 19 G2 c. 12 Duty imposed 
1777 17G3 c. 39 Duty raised. Wasteage allowance given. 
1786 26 G3 c. 77 Drawback regulations simplified 
1787 27 G3 c. 13 Excise laws consolidated. 
1787 27 G3 c. 28 Bounty added to the drawback. 
1792 32 G3 c. 40 Flint glass regulations 
1794 34 G3 c. 27 Duty and drawback raised on flint, plate and 
window glass 
1795 35 G3 c. 114 Duty on the manufactured goods for bottles 
1803 43 G3 c. 68 Duty raised 
1805 45 G3 c. 30 Duty raised by 507* 
1806 46 G3 c. 138 Irish countervailing duties 
1809 49 G3 c. 63 Duty on manufactured goods for window glass 
1811 51 G3 c. 69 Duty on manufactured goods for flint glass 
1812 52 G3 c. 77 Bounty re-ýintroduced 
1812 52 G3 c. 94 Duties doubled 
1814 54 G3 c. 87 Duty on Irish window glass 
1814 54 G3 c. 96 Export regulations. Excise on imported bottles 
1814 55 G3 c. 7 Duty on Irish window glass repealed 
1815 55 G3 c. 113 Drawbacks altered 
1816 56 G3 c. 108 Drawback on unpolish ed plate glass reduced. 
1818 58 G3 c. 33 Allowance for plate glass altered 
1819 59 G3 c. 115 Duty on plate glass reduced 
1825 6 G4 c. 81 Licenses raised 
1825 6 G4 c. 117 Gauge re-introduced for flint glass and 
extended to Ireland. 
1828 9 G4 c. 48 Duty on Irish window glass 
1832 2&3 W4 c. 102 Flint glass duties altered 1835 5&6 W4 c. 77 Flint glass duties reduced 
1838 l&2 V c. 44 Glass laws consolidated and amended 
1839 2&3 V c. 25 Broad glass defined 
1840 3&4 V c. 22 Broad glass duty raised 
1844 7&8 V c. 25 Flint glass duties reduced 
1845 All glass duties repealed 
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Figure 17: Rates of duty and drawback. 1745 - 1845. 
Year Plate Flint, Crown and Broad Bottles 
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a mechanical one, that of ensuring that the amount of duty due to the 
government was actually received by the Treasury. It advised the 
Treasury on how best to secure the revenue but the Treasury was under 
no compulsion to accept its advice. Thus in contentious issues, where 
the law was not clear, or w here new proposals were being made, both the 
manufacturers and the Board of Excise could appeal to the Treasury and 
if the Treasury decided that the interests of the revenue lay with the manu- 
facturers then it was their wishes and not the Board9s that won the day. 
The relationship between these three bodies underlies the whole develop- 
ment of the tax until the 1830s. 
The second reason for looking at the glassdity in some detail is the 
role of the north-east manufacturers in shaping the legislation. Working 
from north-east sources and with these manufacturers in mind there is 
naturally a danger of over-estimating their influence. However,, even 
making allowances for this, it is still arguable that compared to the 
manufacturers of Bristol, Stourbridge or Lancashire, the north-east manu- 
facturers had the greatest voice of authority vAth the Treasury and the 
Board of Excise. That this was so was due in no small way to the fact 
that a substantial portion of the glass revenue came from the area. A 
further reason for the authority of the north-east men was that, -they 
could count in their ranks men of social importance and political influence: 
men such as Sir John Delaval and the various members of the Ridley family, 
who were both glass manufacturers and Members of Parliament. Although 
neither Delaval nor the Ridleys was possessed of gre. 1 political power 
they were able to ease the channels of communication between the manu- 
facturers and to open up certain channels that would not have been 
available without the help of personal influence. Personal influence was, 
of course, a common place of political life; the methods used by the 
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glass manufacturers differed in no great respect from those used by 
any other group seeking to influence Treasury opinion. However where 
Delaval and the Ridleys were especially important in comparison to 
those pressing other cases, was in the fact that they-were manufacturers 
themselves with a positive financial commitment to the trade. Unlike'q 
say, the salt trade, the glass trade could not rely on disinterested MOP, s 
to support it on theoretical or social grounds. Until--the 1830s the 
glass duties were of very little interest to anyone outside the glass 
trade and glass manufacturing Members of Parliament were, therefore, 
invaluable. Delaval and the Ridleys appear to have been the only ones 
until the 1830S (by which time the major alterations in the tax had 
taken place) when Sir Matthew White Ridley was joined in the Commons by 
Thomas Hawkes of Dudley. The Ridleysand Delaval worked to protect the 
interests of the trade in general and not exclusively those of their 
fellow manufacturers in the north-east however it was to a certain extent 
inevitable that they should have reflected the opinions and desires of 
the trade in the north-east more than those of any other region. 
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1.1745 - 1777 
The tax on glass was introduced in 1745 by Pelham. Along with the 
raising of the duty on spirituous liquors it was a measure to help meet 
the cost of the War of the Right of Search and the suppression of the 
1745 rebellion. The doctrine that lay behind the introduction of a tax 
on glass was the standard contemporary onelhat taxes should be levied on 
luxuries rather than the necessities of life. Glass was certainly 
categoriSed as a luxury and as such its taxation does not appear to have 
excited much opposition. Glass had already proved itself an eligible 
subject for taxation in that imported glass hadbDrne a customs duty 
since 1690 and there had also been a tax on English glass for a short 
period during the 1690s. This duty had been introduced as a tax on a 
luxury and was repealed not because glass's luxury status was questioned 
but because of complaints from the manufacturers: its repeal was a 
measure for the relief of the manufacturer rather than the relief of 
the public. Despite the growth of production and consumption during 
the first half of the eighteenth century, by 1745 glass was still cat- 
egorised as a'luxury and thus a fit subject for taxation when financial 
pressure on the Treasury necessi_ýtated the opening up of new revenue 
sources. 
A gesture was made, howevert towards the obvious fact that certain 
types of poor quality glass were less of a luxury than others in that the 
Act of 1745 (19 G2 c12) divided glass into two categories and put 
appropriate rates of duty on each. "White glass" which was described- 
as "crown, plate and flint" paid 9s 4d per cwt. (ld per lb. ) whilst 
"green glass and bottles" paid 2s 4d per cwt. (14d per lb. ) Imported 
glass paid a customs duty at a far higher rate: 8d and 2d per lb. respect- 
ively. Other standard excise measures were introduced. Excise officers 
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had the power of entry into the premises at all times and were to make 
returns to the Board every six weeks (four weeks for London glasshouses) 
of the weight of materials used. Payment of the duty had to be within 
six weeks of entry for provincial glass houses and four weeks for those 
in London. A drawback of the duty could be claimed when the glass was 
exported. 
The 1745 Act was a simple and straightforward piece of legislation. 
The regulations it contained were uncomplicated to the point of being 
crude compared to those in the later glass acts. The f act that it lasted 
32 ydars without alteration could be seen as a memorial to the benefits 
of simplicity. It is more likely, however, that it survived without 
amendment because the rates of duty were low rather than because the 
simple system was a satisfactory one. Whilst the duty was low the faults 
in the system such as thelack of provision for wasteage in the manufiacture 
only amounted to a slight inconvenience. As the duty was-increased so did 
the losses from these faultsaAdthe manufacturers began to demand that the 
system itself be altered. The uncomplicated nature of the 1745 Act led 
directly to the complicated legislation of the period 1777- 1811 because 
at root the system established in 1745 was an unsatisfactory one for glass. 
The two particularly unsatisfactory aspects of the system established in 
1745, and which were both to give rise to a series of problemss were: 
firstly, the method of assessing the duty by a gauge; and secondlyý the 
divisions betvieen the various qualities of glass. 
Gauging was a method that was used to assess the duty on a number of 
other excised commodities - beer and malt for instance - but it was not 
at all well suited to the glass manufacturing process. Although the duty 
was ostensibly on the glass itself, the 174S act had directed that the 
amount payable was to be ascertained by the weight of the materials used 
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for making glass. The materials were either to be weighed before they- 
were put into the melting pot or gauged when they were in a molten 
state in the pot. In practice gauging was always the method used but it 
created many practical problems for the glass manufacturer. Most 
importantly, once the metal had J)een gauged the manufacturer was prevented 
from making any of the alterationý fiecessary to bring the fluxing metal 
to a perfect state. He was allowed to improve the metal by taking glass 
metal from the pot i. e. skimming off the impurities from the surface, 
but he was not allowed to add anythingtD the. pot thus preventing him 
from adding manganese, extra cullet, arsenic or any other material that 
would cleanse or-improve the texture of the metal. From the glass manu- 
facturerts point of view gauging was also unfair in that between the 
gauging of the metal in the pots and the completion of the manufactured 
goods there was considerable wastage of glass therefore duty was paid 
on glass that was not eventually made up into goods. The gauge was a 
perehAial subject of complaint from glass-manufacturersthroughott-the 
eighteenth century. In March 1760 a petition of provincial glass makers 
(ex6luding those in the north-east) pleaded for a change in the method 
of assessing the duty; "that instead of the present method of collecting 
the duty on glass it may be laid on the saleable manufactured goods". 
I 
As we shall see the Board of Exciseýwas eventually forced to adopt this 
method instead of the gauge but in 1760 it rejected it as being conducive to 
fraud and not wanted by the majority of glass makers, 
The second unsatisfactory aspect of the system was the division of 
glass into different categories. Although the intention behind the 
introduction of categories was to reflect the-real differences between 
different types of glass, the divisions introduced by the excise were 
necessarily artificial and frequently proved-incapable of coping with., 
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the infinite variety of glass able to be produced. The simple categories 
introduced by the 1745 Act - "white" and "green" - were soon proved 
inadequate (see below) and the following act of 1777 attempted to make 
the tax more realistic by introducing four categories instead of two. 
In many ways this increased the artificiality of the distinctior6made 
by the excise and amplified the whole problem of how the various types 
of glass were to be defined. Under the 1777 act glass had to fall into 
one of four categories: plate, flint, crown, broad or bottle. Although 
apparently four distinct types of manufacture certain types of glass 
still presented a problem: what was the difference between blown plate 
and german sheet? when did abDttle become a phial? should a wine glass 
made from soda glass be charged as crown or flint glass? These were 
typical of the questions that the Board of Excise had to contend with 
right up to repeal. 
The problems caused by the division of glass into different 
categories were shown up at an early date by an incident concerning broad 
glass, a type of glass that had not been mentioned in the 1745 Act. 
In July 1750 a petition was sent to the Treasury from the proprietors 
W 
of the middle glass house in Newcastle (part of the Newcastle Broad Crown 4 
Glass Company) complaining of the arbitrary and unjust conduct of the 
Excise. 2 According to this petition the excise officers had charged 
broad glass as green glass for the first few years of the tax but in 
1748 had declared it to be white glass and ordered it to pay the higher 
duty. The manufacturers maintained that the colour of the glass was no 
better than what had previously been deemed to be green and they had 
refused to pay the higher duty. However, as tLe Board of Excise had 
commenced a prosecution against them to recover the arrears of duty they 
now appealed to the Treasury to cause the prosecution to be stopped and 
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to fix the rate which the glass in question should pay. As was the usual 
practice the petition was sent tothe Excise Board for its comments. It 
reported back to the Treasury that the glass was certainly of sufficient 
quality to bring it under the higher duty and if the Newcastle manufacturers 
were allowed to pay the lower duty on it then other manufacturers would 
follow suit and the Revenue be diminished. The Treasury appears to have 
sided with the Excise and broad glass was ordered to pay the white glass 
duty unless it was made of common bottle materials and obviously a coarse 
and green glass. Soon after this the Board of Excise began a consultation 
with the manufacturers with a view to bringing in an Act of Parliament 
to fix a "middle duty" of 5s 3d per cwt. (n broad glass. This Act was 
never brought in forp as a Report to the Treasury from the Excise in 
1758 3 explained, the manufacturers suddenly withdrew from the discussions 
having discovered that they could avoid paying anything more than the 
green glass duty by appealIng to the local justices: 
The glass makers in and about Newcastle make a certain species of 
glass which is denominated Broad glass but is greatly superior - 
as good a quality and colour as some crown glass and judged to be 
crown glass by several glass makers and glaziers. We have always 
directed the officers to charge the crown glass duty but the glass 
makers in and about Newcastle always dispute the same laying their 
complaints before the justices to be relieved from the duty of 
crown glass alleging that the Broad glass ought to be charged with 
green glass duty whereupon the justices always determine in their 
favour so that the Traders in those parts are encouraged to continue 
these disputes .... the duty is not payable until six weeks after 
the charge or return is made. The traderstake the opportunity of 
applying to the justices for their warrants to be discharged the 
duty on white glass before it becomes payable, whereby the Revenue 
is deprived of haxing the point determined in the Court of Exchequer. 
This report underlined the Board of Excise*s problem with definition 
for there was no statutory definition of "white glass" that they could 
fall back on to prove that the broad glass made in Newcastle was white. 
They based their case on something that had noýbacking in law, namely 
that the quality of the materials used defined the manufacture. They 
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claimed that the Newcastle manufacturers made use of'Yarmouth sand 
in their broad glass and this was sufficient to make it eligible for 
the higher duty. 
Small white sand is used for white glass and any coarse hard 
sand for bottles and common green glass - such is the sand in 
Newcastle river and that which is dug out of rocks and banks at 
Stourbridge, but Yarmouth-sea sand, which is of a much better 
quality, was never used for bottles or any other coarse green 
glass .... the Newcastle glassmakers have sincenot only persisted 
in improving the quality of their glass by varying the proportions 
of materials from what are used for common bottles but have privately 
made use of Yarmouth sand which the officers have detected therein. 
Unfortunately for the Board the claim that the materials defined the 
manufacture had no backing in law, as the local justices realised. They 
ruled that the materials were in no way relative to -the duty mr were the 
glass makers bound to any proportions by the present law. They would 
not suffer evidence of the materials to be examined "alleging that it 
would be discovering the Mystery of their Art" and would also be dis- 
couraging ingenuity. Their ruling was confirmed by the Attorney Cienerall 
to whom the Board of Excise submitted the case in 1758, who clearly 
stated that "Materials ought not to decide the questiont the glass 
itself when made is the touchstone by which the duty is to be fixed". 
He added that this was not a case which could ever be settled by any 
fixed rule as the law now stood and he recommended laying a middle duty 
on broad glass. 
A middle duty of 5s 3d per cwt. on broad glass was the solution 
adopted by the Board of Excise. It was not to come onto the statutes 
until 1777 but the Board had urged it on the Treasury in 1756 along 
with several other clauses "for better regulating the dutys on glass"; 
these clauses concerned other types of glass such as enamelled, stained 
or paste glass which werehin an ambiguous position not having been 
mentioned in the original act. Why these recommendations were not made 
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law before 1777 is not known. In 1760 the Board of Excise drew the 
Treasury9s attention to them once more but again legislationg was not 
forthcoming. 4 It seems likely however that the measures were introduced 
before 1777 in an informal way through either a Treasury'lor an Excise 
order. As the Excise reminded the Treasury on both occassions the 
measures had been agreed with the manufacturers who were as happy as 
the Board to find a means of putting an end to the "vexatious disputes" 
and if this was so, formal legislation was not perhaps seen as necessarye 
The draft proposals forthe middle duty on broad glass had only 
been drafted after the "principal officer" of the Board had travelled 
down to Newcastle to consult the manufacturers and hear their wishes on 
the matter. The fact that the manufacturers were being allowed the 
opportunity to influence the legislation is not merely evidence of 
the sympathy of the Boatd towards the manufacturers, but evidence that 
the successful operation of the tax depended to quite a large degree 
on the collusion of the manufacturers. This was a point that was to 
underlie the whole subsequent development of the duty. The tax could 
only work if the manufacturers themselves accepted the artificial 
distinctions it made. 
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1777 - 1811 
These years saw the transformation of the excise duty on glass 
from a tax that was relatively straightforward and simple to one of 
the most complicated of all the taxes under the E: xcisets care. That this 
occurred was largely due to the severe financial pressure on the Treasury 
during the yea-s of war. This necessitated substantial rises in the rates 
of duty payable on excised articles and, thanks to the sympathy of the 
government of the day towards manufacturers, these were frequently 
accompanied by additional legislation to ensure that the higher rates 
of dutydid not press too heavily on the manufacture. At the same timep 
as the duty rose so did the incentive to defraud the revenue and this 
necessitated further detailed and often complicated legislation. As a 
result the tax gradually took on the nature of the gross and swollen 
body of vexatious regulations so stigmatised in later years by the 
political economists. However in pointing to the jungle of regulations 
surrounding the glass industry as an example of offensive government 
interference the later critics of the glass duties failed to appreciate 
that in almost every case, the most complicated regulations were those 
adopted for the manufacturerst interests and in many cases were actually 
suggested by the manufacturers themselves. As a general rule it seems 
true to say that the more complicated the particular glass act, the more 
the manufacturers themselves hadhad a hand in framing it. 
That the complicated regulations made their appearance during th-b 
period, the years when Pitt was in power, was no accident. Throughout 
the period Pitt showed himself to be greatly sympathetic to the 
manufacturers' wishes, even to the extent of going directly against the 
advice of the Board of Excise, and the increasing complexity of the 
glass legislation can in many ways be seen as a memorial to this. 
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This period saw substantial alterations in the mode of collecting the 
duties and the regulations surrounding the manufacture, both to 
the manufacturers* advantage. It saw a strong and positive encouragement 
to export and a strengthening of the home manufacturer's position in 
the home market. It would not be exaggerating to say that these changes 
came about largely because of the personal involvement of Pitt " appears 
to have combined a very real understanding of the problems facing a 
manufacturer under an excise with a willingness to experiment with 
methods that might weigh less heavily on the industry. 
(i) The problem of moiles 
The period began with a substantial rise in the rate of duties, 
the first since 1745. This, as Lord North made quite clear in his budget 
speech, was because of the increased demands on the revenue from the 
expenses of the American War. 
5 
Having made out the case for increases, 
in taxes, he then wentcn to state what was the accepted doctrine of 
contemporary taxation: that as a commercial country Great Britian should 
avoid taxes on manufactures; that taxes on articles of daily and 
necessary consumption should also be avoided in order not to press on 
the lower part of the community; that the only fit subjects for taxation 
were property and luxuries. Glass was certainly considered to be a 
luxury, however the view that a tax on glass could be seen as a tax on a 
manufacture was admitted by Lord North and, )in order to give a degree 
of protection to the home industry against foreign manufacturesýhe also 
proposed additional duties on imports, "nearly equal to a prohibition"I 
which would,, "as far as home consumption is concerned give us the whole 
of the market": North also spoke of giving the home glass manufacturer 
a "monopoly" in the home market. 
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Thus a direct link was firmly tstablished between the internal 
excise duties on glass and the customs duties on imported glass. This 
link was never to be broken and indeed was strengthened as the internal 
excise rates increased: prohibitive customs duties, designed to protect 
the home manufacturer and the government's revenue from the home industry, 
were an essential component of the glass excise. 
The rise in duties enacted in 1777 (17 G3 c. 39) was substantial. 
For all types of glass it doubled, as did the customs duties on imported 
glass which were accompanied by severe penalties for smuggling glass. 
Further regulations concerning the export of glass and the gauging of the 
pots were introduced: the export of glass from any quay or river near 
the glass housev provided an excise officer was present, was permitted 
(previously it had onlybeen possibleto export glass through a customs 
house). The gauging of pots was altered to give, for the first timep 
an allowance for wasta3(ý. of glass. The allowance varied according to 
the type of glass being manufactured. Flint glass manufacturers were 
allowed one quarter of the total gauge plus one inch of metal in the 
pot (to allow for the sediment of unworkable glass left at the bot tom, 
of the pot). Window glass manufacturers were allowed one quarter of the 
gauge plus four inches, and bottle manufacturers were allowed one fifth 
plus three inches. 
These allowances met one of the fundamental complaints of the 
manufacturers that they paid duty on gauged metal that was never made up 
into articles. But in order to prevent the possible abuse of the system 
the Act included a clause which was to give even greater cause for 
complaint. This clause, section 33$ was designed to prevent the posgible 
abuse of the gauge by manufacturers who added metal-to the pots after 
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they had been gauged. The section specifically mentioned one of the 
practices it was hoped to put a stop to: "whereas some makers have also 
put in metal or materials into the pot after 
Ot 
gauge of metal therein hath A 
been taken by the officer, under pretence that the same were moyles of 
glass of the present or some former making, by which means the revenue is 
greatly defrauded .... 11. A I'moyle" or I'moile" was the glass that adhered 
to the blowing pipe when it was dipped into the pot to take a gather of 
metal. The time honoured practice had been to let the moiles cool and then 
"crack" them back into the pot leaving the blow pipe clean and the moile to 
be remelted and worked out again. The 1777 Act expressly forbad this 
practice on thegmunds that the new wast__age allowances covered all lossess 
including moiles. Instead of being cracked back into the pot the moiles 
were to be cracked out somewhere separate along with all the other trimmings 
and skimmings, weighed, and charged with duty again. Understandably the 
ruling was seen byall glass manufacturers as extremely unfair, it was in 
effect charging the same metal twice for duty, but to bottle manufacturers 
in particular it posed a more serious threat. According to the bottle 
manufacturers to comply with the ruling on moiles would entail unacceptable 
losses since to make bottles it was necessary to dip the pipe into the pot 
at least three times and the amount of glass lost in moiles was far greater 
than in any other branch of the manufacture. 
6 For other glass manufacturers 
the moiles ruling-appears to have been an inconvenience which they reluc- 
tantly accepted; for the bottle manufacturers it was a more serious matter 
which they*could not, under any circumstances, accept'. 
The bottle manufacturers were encouraged to challenge the Board on 
this ruling by the fact that the issue had arisen before. In 1749 an order 
had been sent out from the Board in London forbidding the cracking of moiles 
and because of remonstrances from the bottlemakers the order had been 
- 336 - 
revoked and the practice admitted to be just. A letter in the Cookson 
papers dated 1765 confirms that at that time it was permitted: the Board 
had informed him that as a crown glass manufacturer he must not return 
waste metal to the pot for it was not permitted "except for the bottle 
makers who are allowed to crack their moiles into the pot from whence 
they were gathered". 
7 
If the manufacturers were in any doubt as to the real meaning of 
the clause then the Boardts intention was quickly made clear. Sir John 
Delaval, for instance, questioned the ruling believing that the Actts 
intention had only been to prevent new materials beingput into the pot. 
But in July 1777 he received an answer from the Board via the supervisor at 
South Shields informing him that the Act included full recompense for all 
loss and damage and that no metal must be returned to the pot without a 
fresh notice in writing to the officer and a fresh gauge taken, and that 
".. the Board insists that you stop cracking the moiles unless proper notice 
be given", and if he did not they would be, "under the disagreeable necessity 
8 
of prosecuting you 11 . 
In November 1777 the bottle manufacturers of Northumberland and Durham 
sent a memorial to the Excise stating the effect the ruling would have on 
them. 9 If they were not allowed to crack in the moiles, they claimed, they 
would be paying 4s 8d duty instead of 3s 6d per cwt., the home price would 
have to rise by 15% and the foreign trade be lost completely. They 
reminded the Excise of the events of 1749 and begged that any attempts to 
stop the practice be put a stop to. They also begged that no suits of 
law would be brought on the issue. The petition was forwarded to John 
Delaval's London lawyerv Oliver Farrer, to present to the Board of Excise. 
This be. did in November by which time a prosecution had indeed been 
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commenced against John Delaval which added some urgency to the 
issue. 
Small infringements of the excise regulations were usually heard before 
the local justices but in matters of importance or indeed when the Board 
wished to remove any doubts about a ruling, the matter was withdrawn from 
the justices and an information filed in the Court of Exchequer. An 
Exchequer prosecution was a far more hazardous process for a manufacturer 
to undergo, it was more costly and the chance of being acquitted or fined 
a nominal penalty considerably less. 
The ruling onwiles affected all bottle manufacturers not just those 
in the north-east and with a view to uniting their efforts, John Wilcox, 
a Bristol bottle manufacturerp wrote to Delavalts agent, George Douglas, in 
November urging co-operation in pressing their M. P. s to bring the matter 
into the House of Commons: 
10 
The trade in Newcastle seem shy in corresponding with us, you may 
inform them that it will befor the general good to unite, any in- 
formation on their proceedings will oblige the trade in Bristol. 
It doesSeem true that the Newcastle manufacturers did not feel the need 
to unite their efforts with others. In reply to a letter from John Delaval 
Middleton Hewitson of the St. Lawrence bottle house said1hat he had not 
corresponded with any London gentlemen on the subject for he felt that their 
own petition met the matter well. 
11 
Delaval had a London contact in 
Benjamin Harrison,, his London agent who at this time managed a small 
bottle house of his own, with whom he certainly exchanged views on the 
subject. Harrison, being in London, was able to provide further information 
particularly on the subject Delaval was most anxious about - his impending 
prosecution. Harrison was in fact rather optimis'tic and wrote in December 
to tell Delaval that he didn2t think the prosecution would take place for 
he had talked with one of the Excise Commissioners who had said that 
because of the loss of the American trade and-its precarious state to the 
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West Indies the revenue would not be benefited by pressing the manufacturers 
too hard. This. proved rather too optimistic for in January 1778 a writ 
was served against Harrison himself for cracking in the moiles. 
It seems to have been the threat of prosecution that acted as a 
catalyst in bringing the glass manufacturers together nationally to challenge 
the Excise as one, united trade. At the end of January it was agreed that 
one manufacturer should be put forward as a representative to stand trial 
on behalf of the whole trade and the manufacturer chosen was Isaac Cookson. 
At the same time ef forts would be made to bring pressure on the Board at 
a higher level. George Douglasq who had gone up to London to persuade the 
Board to cease the prosecution, wrote to Delaval on these matters in 
January: 
12 
Mr. Cookson*s name is given to the Solicitor of Excise to be the 
person who will stand trial on behalf of allihe proprietors in this 
country. I have informed the Bristol people whom Farrer also works 
on behalf of. Hewitson says that if you and Sir Matthew White Ridley 
and the member for Bristol would speak to Lord North about the 
impropriety of the Excise's conduct he would put a stop to the 
prosecution. 
Cookson9s trial never took place. By April the issue appeared to have 
been dropped and Cookson felt able to return completely to the north. The 
reason for this, it later appeareds was that at the request of the manu- 
facturers three of the Commissioners of Excise had personally attended at 
a bottle house in Gravel Lane in Southwark where, on inspecting and 
examining the process of manufacture, they became convinced that the manu- 
facturers' case was indeed a just one. Whether this was the entire 
truth of the_matter or whether their change of mind, was also due to some 
pressure from above is not known. However in view of the later stubbornness 
of the Board over exactly the same issue it would not, seem unlikely that 
pressure from the Treasury or other parts of the government had been 
brought to bear. For the moment the issue was dropped and the bottle 
- 339 - 
manufacturers continued to crack in the moiles as usual. 
The issue of the moiles remained in the Excise's view as one of 
waste allowances and this was anaspect of the legislation that it became 
increasingly concerned with after the Act of 1777. The allowances made 
in that Act seem invany ways to have been rough estimate and the Board 
was therefore anxious to reassure itself that the allowances were not over- 
generous. Its-. most tricky problem in this respect was the waste allowance 
granted to the newly established British Plate Glass Company at Ravenhead. 
(The problems of this company were unique and highly complicated butý 
briefly, various 
-allowances were 
tried culminating in an act of 1787 which 
fixed its waste allowance at 5076 of the total gauge, although the company 
insisted that its waste was nearer(M. ) In 1787 the Board embarked on 
an effort to gather information about the loss in the more conventional 
branches of the industry and wrote to its various officers around the 
country bidding them enquire what the "actual waste or unavoidable loss" 
amounted to in various glass houses. 
The Newcastle officers Marmaduke Clark, was directed to enquire among 
the broad glass makers. He found that in both Sir Matthew White Ridley's 
house and George Lake's house the allowances provided by law were about 
right; one house wasting slightly more, the other slightly less than the 
statutory allowance. The proprietors themselves were well satisfied. 
The Supervisor at Bristoll Charles, Johnsoný was directed to enquire amonst 
the bottle manufacturers and his report once more threw' doubt on the 
practice ofcra&ing in the moiles. The implication of his report was that 
cracking in the moiles was not a universal practice and those manufacturers 
who kept their metal clean did not do it: 
13 
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"That which is complained of as a grievance then seems to be no 
more than this - the manufacturers in particular places 
(for such 
as have good metal have no reason to complain) finding themselves 
obliged to skim the pots frequently in the journey either by reason 
of the badness of the metal or a foulness caused by returning the 
moiles to the pot (which is a practice very unfavourable to the 
making of good bottles) waste the metal which ought to be made into 
goods, which is an evident loss to the manufacturers, but it is their 
opinion (the officers') that this loss would always be prevented if 
good metal were made". 
From all the other evidence available, (including the fact that the 1777 
campaign to reverse the moiles ruling had been joined by most if not all 
of the English bottlemakers), it seems highly unlikely that there were 
bottle manufacturers who managed to make bottles without cracking in the 
moiles, but this was the argument that the Board adopted. In July 1793 
an order was sent out to all officers once more forbidding bottle makers 
to crack in the moiles. In a report to the Treasury the Excise justified 
its action in that ".. the practice was not universal and as we thought 
it not general thought it our duty to suppress it ". Inevitably it soon 
brought a case in the Exchequer on the issue where to the alarm of the 
bottle manufacturers, verdict was found against the defendants. Action 
by the manufacturers was once again called for. 
(ii) The bottle manufacturers* lobby 
The story of the bottle manufacturers' lobby in the 1790s firstly 
to alter the order on moiles, and subsequently to alter the whole mode of 
assessing the duty, is an interesting one illustrating the channels through 
which manufacturers were enabled to protect their interests. It also 
contains an interesting illustration of the relationship between the ' 
Treasury and the Board of Excise, how the Board in, reality held very little 
power and that when stood against an interest that could enlist support 
from the government$ it was the loser. If one thing. does emerge as the 
most significant aspect of the whole episode, it is the -'informality of the 
way the manufacturers approached the government. ThLs was certainly a case 
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where personal influence and personal contact were all important and 
it is partly because of this that the north-east manufacturers seem to 
have played such an in+luentlAl role. The mediation of the north east 
M. P. s, Delaval and Ridley, was all important and it was through them that 
manufacturers such as Isaac Cookson were enabled to bring their message 
right to the heart of the government. 
Almost as soon as the order on moiles had been received, the north- 
east manufacturers wrote in a body to Delaval asking him once more to act 
on their behalft a request to which he obvicusly agreed. His lawyer 
Farrer was once more brought in and, following the usual methodsl a memorial 
was sent to the Board of Excise in August 1793.14 This proved fruitless aid 
15 
was followed, in September, by a petition to the Treasury. 
The September petition was far more impressive than any of the 1777 
memorialss largely because it was signed by a deputation acting on behalf 
of the whole English tradeq a clear indication that right from the beginning 
the manufacturers had determined to act in concert. The deputation 
consisted of Francis Blackett (Cookson's partner at South Shields), William 
Carr of the Ayres Quay Company at Sunderland, and Cornelius Pry of Bristol, 
(later they would be joined by ArchibQld Geddes representing the bottle 
manufacturers of Scotland). Besides this the petition also gave a firm 
indication that the manufacturers intended to act on their own accord 
to protect their interests, despite the Excise's ruling: 
Your petitioners have determined as soon as may be possible after 
the meeting of the next session of Parliament to apply for and 
obtain an Act of Parliament whereby the bottle manufactory in 
England may be put under such r'egulations as will enable your 
petiiioners to continue the same and secure to His Majesty the 
revenue arising thereon. 
The manufacturers once more stated their case and the consequences of 
what would happen if the moiles were not allowed to be cracked in, which 
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was that the manufacture would cease entirely in England. They also 
prayed that the Treasury would protect them against prosecutions by the 
Excise until they could bring in their Act of Parliament. 
This Petition was naturally passed on to the Excise for comment and 
its report back to the Treasury restated its firm conviction that the 
practice should not be allowed. According to its own officers the moiles 
I 
never mounted to more than -g of the pot, the legal allowancet and it pointed 
out that cracking in the moiles was not allowed to other glass manufacturers. 
Above all it insisted that cracking in the moiles led to terrible frauds 
on the revenue which were estimated as amounting to 207o of the total 
revenue from bottles. 
Having thus failed to move the excise through the conventionalo more 
formal, channels the manufacturers were forced to resort to a higher author- 
ity and set about reversing the order by Act of Parliament. It was certainly 
with a view to this that Cooksono accompanied by Oliver Farrerl went to see 
Pitt in November 1793. In February of the following year Delaval himself 
had a meeting with Pitt and in March a further and important meeting was 
held between Pitt, Cookson and Mr. Cholmondly, a secretary to the Treasury. 
At this meeting Cookson was evidently given an assurance that the manu- 
facturers* grievances would be attended to and he was advised to petition 
the Treasury once more setting forth the results of an "experiment" he 
had made at his bottle house. This was duly done but in June Cookson 
wrote to Pitt once more complaining that not only had no reply been received 
to his petition but also that the Board had filed an information against 
him in the Exchequer. In this letter Cookson saw the basic cause of the 
quarrel between the Board and the manufacturers as the Boardts lack of 
knowledge of the industry, and he contrasted the English Board with its 
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Scottish counterparts who continued to allow the moiles to be cracked in: 
16 
The Scotch Commissioners live on the spot where the manufacture 
is carried on in an extensive manner and well knowlthe injustice 
of such an order. I should think this alone was sufficient grounds 
to test the matter on ..... There used to be a Surveyor General 
of glass, perhaps a fixed one was found unnecessary); et if a 
person were appointed to inquire into this business of the moiles 
it would be attended with the best effects. Anythingwb*Lch manufact- 
urers have to advance are seldom credited and any plans coming from 
them for a better modeof ascertaining the duties are generally suspect. 
Quite apart from being a pertinent comment on the relationship between 
the Board and the manufacturers, this last sentence is interesting as the 
first mention of a change in the mode of ascertaining the duties. At some 
time during 1794 the bottlemakers9 campaign to reverse the ruling on moiles 
developed into a campaign to completely alter the method of charging it bý C"rx) 
on the weight of manufactured goods not, as hitherto, on the weight of the 
materials gauged in the pot before manufacture. Exactly who conceived this 
plan is not known-, however there is a strong possibility that it came from 
the north-east manufacturers. If not actually suggested by Cookson (perhaps 
his "experiment" had something to do with it)., it was certainly brought 
forward and probably encouraged by Cooksonts meeting with Pitt and the 
assurances he had received there. 
The first formal suggestion of the new method came in a memorial to 
the Treasury of July 1794-from, not the whole English trade, but just the 
manufacturers of Northumberland and Durham. 
17 
Essentially this memorial 
submitted a proposal that if implemented would, in the manufacturerst 
opinion , provide the! Excise with sufficient checks to ensure that new 
glass was not being added to the pots under the pretence of being moiles. 
The manufacturers-proposed that the manufactured goods should be weighed 
after annealing and this would act as a check on the gauge. Any goods 
weighing more than the net gauge would be charged excess duty at a high 
rate and if the weight was less then the manufacturers would receive no 
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reduction or abatement on the original duty charged. To ensure that the 
check was not falsified by the removal of goods from the annealing oven 
the manufacturers proposed that they be locked with iron gratings and 
onlycpened when the officer was present. 
The memorial was sent to the Board of Excise which, perhaps inevitably2 
rejected the proposals as not being sufficiently secure against fraud and 
being too expensive. The Board admitted that waste did occur in the process 
of manufacture but maintained that the manufacturer. 4 proposals would enable 
goods to be removed before being weighed. The Board was also alarmed at 
the prospect of the whole security of the system being lodged in the hands 
of one weighing officer "and him of an inferior rank" whereas now there 
were various checks from the various accounts of different officers. The 
Board's rejection of the manufacturerst plan was a mistake in that it achieved 
the opposite effect to that which .' had been intended. Not only 
did the 
manufacturers go on to realise their proposals in an Act of Parliament but 
they did so without any further consultation with the Board at all. The 
discouraging report to the Treasury appears to have been the last time the 
Board had any say in the matter, from then onwards the manufacturers'. -and 
the Treasury dealt. with each other directly. It is quite clear that the 
Board of Excise had seriously misjudged the situation, both in the real 
danger which its order threatened tothe manufacturers, and the manufacturerst 
own determination to protect their interests. As a result the Board was 
to suffer a loss of face in seeing its advice deliberately ignored by 
the Treasury, and the manufacturers were to gain far more than they had 
originally intended. 
According to evidence given to the 1835 Commission: 
The mode of taking the duty on bottle glass in the annealing oven 
was established by Mr. Pitt in opposition to the Excise ... It was 
suggested by the manufacturer3and was established by Mr. Pitt on 
the report of two men who were sent to the manufacturers for this 
purpose. 
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Who the two men were and what exactly they reported has not yet been 
discovered, but that the Bill was drafted by Gearge Rosev the secretary 
to the Treasury, under Pittts direction,, is absolutely certain. Judging 
from the number of papers concerning the British Plate Glass Company in 
the Chatham papers it would seem that Pitt had already interested himself 
in the glass trade. The Company was of course a prestigious undertaking 
and one which affected commercial competition with France, his concern for 
that is immediately understandable. His concern for the bottle trade is 
also perhaps understandable. The manufacturers had given clear indications 
that if they were not listened to then the manufacture-. would cease in this 
country altogether. Besides this, the well being of the bottle trade affected 
the revenue of the country in another way since it had a direct relation- 
ship with the wine and spirit trade. The Excise had offered nothing more 
than conjecture as arguments against the manufactureW proposals and Pitt 
had evidently decided that this was a case where the manufacturerst wishes 
could be met with adequate safety to the revenue. 
The eventual Act of 1795 (35 G3 c. 114) gave the manufacturers far 
more than they had asked for in the memorial of 1794. There they had 
proposed that the manufactured goods be weighed as a check on the gauge. 
The Act provided that the duty was to be assessed entirely on the weight 
of the manufactured goods and the gauge was to be completely dispensed with. 
That this further development was also suggested by the manufacturers 
there seems little doubt. From the manufacturerst point of view it was 
far better to postpone the moment when the duty was taken to as late as 
possible in the manufacturing process. - 
The Board of Excise does not appear to have been consulted over the 
drafting of the Act and there seems little doubt that it did not approve 
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of the change. Throughout the winter of 1794, 'in despite of the impending 
Act, it continued to prosecute the manufacturers vigorously for cracking 
in the moiles. Most manufacturers had evidently continued to crack in the 
moiles: Delaval in fact had ordered his men to do so in August 1793 after 
only a month's trial of not cracking them in. Besides the question of loss.,. 
not to crack them in disrupted the work inmny other ways: such as reducing 
the amount of overwork the blowers expected to be able to do. In July 
John Sime the bottleworks" maQ'ger, had written to Delaval on this subject 
saying that the men were upset because cracking out the moiles meant there 
was not enough left in the pot for the men to work over their basic rate 
of 62 dozen. He had tried to remedy this by giving them small sized bottles 
to make but feared this could not continue indefinitely. 
Delaval was not the exception in ordering that the cracking in continue 
for informations were filed against vatious other manufacturers for the 
offence. 
18 
Most were heard before the local justices and the fineswere 
minimal; Cookson, for instance, was fined one guinea and Fenwick of Sunderland 
five guineas. In October 1794 however an information laid against the Ayres 
Quay proprera'ý'tors was withdrawn from the justices to be entered in the 
Exchequer. This was followed in January 1795 by strict orders issued 
by the Board to the supervising officers not to allow the moiles to be 
cracked in. In view of the pending Bill, all this activity on the Excise's 
part appears to be nothing more than vindictiveness. The manufacturers 
were certainly at a loss to see any reason for it*., "the matter is now 
becoming more curious than ever. " wrote John Crooks to Delaval in February 
1795 telling him of another prosecution "all lot most of the bottle houses 
in the neighbourhood have been prosecuted and some of them two or three 
times over and some, I believe, ar Ie in the Exchequer ". 
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By May 1795 the negotiations between the Treasury and the manufact- 
urers had been completed and Pitt had gathered sufficient information to 
convince him that a trial of the new method was feasible. A letter to 
George Rose from the English and Scottish Bottle Manufacturerst Committee 
exPressed joy at his decision and the firm belief that the new mode was 
the best that could possibly be devised for securing the revenue and would 
also prove to be the salvation of the bottlemakers. Such was their con- 
fidence in the new mode that t he bottle manufacturers declared: 
19 
so* if the trial does not succeed we will cheerfully submit to 
any other plan the government may think fit to adopt but will also, 
by any additional tax make up any deficiency that may arise from 
such a trial; as we wish not on any account to lessen the revenue. 
Later they nearly had cause to regret this promise. A draft of the new 
Act was sent to the manufacturers, via Delaval, and it was introduced into 
the House by George Rose on June 10th. Its passage was swift and it passed 
its third reading on the 18th. 
The greater part of the Act concerned further regulations to, prevent 
fraud: giving the officers extensive, powers of search, empowering them to 
unstop pots to gauge at will. and enacting heavy penalties even for stirring 
the fire to raise smoke whilst the officer was examinining the pots. The 
bottle regulations were contained in sections 7- 15. Under them a manu- 
facturer could give notice that he desired the duty to be charged on the 
manufactured goods rather than the gauge in which case he was required to 
erect an annealing oven of a certain specified construction with only 
one mouth to which the officer would have the key. The manufacturer had 
to provide iron gratings, locks and keys and accurate scales and weights at 
his own expense. The procedure of charging the duty involved a declaration 
given by the manufacturer before the metal was worked of the number of 
bottles he expected to make and if the final tally of manufactured bottles 
varied by more than 5% a heavy penalty was incurred. The duty was charged 
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on the weight of the manufactured bottles which were weighed by the officer 
with the help of the bottlehouse servants, and then checked by a re-weighing 
from another officer. It appeared to be a highly complicated system, in- 
volving rany notices to be given to the df icers in writing 'and many penalties 
and fines for even a slight departure from the set procedure. It also 
involved the manufacturer in considerable expense. Despite this, even 
though the manufacturers were given a choice whether they adopted the new 
method or not, the switch to the new system appears to have been universal 
and immediate which underlines the attractiveness of the new system to the 
bottle manufacturers. At Delaval*s Hartley works the alterations took 
nearly a month to complete but by the end of August John Crooks was able 
to inform his employer that they were able to make the declaration that 
they wished the duties to be charged on the manufactured goods. 
The establishment of this method of charging the glass duties was an 
event of immense importance not just for the bottle manufacturers but fbr 
the subsequent development of the excise on glass on a whole. The 1795 Act 
could clearly be seen as a triumph for the manufacturers, they had directly 
opposed the Excisets order and had ended up with benefits that far exceeded 
the limited ones they had originally asked for. 
The lessons of the episode were not lost onother glass manufacturers 
and the establishment of the charge on manufactured goods for bottles 
heralded the beginning of campaigns to change the method in similar fashion 
for other, types of glass. In every case the manufacturers encountered 
bitter opposition from the Board of Excise, its main objection always being 
that the system was conducive to fraud since the manufacturer could either 
remove goods from the annealing oven or bribe the weighing officer. That 
certain manufacturers did defraud the revenue is undeniable, frauds had 
certainly taken place, however it is impossible not to remark on the fact 
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that whenever the Board of Excise disapproved of a measure it always 
justified its disapproval by the claim that fraud would thereby be en- 
couraged; fraud was a convenient reason and'one which was used frequently, 
even indiscriminatingly, by the Board. In the case of bottles, the measures 
suggested by the north-east manufacturers in 1794, of having the weight 
of the manufactured bottles act as a check on the gauge, would have provided 
more checks than the existing system and yet the Board rejected it on the 
grounds that it was not secure enough. It-was not the Board of Excise's 
task to initiate change, it was entirely concerned with managing the system 
and therefore a bias towards the existing system was to a certain extent 
inevitable. Nevertheless its suspicion when presented with a reasonable 
case for change does not reflect particularly well on its capacity to assess 
a situation. The fault however was perhaps not so much the Board's intrinsic 
inertia but, as Cookson had pointed out, its lack of accurate information 
about the industry it was regulating. The Board acted on the information 
provided by its officers and this was not perhaps always reliable as might 
be desired. 
The measure introduced by the 1795 Act were a trial. covering a 
limited period only. At the end of five years the*argument about whether 
the new method encouraged fraud or not was rejoined. Unfortunately for 
the manufacturers the Excise could now fuel its argumentv since the figures 
for the bottle revenue after 1795 showed a distinct decline "which" as 
George Rose wrote to Rowland Burdon (the M. P, for Sunderland)v "is not 
an encouragement far the continuanc. e- -, of 
the measure". 
20 
1794 £489874 17s 1P- 
, zd 1795 £479614 9s 8ýA 
1796 £479417 15s V. Lýgd 
1797 £469138 12s 415d 
1798 £339314 Os 2d 
1799 £403050 18s 712, d 
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He reminded Burdon of the manufacturers* pledge that if the measure was 
adopted the revenue should not be .-. decreased. Even allowing 
for 
the decrease in imports of wine this had not appeared to be the case. 
The letter, was sent on to Delaval whose comment,, presumably echoed by 
the other manufacturers., was that "the revenue had not thereby been decreased 
but from other causes"namely the depression in trade caused by war. 
Francis Blackett and William Carr were despatched down to London to press 
the manufacturersO case that the Act be renewed, in which they were helped 
once more by the north-east M. P. s. Their efforts met with success and in 
April Rowland Burdon wrote to Cookson 
21 informing him that he had the 
repeated assurance of both Mr. Rose and Mr. Jackson that Pitt had made 
up his mind to renew the Act "for one year at least". This was done and 
the Act subsequently renewed for an indefinite period, 
The firm establisment of the method of charging the duty on the 
ranufactured bottles was the signal for other branches of the glass industry, 
the cnown and flint manufacturers, to commence campaigning for the same 
method to be applied to their own particular branches. Before considering 
these campaigns another important development in the Excise, along with 
the further rises in the rates of duties, that occurred during this period, 
should be considered. 
(iii) Pi tt and the bounty 
The alteration of the method of charging the duty on bottles was the 
most dramatic alteration in the excise on glass during this period, and 
certainly the one in which the manufacturers had the largest say. But A 
was equalled in importance by. another development which was to have an 
equally far-reaching effect on both the industry and the subsequent develop- 
ment of the tax. This was the addition of an extra sumo or "bounty" to 
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the drawback of duty received when glass was exported. This addition 
seems to have been introduced largely on Pitt9s personal initiative 
without too much prompting from the manufacturers or much consultation 
with the Board of Excise. It certainly attracted mne of the argument which 
had surrounded the question of moiles. 
Until 1787 the drawback had always been paid at exactly the same -rate 
cwt. for cwt. as the duty had been paid. This, as a petition of 1777 
22 
indicatesp had always been a source of some grievance to the manufacturers: 
But by the present Act we are only allowed !ý lb. or I penny per 
lb. whereas the duty is charged on a much grFater quantity than 
can be exported there being great was tage and breakage in packing, 
weighing and carriage to the place for_export. The duty on crown 
glass particularly as charged is 40s. on 200 lbs., being exported 
will draw back but 16s 8d. 
Whilst the duty remained low this loss was slight and could be absorbed 
by the manufacturer. But2 as the petiltion pointed out, the rise in the duty 
meant that some of thisloss had to be passed on to the foreign consumers 
The manufacturers were only concerned with keeping the'. prices low in the 
foreign market and not allowing the internal duty to affect the prices 
abroad; 
" 
this risev the petition maintained,, would have to be passed 
on to the foreign consumers which would not encourage them to buy and 
would encourage people in America and the colonies to erect glass houses 
oftheir own. In order to prevent this it was necessary to make allowances 
for all the glass on which duty had been paid but which was lost in making 
the glass fit for export. Besides the loss in breakage, the point the 
crown glass manufacturers were most concerned about was the loss they 
sustained in cutiing'the circular tables into square panes. 
Pitt was plainly aware of this argument and when, in 1787 (27 G3 c28) 
he imposed heav y countervailing-duties on French. glass imported into 
England he also made several additions to the various drawbacks on home 
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manufactured glass which in all cases raised them slightly above the 
duties. In the case of bottles and broad glass the difference was only 
slight but for crown, German sheet, flint and plate it was more substantial 
and was further increased on these latter types in 1794 '(34 G3 c. 27). 
This Act made additions to the duties but the additions to the drawbacks 
were even larger. The duty on flint glass, for instance was increased by 
10s 8d, the drawback by 14s 6d. On crown and German sheet the duty was 
increased by 8s, the drawback by 9s lld, thus leaving a substantial 
bounty on the export of these higher qualities of glass. In adding a 
bounty to the drawback Pitt was doubtless acting on his conviction that 
foreign trade was an essential patt of Britiants prosperity and therefore 
should be encouraged. The Board of, Excise was less happy with the bounty 
and the issue was to prove one of the most strongly contested between the 
manufacturers and the Board in years to come. Whilst Pitt remained in 
power though the bounty remained unchallenged. In 1805 when the duties 
were increased by 507c, the drawbacks were also increased by 5076 leavingp 
to the Board of Excise2s alarm, a substantial difference between the duty 
that was paid into the revenue and the s um that was taken out by the 
manufacturer on the export of his goods. 
Despite Pitt2s, and indeed Lord Northt*sv reluctance to burden home 
industry with further. taxation, the expense of the war years necessitated 
several rises in the rates of duty during this period.. Lord North made 
three small additions with his three 5% increases on all excised articles 
in 1779 (19 GI c. 25),,, 1781 (ZI G3 c. 17),, and 1782 (22 G3 c. 66). These 
made permanent by Pitt in 1787 (27 G3 c. 13) bringing the levels to 21s 512, d 
per cwt. for flint or plate glass, 16s, 11-4d for crown or German sheet., 
8s 02-d for broad glass and 4s 04-d for. bottles or vessels made from bottle 
metal. Pittts additions of 1794 only affected flint, plate and the better 
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window glass, articles which in his budget speech, he said, "might fairly 
be considered as mere articles of luxury". Pitt upheld the view that a 
distinction between glass the luxury and glass the necessity should be 
made, and this is confirmed by a plan in the Chatham papers for a proposed 
tax on glassitems that were indisputably luxuries; 
23 
chandeliersq girandolesl 
chimney glasses, pier glasses etc. Each house or assembly room,., would pay 
according to the number of items of this sort it possessed, on a sliding 
scale based on class from "nobility in general" down to "shopkeepers and 
farmers". The arguments for the tax put forward in the plan were that it 
wouldnOt affect the poor and that each man would pay according to his means. 
The tax does not appear to have got beyond this planning stage which is 
perhaps a pity as it might possibly have relieved some of the burden of tax- 
ation on the other types of glass. 
Small additions were made to the duties in 1803 (43 G3 c. 69) which 
nullified the slight bounty on the drawback for broad glass and bottles. 
This was followed by a substantial rise in the 1805 (45 G3 c. 30) when the 
duty on all types of glass except bottles was increased by 5076. Pitt's 
original Budget proposals had not included this rise in the glass tax) but 
it was forced upon him following the rejection by the House of his original 
proposals. The rejection of the proposed tax on horses used. in husbandry 
and the alteration of the Salt duties left him in the difficult position 
of finding a revenue source to provide Z405,000 at short notice. The 
only solution was to make additions to existing duties including glass 
which would provide Z80,000 of the(: hficit. The rise included broad glass 
which had been left untouched in 1794 but it did exclude bottles which 
remained at their old rate. Presumably Pitt was taking into account the 
difficulties. being experienced by both the wine trade and the bottle 
trade during the long years of war. 
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(iv)- The duty on the manufactured goods 
Once the bottle manufacturers had succeeded in establishing a new 
method of assessing the duties, it was inevitable that the other manu- 
facturers would follow their example. Although the ruling on moiles had 
not affected the other branches so severely, there was still considerable 
loss to the manufacturer from the loss of metal, on which duty had been 
paid, during the process of manufacture; a loss which of course increased 
as the duties rose. The first instance of other manufacturers asking for 
the new system was the British Plate Glass Company wh)chj in a memorial to 
the Treasury of 1796,24 asked for an increased waste allowance or to have 
the duty charged "on the actual weight of the saleable goods in the scale 
in the same manner as now practised with the glass bottle manufacturers, 
'. I 
. 
Concerted pressure from the other manufacturers did not start however 
until the 1800s by which time the method was firmly established. 
The first to apply were the flint glass manufacturers who, early in 
1803., petitioned the Treasury on the subject of altering the mode of duty 
on flint glass. 
25 
Right from the start the flint glass manufacturers appear 
to have acted as a united trade and not as individual firms. The Board of 
Excise's report on the petition was unfavourable with the result that a 
meeting was held between Mr. 'Vansittart of the Treasury, Mr. Jackson -a 
Commissioner of Excise, and a deputation from the manufacturers. A this 
meeting Mr. Jackson put forward the Boardts main objection to the proposals 
which were answered by the manufacturers in a further memorial to the 
Treasury sent in December 1803. 
The Board*s objections were. more or less identical to its objectionS 
to the bottle manufacturers in 1794; all based'around the firm conviction 
that the new system would encourage fraud. It pointed out that the whole 
charge would rest on one, easily corruptible, weighing officer and that 
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the manufacturer could remove goods, from the annealing lear (or the tunnel 
through which flint glass goods were drawn in order to cool them gradually 
and uniformly thereby avoiding stresses in the glass). The manufacturers 
attempted to meet these objections. As for the bribing of officers; "the 
committee does not presume to contradict the experience of the Board of 
Excise respecting the probity of their own officers" but they pointed out 
that a corruptible officer was just as likely to work against the manufact- 
urer's interests - by fabricating prosecutions in order to share in the 
penalty - as for his interests. To guard against any possibility of 
collusion they proposed there be two weighing officers, each acting as a 
check on the other. As for the possibilityýof removing goods, the manu- 
facturers submitted a complicated plan of locked lears and weighing rooms, 
and the constant presence of an officer "so that no jealousy can rationally 
exist on the part of the Excise as to the correctness of the charge of 
duty". To meet the expense of all this they proposed that the annual 
licence fee of ZIO paid by each glass house be increased to ZIOO "which 
would furnish a handsome increase in salary to two officers and enable 
the government to select men of superior situation and sterling character". 
The trade offered to supply detailed plans of the proposed lears and 
weighing rooms and the memorial ended by emphasing the mutual benefits 
of the plan. The manufacturer would be benefitecl- by only paying duty on 
the glass brought to perfect manufacture and by being lefý at liberty to 
experiment and improve on the liquid metAl in the pot. The revenue would 
be benefited "to the extent of the extent of the existing frauds and by 
allowing the bounty on export precisely the same as the duty has been 
paid. " These two benefits to the revenue were, as the manufacturers were 
probably well awaregmatters on which the Excise and the Treasury were 
becoming increasingly concerned. 
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The memorial was sent to the Board of Excise which took two and a 
half years to report ! back on -it. When it eventually did, in 1806, it WCXS 
I 
clear that the delay had not been occasioned by the further gathering of 
information. The Report was a curt restatement of the Boardts convictions: 
the proposed mode of ascertaining the duty was highly objectionable and 
neither to the advantage-of the revenue nor the generality of flint glass 
manufacturers. To deter taking the account until the end of the manufacture 
would furnish numerous opportunities for fraud and neither the mode proposed 
by the manufacturers, of the constant attendance of two or more officers 
to weigh the goodsnor the increase in licence fee would-serve as an 
effective check nor would it answer the enormous expense. 
As with the rejection of the bottle manufacturers$ proposals, the. 
stubborn opposition of the Exdise Board to a change in' the system can be 
seen as slightly surprising. One might have expected the Board to welcome 
a system that, on the face of itv offered more measures to prevent fraud 
and which did away with all the uncertainty over waste allowances. The 
existing systemv as the Board itself admitted, was far from secure against 
frauds. Indeed Richard Russellý a London flint glass manufacturer, claimed 
in a memorial sent to the Treasury in 1806, that frauds in the industry 
26 
'being, amounted to MOOpOOO a year. He described the*notorious ones as 0 
glass added to the pots after they were gauged - including moiles which 
they were supposed to crack out, whole pots being worked into goods unknown 
to the officers and then refilled with metaL. pots being switched round so 
that pots of large dimension were replaced by pots. of smaller capacity. 
Russell considered that he lost heavily from the competition of those 
fraudulent manufacturers who evaded the duty, so he proposed a draconian 
system whereby mor, e or less everything, including the, pot lofts and mixing 
rooms)were under lock and key-and an officerts presence was necessary for 
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every operation. Fortunately for the rest of the trade the Board did 
I 
not find his system attractive. It admitted that the practices he listed 
did take place but not to the extent that he claimed. His plan they 
dismissed as too expensive and too oppressive to the fair trader. 
The Boardlýs own method of putting a stop to these frauds was to 
encourage the vigilance of the officers and prosecute offenders vigorousiy 
in the Exchequer. The increase in Exchequer prosecutions did in fact add 
urgency to the manufacturers* casefor an alteration since, although the manu- 
facturer was prosecutedit was frequently the workman who had committed 
the offence: 
27- 
Prosecutions were instituted against several respectable glass 
manufacturers who were charged with penalties to-the amount of 
nearly seven hundred pounds on the evidence of discarded servants 
of profligate and abandoned character, who, for the base. purposes 
of revenge and for the sake of sharing the Penalties,, hadthemsleves 
committed, unknown to their masters, the very offences charged in the 
informations. And in illustrationod the dreadful effetts of the 
system of Gauge it may be observed that a single workman can in 
One Hour commit offences which would subject his master to the 
payment of penaltiesto the amount of five thousand pounds. 
Besides. frauds, the. manufacturers had also claimed in their memorial 
that the revenue would be benefited by allowing the drawback on export to 
be paid at exactly the same rate as the duty was paid; in other words 
to do may with the bounty. This too was an issue over which the Board was 
uneasy, particularly following the 5076 rise of 1805 which had left a sub- 
stantial difference between the duty paid and the drawback claimed - in the 
case of flint glass 16s 3d per cwt. It seems highly likely that the 
prospect of a reduced drawback was one of the most important factors that 
persuaded the Board into a change of opinion over the flint glass duties. 
28 This was expressed in a further Report to the Treasury of June 1810. 
This report is still basically opposed to the manufacturers* proposals 
but does grudgingly admit that provided certain conditions-are met "an 
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experiment might be made of this proposed mode for a limited time". In 
this case the Excise too had perhaps learnt a lesson from the bottle 
manufacturers' campaign and was ensuring that this time it would at 
least have some say in the final outcome. Had the Excise continued to 
oppose the flint glass manufacturers then it seems likely that they, like 
the bottle manufacturers, would'have. gone on to seek an Act of Parliament 
on their own-account without the Board*s approval. The 1810 report gives 
the impression of being far better informedthan the- previous report 
and was ostensibly made after extensive enquiry among the Board*s officers 
well acquainted with the survey on glass. It still maintained that the 
new system would encourage fraud but that this might be averted by the 
proposed method of locking the lears and the weighing rooms. It also 
maintained that the manufacturers would find themselves greatly incon- 
venienced by the new system, but if that was what they wanted the Board 
could not be blamea' for it. Finally there was the question of the 
bounty: 
I'Many officers are of the opinion that the amount of duty will-be 
considerably lessened and therefore we think it necessary to lower 
the drawback to the rate of duty ... instead of paying a higher 
drawback as the-excise now does. " 
Despite the grudging'tone of the report it was an approval and the 
manufacturers proposals were incorporated into a Bill which became law 
in 1811 (51 G3 c. 69). This was one of the longest and most complicated 
of all the acts concerning glass and-certainly bears out the theory that 
the more complicated'the Act the more in the manufacturer0s interests 
it was. Regulations covered the construction of*the, lear, the method of 
pulling the goods through it, the construction of the weighing and re- 
weighing roomsv the locking of the rooms and the methods of weighing the 
goods. - All the alterations were to be done at the manufacturer's expense 
and he was bound by law to keep the new equipment in good, repair-ab his own 
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expense. The officers were given extensive powers of search and the fines 
and penalties were considerable, ranging from Z200 for obstructing an 
officer in hiss-earch., to E500 for removing goods before they were weighed 
or even for not renewing the yearly licence. This rose, as the manufacturers 
had suggested,, to E100, but instead of being a licence on the glass house 
it became a licence on the lear, thus if a manufacturer had two lears he 
had to buy two licences. The Act, which commenced on the Ist August 1811, 
only covered a trial period of one year. Despite this and despite the 
considerable expense to which the manufacturer was put, like the bottle 
manufacturersp the switch to the new method seems to have been immediate 
and universal. 
Between the time the flint glass manufacturers first proposed an 
alteration in the duty and their success in seeing it established in law, 
the method of charging the duty on crown glass had been altered in similar 
fashion to charging the duty on the manufactured goods. Unlike the other 
two branches of the industry, this did not come about as a result of 
united action but the isolated action of one crown glass manufacturer, 
James Dixon of Dumbarton. 
29 In January 1807 the Commissioners of Excise 
for Scotland were forced to take Dixon to court for refusing to pay the 
glass duty. His refusal was a protest against the unfairness of the gauge 
system which, particularly because it made no allowance for the contraction 
of the pots when they were heated, resulted in his, being overcharged; the 
most widely used gauge system was the "dry dip" which calculated the duty 
by measuring the total capacity of the pot when cool, plus, the dry inches 
at the top of the'pot when the dry materials were first put in. To 
Dixon's delight the Solicitor General of Scotland instituted a full 
investigation into the complaint of over charging and found that 157, 
unavoidable shrinkage and contraction did in fact occur in the pots and 
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. that therefore "the existence of overcharging being proved, a verdict 
must go to the defendant notwithstanding the prevelance of the system 
r 
of charge". This result * lef V the, Scottish excise commissioners with two 
alternatives: they could- either -introduce a "wet dip" oi gauging the red hot 
molten metal v which was not only harmful to the glass 
but highly danger- 
ous, or they could make -the charge on the manufactured goods and it was 
the latter method that they decided to adopt. 
Immediately the charge on manufactured crown glass was introduced in 
Scotland, the English Board was petitioned, firstly by Joshua Bower a 
crown glass manufacturer of Leeds and secondly by the crown glass manu- 
facturers of Tyne and Wear, demanding that the same system be introduced 
in England. Both petitions claimed that the petitioners were at a serious 
disadvantage in that Scottish crown glass was now able to undersell theirs 
in the market. The Board of Excise9s response was predictable: first it 
prevaricated and finally, after having sent excise officers to Scotland 
to examine the new system, concluded in April 1808 that "our best officers 
are of the opinion that the revenue would be exposed to considerable risk 
and we cannot recommend- altering the law on the subject". This, however, 
proved to be another occasion when the manufacturers succeeded in enlisting 
the support of the Treasury against the wishes of the Board of Excise and 
in May 1808 the Lords of the Treasury wrote to the Board of Excise 
directing them to prepare a bill on the subject "having taken into con- 
sideration the numerous representations of the manufacturers 6f glass 
concerning the inconvenience and hardship to which the-trade is liable 
and it appearing that under the-present mode the charge is unequal in 
different manufactories". 
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North-east manufacturers appear to have again played a decisive 
role in influencing Treasury opinion and their main argument appears to 
have been that the unfair advantage enjoyed'by the Scottish houses 
operated as a loss not only to English manufacturers but to the revenue 
through the drawback system. Since 1805 the drawback had been paid at 
7s 10d more than the rate -of duty which was supposed to cover loss in 
manufacture and waste. _ 
through cutting the tables into squares. Dumbartons 
it was claimed, was now able to make a profit frl6m this situation in that 
asihe duty was charged on the manufactured goods, the ccmpany lost no 
glass in the process of manufacturing and furthermore the companyts export 
market consisted of the export of whole tables of glass to Ireland. 
According to figures produced by the north-east manufacturers, and sent in 
a personal letter from Sir Matthew White Ridley to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Spencer Perceval, the amount paid out on drawback plus the 
expense of collecting the duty came to E600 more than the crown glass duty 
actually paid into the revenue from Scotland in. the year ending 
5 January 1808. 
The north-east manufacturers were certainly consulted in the preparation 
of the bill which was drafted by William Huskisson, an under secretary at 
the Treasury. A draft of the bill-was sent to the manufacturers for their 
comments in November 1808., On the whole'they were pleased but certain 
points were amended and returned to the Treasury via Sir Matthew White RidleyN. - 
Annexed are ... 'all the objections or amendments the Trade-at large 
are inclined to make all of whom, wish to meet the ideas of Government 
as far as the nature of the manufactory will admit, it appears they 
have consulted those who do not understand the process of working 
glass metal, from introducing clauses that the process cannot accommodate. 
The amendments, ikhich mostly concern the placing of the manufactured tables 
in the annealing archl all appear to have been incorporated in the final 
act. 
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Lamb and Head went up to London in May to try and see Huskisson 
on certain points they were concerned abouts and also to be on the spot 
to prevent any last minute alterations to the Bill as it passed through 
Parliament, which they were well advised to do. 
31 
Mr. Lamb and I called at Mr. Dorringtonts house at the House of 
Commons where we fortunately met Mr. Jackson making an alteration 
in the Bill to limit the size of glass squares to be exported 
not to be less than 12 superficial inches and up to 48; we 
prevailed on him to name up to 56 inches to Mr. Huskisson who 
consented. 
Unfortunately they were not able to see Huskisson personally so wrote 
to Ridley begging him to take up the matter. There were two points in 
particular they were concerned with; the first was the postponement of 
the date that the Act would come into force, which allowed the Scottish 
houses further time to take advantage of the English houses in the market,, 
the second concerned the drawback. 
In drawing attention to the loss to the revenue through the bounty 
paid to the Scottish crown house, the north-east manufacturers had over- 
stated their case and now faced the prospect of the bounty being withdrawna4irý 
and not just, as they had intended, to Ireland. Ridley was asked to pass 
on to Huskisson: 
thý anxiety we feel respecting our foreign trade from the 
bounty being entirely withdrawn., We are confident it will lessen 
the expo 
' 
rt of glass most materially and as tte trade at home is 
diminishing greatly we fear, much we will have to curtail our 
workmen and manufactories .... To Ireland we do not wish any Bounty to be granted but to all other places we trust-that it will be allowed. 
Their argument was that even when the duty was charged on the manufactured 
tabless there was a further loss from cutting these tables into squares. 
However the government did not respond and in the Act, of 1809 the drawback 
was reduced to the rate of duty. ýý 
1% 1 
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The Act (49 G3 c. 63) introduced a system, simili r to the other 
branches of locked annealing arches and weighing rooms ard a declaration 
by the manufacturer of the quantity of tables to be placed 
in the 
annealing arch. The Act only covered a trial period of 2 years but was 
renewed in 1811 when further regulations were introduced to tighten up 
the drawback; namely that no drawback could be claimed unless the tables 
were undamaged and the panes were regular shapes with each side measuring 
no less than 3ý211, all other glass was to be deemed waste glass. One other 
point that must be mentioned is that the 1809 Act raised the duty on 
broad glass from 12s 3d to 15s. Why this was done is something of a 
mystery but may have been merely that the duty was considered too low 
for 
the article. In the original Bill presented to Parliament, the duty was 
proposed to be U. but this was reduced to 15s during the Billts passage. 
The period 1777 - 1811 was, broadly speaking, a period when manu- 
facturers saw their wishes listened to by those in high places and were 
able to influence the development of the excise on glass to quite a con- 
siderable extent. At the beginning of the period the tax was a simple one 
levied on all branches of the manufacture in an identical way. By the 
end it had been split into various branches, each with its own slightly 
different set of regulations designed specifically to accommodate the 
different manufacturing processes. Though the basic principle of charging 
the duty on the manufactured goods was identical for allbxanches (except 
plate glass) the regulations governing each branch were quite individual 
based on either the annealing oven of the bottle houseq the annealing arch 
of the crown house2 or the flint glass house lear. These regulations had 
been introduced at the request of the manufacturers and in the case of 
flint and bottles the manufacturers had played a large part in planning 
them. Though apparently an increase in government interference in the 
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process of manufacture, the developments were almost certainly seen by 
the manufacturers as welcome improvements. 
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1811 - 1825 
To a certain extent the manufacturers had been spoilt by the 
liberal 
and sympathetic treatment they had received under the governments of 
Pitt and those influenced by him. The period 1811 - 1825 saw an alteration 
in the government's attitude towards the glass manufacturers to one that 
wasrot nearly so inclined to indulge their wishes. Whereas Pitt had 
understood the delicacy of the balance of supply and demand and the danger 
of upsetting the balance by over-heavy taxation, his successors adopted 
the less sophisticated view that the way to increase revenue from a partic- 
ular industry was simply to raise the rates of duty and increase the regu- 
lations to prevent fraud. This period saw only one rise in the rates of 
the duty-but it was a massive one: the notorious "double duties" of 1812 
whose effects dominated the industry throughout this period. There is no 
doubt that this alteration in the governmentts attitude reflected the 
severe financial pressure on the country following the long years of war. 
The attitude of the Board of Excise towards the manufacturers also 
underwent something of an alteration. Previously conflicts between 
the manufacturers and the Board of Excise had generally been won by the 
manufacturers on their appeal to the Government, Now, perhaps with the 
knowledge that the manufacturers would receive a less sympathetic hearing 
from the legislaturel the Board began týtake the initiative in questioning 
many of the concessions won by the manufacturers and in some cases seeking 
to do away with them altogether., The particular issues questioned by 
the Board were the drawback and the bounty ( which was to be reintioduced 
in 1812). Not only did the Board begin to question the manufacturers' 
testimony as to the amount of waste they incurred in preparing goods for 
export but it also began to challenge the whole principle of a drawback. 
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In many ways, as we shall see, Ithis 
represented a more realistic attitude 
on the part of the Board, but it also arose with the benefit of experience. 
Bounties had been in operation for over 20 years and there were ample 
statistics available from which to draw conclusions about their desir- 
ability from the governmentts point of view and -not just the manufacturers2. 
All the Boardts moves against the manufacturers were enacted under the 
banner of reducing loss from-the revenue, which loss they tended to call 
"fraud" indiscriminately even though some of the losses were, as we shall 
see, quite legitimate. 
(i) The double duties 
The double duties of 1812 (52 G3 c. 94) was arguably, the Act that 
had the largest single effect on the glass industry. It affected all 
aspects of the trade; it affected demand which in turn affected the 
governmen? s revenue which encouraged the Board of Excise to redouble its 
efforts to stamp out fraud. The duties were doubled purely for revenue 
reasons, followingo'no doubtq the example of Pittts 5076 increase in 1805 
which appeared to have had no serious . ef f ects, on -the' 
industry. However 
the 1812 Act differed from Pitt9s in that the rise was that much larger 
and it included all types of glass, even bottles on. which the ef f ect was 
to be one of the most pronounced. Although-ostensibly still adhering to 
the doctrine of taxing-luxurieso glass was, like the 
, 
o, ther commoditi es 
whose duties were doubled,. -hides skins, and tobaccog- an article whose wide- 
spread use wasýthe very aspect which recommended further, taxation. 
In introducing the budget the Chancellorv NiCýO'las-". VanSittart, (though 
it was the work of the late Spencer Perceval), spoke optimistically of'the 
,, "- 32 possible consequences: 
4-- 
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The next article which he should propose was also an Excise 
duty. It was that of glass. This duty had been considerably 
increased in the year 1805 but after an extensive enquiry among 
the manufacturers Mr. Perceval had been convinced that an additional 
tax equal to the present would not be injurious to the trade. It 
was not indeed probable that the consumption of this country would 
be lessened by the increase of price which this duty would occasion 
as glass was an article in very little use among the lower classes 
of society; and this, was, - so 
far as he could understand, the opinion 
of the manufacturers themselves, provided they were protected against 
foreign competition by sufficient duties on importation and by proper 
drawbacks on exportation. The product of this tax, calculating as 
before on the average, of the last three years, would, be S328,000, . 
Details of this "extensive enquiry" are not available but perhaps the 
fact that there do not appear, to be. any petitions to the Treasury. against 
thed)uble duties from the manufacturers indicates that they had in fact 
given their consent - provided indeed theyf eceived' protection in the home 
market and a "proper" drawback on exportation. By "proper" drawback there 
is no doubt that Vansittart was, referring to the drawback plus a bounty, 
of the type that, for flint and crownphad been abolished when the duty 
charge was switched to the, manufactured goods. However the very evening 
that the Budget proposals were introduced as a Bill into the House of 
Commons, a separate Bill concerning-: the glass duties, passed its third. 
reading. This (52 G3 c. 77) was an Act for grantinga , dditional sums to the 
drawbacks on flint, and crown glassl sums that were exactly the same as 
those that had been abolished in 1809 and 1811. In other words the bounty 
was re-introduced. This Bill had, been, introduced into the'House in May 
by Mr. Lushington of the Treasury and thus was certainly a Treasury Bill - 
rather than aýprivate effort by the manufacturers. Thereýseems little 
doubt there was a direct connectioný. between the re-introduction of the 
bounty and the m anufacturers2 apparently passive acceptance of'the double 
duties. When, the duties and the-drawbacks were doubled, later that year 
the manufacturers found themselves with an extremely attractive'incentive 
to export; the doubled duty for flint stood at Z4 18s per cwt., the 
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drawback at Z6 10s 6d per cwt; the doubled duty and drawback for crown 
were Z3 13s 6d and Z4 18s per cwt, respectively. 
But if the manufacturers had expected that demand would not be 
lessened by the rise in price that followed the double duties then they 
were soon proved over optimistic. There is no doubt that demand was 
affected and production declined as a result (see Fig. 18). The decline 
is underlined by the fact that even though the rate of duty doubledo the 
net revenue from tie duties declined (see Fig. 19) Some of the worst 
effects were felt by the flint and bottle manufacturers who had traditionally 
supplied wholesale'tradesp such as apothecaries or soda water manufacturers, 
which used glass merely as a container. These trades frequently aimed at 
a popular, cheap market and a price rise of this size was not acceptable. 
An advertisement from the Newcastle Courant illustrates a typical response 
to the double duties: 
35 
The Cordial Cephalic Snuff 
The proprietors are under the necessity of substituting 
Tin Cannisters for Glass Bottles. The latter article 
(in consequence of the double duty) making it impossible 
to vend the snuff in glass wi*thout a very considerable 
advance on their customers. 
Substitutes such as tin or earthenware could easily be found for glass used 
merely as a container and it was as a result of the bottle manufacturers* 
complaints of the competition they suffered from the substitution of stone 
tW&kv wo4impose4oh5fvte 6offies 
bottles in 1812. The Excise eeport on the Stone bottle tax of 1834 includd A 
a table showing how the duties had affected the price of glass 
36 
1811 to July 1812 
to Jan 1820 
to Jan 1822 
to Oct 1825 
to Sep 1828 
to Aug 1829 
to Jan 1831 
Price 40s per gross 
It 52s it 
tt 45s is 
It 42s tt 
it 44s tv 
to 42s of 
to . 40s it 
Duty 4s Od per Cwt 
it 8s Id it 
it 8s Id to 
to 8s Id it 
of 8s ld it 
to 7s Od to 
to 7s Od to 
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Figure 18 
Glass charged with duty 1805 20 (in thousands of tons) 
33 
White glass - Bottle glass 
1805 9.9 13.6 
1806 9.1 13.5 
1807 9.3 15.7 
1808 9.1 16.7 
1809 9.1 16.0 
1810 9.1 16.5 
1811 9.3ý 16.6 
1812 7.9 15.0 
1813 62 10.7 
1814 7: 0 11.7 
1815 7. T 13.9 
1816 0.9 15.4 
1817 5.9 14.0 
1818 7.4 15.5 
1819 8.4 16.7 
1820 6.7 12.8 
Rqure 14*1+ 
q- 
FLINT Duty charged 
1808-1812: f, 8529279 
1813-1817: flv24lv8lO 
PLATE 
1808-1812: Z135v729 
1813-1817 f, 213v212 
Drawback Net payment to the Exchequer 
f, 599,818 96109469 
U91982820 ; Z599sOO2 
S202464 Z115j263 
U939029 Z202183 
CROWN 
1808-1812 f, 801v559 E116t843 
1813-1817 U, 275j889 Z310sI12 
E684,716 
f, 959p777 
. ' 
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The report in fact concluded that the tax was an unnecessary protection 
since the major market for glass bottle was the wine and spirit trades 
which would never contemplate using stonebDttles. Whilst it is true that 
glass did continue to be used for purely utilitarian purposes, it seems 
clear that the double dutiesdLd discourage a substantial part of the 
existing market, particularly for: 
37 
Those articles which before the imposition of the double duties 
by the statue of the 52 G3 c. 94 were made of an inferior glass 
ahd sold to a very great extent but which are now, in consequence 
of such double duties rendered unsaleable by the substitution of 
earthenware tin and other ware at less than one third of the price. 
The effects of the double duties were not confined to market demandq 
they did much to brirg both the Board of Excise*s and the Treasury9s 
attention back to the bounties and question their acceptability to the 
government. The doubling of the drawbacks had left the manufacturer with 
a greatly exaggerated incentive to export and, along with the falling off 
in demand at home, there is no doubt that many manufacturers lost no time 
in exploiting the situation with the result that the Board found itself 
paying out far greater sums for drawback than it had ever done before. 
This was quickly seen as a loss to the revenue and immediately suspected 
as - fraud rather than the legitimate results of economic and political 
conditions. There is no doubt that at root the cause was the legitimate 
effects of the 1812 legislation but there is equally no doubt that certain 
manufacturers had acted with considerable cunning in exploiting the situation 
and in particular the generous drawback. 
(ii) Ireland and the double drawback 
The problem of large scale export to Ireland-merely to claim the 
drawback was, as we have seen, not a new, one. It. had already come to the 
Board of Excisels attention in 1809 when the main offenders appeared to 
be the Scottish houses. This was evidently still the case in 1815 and the 
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most notorious practioner of the system was the crown house at Dumbarton. 
Indeed Dumbarton's trade with Ireland appears to have well deserved the 
description fraudulent even though it kept within the technical bounds of 
legality. In 1815 Dumbarton petitioned the Treasury38 asking to be 
allowed to import cullet (broken glass) from Ireland without paying the 
countervailing duties imposed on imported glass from Ireland. 
39 In reply 
to the Treasury enquiry, the Board of Excise reported that it was 
absolutely necessary to insist on the duties because of the abuses 
practised by Dumbarton and referred the Treasury to a report from the 
Scottish Board of Excise sent to its English counterpart in. August 1814. 
This report stated that Dumbarton was in the habit of shipping irregular 
fragments of crown glass to Ireland. for no other purpose than to obtain the 
drawback, breaking them up in Ireland and then relanding the whole as 
cullet in Scotland to be re-manufactured - which practice had actually been 
admitted by the Company in the course of a trial (in which they unsuccessfully 
tried to sue the Scottish Excise Board for f. 20,000 damages after an officer 
had failed to attend the packing of 200 cwts. of crown glass for export). 
The Scottish Board had thought it right to bring this matter to the 
attention of the English Board because, though they now insisted that the 
cullet from Ireland pay the countervailing duties, the English officers 
were not so strict and the Dumbarton Company had taken to re-importing it 
via Liverpool. As both the English and the Scottish reports pointed out, 
there were no crown glass houses in Ireland therefore any imported crown 
cullet must be English on which a drawback had been given. 
The first attempt to remedy this abuse was an Act passed in 1814 
(54 G3 c. 87) imposing an excise duty on crown, plate and broad glass made 
in Ireland. Although none of these were actually manufactured in Ireland 
this measure allowed the imposition of countervailing duties on crown glass 
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exported from England to Ireland, thus equalising the two countries and 
abolishing the drawback to Ireland. As the measure only covered window 
glass it seems likely that this act was a direct consequence of the 
discovery of Dumbarton9s practices. But astonishingly this Act was repealed 
a few months later at the beginning of the next session (55 G3 c. 7). The 
reason for this sudden repeal appears as an episode in a short biography 
of Charles Attwood of the Tyne Glass Company, 
40 
Immediately after the 
original act extending the excise to Ireland was passeds in the month 
before it became law, both Attwood and the Dumbarton Company shipped a 
three year stock of crown to Ireland from the Clyde having first obtained 
legal advice that any fiscal bill could not be altered in the same session 
of Parliament. However, the Irish Treasury minister,, Mr. Fitzgerald, 
introduced a clause into a completely different bill, the Irish Customs 
Billp enacting that the glass duties take place retrospectively. This passed 
unhindered in the Commons and the Irish Customs seized the cargoes of glass. 
Attwood was furious, not unnaturally, for he stood to lose Z20,000 in retro- 
spective duties and remonstrated to Robert Peel, then the Secretary of 
State for Ireland. This proved fruitless so he sought the advice of a one 
time Attorney General, Lord Plunkett, who affirmed that a retrospective 
duty could not be imposed. Armed with this he returned to see Peel who 
was forced to admit that the duties could not take place retrospectively. 
However, to Attwoods great annoyance, Peel and Fitzgerald brought in a 
Bill in the next session to repeal the duties and after lying for many 
months on the open quay at Dublin the stock of glass had to be disposed of 
at great loss. 
Thisstory is corroborated by the debate in the Commons on the Irish 
Glass Duties 
41 
which occurred when Fitzgerald was forced to ask Parliament 
to repeal an Act he had himself introduced in the last session. His 
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embarrassment, not only at being put in such a position but also having 
to admit that a similar Act might be introduced in future,, is evidentl as 
is his anger at the unfair speculation of certain manufacturers (he did not 
mention the offending parties by name but referred to a petition sent to 
him f rom Newcastle merchants protesting against the retrospective imposition 
of the duties). Fitzgerald justified the repeal on the grounds that the 
duties would now be unproductive, and also on the grounds of public good 
having heard that-those who had accummulated a stock in Ireland intended to 
charge the full price on it; the price that would have been charged had the 
glass paid duty. On being questioned and indeed censured on the "extra- 
ordinary circumstance" of passing an Act on the 14th July and by a 
subsequent Act back-dating it to the 6th, Fitzgerald said that the counter- 
vailing duty was a customs duty (which was not correct, it was managed by 
the Excise) and as was usual with Customs Acts should have been dated from 
the date of the resolutions, of the Committee on which the Act was founded. 
In doing so he admitted: 
that the principle duty under this Actv though obviously one 
of excise)was tl-e countervailing customs duty which was to 
be levied on importation. 
Which only led to further embarrassment as comment was made on the novelty 
of subjecting to excise in Ireland an article not of Irish manufacture. 
Sir Matthew White Ridley raised the question of the lack of consideration 
the Irish Treasury had displayed towards -the English manufacturers "for 
they would not have imported the quantity they had done except on the 
faith of the first act-". Whichp understandably, provoked a long and 
rather rancorous outburst from Fitzgerald verging on a personal attack on 
the honourable baronet whom he obviously considered to be one of the 
guilty speculators. In reply 
-to a question 
in a further debate, Fitzgerald 
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repeated what the gist of this outburst wasq that the English manufacturers 
needed no recompense from the government: 
Mr. Fitzgerald thought it was not necessary to attend to the interest 
of the glass importers who had created a monopoly in the Irish market 
and who had bought up for that purpose the only glass manufactory in 
Ireland. Par from suffering loss, the exporters of glass to Ireland 
had a drawback exceeding by 15s 9d the sum paid by them as duty; 
and who charged the people of Ireland E7 for the articles which cost 
them Z2. 
The goverment was not to leave the situation as it stood. Throughout 
1815 various solutions to the Irish glass problem were brought into 
Parliament, tried and tested and, after heavy amendments, dropped. The 
complications of the Parliamentary history suggest- firstly that the 
Treasury was uncertain as to what the best course of action would be, and 
secondly that there was a body of interest in the Commons able to amend 
the resolutions as they were . -presented; after the exposure of the 
issue 
in the debate on the Irish glass duties interest was possibly wider than 
it might otherwise have been. 
Almost as soon as the Irish Act had been repealed, a Committee of the 
House was ordered to consider the drawbacks on glass. Plainly aware of the 
mood of the moment and the possibility that the bounty would once more be 
entirely withdrawn, the crown glass manufacturers of the Tyne and Wear (not 
including, interestingly enough, Charles Attwood) sent a petition to the 
Treasury 42 . It-was sent directly to Lushington by Matthew White Ridley with 
a covering note telling him1hat the manufacturers had appointed a deputatioi 
to go up to London and see him personally on the. matter. The petition 
restated the desirability of the bounty from the manufacturers* point of 
view; how it enabled the British manufacturer to meet those of Bohemia and 
France on good termss which was especially important following the recent 
pacification of Europe. It emphasised particularly the importance of the 
bounty to the American market taking care to point out that the young 
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American glass establishments enjoyed the positive support of their 
government, "protective duties give them every encouragement. If the 
British government withdraws its support as our difficulties increase so 
establishments in America will prosper. ". 
If these arguments miglt have swayed Pitt they appear to have had 
little influence on Lushington or Mr, Brogden, the Secretaries to the 
Treasury. The resolutions of the committee presented on March lst 
recommended the complete repeal of the 1812 Act re-establishing the bounty 
and the repeal of that part of the double duties act that doubled them. In 
other words the drawback was to be reduced to the level of the duty. However 
after the first reading an amendment was made and passed, the addition of 
the words "to Ireland" which would have limited the reductions to Ireland 
only. Brogden and Lushington were directed to prepare a bill which they 
never- presented, presumably because they were not happy with the amendment. 
On Marchl3th another committee was ordered, with the wider brief of 
considering all the duties on glass. These resolutions proposed that the 
drawback to Ireland be reduced, elsewhere to remain the same. This passed 
without amendment. Further resolutions presented on 18th May made allowances 
for the Irish countervailing duties to be reduced to a similar level andp 
most importantly, that the impoýrt of broken glass into Great Britain from 
Ireland be completely prohibited. Again these passed but no Bill was 
brought in. In June Brogden presented yet another set of resolutions for 
the house to consider. These proposed raising the Irish, countervailing 
duties instead of lowering them thus virtually prohibiting any commerce at 
all in glass between the two countries. These were rejected by the House. 
More important though were the resolutions concerning crown glass. For 
the first time a distinction was made between crown glass expcrted in tables 
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and crown exported in squares. The resolutiow proposed to lower the 
drawback on the former and retain the bounty for the latter. These 
resolutions were passed with some small amendments land 
at last a Bill 
was brought in. 
The resulting Act (55 G3 c. 113) effectively reduced all drawbacks to 
Ireland to the level of the duty (; C4-, 18s for flint and ; 93 13s 6d for crown). 
The bounty was retained for all flint glass exported elsewhere and crown 
glass cut into squares; crown glass in tables, whereever it was exported) 
was only eligible for, the reduced drawback. 
The bounty on crown had always been understood to compensate for the 
waste incurred in cutting the tables into squares. Tables incurred no 
such waste and it is at first sight surprising that provision had not been 
made for this fact before. The explanation is that the export of crown 
consisted almost entirely of squares 'rather than tables since squares were 
less fragile and more likely to survive a sea voyage. This 
point had been urged on Isaac Cookson jr. by the Bristol crown glass 
manufacturer Lucas Chance in a letter of December 1814. Chance was alarmed at 
the recent resolution of'the House of Commons withdrawing the bounty 
completely and urged Cookson to gather the north-east trade and "exert your 
influence to prevent so ruinous and unjust an act from passing into Law". 
He encouraged CooksDn to make the most of the fact that the bounty was a 
legitimate allowance for cutting'the tables into squares: 
43 
soe it is evident that the present excess of drawback is no bountyp 
it being no more than a bare compensation for-wastes, to enable the 
manufacturer to export his glass free of duty... crown glass exported 
in tablesýis subject to no other waste than that of breakage in 
annealing and consequently requires but little excess of duty beyond 
the rate of duty. It is on squares that the waste principally arises 
and it is on squares only that, glass can be exported into the American 
states and other distant parts. From the very great liability to break- 
age and the, expense of freight, glass in tables cannot be exported 
thither. 
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After the Act separate accounts were keptJor crown glass exported-in 
tables and crown glass exported in squares claiming the higher drawbackv 
from which it is quite clear that tables amounted to only one fifth of the 
total export of crown. Isaac Cookson told the 1835 Commission that his 
firm only exported tables to the Baltic. 
The next drawback to come to the attention of the Board of Excise was 
the drawback on plate glass. It was brought to its attention by Isaac 
Cookson following his recent establishment of a cast plate works. Plate 
glass, since it was confined to two firms one of which - the British 
Plate Glass Company - operated largely under its own Acts of Parliamentj 
had not seen many alterations in its duty since the eighteenth century. 
It was the only branch of the glass industry still to pay the duty on the 
gauge and the proportional rate of drawback to the duty remained that which 
had been established by Pitt in 1794 which, in 1815, meant that plate glass 
paid a duty of Z4 18s per cwt. and received a drawback of 6s 6ý2d per 
square foot. The problem of correlating a duty paid by weight and a draw- 
back paid by area was, of coursev con§iderable but the relationship between 
the two had been judged fair in'1794 according to the waste that the 
British Plate Glass Company then produced in grinding and polishirig its plates. 
Even assuming that it was still in 1815 a fair sum for polished plates 
(though there is no doubt that the Ravenhead Company had improved its 
techniques since 1794) what it certainly was not fair for, from the 
revenue's point of view, was the export of "rough plate" which had not 
been ground or polished. It was this anomaly to which Cookson brought 
the Board*s attention in 1816. 
To be fair to the Board the overlooking of such an obvious, anomaly 
was not to be bla_med on its short sightedness. Until 1815 when Cookson 
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adapted his blown plate house at South Shields to manufacture cast plate, 
the export of rough plate was unknown. The Ravenhead Company was concerned 
entirely with the polished article, and had long since perfected its 
techniques and there was no reason at all for it to produce rough plate. 
Cookson, however, was embarking on a new venture and, as he told the 1835 
Commissioners, his original attempts were so poor that he exported plates 
unpolished merely for the sake of getting the drawback. Thus he discovered 
that the legislation was unnaturally to the manufacturer9s advantage. The 
Commissioners noted his forebearance in not making greater profits from 
the affairp but he had evidently got something from the episode. The 
Surveying General Examiner, William Hetherington, told the Commissioners 
that Cookson did not realise what was happening "until he had pocketed about 
S70,000 and then he made the matter known to the government. ". Figures for 
the plate drawback confirm that the revenue paid out a substantial sum 
under this heading (Fig. 20) during 1816 and 1817. 
The anomaly was stopped by a clause tagged on to a Bill concerning 
the excise duty on beer which was passing through the Commons in June 1816. 
By this (sections 3-7,56 G3 c. 108) the drawback on unground plate was 
reduced to E4 18s - the duty rate; on polished plate the duty remained the 
same. The Act also included provision for the manufacturer to break down 
plates in the weighing room if he found them unfit, and be allowed the 
equivalent of the weight in the duty charge. *This, one can assume, is 
something asked for by Cookson since it was the problem of what to do with 
the substandard plates that had led him to export in the first place. 
Unfortunately the details of Cookson's appromh to the government are 
not known. He does not appear to have gone through the usual channels of 
petitioning either the Excise or the Treasury. In the Ridley papers there 
is evidenced his involvement in a subsequent amendment to the Act in 1818 
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Figure 20: Duty received on plate glas and amount drawnback 1814-30 
45 
Year 
ending 
I Jan 
Quantity 
charged 
cwts. 
Rate of 
duty 
per cwt. 
Amount 
of duty 
Zs 
Quantity 
exported 
sq. ft. 
Rate of 
drawback 
per ft. 
Amount of 
drawback 
f, s 
1814 119087 f. 4 18s 549326 260496 6s 6ý-2d 81256 
1815 9v254 453,344 37,510 12$122 
1816 91706 47., 559 1382997 45,463 
1817 71509 36,, 795 190v144 62,192 
1818 49388 21,, 502 392195 121,820 
1819 89473 41,517 300815 lOjO79 
1820 39923 3 Z4 18s 32,951 29s, 907 6s ýdj 9ý870 
49575 Z3 Os 646 2s 9d 
1821 99005 279191 61671 918 
1822 9,986 30., 014 6,, 108 839 
1823 10j, 032 309226 10,, 840 1,490 
1824 129106 369319 10,901 is 12498 
1825 139,922 41,766 -83,765 11136 
1826 159642 40,926 12,, 222 19680 
1827 129937 389913 99406 11,293 
1828 14., 807 44,421 13., 056 lv795 
1829 179665 531,088 119910 19637 
1830 141,470 43v480. l2v201- 1ý677 
(The figures for quantity charged do not include small amounts of 
unpolished plate which, after 1819, were charged at the old rate 
of Z4 18s) 
(58 G3 c. 33) which extended his allowance for broken down plates by 
allowing 110lbs gauged metal for every 100 lbs weight of plates broken, 
I 
thus taking into account the slight loss from ladling the cast plate. 
Cookson was sent a draft copy of this bill for hisapproval by Ridley 
44 
who 
also sought information from Robert Roughl Cooksonts London agent. 
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Thus by 1818 the drawbacks on the three branches of glass that 
claimed bounties, crown, flint and plate, would seem to have been altered 
to the Board of Excisetýs satisfaction, but this was not so. Bounties were 
still claimed on glass exported to foreign parts excluding Ireland and on 
polished plate. In the Board*s opinion the system still permitted extensive 
frauds to be practised on the revenue and its attitude towards bounties 
was succintly expressed in, a report to the Treasury in 1815.46 This report 
commented on a petition sent to the Treasury by two of the three remaining 
broad glass manufacturers in England pleading that they too should be given 
a bounty. The petition claimed that broad glass, like crown glass, incurred 
unavoidable waste in being cut into squares and this could be fairly met 
by a bounty of 10s per cwt. ' The Board was not at all amused by this request 
and firmly told the Treasury that "the granting, of high drawbacks is 
dangerous to the revenue - as has been fully experienced in crown glass". 
This conviction was expressed with even more force in a report presented 
to the Treasury in April 1818 47 on the subjec f defects in the glass duties 
along with suggestions for their remedy. In this report further reductions 
of the drawback and the abolition of the bounty are suggested as a matter 
of urgent necessity. The whole basis of this report was a comparison 
between the revenue in each of the three branches of platev flint andý 
crown, for the five years before and after 1812. These showed that the 
flint and plate revenue had actually diminished since 1812 and the crown 
revenue had not increased as much as might have been expected.. (Fig. 19) 
The Board*s analysis of the cause of this diminution was. howeverp 
perverse. It refused to acknowledge the one obvious cause, the diminished 
demand caused by the double duties, but explained the dimimution by the 
over generous drawback and by frauds: in the case of flint glass frauds 
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directly connected with the charge on the manufactured goods: 
we are inclined to attribute it mre to an alteration which took 
place in the mode of charging the duty on flint glass about the 
time when the double duty was imposed, and tolhe state of the 
drawbacks which we are of the opinion are much too high in all 
the glasses, than to the depressing effects of a doubledity on 
the trade and the diminished consumption of the article consequent 
thereon. 
Perhaps as a result of its-experiences with crown and plate glass.. the 
Board's arguments against the drawback on flint appear more sophisticated. 
It noted that although the bounty on flint was mainly given to compensate 
for the waste sustained by cutting, "the increased value of the article 
after cutting more than compensates for the loss of drawback by diminished 
weight". It also pointed out that in its experience, though not statis- 
tically provable, only a small proportion of flint glass exported was cut, 
most of the export trade consisting of plain undecorated articles. The 
Board recommended that the bounty be completely withdrawn from flint glass 
and the drawback reduced to the level of the duty. 
A similar recommendation was made for crown and plate glass. With 
crown the Board noted that the increased value of the article after having 
been cut into usable squares more than compensated for the loss of duty. 
With plate the problem was more complicated since the duty was levied by 
weight and the drawback on polished plate calculated by area, yet the Board 
was iný no doubt at all that this was the most scandalous of all the bounties, 
"in the attempt to adjust the relative equality of these two different 
measures, the revenue would appear to have been greatly imposed on". As 
ýproof it enclosed a calculation suggesting that 48 polished plates twelve 
I inches square would be charged Z6 13s 91ý.; d duty but would received a drawback 
on export of Z15 14s. The Board's argument against the plate glass 
bounty were, however, over hasty, as was its erroneous calculation. -In 
comparing the sums paid out on drawback before and after the double dutiesy 
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the Board had failed to take into account the large sums unintentionally 
paid out to Isaac Cookson on unpolished plates which fault had been 
remedied in 1816. The Board itself recognised its oversight in a further 
report on plate sent to the Treasury in May 1819.48 This report gives the 
impression of being far better informed on the subject and had indeed 
been made after consultations with the two plate glass manufacturem 
According to this report both manufacturers and the Board had come to an 
agreement on the best way to reform the plate glass duty and both sides had 
made some concessions. For its part the Board recognised that the major 
defect in the plate glass duty, the drawback on unpolished plate, had 
already been repaired but it still believed that "the drawback on polished 
plate is higher than warrants and furnishes the temptation to fraud". 
The manufacturers conceded that the drawback was indeed unfairly high and 
both sides agreed that 4s 6d per square foot was a more realistic rate. 
The most surprising concession came from the Board in that for the first 
time it admitted that the double duties were in some degree responsible 
for the diminished revenue: 
The duties (on plate) are not large and the manufacture is 
greatly diminished since the double duties (in 1812 11,707 cwts 
were charged, in 1817 51396 cwts. ) therefore the trade might be 
encouraged and the revenue eventually benefited by reducing the 
duty to Z2 9s and the drawback to 2s 3d per square foot. 
This was a remarkable compromise in view of the Boardts suspicions of the 
other branches of glass and its refusal to admit the effects of double duties 
on them. It perhaps can only be explained by the fact that at this period 
there were only two plate houses in England and there was evidentally a 
high degree of personal contact between the manufacturers and the Board. 
The subsequent Act of 1819 (59 G3 c. 115) reduced the duty on the 
materials used in the manufacture of plate glass "in sheets'-'. " -2-sell thick 
made for the purpose of being ground and polished" to f. 3 per cwt. and the 
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drawback was fixed at 2s 9d per square foots slightly more than the 
Excise's original proposal. This Bill also included a clause that was to 
prove a useful resort for manufacturers wishing t6 improvecptical glass. 
"It shall be lawful for the Lords of the Treasury to alter the whole or 
part of the regulations as they may judge necessary for the better selection 
of glass adapted to the making of optical instruments. ", From the excise 
returns (Fig. 20) this measure was a highly successful one; production 
increased, the revenue eventually increased and the amount paiq out on 
drawback was reduced. 
(iii) Flint glass and the gauge 
The Board of Excise had never really accepted the loss of the gauge 
in flint glass. Although the Report to the Treasury of 1818 was the first 
official resurrection of the issue, the Board had been pursuing it with 
vigour through the Court of the Exchequer ever since 1811. The 1811 Act 
which had established the duty on the manufactured goods brought in its 
wake a series of prosecutions against flint glass manufacturers who were 
accused of removing goods from the weighing room before they were weighed. 
During these trials the Board made ample use of the opportunity to denounce 
the new system which had, it maintained, opened the door to fraud. This 
firm conviction added zeal to its efforts to seek out fraud in these years 
indeed it may have led it to see fraud where none had occurred (see section 51ii). 
The evidence against the manufacturers in many cases rested on a comparison 
between the quantity of metal gauged before manufacture and the weight of 
manufactured goods that paid duty. The 1811 Act had, specifically said 
that gauging of the metal was not un-lawful and the Board had directed that 
gauging continue and the quantities be entered in the books to act as a 
"check". As the manufaclurer was no longer compelled to use all the fluxed 
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metal - he could use only the best metal from the middle of the pot and 
re-flux the rest if he wished - the gauge was useless as a check, but 
this did not deter the Board from using it in trials as positive proof 
that fraud had occurred and manufactured goods had been removed without 
paying duty. 
The Board"s campaign against the new system culminated in its report 
to the Treasury of 1818 in which it maintained that the system had resulted 
in a considerable loss of revenue. It repeated the earlier arguments: 
the trader had greater facility to remove goods from the weighing room 
before they had paid duty, there were more opportunities for collusion 
with the officers ("and glass houses are frequently under the care of 
inferior officers") and that not all goods needed annealing so some were 
removed before they even got to the weighing room. The Board compared the 
total gauge figures for the years following 1811 with the figures for the 
quantity of glass that had paid duty. If the duty had been on the gauge, 
it claimed, the government would have received an extra E513,746 in duty. 
It pointedlDthe diminution of revenue as a direct consequence of the 
new system, firmly denying that the double duties had had any part in it at 
all: "We think there is no-need to lower the duties because the loss to 
revenue comes from other causes, the drawbacks and evasions". As we have 
seen the Board also recommended that the drawbacks be reduced. 
The 1811 Act was to expire at the end of March 1818. The flint glass 
manufacturers were not unaware of the danger that it would not be renewed 
and their apprehension increased when the nature of the Boardes report to 
the Treasury became known. The main protest from the manufactures took 
the form of a printed leaflet 
49 
. and this was supplemented by a petition so 
of the flint manufacturers of Tyne and Wear to the Treasury in March 1818. 
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Both mention the manufacturers* dismay and concern at learning of the 
Excise's recommendations in the report of 28th February. The printed 
leaflet restated at length the "dreadful effects" of the system of 
gauge and described the new system with its exten sive checks against fraud. 
The brief argument consisted of countering all the points raised in the 
Excise report. In particular it denied the justness of the comparison 
between the gauge figures and the manufactured goods. It ended with an 
eloquent plea for the tetention of this "just and equitable" system and a dire 
prediction of the consequences if the "injurious and oppressive" one should 
be re-introduced: 
The manufacturers feel it incumbent on them explicitly to state that if 
the renewal of the system of gauge should be again resorted too they 
will be driven to the Painful Necessity of abandoning a Trade so 
surrounded with Difficulties and so Pregnant with Ruin and Destruction 
to their Fortunes Happiness and Characters. 
The petition from the north-east manufactures (which seems to be the only 
one from a particular area) contained similar arguments but argued far 
more strongly for the retention of the high drawback. It claimed that 
despite its apparent high rate, the drawback only just covered the losses 
which were sustained on export. These they listed as breakages, cuttings 
loss of interest, on the duty from the time it was paid until the time 
of receiving the drawback, annual licenses, customs duties and duties 
on raw materials. All of these were expenses that would have to be passed 
on to the foreign consumer if the drawback was reduced. 
The intenst of the manufacturers seems to have won the day for in 
April 1818 the Parliamentary Commission under Brogden recommended that the 
flint and window glass Acts be continued. This continuation was only for 
a further year and in 1819 the issue came up again. A further Excise 
report of 1819 
51 
recommended once again that the gauge be re-introduced 
for flint glass and that the drawback be reduced. There was however a 
- 386 - 
slight modification of its Position since it was suggested that if it 
proved impossible to re-introduce the gauge, weighing the waste might 
provide a check on the manufacturer and discourage. -- 
fraud. This 
suggestion wastaken up as a suitable compromise and an Act (59 G3 c. 104) 
passed in July 1819 provided that the manufacturer had to collect all the 
waste metal and skimmings from each weekly making. The officer was to 
pick over and w. gh the waste metal and if the total of waste plus manufactured 
goods did not amount to 98% of the gauged metal the deficiency below 98% 
was to be charged with duty. 
This Act added a further twist to the already over-complicated life 
of the flint glass manufacturer but it was perhaps bearable as an alternative 
to the complete re-introduction of the gauge. As a compromise it appears 
to have worked well. There are no petitions from the manufacturers complain- 
ing about it and the Board of Excise appeared to have relaxed its campaign 
to re-introduce the gauge as a result of this Act. -However in 1825 the duties 
on flint glass were completely remodelled and the gauge system re-introduced. 
The re-introduction of the gauge in 1825 appears to have been 
accomplished with the consent of the manufacturers. If they were so oppDsed 
to it in 1818 why were they not in 1825? The anwer seems to lie in a 
comment of the 1835 Commissioners which speaks of the manufacturerso 
willingness to submit to the reg6lations for the sake of the security they 
are supposed to provide against competition from fraudulent traders. By 
1835 competition from fraudulenttraders was the predominant preoccupation 
of the manufacturers and there is every indication that this was already 
a problem in 1825. Fraudulent competition was something that all fair 
traders faced but it was more of a problem foi flint glass than for any 
other branch. There was competition from illegal "cribs" who melted down 
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glass and manufactured small moulded articles and there was competition 
from licensed manufacturers who somehow managed to evade the duty. The 
extent of both these frauds was such that in 1825 the manufacturers and 
the Board of Excise seem to have united to work out measures that would 
tighten up the control of fraud. 
The 1825 Act (6 G4 c. 117) was similar to that of 1818 in that it enacted 
a combination of the gauge and the weighing of the waste and the manufactured 
goods. Wheareas the previous Act had used the gauge as a check on the 
manufactured goods, now the goods acted as a check on the gauge and the 
duty was charged on the gauge. It was in effect a re-introduction of the 
gauge but it was a very different and far more complicated system than the 
previous one. The complications were largely the result of trying to meet 
the manufactures* old objections to the gauge and this Act is perhaps the 
prime example of legislation that was terrifyingly complex because the 
manufacturers had had a hand in framing it. For every 1,000 lbs gauged the 
charge was E12 10s with no deductions or waste. allowances. Instead , the 
manufacturers were required to work out all wares by 6 otclock on Saturday 
evening, lade out all the waste metal which would then be gauged and the 
total deducted from the gross gauge. The wares would be weighed in the 
annealing rooms as before with the same regulations about locking and 
unlocking the weighing rooms and lears. Every 6 weeks a comparison of the 
gauge and the weight of the manufactured goods was made and if the goods 
exceeded the gross gauge by an amount greater than 5076 then the manufacturer 
paid an extra 6d per lb on the surplus. This complex system was usually 
summed up as in, effect a charge of 6d per lb. The regulations accompanying 
this basic plan were legion and included strictly. laid out procedures for 
I 
a variety of situations such as making coloured glassý improving the colour 
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of the glass in the pot and recharging pots. Many of these regulations 
must have been introduced by the manufacturers and their influence is 
also seen in a clause whereby any workman maliciously adding material to 
a pot after it had been gauged was liable to conviction and three months'ýý 
hard labour. 0 one of the manufacturers* chief complaints about the previous 
gauge system had been their own liability for the actions of their workmen. 
The drawback was fixed at Z29 3s 4d per 1,000 lbs. (this was usually summed 
up as 7d per lb. ) with two important provisos that the glass was not 
entitled to drawback unless it was of a specific gravity of 3,000 and unless 
it was worth at least lld per lb. in the home market. This was obviously 
intended to put a stop to the export of inferior glass. In practice it was 
to give rise to a lot of confusion$ particularly whether "the home market" 
meant the London market where standards of quality were high or the glass 
manufacturers9 home town market. This became a problem when glass was 
exported, as it frequently was., via. London. 
52 
One of the most important aspects of the Act was that it extended the 
flint glass duties to Ireland. This too was seen as a measure against fraud 
for smuggling of duty free glass from Ireland to England had become an 
enormous problem both for the Excise and the English flint glass manufact- 
urers. The problem was highlighted in the Report of the Commissioners of 
Excise Inquiry into the' - Scottish Excise, published in 1825.53 Brieflythe 
situation described in that report was that the Scottish flint manufacturers 
were finding their home market severely threatened by increasing quantities 
of cheap glass smuggled from the Irish flint glass housess particularly the 
ones in the northern provinces "which only exist by the facility they have 
in smuggling their goods into Great Britain and are chiefly set a-going 
for this purpose to the ruin and destruction of the fair trader here". 
The report strongly recommended the extension of the"duty to Ireland and 
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it was acting on its reco=endations that the 1825 Act was brought in. 
The 1825 Act was not as successful as might have been hoped. By 
the time of the 1835 Commission it was clear that the measure had not, 
succeeded in suppressing evasions and that the minuteness of its regulations 
was proving a considerable inconvenience to the fair trader. This will be 
described in more detail in section 4. 
(iv) Crown glassand Ireland 
The 1825 Report which had drawn attention to the smuggling of flint 
glass from Ireland, also drew attention to the Irish situation as respects 
crown glass. Crown glass was being smuggled from Ireland to England but 
as there were still no crown houses in Ireland the glass was originally 
English which had been exported on drawback. The Report therefore had 
recommended not the extension of the crown duties to Ireland but the complete 
abolition of the drawback to Ireland. This would deter English manufacturers 
from exporting to Ireland and would thus solve the smuggling problem. 
Nothing was enacted until 1828 but there are a number of letters in 
the Ridky papers 
54 
which indicate that the Treasury was working out its - 
proposals in 1825 and seeking the manufacturerstý opinion on them. The letters 
contain the manufacturers" opinions on various proposals put to them by 
George Dunn, Matthew White Ridley9s manager, to whom the proposals had been 
sent by the Treasury via Sir Matthew White Ridley. Dunn reported back to 
his employer to bepassed on to the Treasury. It is an interesting example 
of the informality of the channels of communication between the manufacturers 
and the government. It seems likely that similar lett6rs were exchanged 
over other issues, if so it is unfortunate that these too have not 
survived. On 14 Marchp Dunn told Ridley that he*had had a meeting with 
Cookson, Cuthbert, Mr. Waldie of the Northumberland Glass Company, 
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Richard Shortridge and Mr. Dixon of Dumbarton who was passing through the 
area on his way to London. Dunn was afraid that the latter two "who are 
the greatest exporters to Ireland" would have been against the measures 
he proposed to them but as it turned out they were all in agreement. These 
measures were the abolition of the drawback to Ireland and a reduction of 
the duty to 60s per cwt,: 
We were quite unanimous in thinkipg that the minister might reduce tle 
duty to 60s per cwt. which is now 73s 6d per cwt, charging the same 
sum in both countries and no drawback to Ireland. The general opinion 
is that no more than two fifths of the glass imported into Ireland is 
used, the other three fifths all smuggled back into England and 
Scotland; although the price of glass in Ireland would in this case 
appear high - little of that would be felt by the lower orders of 
people and it would completely put an end to smuggling and give the 
fair trader a chance. 
Dunn wrote again on the 23rd March after having put an additional 
proposal to the manufacturers . They, and Dunn himself, were not so favour- 
tke 
able to this which was A reduction of the duty to 40s per cwt. and no drawback 
to any foreign parts at all: 
They are decidedly against the measure of discontinuing the drawback 
to all foreign parts - the exports from our works have been very little 
for many years but we reap'the benefit by others who do a great deal 
in that way by leaving us the 6me market for our inferior glass 
called CC which is generally exported. If the measure is adopted the 
export trade will probably be little for at ledst one year therefore 
large-stocks of that quality will be on hand. 
Dunn himself. was against the measure and calculated that if the drawback 
was discontinued it would mean a price rise from 38/- per crate (exclusive 
of freight) to 80/. per crate in those places which now enjoyed the draw- 
back. - He felt unable'to predict what tir consequences of this would be: 
But the question is, can either the Irish or the Canadians or the 
merchants in the Baltic supply themselves in any other manner with 
so good an article and so reasonable as that from England if the 
duty was reduced to 40/- without drawback? This will be for the 
consideration of the ministers. - No doubt it would suppress smuggling. 
The ministers evidently decided that this measure would do unnecessary 
harm to the export trade and the proposal was never putforward. 
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Dunn*s letter of the 25th A contained some gossip about 
Dixon-, of 
Dumbarton whic h indicates that despite all the measures taken against him 
he was still thriving on his trade with Ireland and was still stockpiling 
glass there. Dixon had given evidence to the 1825 Commission on the 
Revenue in which he admitted that a lot of what they exported to Ireland 
was cut up and smuggled back into England "but think the quantity is over- 
rated 11, His evidence also confirmed the poor quality of the glass that 
was shipped fromthe Irish market 11bhe Irish CC is of such coarse quality 
that is is seldom used in Great Britain". This was another reason why 
export to Ireland was so popular with English manufacturers, not only did 
it furnish them with a quick and easy drawback but it enabledthen to 
make the fullest use of their materials by working out the poor metal in 
the bottom of the pot; metal that was not usually fit for manufacture. 
Dunn confirmed this by a comment on the effect of abolishing the drawback 
on the new Lancashire crown houses: 
I have reason to believe that the large crown glass house at Warrington 
near Liverpool would never have been built two years ago but for the 
Irish trade for both these two other houses send all their coarse 
glass to Ireland, by such a means they are enabled to send the cutters 
in London and elsewhere a finer assortment, nor such as we can. 
AlthoUgh the young houses won*t want too large a capital (if the duty is 
reduced) they won9t be able to work their pots so low as they now do 
and therefore won*t benefit much. I am confident that it is the best 
thing that can happen for us. 
Though Dumbarton was the most notorious exporter to Ireland there is no 
doubt that every English and Scottish manufacturer made use of-the system 
when the opportunity presented itself. Even Dunn, who told Ridley that 
they had about 130 crates of export glass on hand at the present time "but 
the moment I can get a ship will ship it for some port in Ireland and will 
use extraordinary exertions to reduce our coarse stock of glass as low 
as possible". 
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Despite all this consultation with the manufacturers in 1825, no 
alteration was made to the crown glass situation until 1828 (9 G4 c. 48). 
In this Act none of the measures previously proposed to the manufacturers 
were adopted. Instead, following the example of flint glass, the duties 
on crown, broad, bottle and plate glass were extended to Ireland. No 
alteration was made to the rates of either duty or drawback except for a 
small provision restricting the drawback to the Channel Islands to those 
articles whose drawback was low; neither polished plate nor crown glass 
squares were permitted to claim drawback. As with the previous attempt 
to extend the window glass duty to Ireland it was solely a measure to 
abolish the drawback claimed by English _'manufacturers when expol, 
ting 
to Ireland since neither crown, bzoad or plate glass were manufactured in 
Ireland. 
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4.1825-- 1845 
If the years following the imposition of double duties saw a 
tightening up of the Excise*s regulations on -drawback and frauds, the 
years after 1825 could be described as ones of relaxation. Much of the 
financial pressure on the Treasury had been lifted and this was even 
sufficient to allow some reductions in the rates of duty during this 
period; the bottle duty was reduced in 1828, the flint duty in 1835 and 
1844. The easing up of pressure was reflected in the relationship between 
the manufacturers and the Board of Excise. This was a period that seems 
to be characterised by mutual understanding on both sides, with far less 
suspicion of the manufacturers displayed by the Board. Most of the 
discordant points had by this time been fought over and compromises achieved; 
the industry had completely adapted to working within the confines of the 
excise regulations and the Board appeared satisfied with the system. The 
few major alterations that did occur during this period were largely the 
result of new technical developments and were largely accomplished with 
the minimum of disagreement. The one exception to this harmonious state of 
affairs was flint glass where the re-introduction of the gauge in 1825 had 
resurrected all the old problems of waste allowance and this necessitated 
quite substantial amendments to the legislation. 
However during this period it was not solely the various relationships 
between the Board of Excise, the Treasury and the manufacturers that 
brought about changes in the glass duties. For the first time in its history 
the tax found itself the subject of considerable attention from a relatively 
disinterested body of opinion, political economists, and it was the 
opinions and activities of the political economists that proved to be 
perhaps the major influence on the glass duties during this period. 
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In many ways the glass tax was the, ideal target for the political 
economists who saw the artificial and distorted system of taxation, est- 
blished during the long years of war as a millstone weighing down the 
exertions and industry of the country. Not only did the glass duty- restrict 
the home industry by a most spectacular set of "vexatious regulations" but 
statistics existed to prove that the taxvas affecting consumption in an 
adverse way. Brougham pointed to this in 1817: 
The duties on. glass were nearly doubled in ten years; the produce 
of these duties has not sensibly increased at all. Here then is 
a destruction of the glass trade to the amount of one half its whole 
bulk without any direct gain to the revenue ard with a very certain 55 loss to-it in other branches connected with the diminished consumption. 
The glass tax provided real examples of more or less everyhbjection 
the political economists had to restrictive taxation. It encouraged mono- 
polies by preventing small capitals from entering the trade, it halted the 
free progress of invention and improvement, ý its regulations used up un- 
necessary amounts of capital, it distorted the natural price of the article, 
it checked consumption, its high rate furnished a motive to fraud, the cost 
of management was high and therefore a loss to government. It offended in 
every way. Although taxes on luxuries were theoretically approved of the 
glass tax could no longer shelter behind this defence since glasso like 
windows which were originally taxed as a luxury, increasingly was seen as 
a necessity, The duties thus had a pernicious effect on the health of 
the people by discouraging both adequate ventilation and the use of hygenic 
containers for food and medicine. According to McCulloch, the glass duties 
were the "most questionable" of all those under the management of the 
Excise. 
56 
There seems no doubt that, it was the rýadoption of these economic 
doctrines by those in power that lay behind the denuciation and eventual 
repeal of the glass duty, It was certainly not the result of a manufacturerst 
- 395 - 
campaign nor indeed of the Board of Excise suggesting that the amount of 
revenue the tax yielded was no longer worth the trouble of managing it. 
The point at which the changing political and intellectual climate brought 
repeal of the glass duty into the political arena as a real possibility 
can perhaps be fixed at 1830 for by this date it was, clear that the tax 
had been adopted as an issue by those in the Whig opposition party 
associated with a Ricardian economic policy. The publication of Henry 
Parnell9s Financial Reform in the spring of 1830 and its expression in 
Parliament by Poulett Thomson in his speech on injudicious taxation made 
this quite clear. Poulett Thomson singled out the glass tax along with the 
taxes on paper and printed calicos as "peculiarly oppressive and peculiarly 
deserving of inquiry"; and of these three the, most devastating disapproval 
was merved for glass. 
57 
A miserable duty, amounting to only E5009000 and upon which a charge 
of 10% is made for collecting is allowed to impede our native industry 
and to put a stop to all improvements and be a source of endless fraud. 
Pculett Thomson9s denuciation of the glass tax was impressive and it is'hardly 
surprising that when, the following year, the Whigs came to power and 
Thomson was installed at the Board of Trade, expectation that the duty would 
soon be repealed ran high. Before looking at the prolonged attempts to 
repeal the duty, however, the various alterations made in the tax during this 
period must be described. 
(i) Flint glass 
Flint glass was the only-branch to see alterations in both the regu- 
lations and the rates of duty, during this period. ., The re-introduction of 
the gauge in 1825 had created many difficulties and the Act was considerably 
modified in the light of experience in 1832 (2 &, 3 W4 c. 102). The modifications 
were largely suggested by the manufacturers and the 1835 Commission makes 
it clear that there had been considerable consultation between the Board 
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and the manufacturers. The main alteration was that the proportion of 
manufactured goods required to be manufactured from the gauged metal was 
reduced from 50% to 40%. The rate of duty was also altered and slightly 
reduced to 20s per 100 lbs gauged metal. Among the other provisions, the 
most important was a clause that gave the manufacturer the right to break 
down any goods he considered imperfect in the weighing room, remelt and 
remanufacture them. This allowed him far more scope to experiment and the 
significance of this measure also lies in its direct connection with the 
adoption of pressed glass - perhaps the most important nineteenth century 
development in flint glass. This connection is made clear in the evidence 
given to the 1835 Commission: 
We have since manufactured it (pressed glass) in this country. 
It was the invention of the Americans but the manufacturers have 
got into the mode of making it now in consequence of the allowance 
made to break down the glass in the weighing room by the act of 1832. 
Despite the modifications of 1832, the evidence to and report of the 
1835 Commissiai of Enquiry paints a dire picture of the present state and 
future prospects of the British flint glass industry. The respectable 
manufacturers had accepted the re-introduction of the gauge with the 
regulations that surrounded it for the sake of preventing fraud yet now they 
had the worst of both worlds. Competition from fraudulent manufacturers 
had not abated and the regulations were proving a burden almost too great 
to bear. Perhaps the most pertinent evidence on both these issues came from 
Apsley Pellatt, a London flint glass manufacturer who had recently relin- 
quished the business because the difficulties proved insurmountable. As 
a manufacturer of high quality goods he did not suffer so much from 
fraudulent competition but he found the regulations and the prohibition on 
any experiment or improvement unacceptable, In particular he mentioned 
the impossibility of adopting the French method of manufacturing and the, 
barriers against developing a satisfactory scientific glass. Pellatt told 
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the Commissioners bluntly that , he deeply regretted having to quit the 
trade but would only return if the duties were totally repealed (which in 
fact he did). The flint manufacturers* plight was also explicitly stated 
in a deputation sent to see Robert Peel, the then Home Secretary, in 
58 March 1835. The deputation, (Thomas Hawkes and Thomas Badger of Dudley 
and R. T. Shortridge of South Shields), again had a blunt message; the 
trade was now ntotally unrenumerative". This state of affairs they blamed 
on competition from fraudulent houses which lowered the prices of all basic 
articles with the result that honest manufacturers had to sell at a loss 
in order to stay in the market. The deputation pleaded that the government, 
"either totally abolish the duty or repeal the part that would diminish the 
temptation to fraud" and it was suggested that this part reduction might 
be to one third of the present duty or 2d per lb. 
The Commissioners took note of the flint manufacturerls plight and 
recommended a reduction. Very soon after the report was published the 
government acted on its recommendation and in 1835 an act (5 &6 W4 d. 77) 
reduced the duty to 6s 8d as the manufacturers had suggested. This'afforded 
some respite but the situation remained grave and a further reductionw 
was made in 1844 (7 &8c. 25). only a year before the duties were repealed. 
(ii) Cylinder windcw glass 
The act of 1835 which reduced the duty on flint glass also reduced 
the rate of drawback claimed by German sheet glass. This was also 
something that had been recommended by the 1835 Commissioners in their 
report. German sheetv as we have seen was flat glass manufactured by the ý; 
dl Y Omy 
cylinder process. Unlike crown glas SA waste was involv ed in cutting 
the flattened cylinder into squares and yet it was still eligible for the 
high drawback which made some allowance for cutting the circular tables 
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of crown glass into squares. German sheet had been experimented with in a 
small way during the eighteenth century and had been mentioned along with 
crown in all the flat glass acts since 1777 but it had not been manufactured 
in Britain to any significant extent until 1832 when it was "introduced" 
into this country by R. L. Chance and James Hartley. In their report the 
Commissioners had agreed with Chance that the manufacture had great potential 
because of the large size panes that were able to be obtained but they had 
also recognised that the high drawback - needed to be revised. They 
recommended that the drawback be reduced f rom Z4 18s per cwt. to 94 2s 8d 
which still left sheet with a slight bounty on the rate of duty. These 
recommendations were enacted in the 1835 Act. Although the terms were 
reasonably generous Chance petitioned the Treasury against any reduction at 
all pleading that although the waste in cutting squares was not very great, 
the bounty had offset-other expenses such as the annuity of f. 200 he paid 
to the French manufacturer Georges Bontemps. 
59 
Understandably-the Board 
of Excise had no truck with this and pointed out to the Treasury that Chance 
had embarked on his experiment at a time when he thought repeal was imminent 
and therefore cannot have been relying on the drawback as a source of finance. 
Indeed the expectation that the duties would indeed soon be repealed may 
have been one reason why the Board oUExcise did not move with more speed 
to reduce the drawback on sheet. 
The provisions of 1832 which had allowed Chance to embark on his German 
sheet experiment by permitting-him to construct an annealirg arch with two 
mouths ý_ ;, led indirectly to the final alterations in the 
regulations surrounding flat glass. 'These again concerned window glass 
produced by the cylinder method but not sheet glass. The alterations con- 
cerned broad glassp'a branch of the glass industry that was considered more 
or less dead by the 1830s. Thomas Dunn of, the Newcastle Broad and Crown 
Glass Companyý one of the two'surviving manufacturers of-broad glass in 
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the country at the time, told the 1835 Commissioners that, inconsequence 
of the cheapness of crown, broad glass was going out of use "the demand is 
now so small we cannot keep the house at work the whole year; we lie idle 
three months"; the principal markets were Norfolk and London where broad 
glass was used for glazing out houses and co ach houses. Despite the relative 
insignificance of broad glass an Act was passed in 1839 (2 & 3V C. 25) 
concerned entirely with the methods of manufacture of broad glass and this 
was followed in 1840 by a further Act (3 & 4V C. 22) which raised the duty 
on broad glass to the level of the crown and sheet duty. What was the reason 
for this sudden concern with a branch of the industry that had apparently 
long ceased to be of any importance either to the public or the revenue? 
The reason given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament 
for the 1839 act was that it was a measure to prevent fraud; the export of 
a new impr6ved kind of broad glass under pretence of being German sheet 
60 
and claiming the sheet drawback. The prevention of fraud was the main 
justification for both these acts and yet the real reason seems to have 
been quite differente Both acts in essence protected the majority of window 
glass manufacturers from an ingen4. ous, patent taken out by James HartLey in 
1838 which threatened to disrupt-Alie whole home flat glass market. 
Hartley, as we have seen,,, was a crucial figure in the introduction of 
sheet glass into this country in-1832.1, He understood the cylinder process 
thoroughly and embodied his understanding in a patent of 1838 for an 
improved method of manufacturing broad glass. 
61, The method he patented 
was indeed an improvement on the. traditional broad glass process but taken 
as a whole it closely resembled the recently introduced sheet glass process 
mainly in that, 
'broad 
glass had, traditionallyýbeen blown in an elliptical or 
cone shaped bulb and Hartley6s, broad, glass, jike sheet and like blown-plate, 
was blown in a cylinder. Hartley recognised the similarities with sheet 
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and took care to point out in his patent that there were distinct differ- 
ences between his broad glass and sheet glass and that these were clearly 
defined by the existing legislation Hartley claimed that the provision 
of 1832 permitting the annealing arch used for sheet glass to have two 
mouths had created a legislative distinction between the modes of manu- 
facturing broad glass and sheet glass. This distinction, he noted, had 
been preserved in the 1838 act consolidating and amending the glass laws 
and furthermore this act had made the additional distinction that broad 
glass should be split and spread whilst hot and "'if allowed to become cool 
before the same is cut andopened it shall be deemed and taken to be German 
sheet and charged duty accordingly". Hartley therefore argued that any 
glass that was split whilst hot and annealed in an arch with one mouth, 
whether or not it was, blown in a cylinder or a cone, was technically broad 
glass and should be charged the, low broad glass duty. 
It was an ingenious but quite valid argument and one which at first 
the officers supervising his, house at Sunderland_accepted. However in 
January 1839 Hartley received notice from the Board in London that a sur- 
charge was to be imposed on his broad glass which would bimg it up to the 
level of German sheet, and-in future it would be charged as such. In a 
virtual repetition of, the 1750 conflict over an improved broad glass,. Hartley 
appealed tolhe local magistrates who decided that he had not technically 
manufactured German sheet and discharged him of the surcharge, presumably 
echoing the feelings of the justices in 1750 that to dootherwise would be 
to discourage ingenuity.. The, only resort for the Board of Excise was to 
remove the issue from the magistrates and try Hartley in the Exchequerý 
which they were encouraged to do by, a powerful re7inforcement-. to their case 
against Hartley which came in February 1839.62 This was a memorial signed 
by all the otherYindow glassmanufacturers in the country; Cookson, the 
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Newcastle Company and all the north east firms., the Chance Brotherso 
Pilkingtons, Dumbarton, Lucas Coathupe of Nailsea and the three . 
Lancashire crown firms. All noted with alarm the Sunderland magistrates, 
actions and claimed that the admission of Hartleyts glass at a low rate of 
duty was a serious threat-to the revenue. Their main concern was ostensibly 
the fraud that would arise, when Hartley*s glass was exported as German sheet 
for they claimed that it was "equal to German sheet and could be sold as 
such and not be distinguished if offered for export". It seems far more 
likely, that their real concern was the competition that they were bound to 
suffer if Hartley*s glass entered the market at a lower price. The difference 
in price was substantial; compared to 2 shillings per foot for German sheet, 
Hartley sold his glass at 9d per foot or 8d in squares. If it really was 
I- 
equal to German sheet then there is no doubt that it would have swept the 
market and both crown and German sheet manufacturers would have suffered 
greatly. 
As a remedy the manufacturers suggested an Act of Parliament be 
brought in with the following clause: 
that no glass shall come under the description of broad or 
spread glass6nless it shall be made as broad or spread glass 
wastsually made previously to 1838, that is blown in conical- 
form, opened whilst hot on sand, spread on sand and immediately 
put in an annealing arch with one mouth, nor unless the narrow 
end of the sheet when spread shall be less than ýi of the widthof 
the broad end. 
The Excise did not recommend this clause to the Treasury "from its tendency 
to check improvements in the manufacture and also. -from the facility which 
attempts to regulate a scientific process by minute legislative definitions 
are in many cases evaded". Nevertheless this was almost word for word 
what was put in the 1839 act,, - As the Excise predicted, Hartley did manage 
to get round this legislation with the result , that in 1840 the duty on 
11 
broad glass was raised. 
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A judgement on this episode -whether it was Hartley being unfairly 
cunning, or the other manufacturers being unfair in using the excise to 
protect their own personal interests- all hinges on the question of whether 
Hartley*s glass was in fact German-sheet. - Hartley insisted that his glass 
was not equal to German sheet, it was inferior, and the evidence of the 
excise returns after 1840 indicate that this in fact was the case. Hartley 
claimed that because his glass was inferior, if the duty was equalised 
German sheet would easily drive him out of the market which is exactly 
what happened. The broad glass duty was raised in 1840 and in 1842 pro- 
duction ceased completely. 
With the benefit of this hindsight the whole episode seems to be 
another case where the Board made an error of judgement. The united 
opposition of the other manufacturers to Hartley is perhaps understandable 
but the Board*s attitude is less so. Even before the other manufacturers 
had made their feelings knownj the Board seems to have acted on the 
intuitive feeling that if the glass was as good as the more expensive types 
then it should pay the higher duty, But this was quite' contrary to the 
whole history of the glass excise. The whole I tax was ba - sed on artificial 
divisions between the various categories which, over the years had developed 
into clearly defined legal distinctions. Within these distinctions the 
manufacturer was, in theory, free to alter and improve his product as he 
wished. Hartley was within the prescribed limits, and in ignoring these 
limits and seeking to charge him with the higher duty, it was reallythe 
ý' Cr'r A Broad of Excise which was not acting by the accepted rules; as Hartley was 
well aware: 
It is fallacious to pretend that 
J 
if it is as good as germ 
, 
an sheet 
it should be charged a'S'german sheet. It frequently happens that a 
manufacturer can manufacture better than another$ it has never been 
considered that his superiority subjects the-article to a higher 
duty instead of giving the fair benefit to the manufacturer. 
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(iii) The-1835 report and the repeal of the glass duties 
What is perhaps most surprising about the repeal of the glass duties 
is why it took so long, As we have seen the beginning of the process can 
be set as far back as 1830 when the duties were firmly denounced as one of 
the most objectional taxes in the financial structure of the country. The 
Whigs came to power in 1830 and in their first administration 
, 
the Parnellites 
were given prominent positions; Poulett Thomson was made vice-president of 
the Board of Trade, and Lord Althorp9who was also sympathetic towards 
Parnell9s ideas, became the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was inevitable 
that financial reform should soon be attempted and highly likely that this 
would include the repeal of the glass duties and this came in the budget 
of 1831 which was an ambitious attempt to realise the theories of Financial 
Reform, indeed Althorp credited Parnell in his budget speech. Under Althorp2s 
original budget proposals the taxes on tobacco, newspapers, small coals, 
auctions, printed cottonss candles and glass were all to be substantially 
reduced. This would leave a deficit of fl3j170,000 which was partly to be 
made up the imposition of taxes on the transfer of property, steam boats 
and Canadian timber. Unfortunately the magnitude of these proposals proved 
too much for Parliament to accept. Such was the strength of the 'opposition 
to the proposed changes, in particular the tax on the transfer of property$ 
that after three days of stormy debate Althorp was forced to revise his 
budget by dropping the property tax and the reductions on the tobacco and 
glass duties. 
The 1831 budget highlighted the formidable gap between the theories 
on which the budget wa's based and the politi I cal reality in which it had to 
stand. Looking at the debates on the budget with the glass fax in mind it 
.t 
is impossible not'to remark on how little attention was paid, to glass and 
how great a comparison this was to the attention it had attracted from the 
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theorists. To judge from Thomson and Parnell the glass tax was one of 
the most oppressive and offensive in the country yet judging 
from the 
debate on the budget this view was not widely shared. Virtually the only 
mention of glass in the initial debate came from Mr. Goulburn, the 
M. P. for Armagh. 
63 
With respect to the repeal of the tax on glass he should say nothing 
more than that he took it that whatever was gained by the people in 
glass would be lost in timber. - 
This was hardly an approval. The only explanation for this apparent lack 
of interest in that the glass tax was not an issue on which disinterested 
M. P. s felt strongly and there was no body of support for its repeal in the 
House. Thus in view of the positive feelings from various interests on the 
property tax and the tax on timber, the proposals for its repeal could be 
said to have actually lacked support. 
This general lack of support is corroborated by a speech of Matthias 
Attwood against the Budget on 14th February. Although this was the very day 
that Althorp dropped his glass proposals, the speech had evidently been 
prepared beforehand and was delivered unaltered. As Attwood9s two brothers 
Charles and Benjamin were glass manufacturers in Newcastle and Sunderlandp 
it is perhaps possib le to see in this speech some reflection of the 
attitude of the manufacturers themselves towards repeal: 
1 -1 1 
The noble Lord, -said he meant to take the tax off glass - did that' 
manufa6ture, then-I abour under any serious oppression? He believed 
not, nor did he believe that any immediate benefit would result from 
taking off the tax. It was one of which no individual complained. 
Glass, it was now expected, was to be exported in, large quantities; 
but that would be at a distant period. The stream of prosperity 
would not flow quite so fast as the right honourable member, the Vice- 
President of'the Board of Trade (Poulett Thomson) supposed. 
Attwood also attacked the government for not making up its mind sooner, which 
had thrown the glass trade into confusion. He said he knew for a fact that 
manufactories had been forced to stop whilst they awaited a government decision 
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on whether the tax was to continue or not. This is confirmed by several 
petitions to the Treasury from various glass manufacturers duking - 1831 
and 1832 all asking to be allowed to bond glass in warehouses and pay duty 
64 
as it is sold rather than as it is manufactured. One of the most urgent 
on 
came from the Edinburgh and Leith Company which petitioned A the matter 
several times: 
For the last twelve months your petitioners have * 
found it to be 
prudent and even necessary in anticipation of the abolition of the 
duties imposed on that article to suspend the manufacture entirely 
...... since it became known that the alteration and probable 
abolition of these duties was intended it is impossible to effect 
sales in proportion to the make. 
It has already been mentioned that the government9s uncertainty over repeal 
caused considerable problems for glass manufacturers throughout the 1830s. 
What were the reasons for the long delay between the abortive attempt 
at repeal in 1831 and the actual repeal in 1845? The duty had been soundly 
condemned by the prevailing economic doctrineland the government of the day 
had expressed its desire to see that doctrine put into practice, but after 
1831 no further attempts were made by the Whigs substantially to reduce or 
abolish the glass tax even though, thanks to surpluses in the revenue until 
1836, many other excise taxes were repealed. The only apparent explanation 
is simply that the pressure for repeal was not there,, either in Parliament 
or the electorate. Without this positive pressure repeal was not feasible 
since the Whigs had no wish to introduce controversial measures which 
might alienate or divide the House and threaten theirýmore important reforms. 
The reductions made on the excises on soap, starch and candles all enjoyed 
positive support. - -Besides which,, as these other excise duties were reduced 
so the importance of the glass'duties to the Treasury increased (Fig. 21). 
This point was made quite clearly, with perhaps some embarrassment, by 
Althorp in 1832: 66 
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Figure 21: Net glass duty ar a 116 of total excise returns, 1813 2 
Glass Excise 
r. 
Total Excise 
ZWO., 000 
Glass at % of total 
1813 5009850 25.9 1.93 
1814 5309791 27.5 1.93 
1815 473,780 29.5 1.60 
1816 353pl88 29.5 1.20 
1817 4619849 26.9 1.72 
1818 584p399 23; 2 2.52 
1819 606j176 24.4 2.30 
1820 500,, 595 26.5 1.89 
1821 521$075 29.6 1.76 
1822 599,029 29.9ý, 1.87 
1823 6079378 29.1 2.09 
1824 728,342 27.2 2.68 
1825 772,303 28.5 2.70 
1826 720#920 22.6 3.19 
1827 699,726 20.8 3.64 
1828 752,097 20*0 3.76 
1829 609,, 406 22.2 2.74 
1830 5429261 21.0 2.58 
1831 531,718 20.0 2.66 
1832 5589423 17.5 3.19 
1833 645v781, 
. 
17.9 3.61 
1834 664,391 17.7 3.75 
1835 6409149 16.1 3.98 
1836 6639162 14.4 4.60 
1837 608,993 15.7 3.88 
1838 667,998 14.6 4.57 
1839 691,467 14.8 4.67 
1840 7249343 14.6 4.96 
1841 6139588 14.9 4.12 
1842 5639347 14.8 3.80 
the 
Mr. Dixon asked if the noble Lord intended to reduce A duties on glass. 
Some time ago he had stated that he did not mean to reduce them immed- 
iately but many people were anxious to know and hoped at least a year's 
warning would be given. Lord Althorp said he had not the least intention 
to meddle with the duty on glass. He believed it would be a great 
advantage to get rid of1hat duty, but unfortunately the revenue could 
not bear the loss of the sum it produced. 
Why was the demand for repeal not there? It seems unlikely that even 
had the manufactures been passionately opposed to the duties they would have 
been able to 
I interest sufficient M*Pes to force the issue in Parliament buts 
from the evidence of the 1835 Commissiong the manufacturers - with the 
exception of the flint glass manufactures - were not passionately opposed 
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to the duties. They were certainly not opposed to the general principle 
of an excise on glass. 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Excise on Glass of 
1835, is an interesting document quite apart from the factual information 
it contains. The Commissioners appointed by the government were Henry 
Whickham, Henry Berens and Henry Parnell and there is no doubt that they 
embarked upon the enquiry with strong theoretical convictions and a pre- 
disposition to find the tax objectionable. Their report is finashamedly 
partisan with much talk of the tax's "objectionable nature", "injurious 
effects". "evil consequences" and "artifical obstacles". Indeed they dwelt 
so heavily on its injurious effects th&t it was obviously felt to be prudent 
to forestall any criticism of this: 
It may perhaps be objected that we have dwelt upon arguments which 
may be urged against the very existence of the tax instead of con- 
fining ourselves to the suggestion'of modifications or improvements 
in the manner of its collection. 
They had evidently been made aware that the governmentts intention was not 
to repeal the tax and to make their recommendations accordingly. This they 
did and presented the government with suggestions for altering the tax; 
however they could not resist making their real recommendation quite clear: 
The recommendatiom which in former pageswe have submitted for a 
reduction of these duties have been so submitted solely on the 
grounds that circumstances may at present exist to prevent the 
concession of a total repeal; and we therefore conclude by urging 
the expediency of that repeal at the earliest possible period and 
by expressing our opinion-that no tax can combine more objections 
more Lt or beAa variance with all sound principles. of*taxation than this 
tax on glass. 
Although the commissioners themselves had no hesitation in condemning 
the glass duty, what is interesting about the 1835 report is that their 
views were evidently-not shared by many of the glass manufacturers from 
whom they took evidence. The evidence of the glass manufacturers threw up 
a mass of practical details which quite overwhelmed and in some cases 
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confounded the commissioners* theory of injudicious taxation. In trying 
to reconcile the reality to their theory the commissioners occ, -as#onally 
resorted to a rather patronising tone towards the manufacturers. For instance, 
on the subject of vexatious regulations: 
The proprietors of the highest class of establishment become from habit 
so much reconciled to the interference with their business occasioned 
by the Excise regulations as not to appear sensible of the disadvantage 
and inconvenience which they actually suffer by those means". 
The regulations hadl in fact, been described as "unexceptionable" and 
"of no annoyance" by, all the manufacturers almost without exception and their 
unanimous opinion was that whilst the duty remained they were an invaluable 
part of the system; they were essential as a guard against fraud. 
The main way in which the Commissioners did manage to fit the details 
to the theory was to draw most of their conclusions from the flint glass trade 
where the evidence did tend to corroborate their ideas. The duties did 
oppress flint glass far more than any other-branch and it was the only branch 
where the manufacturers were pressing for total repeal - on practical rather 
than theoretical grounds it should be said. In concentrating on the flint 
glass trade,, the Commissioners often tended to ignore contradictory evidence 
from the other trades. For instance on the question of experiments and 
improvements, much evidence had emerged from the flint glass examinations 
on how impossible it was to experiment with possible improvements under the 
strict excise regulations. This was not complained of by the other branches 
and when R. L. Chance was asked to confirm the flint manufacturerst evidence 
he was sceptical of their claims: 
I am very incredulous about that. 9 because we are equally surrounded by 
excise men yet we make experiments of which they are as ignorant as 
the man in the moon. 
Nevertheless the prevention of improvement was one of the heads under which 
the glass tax as a whole was condemned by the Commissioners. 
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The difficulty facing the Commissioners was basically that they 
and the manufacturers shared little common ground. The manufacturers 
were entirely concerned with, the practical, only a few showed any inclin- 
ation to frame their answers in language that would lend itself to theo- 
retical conclusions or to be (: onsistent in their views. This is well 
illustrated in the evidence of a ra nuf acturer such as R. T. Shortridge who 
worked in more than one branch. As a flint glass manufacturer he was for 
total repeal and considered the duties a real check on consumption, as a 
crown glass manufacturer he didn9t find the duties oppressive nor did he 
think that consumption would be increased if they were reduced. None of the 
crown glass manufacturers. thought that the duties checked consumption and 
all mentioned the window tax, as more depressing in this respect. Nowhere 
is there any indication that the manufacturers shared the Commissioners, 
views on taxation, and only in, the evidence of the flint glass manufacturers 
Thomas Hawkes, Thomas Badger and Apsley Pellat is there even an awareness 
of wider arguments about the'nature of, a, country9s taxation; but even with 
these men the practical outweighed, the theoretical. 
The Commissioners" task was to generalise and arrive at definite 
conclusions, and they cannot fairly be criticised for the inevitable 
selectiveness that'this involved. It would certainly be perverse to suggest 
that, in order to confirm their existing opinions, the Commissioners 
distorted the evidence put before them to an unacceptable. degree. However 
it is worth pointing out firstly that their existing opinions did affect 
their questioning of the manufacturers, and secondly,, that-their report gave 
greater prominence to evidence from the flint glass trade than any other 
branch of the industry. 
The strongly critical report was published in 1835 and resulted not 
in the repeal of the tax but in modifications which were consolidated in an 
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Act of 1838 "to consolidate and amend the laws on glass" (I & 2V c. 44). 
7bis Act enacted many of the commissioners* recommendations including the 
reduction of the bottle duty and the repeal of many old and obsolete 
regulations. At the second reading of the Bill Mr. Fitzstephen French 
renewed the call for the total repeal ýof the tax. 
67 Denouncing the tax as 
Itunjust in its principlesp vexatious in the details of its operation and 
pernicious in its ef f ects upon the -health of the people". he was at a loss 
to explain the governmentIs reluctance to embrace total repeal considering 
that both the President of the Board of Trade and the Commissioners that tie 
government had itself appointed had strongly condemned the tax. In reply 
the Chancellor, Francis Baring, avoided an explanation of the government9s 
lack of action over repeal but made it quite clear that the tax was to 
continue and this was why1he Bill had been introduced, to make the duty 
'$as little as possible vexatious to the trader". 'He made no mention of the 
possibility of future repeal. The 1838 Act was, and was certainly s. 6en at 
the time asq a clear indication from the Whigs Ihat tle glass tax was not 
to be repealed in the immediate future; that despite its unsati9factory nature 
it was indispensible asýa source of revenue. By the hte 1830s the surplus. in 
the revenue that had enabled several other excise duties to be repealed 
during the first half of the decade had become a deficit and repeal of any 
further taxes was out of the question. 
In view of the Whig*s initial, espovsal of the cause of repeal it is 
ironic that the glass duties, should finally have met their end under Peel. 
Peel had come into contact with the excise on glass at various times during 
his career: in 1834 he had voiced his dislike of the tax in Parliament. 
68 
in 1835, as Home Secretary, he had received the deputation of flint glass 
manufacturers. There is no'doubt that his move to repeal the glass tax 
stemmed from his conviction that--the internal tax was a particularly harmful 
- 
and restrictive onet but he was almost certainly encouraged by the fact 
that it also affected the customs duties on imported glass and thus 
concerned a policy of free trade. William Huskisson had already encountered 
the effect of the excise duties on the customs, duties in 1825 when his 
Customs Consolidation Bill had -proposed a considerable reduction on the 
duties on imported glass, in particular on glass bottles which at that time 
were subject to a duty amounting -to more than half the value of the wine 
they contained. Huskisson was reluctantly forced to drop this measure, in 
order to continue the protection of the home manufacturer, and admit that 
"foreign bottles must still be taxed in reference to the excise duty". 
69 
In 1840 the connection between the excise and customs duties on glassv&s 
also mentioned by the Select Commission on the Import Duties in the evidence 
of J. McGregor who, predictably, concluded that the customs duties were an 
unnecessary protection. His evidence included a comment on the attitude ' 
of the British glass manufacturers themselves towards protective duties: 
70 
The glass manufacturers are among the very few who ask for the 
protective duties ... most of them, as far as it appears to me, a8k 
forprotectbn from ignorance of the matter. 
In fact, as we shall seel British glass manufacturers were quite correct to- 
f eel apprehensive about the possibility of sudden competition from glass 
industries which had developed a quite different character to their own. 
Free trade was an integral part of Peel*s vision of commercial 
prosperity and must have. influenced his attitude towards the internal glass 
duties. But the mainspring of repeal was certainly his conviction that in 
themselves they were oppressive to the home industry and indeed the countryts 
prosperity as a whole. Repeal was announced in the budget of 1845 and the 
revenue deficit that would result was to be made up by direct taxation, 
namely the continuation of the Income Tax and the Property Tax. Peelts 
attitucAe- towards taxation was made quite clear in his budget speech: 
71 
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althotUh direct taxes were unpleasant they were less onerous on the 
community and on the country than taxes such as the glass tax which 
oppressed industry, restricted consumption and damaged the countryts 
prosperity. Indeed Peel optimistically envisaged that the boost to the 
countryts prosperity that the repeal of indirect taxes such as the glass 
tax would produce would enable, the. direct taxes to be dispensed with within 
a few years. A Bill to repeal the- glass duties was brought into the House 
in April 1845. It passed- in May 1845 but the provisions were not to take 
effect until May 1846 leaving the trade ample time to make the necessary 
adjustments. 
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The Effect on the Industry 
I 
The image of the glass tax that has come down to posterity is almost 
entirely that of the political economists, through the writings of Parnell 
and McCulloch and the Report-of the 1835 Commissioners. The phrase from tle 
Report "No tax can combine more objections or be more at variance with 
all sound principles of taxation-than this duty on glass" is the most 
frequently quoted when the duties. are mentioned. The unqualified condem- 
nation of the political economists is perhaps inadequate fully to do justice 
to the real effects of a complex and-double-edged tax. However it is 
inevitable that a discussion of these effects will be based on the specific 
criticisms they made. The 1835 Report summed up these criticisms under 
four heads. The tax was objectionall e) firstly, because it operated as a 
direct tax on industry. Under this head they included the effects on labour 
and capital, the artifical addition made to the price and the check on 
consumption. They also mentioned the hardship suffered by the manufacturer 
because of the regulations and the fear of prosecution. The second head 
was that it prevented the free progress of improvement and inventions 
Thirdly, it was not lucrative to the government because the costs of manage- 
ment were high and. a substantial proportion of the duties was drawn back. 
Fourthly, its high rate drove capital into I fraudulent channels which again 
constituted a loss to the revenue. The last two heads concerned the 
revenue -more than the 
industry but the first two provide as good a framework 
as any for considering the way in which the industry was affected by the 
imposition of the excise. 
The Commissioners admitted that their Report concentrated only on the 
later years of the duty and ignored the earlier period. They justified 
this on the gmunds that to discuss the earlier period would take too long. 
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It is inevitable however that any such discussion will (cncentrate on the 
later period. This is the period for which most information is available 
and further,.. more it is arguable that the effects of the duty on the industr/ 
intensified in direct relation to the increases in the rates of duty. From 
1745 to 1777 the effects appear to have been minimal - slight inconveniences 
to the manufacturer. and a slight increase in price passed completely on to 
the ccn sumer. From 1777 Ahe ef f ects developed more complex and unpredictable 
aspects but it was certainly, the period following the imposition of double 
duties that saw the greatest distortion to the industry from the duties; 
it saw the industry having to adapt to an economic context that was largely 
of the duty's making. 
(i) Finance and Capital 
A contemporary criticism of taxes on manufacture was that when a tax 
was raised a larger capital was required which thus tended to exclude 
small capitals from entering the trade. There is evidence of a tendency 
towards large capitals in certain branches of the glass trade but whether 
this was a direct consequence of the excise is debata6le , The tendency 
was more pronounced in flat glass - 
than flint glass or bottles but 
this was fundamentally a reflection of the dif f erent natures of the 
different-branches rather than sometling for which the duties were directly 
responsible. The existence'of the duty had the effect of emphasising 
certain already existing features of the capital structure of the industry 
but does not seem to, have been, in itself, extraordinarily signi ficant. 
It certainly did not, cause the complete exclusion of smaller capitals from 
the trade. It did though have the effect of creating larger capital require- 
ments than the nature of the various branches of the industry would other- 
wise have demanded. 
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There were two main ways, in which the duty did create larger capital 
requirements. Firstly, and most importantly, money for the duty had to be 
paid to the crown every, six weeks (four weeks in London) which placed a 
permanent demand on the circulating capital of the manufacturer. Secondly, 
capital was required to conform 'to the statutory regulations. The regulations 
demanded that the manufacturer provide locks,, weighing rooms, iron gratings, 
scales etc. at his own expense. They also increased his wage bill by making 
it necessary to hire extra hands to weig h and pack'the glass. 
Of the two demands on capital the first was certainly the greater. It 
was not made any easier to meet by the traditional marketing structure of 
the trade which depended on long credit being extended to the glass merchants 
and wholesalers. Charles Mulvaney, a Dublin flint glass manufacturer, told 
the 1835 Commission of this difficulty. 
We make a constant and heavy advance to the Crown of a considerable 
capital; in our own individual ' case most usually of 
Z2,000 or more. 
From the nature of our trade we are obliged to allow six, nine and 
twelve months credit whilst we are under peremptory obligation to 
pay to the government'in specie every six weeks the duty charged on 
the objects disposed of. 
As the firm expanded so this difficulty increased in size. Cookson, for 
instanceswas by the 1830s having to advance Z70,000 a year from his various 
concerns to the government for duty. When trade was brisk this was manageable 
but in periods of slackness it could be a severe problem as the petitions 
to the Treasury in the early 1830s asking to bcnd glass attest. These 
petitions make it clear that the problem of finding duty could not be over- 
come simply by cutting back the production. as6he cost of manufacture was 
relaýed to the quantity produced. ro cut back would increase the proportional 
cost and therefore the manufacturers felt forced to continue manufacturing 
at their full capacity even whenthe glass was, not selling and thus faced 
the problem of finding sufficient cash to, pay, the duty. 
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In a normal state of trade it is easy to see that the problem of 
advancing cash in duty would weigh less heavily on a large, well established 
firm with a large capital behind it,. than on a smaller one. The well est- 
ablished firm would almost certainly have a more stable marketing structure, 
perhaps supplying one or two*well established merchants who could be relied 
on to remit payments regularly. , John Delaval9s Northumberland Bottle works, 
for instance,, sent most of, the- production to a sirg le bottle warehouse in 
London. In thecarly-years of, this arrangement ýDelaval- solved the problem 
of bridging the gap between payments f ror" the. merchant and payment to the 
Excise by paying the duty with drafts on his London merchant, Charles 
Broughton. The Excise accepted this method of payment until Broughton 
went bankrupt and then- it. appears to have required payment to be made in 
cash at the bottle works itself. This factory was a large one and payments 
from London were regular; yet there were periods, for instance when bad 
weather prevented the bottle ships from returning to the, North, when cash 
was low at the factory and the excise payments became a problem. In these 
situations the advantagesp not so much of. being a large, firm but being a 
firm owned by a man of, extremely large capital)can clearly be seen. Because 
of his wealth Delaval-was- able to choose from a. number of options 
available to him to overcome the cash problem. He could use his estate 
rents to pay the excise bill; he'could send up bills from his London bank 
into which his rents were'usually deposited; he could get short-term credit 
from the local banks or-indeed any local source of available cash. Thus 
72 in 1783 Delaval's agent wrote to- 111m: 
The excise is due and we are not provided--for, it. The collector will 
not wait till I come from Ford, (with, the estate rents) on,. the, 25thj 
however as the time is so short Mr. ýSurtees onLhis own account-will do 
it independent of the'bank if'your Lordship approves and gives, him 
directions to do so which I can-repay him the money, or any, way-your 
Lordship directs or if it please your Lordship-to send up a bill. 
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A firm of large capital was also favoured by being abLe to make use 
of the servicesof a bank. During the nineteenth century the problem of 
filling the gap between remittances and duty payments could be overcome by 
a bank agreeing to enter into a. bond with the Excise to remit the duties 
for the manufacturer. But this was only undertaken when, as one Newcastle 
bank described it, "the risk of trusting the manufacturer complied with that 
of a sufficiently large depo. sit with our London bankers and the necessity 
of a gentlýnan of large property being bound for the due performance of 
our engagement to the Excise ". This 
73 
was written to the Board of Excise 
in 1830 in an effort to persuade them against reducing the time in which 
the bills were payable from the usual thirty days. The bank discounted the 
manufacturers* bills on the London'dealers and acc, epted his cheques to 
the Excise on which it gained 20 
_days 
interest. The profit was not large; 
on a bill of f. 2,000 which was Ahe weekly, average of the bills to the Excise,, 
the profit, deducting stamps-, and. the London bankers commissionv was only 
Z2 7s which "is sufficientl 
, mall that no bank of respect ought to under- yis 
takeit for a smaller renumeration". It was in the Bank*s interest to 
promote the interests of the, excised manufacturers but it felt that a 
reduction of the, credit period to twenty or even, ten days date would leave 
it so little profit that it would have to charge the manufacturer for 
providing the service; at present it was free. This was suggested as a reason 
for not reducing the 30 days date. 
We could remit the bills. at 20 days nay even 10 days but ..... we 
should be obliged, to indemnify ourselves by our charges. to the 
manufacturers. By the present system he is not only exempt from 
any such expense but actually receives a bonus of 10 days interest 
upon all his London bills and this chiefly because the Excise'duties 
are drawn from here in bills. payabl'e at 30 days date. Were they 
drawn at any date shorter he would lose that'advantage, but whether 
the government would 
- 
be, more benefited by a reduction of the dates 
of the Excise bills than injured in any way by pressing upon the manu- 
facturers at a period when diminution of the duties is a proof of their 
present depression is a question on'which we do not venture to express 
an opinion. 
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It is hard to put specific figures on the amount or proportion of 
capital that was diverted into paying the duty but in his evidence 
to the 
1835 Comission William Cuthbert mentioned more than once that the English 
manufacturer had to employ three fi: mes' thýe' capital of his foreign counter- 
part. Abroad, he maintained, they could carry on trade with U0,000 as 
well as could be done here with f-30,000. 
'ý' 'He specifically mentioned the 
duty on timber and bricks as contributing to the high cost of building in 
England; but also pointed out "it is not only in the buildings but the 
capital involved in payment of duty". In'the sane report Apsley Pellatt 
put a figure on the amount of capital taken up by the extra servants and 
equipment called for by the duty. The extra- servants alone cost him U. 000 
a year and the total cost of the regulations he estimated as 5% of the total 
capital employed; this was in, addition to the capital employed in paying 
the duty. Pellatt was in no doubt that, "capital for duty is employed use- 
lessly and worse than uselessly recently, in as much as the honest trader 
has been selling at a loss through the comPetition of the fraudulent 
manufacturers". The extra demand- on capital was obviously there but how 
significant was it in restricting the'trade to large capitalists only? 
One would imagine that the-tendency towards large capital undertakings would 
be most pronounced in the flint and plate trades since these were the two 
branches that paid the highest rates of duty. Though the exclusion of 
small capitals does-appear 
I to be the case with plate it certainly does. not 
in flint. If one'can take'the-figures of duty, paid in'i832 (Appendix I) as 
some indication of the'size of the various flint glass firms then it is 
clear that single houses with'small productions'were the rule rather than 
the exception. ' This isconfirmed in the north-east where the flint glass 
houses were not, as a rulel'undertaken by men of large capital as the 
window glass houses were. ' The owners were men of"middling so6ial'status; 
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George Stevenson of the Carr Hill works had 6e'en' the manager of Joseph 
Lamb*s larger Northumberland Company and George Sowerby had also come to own 
his New Stourbridge house after being'the'clerk under its previous owner. 
Neither Joseph Price of Gateshead noi William Booth of Sunderland appear to 
have had any other large capit'al interests and they were certainly not members 
of the coal owning aristocracy. The comparatively modest means of the men 
who entered the flint glass trade is, perhaps also borne out by the fact 
that flint glass houses tended to change hands far more frequently than 
other glass concerns, Even with 
I 
plate glass it seems unlikely that the duty 
had a significant effect, for plate gl. ass was by nature an undertaking 
that required an exceptionally large capital. Even the 1835 Commissinners 
recognised that: 
-1 
From the nature of the manufacture of plate glass it cai be 
carried on successfully only in extensive establishments' and by the 
application of large capital; and we should add that in this instance 
the natural tendency of the trade'to remain in few hands is- not 
artificially increased by the regulations of the Excise relating to 
the manufacture, as was, the case until-a recent period with respect 
to the manufacture of British spirits. 
It seems fair to say. that the excise did create an extra demand on capital 
but that this was not significant enough to alter the basic capital require- 
ments of the various branches of the industry; that it did not act as a 
discouragement to comparatively small capitals to enter branches such as 
flint and bottle which, by nature were accessible to smaller capitals. Where 
the trade was carried on by comparatively ýew. co, ncerns, for instance with 
plate and crown glass, this was more a reflection of other factors rather 
than the duty, though the duty did perhaps emphasise them. Crown glass, like 
plate, could only be_carried on'profitably in extensive establishments with 
large productionsItherefore theýinitialýcapital requirement was high 
Because of the importance of'the quality of-the mateii als glass houses tended 
to stay concentrated in well established areas and therefore prospective 
entrants were to a certain extent limited by the capital'available in that 
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area. New entry into the industry was also limited by the shortage of 
skilled workmen and managers. It seems more likely that it was these more 
basic tendencies that concentrated the flat glass industry in a few large 
scale enterprises rather than the artificial effects of the excise. 
If the excise was not extraordinarily significant in affecting the 
basic capital requirements of the glass industry could it be argued that it 
did have an effect in limiting growth in the industry? There are two ways 
in which one can see that it might have had an ef f ect. Firstly by discouraging 
investment in fixed capital and secondly bylreducing the level of profits 
that should theoretically have been ploughed back into the firm. The demands 
that the excise made were -entirely on 
the manufacturer9s circulating capital) 
therefore one can see an obvious tendency not to transform circulating to 
fixed capital and thus not to, expand by building more glass houses as 
quickly as he might otherwise have done. It is perhaps significant in 'this 
respect that maýij'of'the large 'glass manufacturers, the ones that did expand 
their works. had alternative sources of capital. As for reducing profits, 
if the evidence to the 1835 Commission is to be believed, many of the manu- 
facturers were being forced to p ay the duty with money they considered 
should have been their profit, partly as a result of low prices established 
by fraudulent manufacturers who evaded the duty. The most memorable 
evidence in this respect was that of Alexander Turnbull of the Edinburgh 
and Leith Company who told the Commissioners that on their capital of 
U359000 ther4had been m dividend for the past 80 years. 
However,, although the duties did perhaps have some effect-in limiting 
growth in the industryp the idea that they were extraordinarily significant 
should again be, approached with caution. The basic nature of the glass 
industry was not one_that suited or permitted fast growth. This was due 
to factors already mentioned, the shortage of skilledýworkmen I and managers) 
- 421 - 
the few suitable areas,, -the 
difficulty of entering the industry from 
scratch because of the notorious unpredittability of newly built glass 
houses. The most usual way for new capital to enter the industry was to 
take over an existing house with an existing workforce. Returns of licences 
taken out by glass manufacturers (Figure 22) give atseful indication of 
growth in the industry from 1785 to 1837. It can hardly be said to be 
spectacular but this almost certainly reflects its basic nature rather than 
the weight of the excise duties it dragged with it. The industry could 
not produce a fast growth and this is to some degree confirmed by a 
comparison with the glass industry of Prussia. Prussia was a country of 
approximately the same size as Great BritaLn with an equally well established 
glass industry going back many centuries, and during the 1830s the number 
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of glass houses was roughly the same; 96 in 1831 and 107 in 1834. 
(ii) Articles, price and, _consumption 
The excise had a direct and an indirect effect on the -type of article 
produced by the manufacturer. The direct effect involved the definition of 
the type and size of the glass by certain statutory regulations. These wem 
usually designed to protect one branch of the industry from another that paid 
a lower rate of duty. For instance bottle -metal was not permitted to be made 
into bottles of less than "a reputed half pint" (6 ounces) interior capa6ity, 
to protect the flint manufacturer*s trade in phials; this was called an 
"unnatural" trade for bottles. Crown or plate glass was not permitted to 
be made thicker than again to protect flint glass; on the continent wine 
glasses and cheap articles were made from the cheap soda window glass. 
When Cookson tried to make thick glass 'ýbullseyeil for ships from his plate 
glass he was stopped 'on the complaints of the flint glass manufacturers. 
German sheet was not permitted, to be made thicker, than 1,8-11 to prevent it 
being polished and exported as plate claiming the higher plate drawback. 
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Figure 22: Glass houses licensed by the Excise, 1785-1837 and types of 
Ticensed glass houses2 1829-1832.14 - 
England Scotland Ireland 
1785 
1786 
1787 
1788 
1789 
1790 
1791 
1792 
1793 
1794 
1795 
1796 
1797 
1798 
1799 
1800 
1801 
1802 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
1811 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 
1816 
1817 
1818 
1819 
1820 
1821 
1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 
1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
61 8 
61 8 
64 10 
69 8 
69 11 
72 16 
77 16 
76 14 
76 11 
73 15- 
78 13 
78 13 
80 16 
77 13 
80 9 
82 13 
81 13 
87 15 
93 17 
96 
95 12 
93 11 
93 9 
105 12 
96 14 
93 14 
102 16 
89 15 
88 16 
97 
101 
95 14 
94 12 
94 15 
94 15 
94, 11 
87 11 
84 11 
89 14 
'100 
12 
107 1ý 9 
109 20 11 
18 12 
18-- 12 Broad Crown 'Flint Plate Bottle 
107 -10 2 28 54 3- 42 
101 13 8 2 25 54 2 39 
102 10 9 2 24 55 2 36 
102 8 8 2 '28 59 2 39 
109 9 8 (England and Scotland only) 
107 7' 
ill 11 6 
128 -15 , 8 
131 15 9 
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These regulations were artificial yet , 
cis 
seen A necessary 
by both the Board 
and the manufacturers. Fear of competition from other branches was fre- 
quently expressed by the manufacturers toý the 1835 Commission, particularly 
in connection with the possibility of. the repeal of just one branch of the 
duty. If the flint glass duty was repealed, for 'instance. ' the window glass 
manufacturers were convinced _that, 
the flint manufacturers would turn their 
attention to making window glass. , 
The flint glass manufacturers predicted 
disaster for them if the- bottle duty, was repealed. The artificiality of tie 
strict legal distinctions was frequently, emphasised by a comparison with 
the continentkl industrys but,, they. were not something that the manufacturers 
complained of or found difficult to comply with. 
The indirect effects of , 
the duty were perhaps more difficult for the 
manufacturers to cop'e -Mos't. pressi. 
I 
ng was the fact that the duty 
weighed far more heavily on I- the ch eap"goods than on the more 'expensive 
articles. Poor quality goods bo, 
'rIe 
an 
' 
extremely high proporfLon of duty in 
their final selling pr, i ce, which, had_ t, o 
, 
be, kept, appropriately low. WM 
more expensive goods the price was higher, the duty was easily absorbed) 
and a profit was left for the manufacturer. This was emphasised over and over 
again in the 1835 Report, particularly by the flint glass manufacturers who 
produced a wide range of goods and fel, t the effects on their cheap products 
more acutely 
The disadvantages we labour under press far more heavily on the 
plainer articles .... than on a richer cut article which sells for a 
higher amount. (Joseph Price of Gateshead) 
The duty is heavier in fact on"articles of necessity than on those 
of luxury. (Mulvaney and, Irwin of'Dublin) 
Since 1826 upon the cut glass we have made a handsome profito this 
has been swallowedýup upon our, loss on the plain. I venture to say we 
have not made 2% on our capital. (Thomas Badger of Dudley) 
The reference to 1826 points to the way in which the flint manufacturers 
were doubly hit by this effect of the duty. Since the re-introduction of 
the gauge in 1825 they were compelled to manufacture poor quality goods 
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by not being ablep as they had been when the duty was on the Jear, to 
make only the best material from the pots into goods and to reflux the 
rest. In other words they were compelled to produce poor quality goods 
which were most vulnerable to competition froý'iin or earthenware and on 
which profits would be small or non-existent. From the 1835 evidence it is 
clear that most manufacturers, like Badger,, had to rýsort to selling certain 
goods at a loss and hoping to make up the profit on other items. This 
frequently led to the suspicion of fraud, Joseph Price accused a Birmingham 
manufacturer of selling stem, 'wine glasses 
at a price far beneath the rate 
of duty they paid but Shortridge'pointed out that this did not necessarily 
mean fraud had occurred:. -, 
It is a rather peculiar kind of trade, there is such a variety of 
articles and perhaps- one manufacturer has a different mode of 
calculating the cost therefore it does not absolutely follow 
that because articles are sold low there is fraud. Many manufacturers 
will perhaps sacrifice the price of an article to obtain an order 
for other articles. 
Besides tending to make life difficult ing., eneral. for the flint glass 
trade, there are two specific areas where this particular effect of the duty 
could be said to have had a significant role. The first is the collapse of 
the Irish flint glass industry after the extension of the duty to Ireland 
in 1825. From the evidence it seems certain that before 1825 the Irish 
flint glass houses were producing comparatively coarse articles for which, 
because of their low price, there was a ready market both in Ireland andt 
as smuggled goods, in England; ý-their attraction-was in their cheapness 
rather than their quality. According to Martin Cream, -a Dublin'glass 
manufacturert this poor, quality was intrinsic to Irish glass because of 
the poor quality of the materials available to them. He particularly 
mentioned the coal from Swansea, which was not able to heat the furnace 
sufficiently to cause the metal tobe in a perfect state. Thus the Irish 
glass houses had grown up to meet a demand for cheap glass and they were 
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hit inordinately hard by the imposition of the duties in 1825 which took 
away their productst main attraction. By ýhe time that the Excise 
Commissioners gathered their evidence, the results of this were quite 
apparent, at lust to the manufacturers themselves: 
There beingg generally speaking, no opulence aý10ngst us, the great 
demand was for ordinary glass: the duty has so enhanced the price that 
the great bulk of the people have substituted common English ware ' 
and tin articles of alldescriptioný A great class of consumers has 
been swept away; 
, 
the few consumers of, a, better description of glass, 
being for the greater number an impoverished gentry who still reside 
amongst usp are supplied from England and Scotland where capital is 
so assisted by cheap fuel and all the other materials used in the 
manufacture., 
Edward Ronayne of Cork 
The duty is much, felt"; particularly on the low-priced articles which 
the Irish manufacturer makes, for generally speaking all the rich-cut 
decanters and'very'heavy articles come from England 
Martin Cream of Dublin. 
The producers of poor quality'goods suffered doubly from the duties for 
not only did their market diminish as'their prices rose but they were the 
ones that encountered the most competition from the unlicensed fraudulent 
manufacturers; the "cribs" who melted down glass to fashion cheap tumblers 
or glasses. Charles Mulvaney3, the Dublin manufacturer, gave evidence that 
they suffered enormously from sUch'cOmpetitiOn in their "leading articles" 
i. e. articles in daily consumption. There' was not the same competition with 
decanters or articles of luxury oh 'whose* 'profits they were only just able 
to save themselves* At'the'moment the leading articles formed the bulk of 
their trade but he told the Commissioners that "if the Excise goes on 
we cannot continue to make these common articles ", They were presumably 
experiencing'the same combi'na'tion'of fac I tors that had driven the coarse 
manufacturers out of London. 
The second area, where the duty, ýould, besaid to have had a significant 
effect was the slowing down of the adoption of pressed glass in England. 
The early pressed glass articles were designed as imitations of cut glass 
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and were intended to be bought by those who could not afford the real 
thing, But because of the duty the price was still high and this limited 
cons=ption by the class for which the glass was intended% 
'The higher classes here will not buy our pressed or moulded goods 
and the lower class cannot afford to purchase them on account of the 
duty, although smuggled pressed'salts have a ready sale at country 
f airs. 
Apsley Pellatt to the 1835 Commission 
The technique had been able to be practised in England since 1832 but it 
was not'until the 1840s that glass manufacturers were enabled to take full 
advantage of the possibilities that it offered; it was a step towards mass 
production but this was not one worth taking until the removal of the duty 
brought a mass market into existence. 
Pressure on the cheaper end of . 
the market can also be seen in other 
branches of the industry. Crown glass, for instance, was produced in four 
qualities of which "CC" was the worst. -_,,., 
*This was usually the quality that 
Olaf. *, e 
was shipped to Ireland to A draw back-("The Irish CC 
is of so coarse a quality 
that it is seldom used in Great BritaLn" said Dixon of Dumbarton) . but there 
seems little doubt that had it been cheaper in Great Britzxýn it would have 
found a market. Curiously enough this distortion of the cheaper end of the 
market probably had the effect of creating a demand for broad glass which 
was of an even worse .. quality than the crown CC. Broad glasý, because it 
paid a lower duty, was priced more realistically and was thus able to continue 
in the market well into the nineteenth century when it should perhaps have 
been replaced with the better cpalitY crown; broad glass was essentially a 
seventeenth century window glass. Thomas Dunn told the 1835 Commission 
that if the duty were repealed he would go out of business because crown 
would then be just as cheap, implying that its present cheapness was the 
only thing that kept it in the market. 
A 
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The duty did distort the production- of cheaper articles by reducing 
the profits on them and diminishing the, consumption by raising the price 
above that to which the quality was appropriate. - -Did it then leave the 
production and consumption of the better, quality glass unaffected? With 
crown it appeamtozhave had very, little influence-on the-general trend 
towards increased consumption and increased. production. The manufacturers 
attributed all checks on consumption to, the window tax rather than the 
glass tax. William- Cuthbert, for instance, predicted that the repeal of 
the window tax would increase consumption by 30-407o whilst taking off the 
glass tax would only increase it: by!. '576. R. T. Shortridge agreed that 
consumption would not increase ? 'so- long as there is the burden of the wind(W 
tax about our necks 11,, and R. L. Chance was quite adamant that "nothing has 
affected the consumption of glass so much as the builders always, aiming at 
bringing all houses fi)r, the Jower and middling classes within the limits of 
seven windows, 11, The Commissioners tried to argue with him that the window 
tax only af f ected a small proportion of, his potential, custom but Chance 
maintained that it was a -very substantial, check on consumption and 
far 
greater than any check_. connected with the, glass, duty. He, did not think the 
glass duty affected consumption materially, except perhaps at the cheaper 
end of the market - Ahe use of, glass for hot, houses. I 
The simple explanation of why the glass duty did not check consumption 
of crown glass is that there. was no real alternative to it as a window glass. 
This held true throughout most of the period when the duty was levied, only 
in the final few years of the duty did cylinder window glass, either in the 
form of polished German sheet or polished plate, become a real alternative. 
But the fact that there was no alternative itself needs an explanation. 
Why was cylinder winiiow glass not adopted in England at an earlier date? 
We have seen that in the case of German sheet it was because from 1809 there 
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was a statutory bar to its production in the ruling on annealing arches, 
but that does not explain why polished plate, particularly blown plate, 
did not develop as a common window glass in the same way that it did on 
the continent. There is no doubt that blown and cast plate did have the 
potential to be window glass and indeed were used as such to a limited degree. 
We can find evidence of their use in the mention of plate in builders' hand- 
book4 and in advertisements of glaziers ftr, large plates for shop windows. 
The development of cast plate was limited by the enormous capital needed 
to establish a new works but the case of blown plate the 
capital requirement was not so high(though still higher than crown glass 
because the glass needed to be polished). What then was the reason for the 
failure of the blown plate industry to expand and to fill the demand for 
window glass of large dimensions? McCulloch addressed himself to this 
question in Taxation and the Funding System and decided that: 
76 
ItIs difficult-to believe that there could be any cause other than 
its high price occasioned by the duty,, for the quantity of plate glass 
used in the fitting-up of the houses of the middle and more opulent 
classes in this country being so much below what is used by the same 
classes in most part of the continent. 
In other words the duty was acting as a check on consumption of plate glass 
as a window glass by raising the price to an inappropriately high level. 
Other causes certainly affected the slow growth of'the blown plate industry, 
most notably the lack of workmen sufficiently skilled to blow the large 
cylinders, but the importance, of the high. duty in discouraging the use of 
plate glass is underlined, by the events surrounding the introduction of 
German sheet in 1832 by R. L. Chance... IEven after 
thereduction, of the plate 
WCIS 
glass duty in 1819 the dutyAst'll sufficiently high'to'encourage manufacturers 
of cylinder glass to name their glass in such a way as to avoid the 'rates 
and regulations of the plate glass duty. 
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The effects of the glass excise on the type of articles produced, 
their price and consumption can be summed up'as I follows. There were 
certain direct regulations limiting the size and thickness of various types 
of glass, designed to keep each brýanch -in' its '"natural" trade, (though 
a comparison with the continent indicates that these distinctions were 
more artificial than naturaý. The duties had a substantial effect in 
diminishing the consumption of cheap or poor quality glass by raising the 
price to an unacceptable level. The excise also affected the-. consumption 
of plate glassp particularly its use as window glass)by putting a bar on 
" reduction of price. Thus it retarded the adoption of cylinder glass as 
" common window glass andp again using a_ comparison with the continent, 
this can be seen as an artifical retardationt England was the only 
European country to retain the essentially eighteenth century crown glass, 
with its small panes and-slight optical distortiont as the common type of 
window glass until 'the 
middle of the nineteenth century. 
(iii) Vexatious-regulations, 
The 1835 Commissioners included in their report an extensive summary 
of all the statutory regulations surrounding the manufacture of glass-, the 
quantity and detail of which make this out. burst from Charles Mulvaney quite 
understandable: 
-, 
Our business and premisesare placed under the arbitrary control of 
a class of menID whose will and caprice it is most irksome to have to 
submit and this under a system of regulations most ungraci^ously 
inquisitorial. 
' 
We, cannot, enýer'into, parts o. f. our own premises without 
their permission; we can do no singlelact in the conduct of our 
business without having previcisly notified our intention to the officers 
placed over'us. ' We haveln the course of'the'week's operation to 
serve. some sixty or seventy notices on these, our masters, and this 
under heavy'penalties of from E200 to-f, 500'for'eve . ry separate negl . ect. 
Under the excise system thýe'excise offi6er was-""thei-most-important person 
in the%ohole manufacturing process for'witho'ut his pres(nce or notification 6145 
given to him hothing could happen. R. L. Chance told'the Commissioners that 
.- 430 - 
he had notices printed by the thousandv which was also the case with 
the north-east housesp some of whom had their notices printed by Thomas 
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Bewick's workshop. But how great a hind . rance was this system to the 
manufacturer in the daily running of his glass house? Was it in practice 
less fearsome than it appeared on paper? 
The Commissioners* main complaint against the system of regulations 
was that it was far too strict and interfered f ar too much in the process 
of manufacture. Yet there is evidence to show that the regulations were 
enforced on a remarkably arbitrary basis and it was this arbitrariness, 
their laxness rather than their strictness, that caused the most harm to 
the manufacturer. The arbitrary enforcement could work to the manufacturer9s 
benefit. At the root of the system was the individual excise officer and 
where there was good will between him and' the manufacturer he surveyed the 
harsher aspects of the system could be mitigated. Apsley Pellatt, for 
instance, described howp when the waste allowance was inadequate and the 
waste had to be weighe&each week9 evasion with the officers9 consent had to 
be resorted top 
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soo loss would have accrued'to 
the manufacturerv unless he had evaded 
the law, by bringing as many casks of cullet from other parts of the 
premises, or weighing as: much cullet twice over as was necessary to 
make up the requisite weight. Excise officers permitted the evasion- 
certainly a questionable fraud - it being impossible to carry out the 
Act of Parliamentp with justice to. the manufacturer, without his 
resorting to self-defence 
Isaac Cookson told the Co=issioners that even though he had been prosecuted 
for using crown cullet in his bottle metal, he continued to use it and 
believed other bottle manufacturers did so too. All the north-east crown 
manufacturers agreed that the regulations were not enforced strictly-where 
79 the manufacturer was known to be-honest. The goorwill of the officer 
on the spot could even operate as a positive bounty to the manufacturer. 
At John Delaval's bottle works an officer was given accommodation at the 
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works and, not unnaturally, the agents were -anxious to preserve his godd 
will by providing him with a good house, I, 
George Allen and I did yesterday examinethe glass house books and 
find that Mr. Burell's gauge is very favourable to the works and as 
a great deal is lef t to the excise man in the gauging the weight of 
mettle in a glass housev more than in a Brewery, we would therefore wish 
to have a good house for him. 
On a later occasion, when it was heard that the officer was to be transferred 
elsewhere, the agents wrote to Delaval asking. him to use his influence with 
the Board in London to prevent the transfer. 
The authority of the officers could, however, work both ways: when the 
relationship between the manufacturer and the officer was less than cordial 
the manufacturer could suffer. There are many'examples among the petitions 
to the Treasury and the' evidence to the 1835 Commission 'of danuf acturers 
suffering loss as a result'of the slackness3, misconductq or non-attendance 
of their officers. A typic , al I exam 
- ple is-the'petition of the Sunderland 
bottle and crown manufacturers in 18,31 
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complaining that they had giVen 
notice to the two officersv Joseph Marshall and Joseph Stonehouse, to come 
and weigh the manufactured glass on the 4th. July 1812 the day before the 
double duties were to take, effect, -, -and, as they had not come the glass was 
weighed on the 5th July, 
'and 
charged the double duty. The Sunderland 
manufacturers* complaint centred around the, fact that although the 4th July 
had been a Sunday, the officers on the Tyne, had weighed goods that day for 
the manufacturers at Newcastle and Shields. 
On that occasion'the manufacturers had only 'suffered a loss from the 
arbitrary conduct of their officers'but there are instances of"a manufacturer 
suffering injustice from the same cause. A memorable example of this is 
the case of Thomas Pemberton, a bottle manufacturer of Sunderland, 'who 
suffered not so much from the inattention of his officers but fromhis 
enmity. Thomas Pemberton. took'over one 'Of the bottle hous I es at Ayres Quay v 
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from his father in 1818. Right from the beginning he evidently made an 
enemy of the officer appointed to survey his house, Richard Ridley, with 
the result that Pemberton was charged with a series of small nominal 
offences and fined before the local magistrates. Eventually, in 1824, 
he was prosecuted in the Exchequer and found guilty. Pemberton felt that 
he had been the victim of an iniquitous persecution on the part of "his 
old enemy" Ridley and in 1824 took out a large advertisement on the front 
page of the Newcastle Couran to give his version of the true facts. 
82 
This is a useful record of the kind of petty charges that could be levelled 
at a manufacturere; useful because they were frequently dealt with unofficially 
by the local J. P. s and records are few. The mediation of the J. P, s had 
traditionally been seen as a welcome way in which the system was made less 
severe, however Pemberton was unfortunate enough to have fallen out with the 
local magistrates over another disPute and in his case the system was 
certainly not relaxed. He was fined the maximum penalties for offences 
that were trifling. 
The first "offence" occurred when a pot from which -a, man had been 
working suddenly broke. To save the metal he, worked it out hurri.. Iy in 
small octagonal half-pint bottles but because of the hurry too much glass 
was put in someroulds and a few of the bottles were made with an interior 
capacity less than 6 ounces. This was an offence and Pemberton was charged 
the maximum 00 penalty for it even though he pointed out that the revenue 
had not suffered because of it, the only sufferers were the workmen who were 
paid by the piece, and him because Pe was left with an unsaleable article. 
A short time later he was fined another Z50 for the same offence although the 
six bottles in q uestion were this time exactly 6 ounces in capacity which 
Pemberton maintainedp rightlyq was within the "reputed half pint" fixed by 
law. Four days later he was fined another, Z25 for giving a false declaration. 
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This happened because his declaration had, listed 103 bottles and 240 
utensils to be deposited in the annealing ý arch. "Utensils" were jars, 
made in the same moulds as the bottles but with wider mouths and shorter 
necks. When the officer came to -remove the articles he- decided that,, 
althoggh the total quantity was correct, there were 288 utensils and 55 
bottles. In December 1823 he was again fined for "an inadvertant misnomer" 
and this time he was annoyedýenough to commence, an action of trespass 
against the magistrates which, *because of a- ýprocedural pointo was not able 
to continue. -, The 
following'year he was fined another Z50 for throwing away 
the broken fragments, of seven bottles. 
Pemberton knew that the offences for which he was being convicted were 
committed by other manufacturers dailyS The reason why he alone was 
prosecuted for them was nothing more than hostility between him and the 
officers. 
Mr. Pemberton is unable to, account f or this unf air, and extreme conduct 
- this species of persecution on the part of the excise officers, 
unless it has been occasioned by his refusal'to treat them with drink 
which they have often applied for and-ýwhich he has always denied. 
The culmination of the feud came in 1824 when Pemberton was charged in the 
Exchequer with af ar more serious of f ence having f alse, beams and weights 
and obstructing an officer in the course of his dutýes. According to Richard 
Ridley, oneof the arms of the beam scale was shorter than the other which 
made a dif f erence of 4lbs. The faulty, beam was sent away to be altered and 
Pemberton borrowed another beam from the neighbouring Ayres Quay house of 
Laing and Hubbard. However when this,.,, Wa5 - ready to be usedp Ridley seized 
Pembertongs weights as also being faulty. 
been severly tried for when Ridley tried 
Pember I tonts patience had already 
to stop the weighing and take 
away the weightsp "Pemberton prevented mep he shoved me from my place called 
me a scoundrel and said I was no worse than a highway robber". The 
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prosecutionts case sounded most convincing but Pemberton was able to makeal 
equallqconvincing defence. He pointed out that the -scales in question 
had been in use in the glass house for the last twenty years without being 
complained of, and as the weighing was entirely the excise officerso 
concern it was up to them to check them. He had acted correctly in sending 
them to beadjusted when the fault was pointed out to him. He also main- 
tained that they were accurate when empty and it was only when 150lbs. was 
placed in them that it turned Ilb. Above all, he maintained that because 
the crown had the turn of the scale the fault would have operated to the 
crown9s advantage. Despite this, he wasfound guilty and fined Z600. After 
applying unsuccessfully for the verdict to be put aside, Pemberton put up 
the manufactory for sale later that year. 
Pemberton had evidently been prosecuted as a guilty man in the excisets 
eyes; a character with a string of convictions who deserved to be prosecuted. 
This was not an isolated case, indeed it almost appears to be a matter of 
policy. William Cuthbert had told the Commissioners that when he had asked 
Mr. Carr, the Excise Solicitor, why they continued to have all these regulations 
that were not enforcedt Carr replied that the Board "do not carry them into 
effect unless we find a man cheating". In other words that prosecution 
depended as much upon the character and the previous record of the glass 
manufacturer as his actual offence. There is quite a lot of evidence that 
the Excise frequently undertook a prosecution with wider issues than the 
immediate offence in mind; for instance that the man deserved to be 
prosecuted, or that a particular point in law needed to be made absolutely 
clear, or to support a strongly held policy of the Board. Pemberton is an 
example of a manufacturer being prosecuted because he was a marked guilty 
man. Another is perhaps John William Bell whose protracted trial and 
re-trial in 1828 may well have resulted, from his guilty reputation gained 
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when he was a flint glass manufacturer in Newcastle. It is very 
noticeable that the same names occur regularly in lists of Exchequer 
prosecutions and, although there is no doubt that some of these manufacturers 
were indeed habitually fraudulent, at thesame time it is highly likely that 
once they gained a reputation for fraud they were more likely to be pro- 
secuted for small infringements of the regulations that would have been 
overlooked with men of better reputation. 
Prosecutions to clarify or emphasise a point of law were not uncommon. 
A good example is the trial of Apsley Pellatt and John Green in 1814 for having 
a lear with two mouths. 
84 There was no evidence at all that the manufactuiers- 
had actually defrauded the revenue and throughout the trial there was no 
question that a manufacturer of Pellatt9s reputation had behaved improperly. 
The trial was being brought to settle a particular matter publicýlly rather 
than privately whichq as there had been no fraud, might have been more 
appropriate. The matter was something which had already caused the Board 
some trouble. By the terms of the 1811 Act the flint glass lear could only 
have one mouth yet some manufacturersv particularly those who made a 
variety of articless put a partition or screen into their lear to regulate 
the temperature. Pellatt and Green had put up such a "regulator" and a pro- 
secution was broughtagainst themv even though the Board was undecided as 
to what their offence actually was. They were charged with constructing a 
lear with two mouths aM with using a lear without a licence (i. e. that 
the regulator made it into two lears) and the jury was left to decide which 
was the most appropriate charge. Despite overwhelming evidence from Pellatt 
himself, furnace builders, other flint manufacturers, surveyers and workmen 
that the regulator was "nothirg more than an expedient contrivance for making 
his wares rather more perfect than another" he was found guilty and subjected 
to a penalty. Another example of a trial being brouglfýto emphasise a point 
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of law is the trial of a firm of "glass toy manufacturers". Moore and 
Bowley of Birminghams 
85 for not entering their premises as makers of glass. 
Again, the revenue had not been defrauded as the glass toy manufacturers 
bought lumps of glass on which duty had already been paid from flint glass 
manufacturers. The Board, however, wished to make an example and although 
there had been no fraud, a verdict was found for the crown "for form*s sake". 
Where a prosecution was broughbmerely on a point of law and no fraud 
was involvedthe fines and penalties were not large and the manufacturer not 
unduly harmed. However the Board was capable of bringing prosecutions in 
support of its policies from which the manufacturer could suffer quite con- 
siderably. There are examples of this among the many prosecutions commenced 
agairEt flint glass manufacturers in the years following 1811, all intended 
to add weight to the Boardts intractable claim that the system of charging 
the duty on the manufactured goods had opened the door to- fraud. Undeniably, 
the majority of the prosecutions were founded on cases of real fraud, but 
in some cases there were considerable grounds for doubt; in some cases the 
Board's zeal to prove itself correct -overwhelmed the true facts of the case. 
In 1816, for instance, George Sowerby and John Lowerywho owned a flint 
glass house in Gateshead, were prosecuted and found guilty of not having 
'200.86 The prosecution a secure weighing room, for which the penalty was f 
was brought on the information of one James Snitch, the Surveying General 
Examiner of Excise, who had been in the North on a visit of general inspection. 
Snitch maintained that when he had inspected Sowerby's house he had found 
an iron grating to the weighing room which could easily be removed by taking 
out some loose bricks at the side of it. He claimed that this was being 
used to remove goods from the weighing room and in support of this broukht 
forward the figures of the gauged metal for the previous two months which 
were far higher than the figures of the weight of manufactured goods charged 
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with duty. This, he claimed, proved that fraud had occurred. His case 
did not stand up well to cross-examination. It transpired that in order 
to remove the "loose" bricks from the side of the grating he had had to 
get the foreman to force them out with an iron bar, the opening was only 9 
inches wide and in constant view of all the workmen, the weighing room had 
been constructed under the supervision and with the approval of the local 
excise officers (as a result of the incident the supervisor at Gateshead 
was discharged and the officers transferred to other surveys) and he had 
nothing except the gauge figures to prove that glass had actually been 
removed. Sowerby and Lowery were found guilty but they felt sufficiently 
wronged to petition the Treasury 
87 
a ter the verdict protesting their complete 
innocence. Their workforce were ready, the said, to come forward to a 
man and swear that the opening had never been used improperly. Above all 
they challenged the"evidence" of the gauge figures, of which the prosecution 
had made a lot : in the trial. It was impossible, they maintained, to - 
relate the weight of the gauge to the'weight of the manufactured goods for 
there were so many variable factors; what type of articles were being made, 
what quality of articles were being made, what the quality of the metal 
was(for if it was bad it needed many skimmingsýand what the skill of the 
workman working it was. The Treasury passed the petition on to the Excise 
who, inevitably, recommended that the verdict not be set aside though they 
did admit the weakness of their case, "although no positive act oFfraud 
was proved there was the strongest pres=ption that the opening had been 
made for no other purpose". 
A similar case was that of James Seager, again of Gateshead, who was 
prosecuted in June 1814.88 It was similar in1hat Seager strongly protested 
his innocence, in that the Excise's case rested on conjecture and the gauge 
figures, and in that the Excise used the opportunity to underline the_ 
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disastrous consequences of giving up the gauge which "lays the door open 
to fraud of which this case furnishes so gross an example". Seager was 
charged with having an insecure weighing room, and with a more serious 
offence - removing glass, the combined penalties for which were Z900. He 
was found guilty and forced to sell up his glasshouse to pay the fine. The 
charges were brought on the evidence of the supervisor at Gateshead, Thomas 
Wilkinson, and the surveying officer, Isaac Sewell. Their suspicions of 
fraud had been excited on two separate occasions; once when Sewell had seen 
pans going into the lear filled with tumblers stacke& in nests and had 
found them in the weighing room in single lajers; the second time when he 
had counted 403 tumblers going into the lear and seen only 100 emerge in tle 
weighing room. To substantiate their suspicions they had both gone into the 
glass house one Sunday when it was empty and, on examining a room above 
the weighing roomp found a floor board which they were able to take up 
and thus discovereA what they maintained was the space through which glass 
could bepassed up from the weighing room. As in Sowerby's case it sounded 
most convincing until the cross-examination. Then it appeared that it had 
taken them from 10 in the morning until after midnight to discover this loose 
floorboard, that they had had considerable difficulty in getting the floor 
board up and had had to use an iron bar and cleaver, that it was highly 
Sewell 
likely that the pans A had seen stacke dwith tumblers in nests were not the 
same as the ones he had seen in the weighing room the following day, that the 
day on which Sewell claimed to have counted 403 tumblers his own gauge 
figures showed that such a quantity couldrDt possibly have been made, above 
all that in order to pass glass from the weighing room to the room above 
someone would have had to crawl down the lear into the weighing room which 
was impossible during the week because of its great heat. Wilkinson admitted 
that when he had tried to do it on a Sundays when the lear was coolv the 
4 
experiment had nearly cost him his life, Despite the defence's insistence 
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that all was conjecture and the "decisive fact" of the gauge figures, 
which again the prosecution made much of, were nothing of the sort, Seager 
was found guilty. 
It is impossible to say with certainty that a miscarriage of justice 
had occurred inbDth the above cases. It is also impossible to claim that 
as a rule, the Board of Excise abused the power to prosecute. However 
the zealous pursuit of certain objectives by the Board and the arbitrary 
conduct of its officers may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice in 
certain areas. This affected the industry as a whole by discouraging certain 
manufacturers from continuing in the trade and even, perhaps, in discouraging 
prospective entrants to the trade. Prosecutions certainly affected people 
within the trade. There are many instances of manufacturers being forced 
to sell up because of fines imposed after prosecutions. 
The whole effect of the system of regulations on the trade and the 
manufacturers was thus a double edged one, with a good and a bad side. To 
a well established, honest manufacturer, the regulations were undoubtedly 
a good thing for they protected him against unfair competition and yet they 
were flexible enough to allow him to infringe them in small ways in order 
to proceed with minimum inconvenience. To a manufacturer whose character 
was less firmly assured they were potentially dangerous. Their arbitrary 
enforcement left him uncertain as to what exactly constituted fraud and he 
could not rely on the example of his neighbours for he was quite likely to 
be prosecuted for an evasion others committed without repercussions. A 
manufacturer who had already been branded as fraudulent stood to be prosecuted 
for every small, minor infringement. This meant that the system did not 
weigh as heavily upon the trade in general as the 1835 Commissioners had 
supposed, which is underlined by the fact that the regulations were not, in 
general, complained of by the manufacturers to the Commissioners. The system 
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of regulations did however have an effect on the industry and its graNth 
by causing some manufacturers to leave the trade and perhaps by disuading 
others from entering it; it could be said to have slowed down growth and, 
in a small wayq acted as a protection to those well established manufacturers 
who enjoyed a sympathetic relationship with the Excise. 
(iv) Invention and improvement 
The 1835 Commissioners criticised the excise for "halting the free 
progress of inventicn and improvement 11. There is no doubt that improvement 
was made more difficult by the existance of the excise regulations. Any 
pew device - such as the learllregulator'l-had to pass the test of acceptability 
to the Excise before it could be adopted. Any substantial improvement ran 
the risk of being prohibited because it made the article "unnaturally" good 
and brought it into competIMbn with another branch of glass; thus Cookson 
was not permitted to improve his bottle metal by adding crown cullet to it, 
Hartley was not permitted to improve his broad glass to the standard of 
German sheet. There was thus a direct bar against certain improvements. 
However, although the excise did not make improvements easy, there is no 
doubt that it was not strong enough to overcome the natural inclination of 
every manufacturer to-improve and make more attractive his own particular 
product. The quantity of patents connected with glass bear witness to 
the fact that the excise did not halt invention. The period of the excise 
saw many improvements to the manufacture on the technical side and in the 
general standard of quality. Many of the general improvements, such as the 
substitution of soda for kelp and improvements in furnace or glass house 
design, were not directl+rohibited by the excise regulations but the 
difficulties surrounding any experimentation made their development more 
difficult. The main difficulty was almost certainly finaar-Lal in that 
the Excise insisted that duty be paid on all glass that wen tthrough the 
- 441 - 
manufacturerts hands whether it was saleable or not. A further difficulty 
lay in having to conform to the regulations. When R. L. Chance embarked on 
his German sheet experiment, he made a bold but reasonable proposal to the 
Board, that he pay a standard yearly payment of duty to the Board and in 
return be left completely free to experiment in his house; this payment he 
suggested as U0,000 based on the size of his furnace, (90 x 8t),. and the- 
average payment for a crown glass furnace of that size. This was not 
agreed to. 
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The excise, therefore, whilst not halting the free progress of invention, 
made it considerably more difficult than it otherwise would have been. This 
is seen quite clearly in the history of attempts to produce a good achromatic 
glass for optical purposes., Glass used for lenses had to be as near perfect 
as possible, uniform in texture and with no striatiorsor distortions. These 
requirements were not fulfilled by ordinary flint glass and, because of the 
importance of lenses to scientific work, various scientists and glass manu- 
facturers addressed themselves to the problem of improving flint glass to 
make it suitable for lenses. The most well known of these attempts was 
90 
that initiated by the Royal Society in 1825. A committee was appointed 
to seek means of improving the quality ofcptical glass, especially-for 
telescopes, and a subcommittee of Michael Faraday, John Herschel and George 
Dolland, a practising optician who had already made experiments in the field, 
was appointed to carry out the practical work. The committee had the approval 
of the Board of Excise and theA carried out their experiments in Apsley 
Pellattts glass house and later with a small furna, ce of their own without 
interference. However less distinguished experimenters had not beens3-- 
fortunate. It was partly. as a result of the Excise2s hinderance of previous 
experiments that by 1825 England had not managed to produce a suitable 
optical glass, in contrast to the continent, despite the fact that English 
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lead glass was the most suitable base for such a glass. Quite apart from 
the restraint on scientific enquiry that this lack of optical glass meantj 
it also impeded the ordinary optician. A petition to the Treasury in 1822 
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asking for leave to make experiments with optical glass spoke of the whole 
optical and scientific instrument trade being at a stand-still because of 
the lack of suitable glass. 
The major difficulty the Excise created%as a financial one, by insisting 
that duty be paid on all the glassinvolved in the experiments. During the 
1780s Josiah Wedg%ood and James Keir attempted some "Experiments with a 
view to remedy the imperfections of flint glass for achromatic instruments.. ". 
These were made at the flint glass house in Whitefriars and Mr. Knight's 
house at Liverpool. In recording the experimentsl WedCwood noted that 
disputes with the excise officer had prevented the experiments being con- 
tinued. Keir referred to the same difficulties in his "Dictionary of Chemistry" 
and noted that, 
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-The expense of making experiments on a large scale must be very 
considerable not only on account of the large quantities of materials 
employed but especially from the heavy duty of excise which is 
rigourously extracted whether the glass is made into saleable wares 
or not . 
The same problem is voiced in a Petition to the Treasury in July 1820 from 
Joseph Lamb of the Northumberland Glass Company and George Dolland. 
93 They 
complained of serious inconveniencein manufacturing glass for optical 
purposes because the thick crown glass they were using was charged at a 
high rate of duty. Crown glass was not permitted to be made more than 
thick. The Excise had permitted them to make thick slabs for lenses as'long 
as they paid the flint glass duty on it. This made it impossible for them 
to continue because the whole pot was charged with the higher duty even 
though out of an 18 cwt. pot only I cwt. was suitable for lenses and the 
rest was manufactured into ordinary crown glass tables. The petition asked 
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that the Treasury intervene with the Board of Excise' to permit them to 
pay only the crown glass duty on the lenses. This, as Dolland wrote in a 
covering letter, was not an unreasonably large demand "I have asked for 
as little as possible, although I could have wished for more but my wishes 
did not appear to fall into the views of my friend Lamb 11, Presumably Lamb 
had a more realistic view of what the Excise would be likely to allow them. 
This is an interesting and apparently unique example of crown glass being 
used for lenses; most experiments were based on flint glass with its high 
proportion of lead. 
There are a number of petitions to the Treasury during the 1820s and 
1830s asking for warrants to be relieved from the regulations in order to 
make experiments with optical glass. Most., especially in the later period, 
were granted but it is clear that the Excise still managed to impede the 
experiments by insisting that they be kept under its surveillance. One of 
the most active experimenters was Joseph Price of Gateshead who in 1830 had 
applied directly to the Duke of Wellington to permit him to carry on experi- 
ments. 
94 Permission was granted but the regulations that the Excise insisted 
on were so impractical that Price was forced to abandon the whole project. 
Price provided glass for opticians with his "Imperial Sheet Glass" which 
was flint glass blown in a cylinder and flattened "by a peculiar process" 
and used for picture framing or spectacle eyes. In 1840 Price applied again 
to the Treasury but insisting that this time the Excise surveillance be 
less rigoroo, s-.. His suggestions were rather optimistic for he demanded not 
only no restrictions on unstopping the pots or the thickness or specific 
gravity of the glass, but also that he be completely free from any duty 
and that the government pay one sixth of his expenses (about ZIO a week he 
estimated). He was allowed to dispense with all the regulations but not to 
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avoid the duty and he was not allowed a subsidy. His suggestion that the 
government pay some of his expenses was not as unreasonable as it appeared. 
In 1849, after the excise had been repealed, Apsley Pellatt was still able 
to attribute Britain's failure to manufacture a good achromatic glass to 
the lack of Government support. He claimed that even if the manufacturer 
were to supply all the opticians in Britain it would still be unrenumerative 
for him: 95 
Working a larg? pot of glass for optical purposes not only retards 
general oPerationso but usually spoils the greater part of its contents 
whilst the quantity of optic plaýe produced is comparatively smallj 
and uncertain in its results; and if unfit for the optician, it becomes 
valueless to the manufacturer for other purposes. As an affair of 
science and merit, especially were a Government premium offered for a 
uniformly certain process, which had not yet been accomplished at home 
or abroad, it is anticipated that English manufacturers would rival 
foreigners in this field of honourable competition. 
Most experiments to produce a satisfactory optical glass centred on 
flint glass with1h high proportion of lead and a high specific gravity. 
Plate glass with no lead and a low specific gravity was also suitable for 
this purpose but experiments with plate seem to have concerned attempts to 
find a satisfactory reflective lense for use in light-houses. --In-1819-Augustus 
Fresnel had developed an annular lense composed of rings of polished plate 
glass which was successfully installed in a lighthouse in 1823. The 
Commissioners of the Northern Board of Lighthouses approached Isaac Cookson 
soon after this enquiring if he could make a similar one. Cookson and 
Cuthbert were enthusiastic for they considered their glass to be more 
brilliant than the French and maintained they could produce a lense that 
would refract the light so strongly as to be seen through fogfrom 14 miles 
away. They began the lense but unfortunately were not able to complete it 
because of4opposition of the Board of Excise. Since the reduction of the 
duty on plate in 1819- plate had not been permitted to be made thicker than 
normal as a supposed protection to flint glass. Despite protests to the 
Board from the Commissioners of the Northern Lighthouses, and Robert 
I 
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9. evenson who described the episode as "a very great disappointment", 
the ruling stood. The affair came to public notice as an appendix to the 
7th Report of the Excise Co=issioners in, 1834.96 As a result of this, 
as Cookson told the Commissioners int, 1ý35,, the Board had changed its mind 
and allowed them to manufacture thick plates for lenses, but only on condition 
per wft 
that they paid the higher flint duty of S4 18 sA on the glass. This was not 
an incentive to continue, especially in view of the fact that by 1835 the 
flint glass duty had been reduced yet thick plate was still having to pay 
the Z4 18s duty. According to a later accountv Cookson and Cuthbert 
succeeded in manufacturing a number of lighthouse lenses, among them the 
dioptric liGht on Inch Keith (1835) and the light on the Isle of May (1838), 
but with evident difficulty and financial loss; I'Messers Cookson, after 
producing several lens apparatus excellent for that day were forced to abandon 
97 the undertaking with considerable loss. "* The Chance brothers at Spon 
Lane were the only firm to continue -',, i the manufacture of lighthouse 
apparatus. Like the development of optical glass the difficulty of such 
an undertaking was fundamentally its commercial unrenumerativeness. The 
excise had doubled this difficulty but even after the repeal of the duties 
it was still unprofitable. What was needed, in both casesp was positive 
government aid. 
There was evidently no lack of manufacturers willing to experiment 
in glass, either from a spirit of scientific enquiry or from the pursuit 
of a commercial advantage. The excise did not completely prevent such 
experiments but it placed considerable difficulties in their way. It did not 
halt the progress of invention and improvement but slowed it down both 
directly, by putting a bar on certain improvements)and indirectly. )by increasing 
the financial loss the experimenting manufacturer would suffer. 
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(v) Summary 
The most general way to sum up the effects of taxation on the glass 
industry is to repeat Adam Smith's comment that "such taxes always alter., 
more or less, the natural direction of national industry and turn it into 
a channel alwayo different from and generally less advantageous than that 
98 in which it would have run of its own accord I's Whether the natural 
direction of glass would have led it into a more advantageous position is an 
almost impossible speculation, however it is undeniable that the direction 
it did take in this crucial period was heavily influenced by the excise. 
Generally speakings this direction seems to have been a conservative one. - 
The industry tended towards the refinement and improvement of the well- 
established, standard products, producing them by the well-established methods. 
There were no radical departures from tradition, no significant development 
of labour or cost saving methods of production (as there were on the continent), 
and no introduction of new types of glass - such as cheap soda table glass. 
Th conservatism could be directly attributed to the excise which acted as 
a restraint and a discouragement to any radical change. In some cases, 
particularly as we have seen the case of cylinder window glass, this 
conservatism could be said to have been a bad thing; Great Britain did not 
keep abreast of continental developments in glass technology. However, in 
other ways it could be said to have strengthened the industry. By its, 
general emphasis on improving the existing products the tax encouraged a 
trend towards1roducing glass of a high quality., This was emphasised in 
the export trade where the Board of Excise laid down strict standards - 
the specific gravity of flint glass the thickness and regularitycf crown 
glass - with the result that English glass established a reputation for 
quality that no other European country was able to match. This is, partic- 
ularly so in the case of flint glass. The luxurious,. refractive English 
lead glass, heavily cut "a la facon d'Angleterrell was as much envied on the 
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continent as that other peculiarly English manufacture, WedCwoodts cream- 
ware. 
Glass had originally been taxed in England as a luxury and perhaps 
inevitably it seems to have grown into this category. During the years 
of the excise duties the English glass industry grew strong in the producticn 
of high quality finely crafted glass. It maintained methods of manufacture 
more suited to a craft rather than an industry; imthods that compared to the 
continent seemed laborious and expensive. At the same time it grew weak 
in the production of cheaper glass and thus developed a character ill-suited 
to meet the demands of the mass market. 
Although the character the glass industry took on was heavily influenced 
by the excise dutiesv it was the customs duties on imported foreign glass 
that enabled an industry of this character to survive. In many ways it was 
the customs duties not the excise duties that had themost significant effect 
on English glass during this period. Without protection against foreign 
glass English manufacturers almost certainly would have been forced to pay 
tckrtýe Scate 
more attention to cheapness, 1ý - production and modern improvements. But 
the excise without the customs was inconceivable. Whilst the government 
continued to draw revenue from the consumers of glass it was bound to 
protect this revenue by ensuring that the consumers had no alternative. The 
full effects of the customs and the excise duties on the glass industry were 
not seen in real terms until after the repeal in 1845, and it certainly could 
be argued that the greater effects were felt as a direct result of the loss 
of the customs duties. The repeal of the excise opened up new markets and 
new opportunities for the English glass industry but the repeal of the 
customs duties snatched these opportunities away by making them equally 
available to foreign manufacturers who were far better equipped to exploit 
them. 
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The repeal of the excise duties in 1845 and the subsequent confusion 
has perhaps tended to casb the duties as worse than they actually were; the 
rapid and not entirely successful change of direction that the industry 
experienced immediately after 1845 has overshadowed the hundred years of 
solid if slow growth that it saw under the excise. From the manufacturerts 
point of view the restraining influence of the excise must have been seen 
as not altogether atad thing. It regulated and standardised the industry 
and to a certain extent provided protection against unforseen competition 
in the form of new improvements or developments. It gave all manufacturers 
a stable common ground from which to work in "fair" competition. The 
excise was especially agreeable to thcse manufacturers who enjoyed the 
confidence of the Board of Excise. As we have seen the working of the duties 
depended on a degree of collusion between the Board and the manufacturers, 
and the manufacturers were allowed a substantial say in the drafting of 
legislation. Those manufacturers whom the Board did consult and listen 
to were obviously well placed to make the most of the economic situation 
the excise was creating. Furthermore they were well placed to take the 
initiative and use the excise as an instrument to protect their own 
particular interests; Isaac Cookson for instance used the excise to fend off 
competition from German sheet; the crown glass manufacturers used it to crush 
Hartley's attempt at broad glass: the flint glass manufacturers used it to 
protect their trade in phials. To manufacturers who were not so well 
placed to influence the Board and manipulate the excise, the duty held 
out less potential benefits. For the ordinary manufacturer it was not 
an instrument to be used but an inescapable fact of life; a fact that was 
neither wholly bad nor wholly good but which powerfully affected his daily 
business, even to the point of putting him out of business. As had been 
remarked of another group of excised manufacturerss the brewersl 
"considerations other than the economic had a high stake in their fortunes" 
99 
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This was certainly so for glass manufacturers; success and failure in the 
glass industry f rom 1745 to 1845 depended as much on personality and tke. 
peculiar effects of legislation as identifiable commcercial factors. 
